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ABSTRACT 
As stakeholders start holding companies accountable for the non-financial impacts of their 
operations, it is increasingly recognised that the parties to whom companies are accountable 
extends beyond shareholders to include other stakeholders as well.  Around the world, companies 
are responding to stakeholder demands by voluntarily reporting on their corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) performance.  Unscrupulous companies may however, be tempted to use 
green-wash to make false claims relating to their CSR performance in order to reap the associated 
benefits.  This information risk may be ameliorated through the independent assurance of CSR 
disclosures, enhancing the confidence of stakeholders in its veracity.  Reporting companies usually 
voluntarily obtain independent assurance on their CSR performance.  However, in South Africa, 
independent CSR assurance is a regulatory requirement for all JSE-listed companies, albeit on an 
‘apply or explain’ basis. 
This thesis, which utilises a mixed methods research approach incorporating both qualitative and 
quantitative components, seeks to identify and understand the characteristics of the emerging 
independent CSR assurance phenomenon.  In this regard, the empirical component of the study 
was conducted in three phases: in the first phase companies’ CSR disclosures and assurance 
reports are examined; in the second phase survey responses from companies are reviewed; and in 
the third phase interviews with CSR assurors are analysed.  In this thesis, the extent to which 
companies provide independent assurance on their CSR disclosures is established; the providers of 
independent CSR assurance are identified; the reasons that companies select certain CSR 
assurance providers are explored; the reasons that companies provide independent assurance on 
their CSR disclosures are determined; the CSR assurance practices of the various CSR assurors are 
reviewed and compared; and the primary standards and/or frameworks used in CSR assurance 
engagements are identified. 
A conclusion is reached that although independent CSR assurance is a de facto mandatory 
requirement for JSE-listed companies, only 26% of the companies had their CSR disclosures 
independently assured.  Despite its de facto mandatory nature, the study found that South African 
CSR assurance practices remain largely unregulated, resulting in a diversity of CSR assurors; 
utilising various assurance approaches, standards and practices.  In this thesis, it is argued that 
these inconsistencies undermine the purpose of CSR assurance and reduce stakeholder confidence.  
It is accordingly proposed that the identified deficiencies could be addressed through the regulation 
of CSR reporting and assurance.  An oversight/regulatory body should be established to prescribe 
the competencies that CSR assurors should possess; to develop appropriate CSR assurance 
engagement standards; and to clearly articulate the scope that CSR assurance engagements should 
cover; with which all CSR assurors should comply.    
KEY WORDS 
assurance levels; assurance opinions; assurance practices; assurance providers; assurance 
standards; assuror competencies; assuror independence; corporate social responsibility (CSR); JSE; 
King III; mandatory; South Africa 
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1.1 Background 
There is growing global consensus that companies and governments should work together to 
accept moral responsibility for promoting the interests of individuals and society, and to 
incorporate social welfare into economic transactions (Amba-Rao, 1993; Scherer & Palazzo, 2011).  
Despite appearing to be an entrenched component of modern corporate society, prior to the 
1990s, the interrelated concepts of corporate governance (CG) and corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) were almost unheard of (Keasey, Thompson & Wright, 2005). 
A rather topical but relatively controversial issue facing business today, is the compelling need for 
companies to be sensitive about their environmental and social impacts, especially given global 
concerns about the impact of ‘hot issues’ like environmental destruction, climate-change, 
sweatshops, child labour and harmful products on industry, corporate and product brands.  The 
current state of the discourse is illustrated by the CSR horizon remaining fragmented by the 
philosophical and commercial debate about whether or not companies have a social responsibility 
role.  In 2006, McKinsey’s Global CEO Survey found that 84% of 4 238 executives in 116 countries 
appeared to be moving away from blindly accepting Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman’s (1970) 
cliché that the “business of business, is business”.  The majority of respondents were beginning to 
recognise the increasing risk to their businesses, both in terms of reputational damage and the 
destruction of shareholder value, of failing to understand, monitor and manage corporate 
economic, social, political and environmental impacts (Harribey, 2011; Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 
2007).   
Despite this apparent shift, CSR may still be interpreted as simply being ‘enlightened self-interest’, 
or merely an expansion of the ‘business of business’ rationale, within the context of an 
instrumentalist perspective (Nohria, 2010; Palazzo & Scherer, 2006).  While some CEOs may have 
embraced the underlying principles of ‘responsible corporate citizenship’, others may simply be 
superficially adding another dimension that their organisational strategy should consider.  
Moreover, McKinsey’s (2006) findings also imply that 16% of executives do not accept this broader 
stakeholder accountability. 
Freeman (1984) introduced an integrated stakeholder theory by suggesting that businesses are 
responsible to various groups within society that may have a “legitimate claim, ownership, rights or 
interest” in a company and its activities, whether in the past, the present or the future (Clarkson, 
1995; Russo & Perrini, 2010).  It is therefore not enough for companies to maintain the status quo 
by only accounting to their shareholders in respect of sustaining a viable financial return on their 
capital investment.  Companies are increasingly expected to act responsibly towards, and should be 
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held accountable to their broader stakeholders (including owners, financiers, employees, 
customers, suppliers, government and society at large), for the non-financial impacts of their 
business operations as well (Brammer, Jackson & Matten, 2012; Reuvid, 2007).  Companies cannot 
therefore continue to operate with impunity without due consideration of the adverse impacts of 
their operations (Jenkins, 2001; Yang, McDaniel & Malone, 2012).   
The King Code of Governance for South Africa 2009 (King III) draws attention to this changing 
paradigm by not only requiring companies to account to shareholders, but also to consider the 
legitimate interests and expectations of stakeholders (Institute of Directors (IoD), 2009a).  Despite 
the relevance of many of the King III principles to this thesis, it is acknowledged that at the time 
that this research was conducted, many companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange 
(JSE) may not necessarily have applied all of the King III principles.   
CSR extends corporate accountability beyond shareholders to include stakeholders by highlighting 
the challenge faced by companies around the world to find sustainable trade-offs amongst the 
often conflicting interests of their shareholders and broader stakeholders.  The fundamental 
premise underlying CSR involves the simultaneous pursuit of economic prosperity, environmental 
quality and social equity.  Companies should therefore not only be evaluated on their economic 
value added to shareholders, but also on the impact that their operations have on the broader 
economy, the environment and society.   
The objective of accounting to a broader range of stakeholders is complicated by the lack of a 
universally accepted accounting framework for CSR reporting.  It is argued that the development of 
widely accepted CSR reporting practices will be significantly hampered if the development of 
suitable non-financial accounting metrics takes as long as that of conventional accounting reporting 
principles; which have been carefully honed over several centuries (Godfrey, Hodgson & Holmes, 
2003).  The impact of the lack of universally accepted CSR reporting practices is exacerbated by 
the perennial debate between voluntary and mandatory compliance.   
While ‘responsible corporate citizens’, capable of effective self-regulation, may prefer voluntarism, 
other less scrupulous companies may use ‘green-wash’ to falsely represent their CSR performance.  
These companies may realise that it might be difficult for stakeholders to verify their possibly 
unwarranted assertions.  By contrast, proponents of mandatory legislation and regulation tend to 
be sceptical about the ability, or willingness of companies to meaningfully self-regulate.  The 
primary models for accommodating stakeholder interests and expectations are through the 
‘enlightened shareholder’ (Nohria, 2010; Palazzo & Scherer, 2006) and ‘stakeholder inclusive’ (GRI, 
2013a; IoD, 2009a) approaches.  In the former, also referred to as instrumentalism (Morimoto, Ash 
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& Hope, 2005), companies only consider the legitimate interests and expectations of stakeholders 
to the extent that it would be in the best interests of the company and accordingly the 
shareholders, to do so.  In the latter, the board of directors (board) considers the legitimate 
interests and expectations of stakeholders, but from the moral perspective that it is in the best 
interests of the company as a ‘responsible corporate citizen’ as a whole, and not merely an 
instrument to serve the shareholders’ short-term interests (Porter & Kramer, 2002; Prahalad & 
Hammond, 2002).   
King III positions good governance and the law as being critically integrated (IoD, 2009a).  This 
implies that governance is intrinsically interlinked with the law, and cannot therefore be considered 
in isolation.  Within this context, contemporary governance discourse, as well as applicable 
legislation and regulations, clearly identify the board as being the corporate level entrusted by 
shareholders and legally mandated with the responsibility to ensure the consistent and effective 
application of good corporate governance practices.  Corporate governance practices, codes and 
guidelines establish the appropriate standards of conduct that society may expect.  In terms of 
common law, failing to comply with a recognised governance standard, albeit not specifically 
legislated, may render a board or individual director legally liable for the adverse consequences of 
corporate activity.  Similarly, the board may be accountable to its broader stakeholders for any 
violation by the company of its perceived CSR and, by implication, its corporate governance 
responsibilities. 
In this thesis it is accepted that even though King III requires “independent assurance of CSR 
reporting”, the provision of CSR assurance is not the exclusive domain of the audit profession, with 
many different parties providing independent assurance on company CSR disclosures.  Liberally 
paraphrasing William Shakespeare, “it is not enough that Caesar’s wife is beyond reproach, she 
must be seen to be so”. Using this analogy and given society’s expectations of companies, it is 
considered to be more important for companies to be seen as being good ‘corporate citizens’, 
almost irrespective of the true situation.  This assertion is confirmed by King III, which requires the 
board to ensure that the company is seen to be a ‘responsible corporate citizen’.  In this regard, it 
is asserted in this thesis that the quality and credibility of a company’s CSR disclosures are 
enhanced when CSR reporting is authentically quantified, measured and evaluated against 
universally acceptable benchmarks, standards and principles that are designed to improve 
stakeholder interpretation and comparability.  It should however, be noted that a CSR assurance 
engagement is not intended to be a panacea or ‘an end in itself’; but is merely a tool to improve 
CSR practices and disclosure. 
 
Page 15 of 338 
 
1.2 Corporate social responsibility reporting and assurance  
While some companies may remain intransigent about the non-financial impacts of their 
operations, others are responding to increased regulatory pressure and stakeholder demands for 
transparency, by accounting for the impact of their corporate actions, or lack thereof, on the 
economy, society and the environment (CorporateRegister, 2008).  Improved CSR disclosure is 
primarily intended to demonstrate the company’s acceptance of its responsibility and accountability 
for its broader CSR impacts (Godfrey et al., 2003).  Within a broader accountability context, CSR 
reporting represents the manner in which reporting companies discharge their CSR responsibilities.  
Companies disclosing their CSR performance may therefore not necessarily be ‘good corporate 
citizens’, but may simply intend to positively influence stakeholder perceptions.  
In order to derive the perceived benefits associated with good ‘corporate citizenship’ (as described 
in section  2.2), unscrupulous companies may be tempted to use green-wash (as described in 
section  3.2.2), to falsely disclose their CSR performance.  Independent CSR assurance therefore 
reassures stakeholders about the veracity of the information contained in company CSR disclosures 
(Jones, Hillier & Comfort, 2014).  Despite being a relatively new phenomenon, the provision of 
independent CSR assurance is growing.  This growth is attributed in part to reporting companies 
voluntarily responding to increased stakeholder demands for increased transparency, as well as to 
the introduction of regulatory mechanisms.   
While CSR reporting reflects the manner in which a company has discharged its responsibilities to 
the economy, society and the environment, CSR assurance involves an independent evaluation of 
the underlying evidence required to provide an objective opinion about the veracity of the reported 
CSR performance.  Whereas CSR assurance is usually voluntarily provided, South Africa is one of 
the first countries to impose a regulation requiring companies listed on the JSE to provide 
independent assurance on their CSR disclosures, albeit on the basis of ‘apply or explain’.  This 
study is accordingly one of the first to investigate the nature and implications of CSR assurance 
practices, from a de facto mandatory perspective. 
1.3 Research rationale 
Even though companies voluntarily disclose their CSR-related performance, little scholarly research 
has focused on the assurance of CSR disclosures, particularly in South Africa.  Instead, the 
literature has primarily examined the accounting perspective of using CSR reporting to improve 
corporate accountability (Cramer, Jonker & Van der Heijden, 2004; Dawkins & Ngunjiri. 2008; 
Gouws & Cronjé, 2008; Mitchell, Hill & Stobie, 2005).  Existing voluntary disclosure practices may 
however, result in companies selectively disclosing CSR performance that places them in a 
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favourable light, while withholding contrary information (Gray & Milne, 2002).  It is argued that 
companies cannot necessarily be trusted to ‘do the right thing’ and that stakeholders require 
independent assurance that CSR disclosures are complete, valid, accurate and reliable.   
The JSE decision to require listed companies to implement the King III principles on an ‘apply or 
explain’ basis implies that with effect from 1 March 2010, CSR reporting has become a de facto 
mandatory requirement for all JSE-listed companies.  The relative newness of the global assurance 
of CSR reporting phenomenon and the application of the King III principles in particular, introduce 
a need to investigate the prevailing South African CSR practices and to understand the nature of 
the emerging CSR assurance practices, particularly in respect of JSE-listed companies.   
More specifically, the extent to which reporting companies provide stakeholders with assurance 
about the veracity of their CSR disclosures as well as the identification of the primary 
characteristics of South African CSR assurance practices arte established in this thesis.  Although 
CSR assurance is provided by all types of assurors, it is appropriate to specifically examine the 
audit profession’s role in providing this service.  Recognising that the provision of independent CSR 
assurance is not confined to the audit profession, it is of value to understand the nature of the 
assurance practices of the primary independent CSR assurance providers at large.  
Despite the requirement for JSE-listed companies to apply the King III principles (particularly in 
respect of independent CSR assurance), or to explain why they have not, the previous lack of 
demand for the independent assurance of CSR reporting may not have warranted the investment 
necessary for the audit profession to develop its capacity to consider providing assurance on CSR 
reporting.  At the same time, the diversity of CSR assurance providers and assurance approaches 
has prevented the development of a clear framework that may be consistently applied by all CSR 
assurance providers. 
1.4 Thesis proposition 
The propositions advanced for this thesis include: 
• stakeholders require companies to disclose their impacts on the economy, environment and 
society 
• stakeholders require independent assurance about the veracity of the underlying company 
CSR disclosures 
• independent CSR assurance provision will increase after the implementation of the JSE 
regulations and the adoption of the King III provisions 
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• additional assurors are required to provide independent CSR assurance to meet the 
anticipated increased demand 
• notwithstanding these new CSR assurors, the audit profession will collectively remain the 
primary providers of independent CSR assurance, although the extent of this dominance is 
expected to diminish over time 
• despite tending to provide lower CSR assurance levels, auditor assurors will continue to be 
perceived as providing more credible assurance than non-auditor assurors 
1.5 Research assumptions 
The primary assumptions directly influencing the research objectives are that: 
• stakeholders expect reporting companies to act ethically and responsibly about the non-
financial impacts of their operations 
• the JSE-listed companies selected for this the research recognise the importance of 
implementing the King III principles 
• stakeholders require reporting companies to have their CSR disclosures independently 
assured 
• JSE-listed companies will increasingly provide independent assurance on CSR reporting 
• despite expecting that new CSR assurors will start to provide independent assurance on CSR 
reporting, the Big 4 audit firms will continue to be the primary providers of independent CSR 
assurance, followed by specialist CSR assurors 
• CSR reporting and assurance practices, frameworks and standards will continue to evolve 
1.6 Research objectives 
Within the context of the above assumptions, the purpose of this thesis is to identify the 
characteristics of CSR assurance at JSE-listed companies.  These characteristics will be identified 
through addressing the following research objectives: 
• to establish the extent to which JSE-listed companies have complied with the JSE regulations 
requiring them to provide independent assurance on their CSR disclosures   
• to understand the reasons that reporting companies disclose their CSR performance  
• to understand the reasons that reporting companies provide independent assurance on their 
CSR disclosures 
• to explore the reasons that reporting companies use to select particular CSR assurance 
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providers 
• to identify the primary providers of independent assurance on CSR reporting 
• to understand the CSR assurance role of internal audit 
• to compare the practices of auditor assurors with those of non-auditor assurors, within the 
context of the objectives identified above 
• to understand the implications of the various CSR assurance practices adopted by the primary 
assurance providers to 
- identify the primary standards and/or frameworks used in CSR assurance engagements 
- determine whether appropriate universally applicable frameworks exist for the provision 
of independent assurance on CSR disclosures and should such a framework not exist, 
further sub-objectives include identifying: 
 the factors inhibiting the development of such a framework 
 the key elements that should be incorporated into such a framework 
1.7 Research population 
The research population potentially includes all organisations to which the provisions of King III 
apply.  Since the JSE regulations specifically require publicly listed companies to adopt the King III 
principles on an ‘apply or explain’ basis, it is appropriate for the research population to be confined 
to JSE-listed companies.  In this regard, King III principle 9.3 requires organisations to have their 
CSR disclosures independently assured.  On 30 April 2012, there were 376 companies listed on the 
JSE, representing a total market capitalisation of R6 889 billion. 
1.8 Research participants 
The probability that large companies are more likely to have the necessary resources to provide 
independent assurance on their CSR disclosures makes it appropriate for the study population to be 
restricted to the largest JSE-listed companies.  Within this context, purposive convenience sampling 
was used to confine the companies covered by this thesis to a manageable sample of the largest 
200 JSE-listed companies (in terms of market capitalisation).  Despite the study only considering 
53% of JSE-listed companies, these companies represented 99.27% of the total market 
capitalisation of the JSE on 30 April 2012. 
1.9 Research methodology 
Qualitative research tends to explore, describe, explain, interpret and understand the phenomena 
 
Page 19 of 338 
 
emerging from the research in order to build theory (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005).  Although this thesis 
deploys a mixed methods research approach, incorporating both quantitative and qualitative 
components, greater reliance is placed on the interpretation of the qualitative data collected in 
order to promote an understanding of the emerging characteristics of CSR assurance.  The 
exploratory mixed methods approach considers the perspectives of the various reporting company 
stakeholders and assurance providers; and deploys various data gathering methods, tools and 
techniques that are considered appropriate to analyse and interpret the resulting data.  This thesis 
has been conducted in three separate but interrelated empirical phases. 
The first empirical phase involved analysing the CSR assurance practices at the 200 largest JSE-
listed companies to establish prevailing practices.  The two remaining phases attempted to improve 
the understanding of emerging CSR assurance practices by providing insights into the underlying 
reasons for the assurance of CSR disclosures as well as the implications thereof, both from a 
reporting company and assurance provider perspective.   
The first phase involved a manual but detailed analysis of pertinent information extracted from the 
most recently available CSR assurance reports published by the reporting companies selected for 
the study.  In order to ensure the consistency of the research data across the different empirical 
phases, in the second phase a range of potential respondents at the same companies identified for 
the first phase were invited to complete a self-administered online survey questionnaire.  The third 
and final phase of this thesis included conducting semi-structured interviews with the primary 
independent CSR assurance providers identified by the content analysis of the first phase.  The 
research phases outlined above, collectively integrated both empirical primary and secondary data.   
The data collected in the three empirical phases collectively address the research objectives 
described in section  4.2.3.  The data analysed and described in terms of these objectives, is 
described in two results chapters.  The first results chapter (chapter 5) analyses and interprets the 
results of the three empirical phases relating to CSR reporting.  By contrast, chapter 6 analyses and 
interprets the results relating to the provision of independent assurance on CSR disclosures.  
Figure 1.2 aligns the research objectives to the respective empirical research phase(s) and the 
relevant chapters where the results are analysed and described. 
1.10 Research significance  
Despite its recent prominence, the origins of the academic discourse on CSR can be traced back to 
a series of articles between Berle and Dodds in the 1930s, accelerating after Friedman’s 
controversial article in 1970, and regenerated after the emergence of Elkington’s ‘triple bottom line’ 
concept in the 1990s.  Few studies however, have actually focused on the CSR assurance 
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dimension, especially within a South African context.  As a result, the nature, extent and 
characteristics of the CSR assurance phenomenon within South Africa, and particularly the audit 
profession’s role are still not fully understood.  Moreover, this is one of the first studies that 
examine mandatory CSR assurance, albeit on an ‘apply or explain’ basis.  This thesis accordingly 
attempts to identify and understand: 
• the extent to which reporting companies provide independent CSR assurance   
• the reasons that organisations provide independent assurance on their CSR disclosures 
• the characteristics of CSR assurance 
• the factors influencing the reporting company’s decision to use auditor assurors to provide 
independent assurance on CSR reporting, instead of other independent non-auditor assurors 
• the implications of the various practices deployed by the different CSR assurance providers 
Acknowledging that the primary purpose of scholarly research is the pursuit of academic knowledge 
relating to the topic being studied, the following benefits may accrue from this study: 
• Consolidating the global body of knowledge relating to CSR reporting and assurance, 
particularly in terms of linking relevant but often disparate interdisciplinary theories that cross 
conventional accounting barriers, particularly within a de facto mandatory South African 
environment.  For example, the literature and theories relating to various disciplines such as 
accounting, auditing, economics, environmentalism, ethics, governance, legal and social 
sciences are considered in this study. 
• Facilitating the adoption of internationally recognised CSR-related assurance standards such 
as AA1000AS and/or ISAE 3000 by South African CSR assurance providers, while also 
motivating the need to develop a new universal CSR assurance framework that could be 
adopted and consistently applied by all CSR assurors.  The proposed standardised framework 
should provide stakeholders with an assurance mechanism that can be consistently 
interpreted.  This will not only improve the comparability of CSR assurance reports, but also 
provide stakeholders with confidence about the completeness, relevance, validity, accuracy 
and reliability of the underlying CSR disclosures. 
• Providing a basis for developing a competency framework for CSR assurance that could be 
used by all assurors, including the audit profession and tertiary education institutions, to 
inform an appropriate and relevant training and development curriculum. 
• Continuing to stimulate the global discourse on the independent assurance of CSR reporting.  
Governments and regulatory bodies could use the observations of this study to assist in 
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informing the decision on whether or not to retain the present voluntary status, or whether 
legislation and mandatory regulations should be promulgated to compel companies to 
disclose their CSR performance and to have these CSR disclosures independently assured.  At 
the same time, associations like the Institute of Directors, or the JSE, could use the research 
results to design and implement policies and frameworks to improve the confidence of 
stakeholders about the veracity of the CSR disclosures of reporting companies. 
1.11 Academic contribution 
The study examined the extent to which JSE-listed companies apply the King III principle of 
providing independent assurance on their CSR disclosures, as required by the JSE regulations, as 
well as the characteristics of the assurance provided.  As such, this is one of the first studies to 
consider the imposition of mandatory CSR assurance.  Since CSR assurance is not provided in a 
vacuum, the study also provides important insights into pertinent aspects of CSR reporting, such as 
identifying the stakeholders that rely on the CSR reports and the reasons that companies report 
their CSR performance.  The study accordingly assists in understanding the nature and 
characteristics of CSR assurance within a de facto mandatory regulatory regime.  
While the need for companies to account to society for their non-financial performance is not new, 
the provision of independent CSR assurance has recently emerged as a mechanism to provide 
stakeholders with confidence about the veracity of the underlying CSR disclosures.  In this regard, 
the study identifies the primary advisors of independent CSR assurance, investigates the factors 
taken into account when selecting an assurance provider, considers the reasons why companies 
have their CSR disclosures independently assured and identifies the primary characteristics of CSR 
assurance and the components of the resultant CSR assurance reports.  Moreover, this is the first 
study that specifically examines the role of internal audit in CSR assurance.  The study compares 
the observations of de facto mandatory CSR reporting and assurance in South Africa, against prior 
research which found that voluntary nature of CSR reporting has resulted in the inconsistent 
application of CSR assurance practices, by various assurance providers. 
Acknowledging the need for consistency aimed at enhancing stakeholder confidence and increasing 
confidence, the study concludes by considering the appropriateness of existing CSR reporting and 
assurance practices.  Within this context, the study proposes that existing deficiencies and 
inconsistencies can only be overcome through the adoption and implementation of a regulatory 
regime, which prescribes mandatory CSR reporting and assurance.  To improve consistency and 
comparability, these frameworks should prescribe the characteristics of CSR reporting and 
assurance.  To increase stakeholder confidence, it should identify the scope of the CSR assurance 
 
Page 22 of 338 
 
engagement, the reporting and assurance standard(s) used and the competencies that the CSR 
assurance provider should possess.  It should also seek to establish an oversight body to ensure 
that all CSR assurance providers, irrespective of type, consistently apply the proposed CSR 
assurance framework and standard(s). 
In addition, the academic contribution of the study is confirmed by various articles extracted from 
this study having already been accepted for publication in the following peer reviewed journals, 
accredited by the South African Department of Higher Education. 
1. Ackers, B. 2009.  Corporate Social Responsibility Assurance:  A study of South African publicly 
listed companies.  Meditari Journal for Accountancy Research, Vol. 17(2).  
Using a content analysis of the annual, CSR and/or CSR assurance reports, this was the first 
study that specifically examines the CSR reports of the top 100 JSE-listed companies to identify 
emerging CSR assurance trends.  These South African trends were then compared to trends 
established by international researchers.  According to Harzing’s Publish or Perish, this article 
has received 31 citations by 29 May 2015.  
2. Ackers, B. 2014.  Corporate social responsibility reporting: What boards of directors need to 
know.  Corporate board: Role, duties and composition, Vol. 10(3).  
Recognising that CSR reporting is a relatively new intervention that is being voluntarily adopted 
by companies around the world, this article accepts that CSR and accordingly CSR reporting 
remains a relatively obscure concept.  This has resulted in the associated responsibilities not 
being clearly understood.  On the assumption that the board of directors are responsible for 
ensuring effective governance practices, this article which reported on the results of a survey 
of respondents at reporting companies provides important insights for directors into emerging 
CSR reporting practices from a de facto mandatory reporting company perspective.  
3. Ackers, B. 2015.  Ethical considerations of corporate social responsibility: A South African 
perspective.  South African Journal of Business Management, Vol. 46(1). 
The increasing provision of CSR assurance by the audit profession, which is already 
acknowledged as financial experts, requires the expansion of their knowledge and skills base to 
include the intricacies of non-financial performance.  This conceptual article which is supported 
by the results of a reporting company respondent survey, provides insights into the important 
moral and ethical dimensions of CSR and the dilemmas relating to CSR reporting and 
assurance. 
 
Page 23 of 338 
 
4. Ackers, B. 2015. Who provides corporate social responsibility (CSR) assurance and what are 
the implications of the various assurance practices? Journal of Economic and Financial 
Sciences, Vol. 8(1). 
The article reported on a content analysis of the annual, CSR and CSR assurance reports of the 
200 largest JSE-listed companies for the reporting period ended 2011/2.  The study reviewed 
the characteristics of the published CSR assurance reports of the selected companies from the 
perspective of the assurance approach; the assurance methodology, standards and 
frameworks deployed; the assurance engagement scope; the types of assurance providers; 
and the implications of the different assurance levels and opinions provided by the various 
assurance providers.  The exploratory nature of this research is contextualised though the use 
of relevant secondary data from other studies.   
5. Ackers, B. & Eccles, N.S. 2015.  The impact of King III on corporate social responsibility 
assurance practices in South Africa.  Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 
Vol. 28(4). 
To understand the impact of King III on South African CSR assurance practices, the article 
utilises a longitudinal study covering reporting periods both before and after King III 
implementation, and reported on the impact of de facto mandatory CSR] assurance practices 
in South Africa, within a King III context.  As such, this article represents one of the first 
studies to specifically consider the impact of a mandatory regulatory requirement, albeit on an 
‘apply or explain’ basis, for the provision of independent CSR assurance and suggests a future 
direction for global CSR assurance practices. 
6. Ackers, B. & van Heerden, B. 2015.  Can a conceptual framework for corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) assurance be developed?  Corporate Ownership and Control Journal, 
Vol. 12(4). 
This article which used the data in this study, concluded that the development of a conceptual 
framework for CSR assurance was not presently feasible, primarily due to the voluntary nature 
of CSR reporting and assurance.  This has resulted in the emergence of disparate CSR 
reporting and assurance practices.  This article argues that imposition of a mandatory 
requirement for CSR reporting and assurance will result in the standardisation of CSR reporting 
practices and assurance practices.  This standardisation should improve the confidence of 
stakeholders about the extent to which the CSR disclosures could be relied upon, by 
introducing an element of consistency, enhancing CSR and CSR assurance report usability and 
comparability. 
 
Page 24 of 338 
 
1.12 Research scope and limitations 
While this thesis examines the interrelated concepts of CSR, stewardship and accountability, it does 
so primarily from an assurance perspective with a particular focus on the role of the audit 
profession.  Therefore, unlike some other studies, no attempt is made to explore the impact of CSR 
reporting practices on the financial or consumer markets, or to determine the CSR reporting 
expectations of external stakeholders.  The study observations were therefore confined to survey 
responses from internal company stakeholders, with interviews only being held with the 
independent external CSR assurors identified in the content analysis.  Similarly, no attempt was 
made to establish whether investment in CSR reporting and/or CSR assurance had any impact on 
the investment attractiveness of the companies that provide independent CSR assurance, or on the 
resultant share prices. 
Despite the study focusing on the assurance of CSR reporting intended for the broader stakeholder 
base, it acknowledges that good governance practices should also include the internal monitoring 
and reporting of CSR performance, which may provide some level of assurance to internal company 
users charged with this responsibility.  In this regard, the veracity of internal CSR reporting is 
usually achieved through applying the combined assurance model, or is provided by the internal 
audit activity.  Any CSR-related assurance reports that are circulated within the company and not 
published for broader consideration therefore fall outside the scope of this thesis. 
The observations relating to the characteristics of CSR assurance reports included in the first 
empirical research phase were sourced from publicly available information.  While it may be argued 
that publicly available disclosures are intended for broader stakeholder consumption, the study also 
acknowledges that CSR assurors may also selectively and confidentially distribute documents and 
reports to company management and the board.  Therefore, since this study was only confined to 
examining publicly available information, any information that is not publicly available was 
excluded.    
The study commenced before the King III implementation date and continued for two years 
thereafter.  At the time of the study, it was envisaged that there would be insufficient evidence 
available relating to the combined assurance model and integrated reporting.  Both of these 
aspects are additional King III requirements, which are expected to become increasingly important 
as reporting companies move closer to more comprehensively applying all the King III principles.  
Therefore, despite its relevance to CSR reporting and assurance, integrated reporting falls outside 
the scope of this thesis with combined assurance only being considered from the perspective of the 
internal audit activity. 
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One of the objectives of this thesis is to explore and understand the characteristics of the emerging 
CSR assurance phenomenon.  Therefore, given that the empirical study was confined to the largest 
200 JSE-listed companies, the opinions and conclusions emanating from this thesis only apply to 
the actual companies studied and are not transferable to the broader corporate population.  As this 
study was confined to larger JSE-listed companies, no robust inferences can be drawn relating to 
any smaller, privately owned or non-South African companies. 
The diversity and specialised nature of CSR reporting and assurance-related issues, compounded 
by the absence of ‘generally accepted standards’, strongly support the notion that the scope of 
assurance engagements should be standardised to facilitate the meaningful analysis, interpretation 
and comparison of CSR accounting, reporting and assurance reports.  A comprehensive analysis of 
the scope covered by CSR assurance engagements and reflected in CSR assurance reports has 
however, been excluded from the scope of this thesis.  In particular, this thesis does not consider 
the specific activities covered in, or excluded from CSR and CSR assurance reports in detail. 
Since the research focused on identifying and understanding emerging CSR assurance trends, it did 
not attempt to quantify the number of companies that did not provide independent CSR assurance, 
nor the number of companies that failed to explain why they did not, as required by King III.  
Moreover, additional survey responses to questions relating to CSR practices, governance and risk 
management that are not directly related to the CSR assurance dimensions covered by this study 
have been excluded in this thesis.   
Finally, an inherent limitation of self-administered surveys is possible respondent bias.  The 
responses received for the survey component may therefore not necessarily reflect the views of all 
the potential respondents in the population sample, but merely the attitudes of those who actually 
responded.  In addition, it is recognised that company respondents may have provided what they 
perceived were the ‘correct answers’ to the survey.  Despite these methodological deficiencies, it is 
asserted that this is compensated for by the interpretative nature of the research as well and the 
three interrelated phases of this thesis. 
1.13 Outline of the study 
The remaining chapters of the thesis are briefly outlined below: 
Chapter 2 – Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting 
Before considering independent assurance of CSR reporting, it is necessary to first consider 
pertinent aspects of CSR.  This provides the necessary contextual framework within which this 
research is undertaken.  This chapter accordingly considers the literature relating to the current 
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movement calling for increased accountability by companies for the non-financial impacts of their 
operations.  Since CSR-related activities involve the decisions and actions of human beings, this 
chapter also introduces the ethical dimensions as well as the relevant ethical dilemmas faced by 
company management.   
The factors driving the global CSR movement are introduced and CSR is considered as an integral 
component of corporate governance.  Within this context, the broader global dimensions of CSR 
and the CSR business case are described.  To understand CSR’s evolution and components, the 
primary social, economic and management theories considered in this thesis are examined.   
It is a universally accepted principle that the board of directors of a company has the fiduciary 
responsibility for ensuring the adoption of effective corporate governance practices.  The 
mechanisms and regulatory frameworks deployed by companies to discharge this responsibility by 
accounting for CSR performance are therefore explored in this chapter.   
Around the world, the primary mechanism for used by companies to discharge their stakeholder 
accountability is through the voluntary adoption of governance frameworks, such as King III.  In 
this regard, the respective dimensions of mandatory and voluntary practices are briefly described.    
Chapter 3 – Corporate Social Responsibility Assurance 
This chapter considers the need for the independent assurance of CSR disclosures and examines 
the information needs and expectations of the different stakeholder groups.  Recognising that 
organisations other than the audit profession also provide CSR assurance, this chapter identifies 
the different types of CSR assurance providers.  The characteristics and implications of the different 
CSR assurance practices deployed by the various CSR assurors, as well as the different standards 
and frameworks used in the CSR assurance process are also considered.  These dimensions inform 
the criteria against which the empirical components of this study are examined and evaluated.  
Chapter 4 – Research Methodology 
This chapter identifies the research problem, describes the research objectives, considers the 
research questions and outlines the research paradigm and approach adopted.   
The exploratory interdisciplinary nature of this thesis provides an integrated analysis and 
interpretation of components relating to both the qualitative and quantitative research paradigms.  
A mixed methods research approach, combining aspects of both qualitative and quantitative 
research, conducted in three empirical phases, is accordingly considered to be the most 
appropriate research paradigm for this thesis.  The study examined CSR reporting and assurance 
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information relating to the 200 largest companies listed on the JSE.  The results of the various 
empirical research components are described in two results chapters: the first relating to CSR 
reporting while the second considers independent CSR assurance.   
Chapter 5 – Corporate Social Responsibility Reporting 
This chapter presents the integrated results of the second and third empirical research phases that 
relate to CSR reporting.  These observations identify the reasons that companies disclose their CSR 
performance and describe the characteristics of CSR reporting.  The data in this chapter is 
extracted from the results of a quantitative survey of respondents at reporting companies and from 
semi-structured interviews with the primary providers of independent CSR assurance identified in 
the content analysis of the first phase. 
Chapter 6 – Corporate Social Responsibility Assurance 
This chapter presents the results of the three empirical research phases relating to the 
characteristics of CSR assurance of the 200 largest JSE-listed companies.  These observations 
which were extracted from a qualitative content analysis of the published annual and/or CSR 
assurance reports; a quantitative survey of respondents at the reporting companies, and semi-
structured interviews with the major CSR assurance providers. 
Chapter 7 – Contribution and Conclusion 
Conclusions are made in this chapter by presenting a synthesised overview of the significant 
observations of the three empirical research phases described in chapters five and six.  While it 
may be argued that the development of a conceptual framework for CSR assurance is a 
prerequisite for effective and consistent CSR assurance practices, this chapter concludes by 
identifying the obstacles which should first be overcome before an effective universally applicable 
CSR assurance framework can be developed and implemented.  
1.14 Structure of the study 
Figure 1.2 graphically aligns the research objectives (described in sections  1.6 and  4.2.3) with the 
three empirical research phases, and the relevant sub-section of the two chapters where the 
results are described.  Although the three empirical phases were conducted independently of each 
other, the results are interrelated. 
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Figure 1.2 – Thesis synopsis (alignment of research objectives, phases and results) 
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1.15 Conclusion 
Even though CSR has been on the corporate agenda for some time, it has only recently become a 
significant matter for companies to grapple with.  CSR is currently being dealt with by several 
different external organisations as well as by various company functional areas.  Despite the 
opportunities emerging from this ‘new responsibility’, the inherently conservative global accounting 
and audit profession has struggled to define an appropriate framework for CSR reporting and 
assurance that could provide stakeholders with credible CSR-related information, while 
simultaneously protecting their image and reputation. 
The initial CSR emphasis was on developing appropriate accounting and/or reporting tools and 
techniques that could meaningfully account for the CSR activities of reporting companies.  Being a 
more recent development, the CSR assurance discourse is still at an early stage, especially within 
the context of the audit profession.  Citing Rob Gray,1 one of the pre-eminent CSR reporting and 
assurance scholars: “we are eventually beginning to move away from being a lunatic-fringe group 
of accounting academics and becoming more mainstream academics”. 
Despite its relative topicality, the assurance of CSR reporting remains a relatively new field in 
academic research, particularly in South Africa, significantly impacted by the perennial debate 
between voluntarism and mandatory regulation and legislation.  In this regard, King III and the JSE 
regulations provide one of the first frameworks that compel reporting companies to have their CSR 
disclosures independently assured.  This research accordingly presumes that the majority of South 
African accounting and auditing academics presently do not yet have the integrated knowledge of 
the various topics in the manner presented in this thesis.  As the contemporary academic discourse 
continues to unfold, and as the CSR-related role of the accounting and auditing profession evolves, 
this situation is expected to change significantly.  While not intending to represent a definitive 
treatise or textbook on CSR reporting and assurance practices, the emerging nature of the topic 
informed the manner in which this thesis has been written.  In other words, while this thesis may 
appear to provide a disproportionate information overload relating to CSR, it is anticipated that it 
may be consulted by a wide range of readers.  Some of these readers may have little or no 
knowledge of the dynamics and dimensions of CSR reporting and/or CSR assurance, whereas 
others may be relative experts.  The expected readers of this thesis specifically include accounting 
and auditing academics who may be interested in exploring these areas as an expansion of the 
conventional business model of the accounting and audit profession.  
                                           
1 At the 23rd International Congress on Social and Environmental Accounting Research held in St Andrews, Scotland, 
during September 2011. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The combined pressures of increased stakeholder activism; rampant globalisation; a burgeoning 
global population; alarming levels of global destitution around the world; heightened concerns 
about climate change, decimation of natural resources and violations of basic human rights; and an 
enduring global recession require companies not to only improve their operational efficiency, but 
also to incorporate broader corporate social responsibility (CSR) issues into their business strategies 
(Gray & Milne, 2002; Manwaring & Spencer, 2009).  Despite dissidents still arguing that climate 
change is a naturally occurring phenomenon and not necessarily anthropogenic2 (Pascoe, 2007; 
Revkin, 2008; Sutton, 2009), empirical evidence overwhelmingly points to its recent acceleration 
being due to post-industrialisation human activity (Johns et al., 2003).   
CSR is therefore ultimately a strategic issue that cannot be separated from overall corporate 
strategy Galbreath (2006).  To anticipate and adapt to changing stakeholder expectations and 
regulatory shifts, and to optimally address surplus corporate capacity and environmental concerns, 
CSR-related issues should be incorporated into corporate strategy (Waddock & Graves, 1997).  
Increasing globalisation, growing pressure for increased transparency and the need to protect 
company reputations have seen many companies that were already perceived as successful, 
critically re-examining their corporate values (ICAEW, 2004).  It may therefore be argued that 
companies are changing their operating paradigm from ‘exploiting resources’ to ‘sustainably 
utilising resources’.  While this may appear to be a matter of semantics, it does represent a 
fundamental principle that explains the required philosophical shift in corporate morality and 
accountability.  Today’s successful companies are therefore not only those accepting the combined 
crises of climate change, food and water shortages, volatile energy prices, and economic and 
ecosystem collapses, but rather those that ‘rigorously exploit’ the emerging opportunities (Berliant, 
2009).  Illustrating its inherent unsustainability, ‘exploitation’ may be defined as being the point at 
which resources are overexploited, causing their collapse or extinction (Ludwig, Hilborn & Walters, 
1993).  However, appropriate levels for sustainable utilisation may only be determined through trial 
and error, resulting in any initial overexploitation only becoming detectable after it has become 
severe or irreversible. 
Globally, concerns are growing about what companies can and should do to ensure that future 
generations are not burdened with the residual fallout of unethical, amoral or unsustainable 
business practices.  While Mervyn King (2008) may argue that humankind are only ‘transient 
caretakers’ of the planet, with an implied duty to make the world a better place for subsequent 
                                           
2 In other words, not significantly affected by human activity. 
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generations, on the other hand CSR may simply be considered a business opportunity (Hart, 1997).  
When companies define their environmental and social strategies, opportunities for new products 
and services emerge.  Corporate responses to stakeholder pressure for improved CSR may 
therefore simply be an extension of the conventional raison d’être of profit maximisation (Reuvid, 
2007). 
Companies participate in societal governance by assisting to administer the individual rights of 
citizens, both within the company and more broadly within the context of external economic 
corporate relations (Moon, Crane & Matten, 2003).  Moreover, companies are beginning to engage 
in activities that could be regarded as being the domain of government (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011); 
and are increasingly assisting in the administration of the citizenship rights of their employees.  
Companies may for example, engage in activities related to public health, AIDS, malnutrition, 
homelessness, education, literacy and human rights protection. 
Historically, corporate success was measured by financial performance.  Recent developments in 
accountability and sustainability practice suggests that corporate success should be measured and 
reported differently, reflecting performance indicators that comprehensively incorporate all aspects 
of strategy (Force for Good [sa]).  In order to overcome the information asymmetry arising from 
the ‘agency problem’ resulting from the separation of company owners and management (as 
described in section  2.4.5), company performance should be reported in a consistent manner, both 
internally and externally.  According to Force for Good [sa], companies should invest in internal 
reporting systems and have the courage to openly explain their corporate strategy and results to 
both employees and external stakeholders, to the same extent and with the same clarity that 
management uses for corporate decision-making.  As described in  2.7.7.6, the International 
Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) released the Integrated Reporting Framework in 2013 as the 
first global initiative attempting to formalise this broader stakeholder accountability (IIRC, 2013b).  
It should however, be pointed out that integrated reporting complements and does not replace 
other forms of company reporting. 
Being a truism does not diminish the validity of ‘we manage what we measure’.  It is now the right 
time to ask whether the right things are being measured in the right way and correctly 
communicated to the right people, causing some companies to start reporting on their non-
financial performance using one or more of the emerging frameworks and guidelines (Manwaring & 
Spencer, 2009).  
The need for the human race (and by implication for companies) to deal with today’s sustainability 
challenge of avoiding an impending environmental and social collapse, is succinctly articulated in 
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the statement that “If we insist on ruining the planet, we have to stop claiming we’re a superior 
species”3 (Berliant, 2009).  Similarly, the truism “no people, no planet, no profit”4 (unknown) may 
be considered prophetic. 
Since the primary objective of this thesis is to examine the characteristics of CSR assurance, it is 
necessary to first understand the contemporary CSR discourse.  Similarly, since the purpose of an 
assurance engagement is to establish the veracity of the underlying CSR disclosures, this chapter 
considers prevailing CSR reporting practices.  The global CSR movement is impacted by the 
contextual environment of particular countries; the various social, economic and management 
theories relevant to CSR are accordingly introduced.  Companies are juristic bodies, implying that 
their CSR approach is influenced by the company leadership.  As a result, the chapter describes the 
ethical and moral theories influencing company CSR approaches.   
2.2 Corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
The Brundtland Commission defines sustainability as being “development that meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” 
(UNCSD, 2007; Morimoto et al., 2005).  Brundtland elevates the importance of the CSR discourse 
by addressing the growing concern “about the accelerating deterioration of the human environment 
and natural resources and the consequences of that deterioration for economic and social 
development”.  Brundtland identifies the interrelated components of sustainable development as 
being environmental protection, economic growth and social equity. 
Increasing concerns about the adverse effects of unrestrained global economic growth, global 
economic inequity, anthropogenic climate-change and environmental decimation are driving 
companies to respond by developing, implementing and reporting on CSR governance initiatives 
(IIA, 2010b).  Stakeholders are increasingly expecting companies to act responsibly and sustainably 
(Aras & Crowther, 2008), and to account for the adverse effects of their operations.  At the same 
time, CSR provides opportunities for proactive companies to capitalise on.  This changing business 
paradigm that introduces a broader accountability to stakeholders elevates the importance of 
addressing the future impacts of their operations (Davis, 2005; Salgado, 2008). 
CSR represents the “decisions and actions taken for reasons at least partially beyond the firm’s 
direct economic or technical interest” (Davis, 1960: 70–71).  McGuire (1963, cited in Ramasamy & 
Yeung, 2009) expanded on this definition by arguing that companies do not only have economic 
                                           
3 Bill Becker, president of the Climate Action Project. 
4 Although the author of this truism is unknown, it appears to be derived from Cramer et al.’s (2004: 217) proposal that 
the pillars of CSR are encapsulated by the three Ps.  
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and legal obligations, but also certain responsibilities to society extending beyond these obligations.  
More recently, Kok, Van der Wiele, McKenna and Brown (2001) comprehensively defined CSR as 
the obligation for companies to use their resources to benefit society by actively participating as a 
member of society.  This includes taking account of the interests of society at large and improving 
the welfare of society, independently of the accrual of direct benefits to the company.  As the 
contemporary CSR discourse has unfolded, Davis (2005) suggested that CSR should consider and 
respond to issues beyond the narrow corporate economic, technical and legal dimensions.  CSR 
therefore ‘begins where the law ends’, with socially irresponsible companies merely complying with 
the prescribed minimum legal or regulatory requirements (Davis, 2005: 113).  CSR presently 
involves the voluntary adoption of the principles of social responsibility; the processes of social 
responsiveness; and the observable outcomes relating to the company’s social relationships 
(Orlitzky, Schmidt & Rynes, 2003; Williams & Zinkin, 2008; Wood, 1991).   
CSR requires companies to operate in a manner that comprehensively accounts for their impact on 
the planet, its people and the future (ICAEW, 2004; UNCSD, 2007).  The contradictory perspectives 
of CSR contribute to the prevailing cynicism about the CSR phenomenon (Wan-Jan, 2006).  The 
absence of a common meaning does not however, suggest the lack of a common point of 
reference (Swanton, 1985).  Moreover, CSR’s poor definition may actually result in the 
consideration of most, if not all, pertinent issues (Sabadoz, 2011).  Irrespective of the definition 
used, the adoption of CSR-related business strategies and activities that simultaneously meet 
existing corporate and stakeholder needs, while protecting, sustaining and enhancing the human 
and natural resources that will be required in the future, have serious implications for companies 
(IIA, 2010a). 
Contemporary CSR discourse is complicated by the wide range of terminologies used, often 
meaning different things to different people, which may often be used interchangeably to describe 
CSR-related issues (Aras & Crowther, 2008; Kirdahy, 2007b; Votaw, 1972).  This confusion is 
exacerbated by the term ‘sustainability’ having been used in the management and accounting 
literature to simply refer to the ongoing operation of the company, for example from a ‘going 
concern’ perspective.  Therefore, even though ‘sustainability’ appears to be emerging as a 
preferred term in the literature (Adams & Larrinaga-González, 2007; Adams & McNicholas, 2007; 
Aras & Crowther, 2008; Bleischwitz, 2007; Daly, 2010; IoD, 2009b), ‘CSR’ continues to be used in 
recent literature (Armstrong & Green, 2013; Boulouta & Pitelis, 2014; Calabrese, Costa, Menichini, 
Rosati & Sanfelice, 2013; Chin, Hambrick & Trevino, 2013; Fooks, Gilmore, Collin, Holden & Lee, 
2013; Julian & Ofori-dankwa, 2013; Lee, Seo & Sharma, 2013; Murphy & Schlegelmilch, 2013; 
Rupp, Shao, Thornton, & Skarlicki, 2013).  To distinguish ‘corporate survival’ from companies 
responsibility towards society and the environment, except where specifically required for the 
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purpose of clarification or differentiation, the generic term ‘CSR’ is preferred in this thesis.   
Aras and Crowther (2008) contend that companies are attempting to bridge the divide between 
economic growth and environmental protection by accounting for their CSR performance, while 
also taking other issues traditionally associated with development into account.  Without 
diminishing the importance of profits, Nohria (2010) argues that companies should demonstrate 
that they care about more than profits, by introducing progressive ideas and practices.  Although 
classical and neoclassical economists still argue in favour of ‘pure’ shareholder primacy (as 
described in section  2.4.2), Nohria (2010) supports instrumental theory by contending that while 
business cannot survive without profits, at the same time profits were not incompatible with other 
social priorities.  The World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) (cited in Kotler 
& Lee, 2005) contends that business should contribute to the sustainable economic development 
agenda by working with employees, their families, the local community and society at large, to 
improve their quality of life.  Environmental protection and social and economic value should 
therefore not be seen in isolation, but as interrelated dimensions (Odell, 2008).   
Carroll’s pyramid depicted in Figure 2.1, provides a conceptual framework that incorporates the 
CSR definitions of both McGuire (1963) and Davis (1973), categorising the CSR responsibilities of 
business according to its four primary dimensions (Carroll, 1991).  Despite the responsibilities 
depicted in Carroll’s pyramid always having existed, their recent prominence has increased the 
emphasis on the voluntary corporate ethical and philanthropic dimensions (Carroll, 1991).  These 
dimensions include: 
1. Economic – the fundamental responsibility of profitably providing the goods and services 
required by the markets.  By fulfilling this responsibility, companies create jobs, generate taxes 
and improve income distribution amongst the population, especially in developing countries. 
2. Legal – achieving economic goals while complying with the requirements of the legal systems 
in the respective countries, including relevant legislation and regulations. 
3. Ethical – doing what is considered right, just and fair and avoiding harming nature, the 
environment and people (Cacioppe, Forster & Fox, 2008).  The ethical dimension elevates 
corporate responsibility to a philosophical level that extends beyond legal compliance (Davis, 
2005). 
4. Philanthropic – directly contributing to society and improving the general quality of life. 
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Figure 2.1 – Carroll's pyramid of CSR (Carroll, 1991: 42) 
Consumers expect a return on involvement and may even be prepared to pay a premium for 
product brands that are perceived to be sustainable and/or environmentally friendly.  Companies 
perceived to be ethical, tend to be rewarded with higher prices, whereas those with lower ethical 
standards may be punished with lower prices (Creyer & Ross, 1997).  Consumers may even 
demand substantial discounts from companies producing goods in an unethical manner (Trudel & 
Cotte, 2009), or may be prepared to switch brands to support a ‘cause’ (Lii & Lee, 2012).  Page 
and Fearn (2005) however, found that despite consumers apparently being concerned about 
corporate behaviour, they were often unwilling to sacrifice the functionality of goods and services 
to support the socially acceptable characteristics of another product.  This paradox may be 
illustrated by the sales of Starbucks remaining relatively flat, despite launching its ‘fair trade’ coffee 
in 2001 (Ramasamy & Yeung, 2009).  Moreover, it is self-evident that consumers in developed 
countries have more discretionary income, which can be used to pay the premiums currently 
associated with purchasing ‘ethical products’ from ‘moral suppliers’.  It may accordingly be argued 
that, in general, price-sensitive consumers in developing and underdeveloped countries are less 
likely to incorporate CSR-related issues in their purchasing decisions. 
Although CSR is beginning to feature prominently on the strategic agenda of many companies, the 
global CSR drive may still be considered to be in the embryonic stage.  Instead of considering CSR 
as a risk with costs that should be managed, proactive companies are engaging with a broad range 
of stakeholders and integrating CSR practices into their organisational strategy and culture.  Other 
companies are more pragmatically going beyond the confines of the moral or ethical arguments 
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and recognising the merits of the CSR business case (Utting, 2005).  These merits may, for 
example, include reducing transaction costs by improving risk and reputation management 
practices.  Globally, CEOs are beginning to include CSR as one of the top drivers for long-term 
corporate success, as indicated below (Black & Quach, 2009): 
• Reducing risk by improving risk management.  Responsible CSR practices may decrease 
corporate risk and provide appropriate risk mitigation strategies and interventions. 
• Value creation by developing new products and/or markets.  Considering CSR issues may 
assist companies identify opportunities for new products and markets. 
• Reducing operating costs through improved operational efficiency.  Alignment of CSR with 
overall corporate strategy may improve the efficient utilisation of scarce resources. 
• Stimulating employee and corporate learning and innovation.  CSR initiatives may drive 
innovation as companies consider new ways of doing the same things better (process 
improvement), or doing things differently (new product development). 
• Enhancing corporate and brand reputation to improve corporate competitiveness and market 
positioning.  A company’s CSR communication with external parties may help build a positive 
image with customers, investors, bankers and supporters (Orlitzky et al., 2003).  While a 
strong reputation may stimulate sales, conversely, a loss of reputation may result in lost 
customers (Orlitzky et al., 2003). 
• Improving employee motivation and retaining talent.  Strong CSR strategies may assist 
companies attract and retain quality human resource talent (Fust & Walker, 2007).  CSR may 
assist companies develop new competencies, resources and capabilities as manifested in the 
company’s culture, technology, structure and human resources (Orlitzky et al., 2003). 
• Providing a licence to operate.  Companies disregarding their operational impact on society 
and the environment may result in the licensing authorities and/or society withdrawing their 
literal operating or tacit metaphorical licence allowing them to operate. 
• Facilitating easier access to capital.  Capital markets are increasingly being influenced by risk 
assessments based on the corporate environmental, social and governance dimensions 
conducted, especially relating to ethical and responsible investments (as described on 
page 61). 
CSR protagonists suggest that companies have an obligation to mitigate their social and 
environmental impacts in a manner that extends beyond simple adherence to basic business 
principles (Davis, 2005).  Shareholder theorists on the other hand, argue that CSR activity should 
 
Page 39 of 338 
 
be confined to maximising shareholder wealth (Friedman, 1970).  Eells (1960) however, suggests 
that real CSR behaviour falls along a continuum, ranging from minimal to maximum responsibility.  
At the one extreme, the traditional company represents the interests of the providers of capital, 
with its sole legitimate purpose being to maximise shareholder wealth.  At the other extreme, the 
social company recognises a wide range of social purposes and objectives.  Whereas the traditional 
company is only concerned with the ‘economic man’, the social company recognises the ‘whole 
man’.  Companies treating the public and the environment responsibly not only enhance their own 
reputations, this may also provide value to their owners and customers (Henderson & Malani, 
2008). 
Quazi and O’Brien (2000) take the CSR concept one step further, introducing a two-dimensional 
CSR model.  The horizontal axis represents the extremes of narrow and wide responsibility (similar 
to Eells’ (1960) traditional and social companies).  As depicted in Figure 2.2, Quazi and O’Brien 
(2000) add a vertical axis to account for the benefits and costs associated with CSR interventions.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 – Two-dimensional CSR model (Quazi & O’Brien, 2000: 36) 
The four quadrants of the Quazi and O’Brien model represent the following views: 
• Classical view. This narrow profit maximisation perspective only considers CSR in terms of the 
net cost to the company, without the accrual of any meaningful concomitant benefit. 
• Socio-economic view. Despite still representing a narrow CSR perspective, this view 
recognises that CSR should produce net benefits, such as avoiding costly regulatory 
compliance, while enhancing strong customer and/or supplier relationships.    
• Modern view. The modern perspective accommodates stakeholder theory but suggests that 
the maintenance of positive relationships with society provides the company with both long-
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term and short-term benefits.   
• Philanthropic view. In terms of this broader CSR perspective, companies participate in 
charitable activities despite their perceived net cost.  The underlying cause may result from 
altruistic or moral reasons to do the right thing. 
Social values and expectations tend to change over time, resulting in the ongoing evolution of 
dynamic concepts like CSR, facilitating the adaptation to changing social norms (Okoye, 2009).  
Despite widespread acceptance of the principles of CSR, effective CSR implementation remains 
constrained by the lack of a normative grounding for effective regulation (Cramer et al., 2004; 
Campbell, 2007; Okoye, 2009; Wan-Jan, 2006; Whitehouse, 2003).  Whereas CSR was previously 
associated with forgoing profits, or employees performing voluntary work, contemporary business 
leaders are beginning to recognise the importance of ‘doing good’ not only because it is ‘the right 
thing’ to do, but also because CSR can be an investment to enhance shareholder value (i.e. 
instrumental reasons as described in section  2.4.7).  Corporate social investment (CSI) has evolved 
from simply funding ‘worthy causes’ through ‘chequebook philanthropy’, to strategic CSR; 
improving the alignment of CSR activities with corporate expertise and capabilities (Kirdahy, 
2007a).  Although the contemporary CSR discourse has been around at least since the 1930s, even 
though companies are increasingly considering and reporting on CSR-related issues, it is suggested 
that the drive for companies to demonstrate their CSR accountability has not yet reached the 
tipping point. 
2.3 The relationship between corporate governance and CSR 
Although the term ‘governance’ originated in the political science environment within the context of 
government, ‘corporate governance’ only emerged as a prominent business concept during the 
1980s (Driver & Thompson, 2002).  Hobbes (1588–1679) established a very early basis for 
corporate governance theory, by arguing that a social contract results when individuals come 
together and cede some of their individual rights so that others would compromise and cede theirs 
as well.  This establishes the ‘state’ or ‘Leviathan’5, an artificial person existing to create laws that 
regulate social interactions, and to protect and defend the interests of natural persons within its 
jurisdiction (Levy, 1954; Hobbes, 1651).   
Corporate governance involves the collective processes and structures designed and implemented 
to inform, direct, manage, and monitor the organisation’s activities in pursuit of achieving its 
objectives (IIA, 2010a; Reding et al., 2011; Sobel & Reding, 2012).  The Organisation for Economic 
                                           
5 Within a corporate governance context, the ‘state’ may be regarded as a proxy for the company. 
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Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2005) expands on this by defining corporate governance as 
“the system by which business organisations are directed and controlled, and whose structure 
specifies the rights and responsibilities among different participants of the company, such as the 
board of directors, shareholders and other economic agents, who maintain some interest in the 
company”. 
Effective governance extends beyond ethical behaviour towards the company and should include its 
impact beyond the immediate corporate boundaries, creating a direct link between corporate 
governance and CSR (Kolk, 2008).  In this regard it may be argued that effective corporate 
governance has two primary dimensions.  The first, at a micro level, requires companies to pursue 
their objectives primarily for the benefit of their shareholders (as described in section  2.4.2).  The 
second, at a macro level, considers the well-being of society as a whole (as described in 
section  2.4.3) (Keasey et al., 2005).  Sir Adrian Cadbury succinctly linked corporate governance 
and CSR by integrating the two dimensions for the betterment of society, by positing that: 
“Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and 
social goals; and between individual and communal goals.  …the aim is to align as 
nearly as possible the interests of individuals, companies and society” (Corporate 
Governance Overview of the World Bank Report, 1999, cited in IOD, 2002): 
Companies should therefore reconcile their financial goals with the divergent interests of 
stakeholders, the economy and on society as a whole.  Cadbury’s definition clearly positions 
corporate governance as an overarching business concept, with implications for CSR and business 
ethics, while requiring regulatory compliance with associated responsibilities (Bonn & Fisher, 2005).  
According to Bonn and Fisher (2005), the environmental disasters that threaten ecosystems, or 
corporate profiteering at the expense of human safety; are stimulating the discourse about the role 
of companies in society, as well as about the need to adopt the necessary ethical standards, 
management standards, corporate governance and corporate accountability practices.  
Even though corporate governance reforms initially focused on strengthening the mechanisms to 
safeguard shareholder interests (Kolk, 2008; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), this has subsequently 
evolved to also include accounting for broader governance issues relating to employees, customers 
and society.  A broader conception of corporate governance focusing on components of 
environmental, social and financial accountability is accordingly beginning to emerge, driving the 
convergence of corporate governance and CSR-related issues.  Corporate governance should 
therefore effectively delineate the rights and responsibilities of each legitimate corporate 
stakeholder, with the extent of corporate transparency significantly reflecting acceptable corporate 
 
Page 42 of 338 
 
governance standards (Ho & Wong, 2001).  In order to provide equal access to basic corporate 
information, it is proposed mandatory financial reporting should be augmented by voluntary CSR 
disclosures (Ho & Wong, 2001).   
Globally, guidelines, frameworks, codes of conduct and regulations are institutionalising the 
interrelated concepts of sustainable development, the triple bottom line and CSR; the underlying 
principle being that CSR involves the simultaneous pursuit of economic prosperity, environmental 
quality and social equity.  The Treadway Commission in the United States of America (USA), the 
Cadbury Committee in the UK and the initial King Code on Governance for South Africa (King I) 
provided ground-breaking corporate governance initiatives that went beyond the conventional 
financial and regulatory aspects of corporate governance.  In South Africa, the various iterations of 
the King Codes of Governance (as described in section  2.7.7.2) have been the primary frameworks 
driving effective corporate governance practices over the past 20 years.   
The evaluation of corporate governance should therefore not simply be confined to the extent of 
the economic value added, but should include the value, or cost of their operational environmental 
and social contribution and/or degradation (Waddock & Graves, 1997).  Companies are accordingly 
expected to balance their perceived responsibilities to their various stakeholders and report 
thereon, albeit only in terms of instrumentalism from an enlightened self-interest perspective (as 
described in section  2.4.7) (Nohria, 2010; Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). 
The discourse about whether the board and management should simply run the company for the 
benefit of its shareholders, or whether the interests of its broader stakeholder constituencies 
should be taken into account; is almost as old as the earliest writings on corporate governance 
(Becht, Bolton & Röell, 2005).  While it may be argued that accepting responsibility to multiple 
parties exacerbates the agency problem (as described by section  2.4.5) and reduces shareholder 
accountability, it is posited that corporate powers should be held in trust for the benefit of 
shareholders and not for anybody else (Becht et al., 2005).  On the other hand, companies 
constitute ‘qualified private property’ and are regulated by legislation, cognisant of increasing 
societal demands for business to be conducted in a manner that safeguards the interests of those 
with whom it interacts, either as employees or consumers (Becht et al., 2005).   
Within the context of this research, CSR is considered to be an integral component of good 
corporate governance, with the board being responsible for ensuring that management acts in the 
best interests of the company.  It should not be to the detriment of their broader stakeholders 
when companies implement their CSR programme, disclose their CSR performance and provide 
independent CSR assurance thereon.   
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2.4 Theoretical frameworks 
2.4.1 Relevant social, economic and management theories 
The background to the corporate governance and CSR discourse as described in sections  2.2 
and  2.3, provide the conceptual framework for this thesis.  Within this context, it is accordingly 
appropriate to briefly consider the primary theoretical frameworks giving rise to the diverse CSR 
interpretations and practices.  Garriga and Melé (2004) introduce following four primary categories 
of CSR theories: 
• Instrumental theories argue that CSR activities are used exclusively to gain competitive 
advantage (Porter & Kramer, 2002), and to facilitate entry into new markets (Prahalad & 
Hammond, 2002).  These theories include where CSR is considered to be a marketing tool to 
develop and/or maintain company’s reputations and brands, and to contribute to bottom line 
profitability (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). 
• Political theories highlight the responsible use of corporate power and the relationship 
between corporate power and the needs of society (Garriga & Melé, 2004). 
• Integrative theories hold that companies should integrate societal demands into their 
business operations.  These theories, which include stakeholder management and corporate 
social performance theories, consider the interrelatedness of the principles of social 
responsibility, the processes of social responsiveness and the observable outcomes of 
corporate relationships (Wood, 1991).  
• Ethical theories examine the morality or ‘rightness’ of corporate social actions and include 
stakeholder theory, universal human rights, sustainable development and the common good 
approach (Garriga & Melé, 2004).   
Although it may be argued that several economic and management theories could apply to 
company CSR practices, shareholder primacy, stakeholder theory, agency theory and slack 
resource theory, or variations thereof, are particularly relevant to this thesis.  These theories which 
attempt to explain the reasons for the different corporate responses to CSR-related issues tend to 
overlap and are not necessarily mutually exclusive.  The resultant CSR approach adopted by many 
companies therefore tends to incorporate elements of each.  For contextual completeness the 
primary theories relevant to this thesis are described below. 
2.4.2 Shareholder primacy 
Company owners may be defined as those parties holding legal title to its equity share capital (i.e. 
the shareholders) (Freeman, 1994).  Friedman (1970) argues that the social responsibility of 
 
Page 44 of 338 
 
business is to use its resources to engage in activities that would increase profits for the benefit of 
shareholders, while operating within society’s predefined rules and norms (Kok et al., 2001).  It 
may accordingly be argued that profitable companies contribute to the social agenda, albeit 
indirectly, inter alia by creating employment opportunities, stimulating the economy and uplifting 
neighbouring communities. 
The principle of shareholder primacy is embodied in both the corporate and common law of most 
countries, and has historically required management to manage the company’s affairs in the best 
interests of the shareholders (Freeman, 1994), introducing the agency problem as described in 
section  2.4.5).  Advocates of shareholder primacy argue that the company (as represented by the 
board on behalf of shareholders, as described in section  2.5.2), has a legitimate responsibility to 
put its own needs first and to improve shareholder value.  Driver and Thompson (2002) concur by 
arguing that private capital ownership is the ‘foundation stone’ of capitalism, partially explaining 
the reason that legislation tends to be skewed in favour of maximising shareholder returns.  The 
company’s primary (and arguably only) function is therefore to enhance the economic well-being of 
its owners, or to serve as a vehicle through which they can exercise their free choice (Freeman, 
1994). 
Despite recognising the principle that companies may ‘do well by doing good’, Karnani (2010) 
argues that the idea that companies should act responsibility in the public interest, which should 
result in the accrual of benefits, is fundamentally flawed.  The CSR debate becomes irrelevant 
when private profits and public interests are aligned, since it may be argued that company 
profitability simultaneously contributes to social welfare.  Conversely, where profits and social 
welfare are in conflict, CSR initiatives are unlikely to be effective, with management being unlikely 
to voluntarily act in the public interest, or against the interests of their shareholders (Driver & 
Thompson, 2002).   
Contrary to McKinsey’s findings (described on page 12) that the majority of company leaders were 
moving away from shareholder primacy, Henderson and Malani (2008) argue that many company 
leaders (subscribing to the traditional neo-classical economic perspective) still presume that 
shareholders are only interested in maximising the present value of their future dividend streams.  
On the assumption that the sole legitimate purpose of business is to create value for shareholders, 
company management may regard social and environmental issues as being peripheral challenges 
(Davis, 2005; Zenisek, 1979).  Atkins (2006) even argues that management are being irresponsible 
when diverting corporate assets towards social causes. 
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2.4.3 Stakeholder theory 
The stakeholder concept dates back to the work of Barnard in 1938 (Rowley, 1997).  In 1947, 
Ackhoff and Churchman incorporated the stakeholder concept into systems theory.  Despite 
rejecting the usefulness of the stakeholder concept, Ansoff (1965) illustrated the importance of 
identifying critical stakeholders, but viewed them as impediments to the primary company 
objectives (Freeman & McVea, 2001).  In the 1970s, Ackhoff applied the stakeholder concept to 
corporate systems (Freeman & McVea, 2001).  Stakeholder theory was only formalised in 1984 
when Freeman published Strategic management: A stakeholder approach, which built on the 
process work by Mason and Mitroff, and by Emshoff, in the 1970s and 1980s (Freeman & McVea, 
2001).  Stakeholder theory has subsequently evolved into a framework to analyse the way 
companies interact with and manage their relationships with the various parties affected by 
corporate activities.  Stakeholders can be defined as any party affected by, or that can affect the 
company achieving its objectives (Freeman & McVea, 2001).   
Freeman (1994) argued that normative business theories were inconsistent with shareholder 
primacy, and that stakeholder theory provided a better fit.  According to stakeholder theory, 
relevant participants in the business environment should identify with the manner in which 
companies manage their stakeholder relationships while simultaneously achieving their business 
objectives (Blair, 2005).  In terms of stakeholder theory, business is responsible to various groups 
in society that may have a ‘claim, ownership, rights or interest’ in a company and its activities, 
irrespective of whether in the past, present or future (Freeman, 1984).  In addition to shareholder 
interests, stakeholder theory also requires companies to consider the legitimate interests of banks 
and financiers; non-executive directors; trade unions, employees and prospective employees; 
existing and prospective customers and suppliers; government, regulators and policy makers; 
political groups; trade associations; local communities; the public at large; future generations; and 
even competitors (ACCA, 2005; IIA, 2010b; Reuvid, 2007).   
Aligning corporate activities to stakeholder theory, Makower (1994) argues that business does not 
only exist to generate profits for shareholders, should also provide society with required goods 
and/or services.  In recognising that the very existence of business depends on satisfying consumer 
expectations, highlights the need for companies to consider stakeholder requirements when making 
business decisions.  Companies are realising that addressing legitimate stakeholder interests is 
imperative for their long-term corporate viability (Reuvid, 2007).  CSR therefore involves more than 
simply maximising shareholder value (Hummels & Timmer, 2004).   
While some may regard the stakeholder concept as being too vague, ambiguous and diverging 
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(Driver & Thompson, 2002; Blair, 2005), others claim that stakeholder theory, corporate 
responsibility and business ethics are increasingly converging (Fassin, 2009; Garriga & Melé, 2004; 
Valor, 2005).  This drive towards integration is clearly reflected by King III, suggesting that the 
success of 21st century companies is linked to three interdependent subsystems, namely, (i) the 
natural environment; (ii) the social and political system; and (iii) the global economy (IoD, 2009a).  
Two significant shortcomings have been identified since the emergence of stakeholder theory 
(Blair, 2005).  The first suggests a lack of the necessary rigorous theoretical substance for the 
development of pragmatic decision rules.  It is suggested that the stakeholder concept is too 
broad, with insufficient guidance about how to balance the interests of the various competing 
stakeholders.  The second proposes agency theory (as described in section  2.4.5) as an alternative 
corporate relationship model.  Blair (2005) argues that the precision of agency theory (usually 
associated with shareholder primacy) contrasts starkly with the indeterminacy and contextual 
ambiguity of stakeholder theory, and has failed the rigorous model test after more than 30 years, 
continuing in a rather ad hoc manner.   
2.4.4 Legitimacy theory 
Legitimacy may be defined as the perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are 
desirable, proper, or appropriate within a socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and 
expectations (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Suchman, 1995).  The instrumental interpretation of CSR 
(as described in section  2.4.7), leads to pragmatic or cognitive perspectives of legitimacy (Palazzo 
& Scherer, 2006).  The linkage between business and society is inherently normative, which 
attempts to explain what companies should do in respect of the social good.  Legitimacy results in 
stakeholders providing companies with support and/or resources that are perceived to be desirable, 
proper or appropriate.  Stakeholders perceive legitimate companies as not only being more worthy, 
but also more meaningful, more predictable and more trustworthy (Suchman, 1995). 
Morimoto et al. (2005) suggest that CSR provides an excellent tool to enhance company legitimacy 
amongst stakeholders, by improving communication and transparency, while proactively projecting 
a positive company image.  The underlying rationale being that customers may obtain improved 
products and services; supplier management may be improved; competitiveness may be enhanced; 
employees may have improved working conditions; local communities may live in better 
environments; and stakeholders may have easy access to social and environmental information; 
which collectively should improve company profitability.  Conversely, failing to effectively 
ameliorate CSR risks may result in the company suffering a loss of reputation, with the opposite 
effect.   
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Companies losing legitimacy may experience difficulty engaging in business, since stakeholders will 
not trust their commitment to adhere to society’s rules (Palazzo & Scherer, 2006).  While positive 
CSR practices and reporting may enhance a company’s image and reputation (Morimoto et al., 
2005), the company becomes vulnerable when it loses credibility (Hummels & Timmer, 2004).  This 
is illustrated by the UNRISD (2000) suggesting that growing pressure from civil society 
organisations and the market opportunities associated with ‘green technologies’ and ‘ethical 
consumers’ could provide companies perceived to be ‘responsible corporate citizens’ with a 
competitive advantage over their competitors that are not. 
2.4.5 Agency theory 
Agency theory emerged from the separation of ownership and control of companies after the 
Industrial Revolution which began in the 18th century.  In its most basic form, agency theory is 
simply a mathematical representation of the relationship between two parties, one of whom (the 
principal) wants to hire the other (the agent) to carry out some task, or to act on its behalf (Blair, 
2005).  The principal delegates the responsibility for performing a task to the agent, creating a 
need to trust that the agent will act in the principal’s best interest.  Dodd (1932) argued that the 
agent owed the principal more than a simple contractual duty, imposing a fiduciary duty on the 
agent to diligently serve its principal’s interests.  The agency problem results from a situation 
where the owner of the company (the principal) knows less about the business than the manager 
(the agent) (Blair, 2005).  This information asymmetry is skewed in favour of the agent’s self-
interest, causing principals to inherently distrust the actions of their agents (ICAEW, 2005). 
To counter information asymmetries arising from the agency problem, companies face an ethical 
challenge to open the circle of influence, by ensuring that ‘outsiders’ have the same access to 
pertinent company information as ‘insiders’ (Maury, 2000).  The decisions of the owners (or the 
board on their behalf) may be based on the disclosures of management, but could be prejudiced by 
management’s inherent conflict of interest as agents of the company.  The actions of management 
may, for example, be influenced by factors such as personal financial rewards, labour market 
opportunities and interpersonal relationships, resulting in more optimistic corporate financial 
performance (CFP) projections, or even overstated contractual performance.  Resolution of these 
conflicts require the establishment of mechanisms to improve alignment of the interests of agents 
and principals, reduce the scope and impact of information asymmetries, and neutralise the 
potential for opportunistic agent behaviour (ICAEW, 2005). 
Moreover, principals often do not have the necessary expertise, skill or time, to ensure that agents 
are effectively discharging their fiduciary responsibilities.  One of the mechanisms adopted by 
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principals to address the agency problem is to engage auditors to safeguard their interests.  
Auditors independently evaluate the work of the agent and confirm the veracity of the information 
provided, enhancing the principal’s confidence and trust in company disclosures (ICAEW, 2005).     
Maury (2000) however, cautions that despite auditors technically being appointed by, and reporting 
to the audit committee, auditors are actually paid by senior management, potentially impairing 
their independence.  Auditors act as the agents of the principals when performing an audit, giving 
rise to similar concerns about trust and confidence as in the conventional agency problem between 
owners and management.  Despite being engaged as agents under contract, professional auditing 
standards require auditors to be independent of company management and objective when 
discharging their responsibilities (ICAEW, 2005).  Even though certain agents may implicitly be 
trustworthy without any need for incentives to align interests, or for the establishment of 
monitoring mechanisms such as audits or increased regulation, the agency problem implies that 
agents may inherently be untrustworthy (ICAEW, 2005).   
2.4.6 Slack resource theory 
Organisational slack represents the actual or potential excess capacity, resources or unexploited 
opportunities that allow successful companies to respond to stimuli in their operational 
environment, by adapting to change and implementing necessary strategic interventions (Saleh, 
2009).  While this ‘slack’ may provide companies with a buffer against tough economic and trading 
conditions, it simultaneously allows companies to pursue goals that extend beyond conventional 
corporate objectives.  Slack facilitates bolder competition by providing companies with the 
necessary capacity to reduce the trauma involved in corporate restructuring/repositioning, new 
product innovation, or adapting to evolving corporate values (Bourgeois, 1981). 
Driver and Thompson (2002) conclude that the evidence does not provide compelling proof that 
CSR actually optimises CFP.  Similarly, advocates of a negative relationship between social and 
financial performance argue that there are too few measurable benefits and too many costs 
associated with responsible corporate behaviour (Waddock & Graves, 1997).  They suggest that 
‘responsible’ companies accommodating stakeholder interests incur unnecessary and avoidable 
costs, placing them at a competitive disadvantage.   
By contrast, advocates of responsible corporate citizenship tend to argue in favour of a causal 
relationship between CSR and CFP (Cacioppe et al., 2008; Maignan, Ferrell & Hult, 1999; Orlitzky 
et al., 2003; Waddock & Graves, 1997).  On the other hand, ‘slack resource theory’ suggests that 
any causal relationship actually results from strong CFP providing extra resources that could be 
applied to CSR activities, and not necessarily because effective CSR practices produced improved 
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CFP (Bansal, 2005; Mill, 2006; Statman, 2000).  
Attempting to resolve the question whether financially successful companies have more slack 
resources to spend on achieving greater CSR performance, or whether improved CSR performance 
actually resulted in better financial performance, Waddock and Graves (1997) introduce a “virtuous 
cycle”.  They argue that causation runs in both directions, with improved CFP enhancing CSR 
practices, while at the same time better CSR practices improve CFP.  Orlitzky et al. (2003) argue 
that their meta-analysis of 30 years of empirical data6 conclusively prove a positive correlation 
between CSR and CFP, confirming that the relationship is bidirectional and simultaneous.  Similarly, 
KPMG (2011) found that almost half of the companies in their study were already benefitting 
financially from their CSR initiatives (also implying that more than half were not).  Eccles, Pillay and 
De Jongh (2008) however, found no evidence of a causal relationship between CSR behaviour and 
CFP to support either stakeholder or slack resource theory.   
Intuitively, large companies are more able to absorb the cost of this improved accountability than 
smaller ones.  Working with tighter margins, smaller firms are unlikely to have slack resources, and 
are accordingly less able to absorb the increased cost of compliance associated with more stringent 
labour and environmental compliance (Jenkins, 2001; Jones et al., 2014).  While smaller firms may 
appear to exhibit less responsible behaviour, as they grow they are expected to attract more 
attention from external stakeholders, accelerating their need to implement remedial action 
(Waddock & Graves, 1997).  It is therefore unlikely that companies experiencing financial 
difficulties will have the necessary resources to make what they may perceive as being 
discretionary CSR investments (Waddock & Graves, 1997).  As described in section  4.2.7, slack 
resource theory was used to justify the decision to confine the study to a purposive sample of the 
larger JSE-listed companies.    
2.4.7 Instrumental theory 
Arguing that business and ethics cannot be separated, Freeman (1994) posits that shareholder and 
stakeholder theory should not exist separately.  Excessive focus on shareholder value may 
undermine the efficiency of the free market system, with the resultant economic inequality 
introducing a risk to the conventional capitalism model (Driver & Thompson, 2002).  Advancing a 
more balanced approach to shareholder primacy, Morimoto et al. (2005) contend that companies 
are increasingly incorporating social, economic and environmental dimensions into their business 
operations, while simultaneously building shareholder value.  This instrumentalist perspective, also 
                                           
6 This meta-analysis examined 52 studies, covering 33 878 observations. 
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known as the ‘enlightened shareholder’ or ‘stakeholder inclusive’ model of corporate governance 
(IoD, 2009a), suggests that accommodating stakeholder needs assists companies to achieve long-
term success (Owen, Swift, Humphrey & Bowerman, 2000). 
Shareholder primacy holds that social issues are tangential to, and not a fundamental and integral 
part of the dynamic corporate operating environment (Davis, 2005).  Companies that treat social 
issues as being an irritating distraction, or an unjustified vehicle for attacks on business, could 
ignore impending forces that may fundamentally influence their strategy.  Even though these 
societal pressures may not necessarily produce immediate benefits, failing to timeously take action 
may simply delay the inevitable.  Davis (2005) suggests that more than 80% of the market 
capitalisation in western economies typically factor in corporate cash flows beyond the forthcoming 
three years.  Despite its increased risks and costs, CSR can also provide opportunities for value 
creation.  For example, instrumentalism may result in companies producing generic drugs to reduce 
pharmaceutical costs, providing healthier meal options at fast food restaurants, and developing 
cleaner fuels and more efficient engines to reduce emissions.  Proactive companies could therefore 
gain a competitive advantage by identifying and capitalising on these opportunities before their 
competitors.   
Despite the applicability of several theoretical CSR frameworks and the emergence of diverse CSR 
approaches, this thesis primarily considers an ‘enlightened self-interest’ perspective.  Enlightened 
self-interest typically considers CSR from an instrumental perspective, in terms of which companies 
only consider the interests of stakeholders to the extent that it is in their (and accordingly their 
shareholders’) interests to do so, as implied by Freidman (1970).  Companies producing the best 
results for both their business and society do not necessarily regard CSR as merely being a moral 
issue, but rather a pragmatic response to issues affecting their business (Kirdahy, 2007c).  Some 
companies that report on their CSR performance may therefore only be doing so for the benefit of 
shareholders, and not because it is the ‘right thing to do’ as implied by stakeholder theory.  
2.5 Corporate accountability 
2.5.1 Background  
To account is defined by the Merriam-Webster Dictionary as “a statement explaining one's conduct; 
a statement or exposition of reasons, causes, or motives; a reason for an action”.  Similarly, the 
Compact Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘account’ as “giving a satisfactory record or explanation 
of; to require (someone) to explain a mistake or poor performance”.   
The Canadian Government describes accountability as “the willingness to take responsibility for 
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actions and outcomes; delivering what you promised; accepting good and bad outcomes; owning 
up to shortcomings/mistakes; taking responsibility for one’s actions; and honouring obligations, 
expectations and requirements” (Canada, 2006).  Similarly, King III defines accountability as the 
ability to justify and explain decisions and actions, and responsibility as the state or position of 
having control or authority and being accountable for one’s actions and decisions (IoD, 2009a).  
Accountability may accordingly be defined as accepting responsibility for actions and outcomes 
(irrespective of whether good or bad); delivering performance in respect of obligations and 
expectations; and accounting for the impact of actions and/or inactions. 
While the board may accept responsibility to all stakeholders, it cannot be accountable to all.  If the 
board was accountable to everyone, it would ultimately be accountable to nobody.  The board 
should therefore identify the company’s legitimate stakeholders (including shareholders) and agree 
on how this relationship should be developed and managed in the best interests of the company 
(IoD, 2002).   
Company accountability should extend to constituencies beyond their immediate shareholders 
(Moon et al., 2003).  Gray, Owen and Maunders (1987) link CSR and accountability by defining CSR 
reporting as “the process of providing information designed to discharge social accountability”.  
CSR tends to highlight the inherent tensions between maximising the investment returns of 
shareholders without violating society’s trust (Owen et al., 2000).  Companies are accordingly 
extending their public accountability beyond simply reporting on financial performance by also 
providing non-financial information relating to their social and environmental performance (Okoye, 
2009).   
Utting (2005) contends that corporate accountability extends beyond answering to stakeholders by 
imposing a cost for non-compliance.  Utting (2005) however, cautions that corporate accountability 
incorporates various approaches and perspectives, ranging from voluntarism to regulation; and not 
only about strict government regulation, or prescriptive regimes.  
Although many theories may be advanced for reporting CSR performance (as described in 
section  2.4.1), the primary CSR theoretical bases for discharging corporate accountability 
considered in this study include stakeholder theory (as described in section  2.4.3), legitimacy 
theory (as described in section  2.4.4) and instrumental theory (as described in section  2.4.7) (Gray, 
Owen & Adams, 1995).   
2.5.2 The board of directors 
Unlike the rules sole proprietors and common law partnerships, corporate law creates a legal entity 
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distinct from its management and shareholders.  Since companies are incorporated as juristic 
bodies, independent of those who own them (Driver & Thompson, 2002), shareholders do not own 
the assets of the companies in which they have invested, but have a right to the operating 
surpluses generated.  The diverse ownership of modern companies makes effective oversight by 
shareholders difficult or impossible (Warther, 1998), giving rise to an inherent conflict between 
company ownership and control, encapsulated in the agency problem (as described in 
section  2.4.5).   
Globally, corporate law (Fairfax, 2005) delegates corporate decision rights to the board, separating 
company ownership and control (Blair, 2005; Sarens, Decaux & Lenz, 2012) and introducing the 
agency problem (as described in section  2.4.5).  Companies exercise their powers through 
individuals, with boards of directors (boards) discharging governance functions and responsibilities 
on their behalf (Esser, 2008; Sarens et al., 2012).  The board contributes to the achievement of 
company objectives by providing strategic direction and oversight over the activities of 
management, on behalf of company stakeholders (Sobel & Reding, 2012).  The board discharges 
their oversight responsibilities by protecting shareholder interests and vetoing poor decisions, while 
simultaneously assisting management to increase shareholder value (Mellahi, 2005).   
In South Africa, the statutory corporate governance role of the board is legislated by section 66(1) 
of the Companies Act (71 of 2008), which requires a company’s business affairs to be managed by, 
or under the direction of the board, which has the authority to exercise all of the powers and 
perform the functions of the company.  Section 94(7)(i) empowers the audit committee to 
discharge certain responsibilities on behalf of the board.  Stakeholders expect boards to accept 
responsibility and ensure the implementation of strategies and controls to manage the company’s 
impact on society, the environment and the economy; to engage stakeholders; and to disseminate 
the results to the public (IIA, 2010b).  Recent high-profile adverse global and South African 
business events and trends have highlighted the need for boards to accept broader accountability 
to stakeholders.  As the custodians of corporate governance, the board is responsible for ensuring 
that the various statutes7 and the King III principles are being consistently applied (King III, 
principle 2.9).   
King III (and previous iterations) recommends boards to consist of a balance of non-executive and 
                                           
7 Apart from the Companies Act (71 of 2008), other dimensions of stakeholder protection are provided by the Insolvency 
Act (24 of 1936), the Labour Relations Act (66 of 1995), the Basic Conditions of Employment Act (35 of 1997), the 
Consumer Affairs Act (71 of 1988), the National Credit Act (34 of 2005), the Consumer Protection Act (68 of 2008), the 
Competition Act (89 of 1998), the Estate Agency Affairs Act (112 of 1976) (Esser, 2008), the Financial Advisory and 
Intermediary Services Act (37 of 2002), the Public Finance Management Act (5 of 2007), the Municipal Finance 
Management (56 of 2003), the Banks Amendment Act (19 of 2003), the Short-term Insurance Act (53 of 1998), the 
Long-term Insurance Act (52 of 1998) and, last but not least, the South African common law.      
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executive directors, chaired by an independent non-executive director.  To discharge their 
responsibilities, boards should establish various sub-committees; empower executive management 
to implement policies, procedures and controls that facilitate achieving corporate objectives and 
strategies; and ensure that performance and risk management goals and objectives are effectively 
implemented, monitored, evaluated and reported (Percy, 1997).  In this regard, King III requires 
the board (or when appropriate its sub-committee, the audit committee) to be responsible for 
appointing and providing oversight over the agents of the company involved in the governance 
process.  These responsibilities include appointing the chief executive officer (King III, principle 
2.17), providing oversight over the internal audit activity (King III, principle 3.7), appointing the 
chief audit executive (CAE) (King III, recommended practice 3.7.1), and recommending the 
appointment of the external auditor and providing oversight over the external audit process (King 
III, principle 3.9).  
Directors are obliged not to act in their own interests, but to exercise their powers bona fide and in 
good faith for the benefit of the company as a whole, and not to the individual shareholders 
(Cilliers & Benade, 1982; Esser, 2008).  Directors should therefore exercise reasonable care and 
skill when discharging their duties in the best interests of the company as a separate legal entity 
(Esser, 2008; Fairfax, 2005).  Esser (2008) contends that the common law duties of directors 
include a fiduciary obligation (1) to prevent conflicts of interest; (2) not to exceed their powers; 
(3) to maintain unfettered discretion; and (4) to exercise their powers for the purpose for which 
they were conferred.  Esser (2008) extends these duties by arguing that it may be in the best 
interest of the company as a whole for directors’ responsibilities to not only consider shareholder 
interests, but that of other stakeholders as well.   
Agency theory attempts to explain the challenges of separating company ownership and control (as 
described in section  2.4.5).  The board, supported by senior management, should understand and 
appreciate the material impacts of the business operations on society and the environment, as well 
as the resultant risks and emerging opportunities (Black & Quach, 2009).  As described in 
section  2.5.3, the almost universal acceptance that the board carries the ultimate responsibility for 
ensuring effective corporate governance, implies that it is therefore ultimately accountable to 
shareholders (and arguably under certain circumstances even to its broader stakeholders) for 
ensuring the adequacy of the company’s system of governance.  
2.5.3 Corporate level responsible for CSR 
As described in section  2.5.2, even though the board has overall accountability for the effectiveness 
of CSR-related systems of governance, risk management and internal control; management is 
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responsible for establishing CSR objectives, implementing CSR policies and procedures, managing 
CSR risks and measuring CSR performance, as well as monitoring and reporting CSR activities (IIA, 
2010b).  Management should therefore ensure that the company’s CSR-related principles, 
standards and procedures are clearly communicated, understood and integrated into company 
decision-making processes. 
Notwithstanding established company accountability structures described above, the pervasive 
nature of CSR-related activities requires each company employee to accept direct responsibility for 
ensuring the success of CSR-related objectives.  Nevertheless, even though everyone in the 
company may be responsible for CSR, unless responsibility is specifically allocated to a senior 
company official, in reality nobody in the company will actually be accountable.  The importance of 
CSR to companies is indicated by the corporate level to which CSR responsibility has been 
allocated, as well as whether a direct reporting line has been established with the board.  
Companies failing to allocate specific CSR responsibility to a senior executive are likely to produce 
perfunctory, rather than meaningful CSR reports (Nitkin & Brooks, 1998). 
2.6 Corporate ethics 
It may be argued that business has an ethical responsibility to contribute to economic 
development, while simultaneously improving the quality of life of its workforce and their families, 
the local community and society at large (IIA, 2010b).  Irrespective of whether company CSR and 
disclosure practices are motivated by economic reasons (legitimisation and/or instrumentalism), or 
ethical reasons (the right thing to do), or simply in order to comply with prevailing legislation and 
regulations, the ethical underpinnings of CSR are briefly considered below. 
Business ethics deals with concepts that describe and explain the values and principles relating to 
the business environment (De Cremer et al., 2011), including the accountability structures 
implemented and the relationship between ethical behaviour and financial performance.  Business 
ethics normatively reflects what companies ‘ought’ to do (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994).  Being 
juristic bodies, company decision-making is undertaken by individuals on their behalf.  Companies 
may accordingly be regarded as amoral, deriving their ethical practices from the individual or 
collective values of company leadership (IoD, 2009a).  Ethical theories may however, generate 
potentially conflicting interpretations of what may be considered to be ethical or unethical (Beekun, 
Stedham & Yamamura, 2003).   
The principles underpinning CSR essentially argues against morally indifferent business practices, 
instead favouring morally sensitive stakeholder management practices and expansive public policy 
(Windsor, 2006).  Stakeholders expect corporate ethical behaviour to extend beyond mandatory 
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legal compliance, with ethical managers displaying moral reflection in decision-making that extends 
beyond the law.  Windsor (2006) suggests that ethical corporate responsibility practice lies along a 
continuum between mandatory compliance (economic and legal) and desirable philanthropy 
(prudent or voluntary).  Although companies may be motivated to engage in and report on 
responsible CSR practices, either for economic or ethical reasons, the underlying motivation is likely 
to be a combination of the two (Sadler & Lloyd, 2009). 
In terms of King III, corporate leadership is characterised by the ethical values of responsibility, 
accountability, fairness and transparency, in terms of the company’s perceived moral duties (IoD, 
2009b).  Ethics underpin corporate governance and by implication CSR and CSR reporting 
practices.  The board is responsible for ensuring that management incorporates ethically sound 
principles into the company’s vision, mission and objectives, thus providing its ‘licence to operate’.  
Corporations consider stakeholder interests in their business dealings according to three primary 
ethical approaches (Carroll, 1991).  These are: 
• Immoral managers – characterised by decisions, actions and behaviours that suggest active 
opposition to what may be normatively deemed as ‘right’ or ‘ethical’.  The decisions of 
immoral managers are incompatible with accepted ethical norms, actively contradicting what 
may be considered moral.  Immoral managers may regard regulation as an impediment to 
achieving their objectives, and tend to strategically exploit opportunities for personal or 
corporate gain.  Driven by a desire to achieve their objectives, immoral managers may 
disregard or circumvent legislation and regulations.   
• Moral managers – tend to have ethical positions that conform to accepted social ethical 
behavioural norms.  Moral managers not only conform to accepted and high standards of 
professional conduct, but also typically exemplify leadership on ethical issues.  Moral 
managers tend to consider both the letter and the spirit of the law, with the law guiding the 
minimum acceptable ethical behavioural standards.  Moral managers usually operate well 
above the prescribed minimum requirements of legislation and regulations.  While still striving 
for optimal profitability, the decisions of moral managers are guided by sound ethical 
principles such as justice, fairness, rights and due process.   
• Amoral managers – may be neither immoral nor moral, but may simply be insensitive about 
the impact of their everyday decisions on others.  Amoral managers may even be oblivious to 
the harm of their decisions on those with whom the business interacts, albeit unintentionally.  
While the ethical position of some amoral managers may be guided by the letter, and not the 
spirit, of the law, other amoral managers act intentionally, believing that their ethical 
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orientation affects their personal but not their business decisions. 
2.7 Disclosure of CSR performance 
2.7.1 Background  
The primary purpose of financial reporting is to assist shareholders in investment decision-making, 
with a secondary purpose being to provide information to other interested parties such as financial 
institutions, the taxation authorities, bankers and relevant government departments and agencies.  
On the other hand, the objective of non-financial reporting should be to provide information of 
interest to the company’s broader stakeholders (Eccles, 2010).   
Inherent conflict exists between company financial and CSR performance, with preference being 
given to financial performance (Gray & Milne, 2002), confirming instrumentalism (as described in 
section  2.4.7).  Gray and Milne (2002) argue that company practices appear to be inherently 
unsustainable, since pursuing growth and profit will increase their throughput, and, consequently, 
their ecological impact.  This conflict can only be resolved when financial, social and environmental 
accountability are given equal weight, allowing for the assessment of the extent to which economic 
and social/environmental issues are in real conflict.  To overcome this deficiency, companies should 
produce complete and transparent disclosures about the extent to which the company has 
contributed to, or diminished the sustainability of the planet.  This will however, involve a detailed 
and complex analysis of the company’s interactions with ecological systems, resources, habitats, 
and societies, interpreted within the context of the past and present impacts on those same 
systems.  CSR will therefore remain a ‘nice idea’ until substantive legislation exists, with which all 
large companies should comply.  
Historically, non-financial disclosures tended to be regarded as being for information purposes only, 
and were therefore considered less important than financial disclosures.  It may however, be 
argued that the numbers alone provide only a partial or isolated picture of company operations.  In 
order to more accurately depict the ‘big picture’, information inadequately reflected in financial 
reports should be disclosed through contextual accounting practices, normatively reflected in 
company annual reports (Gouws & Cronjé, 2008).   
Contextual accounting should complement financial accounting practices by comprehensively 
reflecting intangibles, opportunities and risks.  Non-financial information provides the necessary 
context to meaningfully assess company performance (Gouws & Cronjé, 2008).  Contextual 
disclosures include reporting on the non-financial economic, environmental and social dimensions 
of corporate operations.  While statutory financial disclosures are provided according to generally 
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accepted accounting practice (GAAP), or more recently to the international financial reporting 
standards (IFRS), disparate accounting and reporting practices are used for non-financial 
disclosures.     
Stakeholders are beginning to appreciate the value of comprehensive CSR information facilitating 
the improved assessment of company risks and enhancing investment decision-making (Hummels 
& Timmer, 2004).  As ratings agencies and socially responsible, ethical or other institutional 
investors become increasingly interested in non-financial company information, the tendency to 
rely exclusively on financial information for decision-making is waning.  While improved CSR 
reporting improves company decision-making, it also assists to entrench a desirable corporate 
culture (Morimoto et al., 2005).  Companies should therefore understand the needs of their 
different stakeholders and adapt their CSR disclosures to accommodate the reasonable information 
requirements of each legitimate stakeholder group.  Companies should therefore disclose any CSR 
information that legitimate stakeholders may consider material.   
The 2011 KPMG report8 found that companies were increasingly willing to account for their CSR 
impacts, as depicted by the recent global growth in CSR reporting.  CorporateRegister [sa]9 
illustrates this growth by reporting that only 26 CSR reports were issued globally in 1992; 201 in 
1995; 837 in 2000; 2 465 in 2005; and 5 627 in 2010.  KPMG (2011: 14) confirmed this growth 
trend by reporting that 95% of the world’s largest 250 companies (G250) reported on their CSR 
activities in 2011, compared to 79% in 2008 and 52% in 2005 (KPMG, 2008: 14).  Country-level 
CSR reporting by the top 100 companies in 34 countries (N100) increased by 11% since 2008, to 
64% by 2011 (KPMG, 2011: 10).  South Africa’s CSR report ranking climbed to third place with 
97% of the top 100 companies reporting on their CSR activities, just behind the UK and Japan with 
100% and 98% respectively (Ackers, 2009). 
In order to be credible, social and environmental reporting should be undertaken with the same 
rigour as conventional financial reporting and as part of a broader integrated reporting framework 
(Force for Good [sa]).  This is aligned to King III principle 9.2 (IoD, 2009a), which requires 
corporate financial and CSR reporting and disclosures to be provided in an integrated annual report 
(as described in section  2.7.7.6). 
2.7.2 Evolution of CSR reporting 
Despite its recent topicality, the origins of CSR reporting may be traced back to the 16th century 
                                           
8 KPMG have published triennial reports on CSR reporting since 1993.   
9 CorporateRegister.com accessed online on 25 January 2012 at http://www.corporateregister.com/stats/.  
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(Mock, Strohm & Swartz, 2007).  Contemporary CSR discourse can be traced to a series of articles 
between A.A. Berle and E.M. Dodd in the 1930s (Okoye, 2009).  Berle (1931) argued that 
managers should limit their use of corporate power to their fiduciary responsibilities for the 
exclusive benefit of shareholders only.  Dodd (1932) on the other hand, disagreed with Berle’s 
increased emphasis that companies only existed to provide shareholders with profits.  Dodd (1932) 
posited that business did not simply exist to provide profits for its owners, but also to serve the 
community.  Although accepting that companies had a fiduciary responsibility towards 
shareholders, Dodd (1932) asserted that companies also had a social responsibility towards 
employees, consumers and the general public.  Suggesting that all businesses had a public interest, 
Dodd (1932) contended that management could legally assume social responsibility without 
violating their inherent fiduciary responsibilities.  Without dismissing the principle of broader 
stakeholder responsibility, Berle (1932) responded by arguing in favour of shareholder primacy, 
and suggesting that until a clear and enforceable scheme of responsibilities to a wider range of 
stakeholders emerged, that companies should continue to exist solely to make profits for their 
shareholders.   
By the advent of the 21st century, changing stakeholder expectations of business prompted 
companies to adapt their reporting strategies from focusing exclusively on quantitative financial 
matters to also include qualitative non-financial issues (Zorio, Garcia-Benau & Sierra, 2013).  As 
more stakeholders demand CSR reports (Morimoto et al., 2005), access to CSR reporting should be 
considered a ‘right to know’ and a priority for the reporting entity, irrespective of whether the 
information is subsequently used by stakeholders (Hibbitt, 1999).  As described in section  2.6, it 
may be argued that companies have both a legal and moral obligation to provide stakeholders with 
relevant information relating to their operational impacts (Archel, Fernández & Larrinaga, 2008).  
Fernandez-Feijoo, Romero and Ruiz (2014) found that environmentally sensitive industries were 
leading the CSR reporting drive.  The interdependence of the interrelated company management 
information systems should provide balanced company reports, with non-financial disclosures filling 
the gaps left by inadequacies in financial accounting and reporting (Gouws & Cronjé, 2008).   
Based on the fundamental principles of transparency and accountability, the technical 
implementation of CSR accounting and reporting developed at the same time as the basis for 
philosophical accounting (Okoye, 2009).  Despite incorporating new types of disclosures into 
company annual reports, CSR performance remains difficult to measure (Gouws & Cronjé, 2008).  
CSR reporting is further complicated by a lack of consensus about what CSR involves, undermining 
the ability to accurately measure CSR performance and relate it to other dimensions of company 
performance (Aras & Crowther, 2008).  The challenge for CSR accounting and reporting is ensuring 
that non-financial information is reported according to the same standard presently used for 
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financial reporting (ICAEW, 2004).  Overcoming this challenge is necessary for both internal 
reporting for management decision-making and external reporting to address the legitimate 
concerns of multiple stakeholder groups. 
New CSR accountability instruments include multi-stakeholder dialogues, public–private 
partnerships, co-regulation10 and social auditing, as manifested in rigorous CSR standards, 
procedures and reporting deployed by companies and industry sectors to account for CSR issues.  
Few of these reports however, provide a balanced perspective of real company social and 
environmental performance, particularly with regard to the negative impacts.  Over the past 
decade, the instruments used to account for CSR have multiplied and moved away from fixating on 
self-regulation in favour of establishing environmental policies or corporate codes (Utting, 2005).  
Company reports previously designated as environmental reports are now being repackaged as 
CSR reports (Aras & Crowther, 2008), more recently being incorporated into integrated reports (as 
described in section  2.7.7.6).  Recognising that various economic sectors require different sets of 
indicators, organisations like the GRI continue to refine reporting indicators (as described in 
section  2.7.7.3) (Utting, 2005). 
2.7.3 Drivers of CSR reporting 
Whereas 25 years ago, 80% of a company’s market value of was reflected on the balance sheet as 
tangible assets, with only 20% representing intangibles; today 80% of company market value 
factors in non-financial information (Eccles, Krzus & Serafeim, 2011: 2; Gouws & Cronjé, 2008: 
109).  The overemphasis on financial reporting may therefore result in other important information 
relating to the manner in which the company affects the environment and interacts with society at 
large being omitted (Cohen, Holder-Webb, Nath & Wood, 2011).  Reporting CSR performance is 
accordingly becoming increasingly important as companies begin recognising the accruing benefits 
of improved corporate disclosures and increased transparency (Aras & Crowther, 2008; Jones 
et al., 2014). 
Current CSR reporting guidelines do not prescribe the corporate boundaries, but leave their 
definition and interpretation to reporting companies and their stakeholders, ostensibly through 
effective stakeholder engagement (Archel et al., 2008).  Despite historically emphasising financial 
information, company annual reports are mechanisms through which companies can convey 
pertinent CSR-related information to stakeholders (Force for Good [sa]).  Annual reports should 
provide a complete and permanent record of corporate activities, as well as their associated social, 
economic and environmental performance.   
                                           
10 In terms of which norms are established and implemented through collaboration by public, private and civil society. 
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Social and environmental reporting represents one important component of CSR that companies 
should account for (Gray et al., 1995).  Stakeholders often use company annual reports to reduce 
uncertainty by assessing the associated risks and capitalising on emerging opportunities.  This 
requires the correct information to be reliably and timeously provided.  Moreover, the Fédération 
des Experts Comptables Européens (FEE) (2011) suggests that the recent global financial crisis has 
highlighted the need to improve long-term sustainable decision-making, including using CSR-
related information.  Disclosing material financial information may be considered important for 
protecting investor interests, underpinning the effective functioning of financial markets.  
Companies not disclosing material non-financial information may therefore actually be deceiving 
investors (IIA, 2010b).  While CSR reporting was once considered a moral obligation, companies 
now increasingly recognise it as a business imperative (Jones et al., 2014; KPMG, 2011).  Company 
responses to the information needs of stakeholders are driving improved annual report disclosure 
practices (Gouws & Cronjé, 2008).  Several stock exchanges now require their member companies 
to report on their CSR performance (Vontobel [sa]).  According to Owen et al. (2000) social, ethical 
and environmental accounting, reporting and auditing complement similar financial functions when 
reflecting on triple bottom line reporting.   
The dynamic nature of CSR reporting is illustrated by KPMG (2011: 18–19) finding that globally the 
primary drivers of CSR reporting has shifted from ethical (69% in 2008) and economic (74% in 
2005) considerations, to reputation management (67% in 2011).  While economic considerations 
were perceived to be a major driver in 2005 (74%) and 2008 (68%), by 2011 it only represented 
32%, which may be attributed to the rather nebulous nature of economic considerations.  Recent 
global focus on CSR-related issues may have contributed to improving respondents’ understanding 
of the research questions, facilitating the provision of more informed responses. 
2.7.4 Institutional investors  
Recent global growth in the equity holdings of institutional investors, such as pension and mutual 
funds has been substantial.  The growth and importance of institutional investors is highlighted by 
Mervyn King who confirms that the shareholders of large corporations have changed from wealthy 
families, to financial institutions and pension funds (King 2008).  Institutions invest on behalf of the 
proverbial “person in the street”, who are ultimately the beneficial shareholders (Temkin, 2008).   
As one of the first researchers to propose a positive correlation between socially responsible 
investors (SRI) and corporate performance, Moskowitz (1972) showed that a portfolio of socially 
screened equity holdings outperformed the Dow Jones Industrial Index.  Corporations should 
accordingly take cognisance of the concerns of institutional owners to improve the investment 
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attractiveness of their companies.  While investment decisions of institutional investors are not 
usually based on CSR disclosures in conventional company disclosures, such as annual reports, 
they are favourably considered when quantified, focused on specific issues and obtained from 
disinterested parties11 (Teoh & Shiu, 1990: 76; Waddock & Graves, 1997: 304, Graves & Waddock, 
1994).  Moreover, institutional investors are more capable of assimilating and acting on CSR 
practices than individuals (Heiner, 1983). 
The demand for ‘responsible investments’ is illustrated by the growth in Principles for Responsible 
Investment (PRI) signatories.  The PRI was launched in 200512 and has grown to include 
1 200 signatory organisations representing assets under management of US$34 trillion (US$22 
trillion in July 2010) globally by May 2014, with 46 of these signatories being from South Africa.  
The Public Investment Corporation Limited (PIC) in South Africa, which manages assets valued at 
ZAR 1.6 trillion (at 31 March 2014) on behalf of its beneficiaries are, signatories to the PRI (PIC, 
2014), making it one of the largest investment managers on the African continent.  Institutional 
investor signatories to the PRI commit to acting in the best long-term interests of their 
beneficiaries.  PRI signatories accept that environmental, social and corporate governance (ESG) 
issues can affect the performance of their investment portfolios, improving the alignment of 
investors with the broader objectives of society.  Some investors may however, only utilise CSR 
information in terms of a separate mandate (Hummels & Timmer, 2004).  For example, institutional 
investors may wish to meet the requirements of some socially responsible index, such as the JSE 
SRI or the PRI.   
The global financial world (institutional investors in particular) recognises that the corporate cost of 
capital is directly correlated to the perceived risk associated with investing in that company.  
Larger, more established companies tend to provide a safer investment and tend to be associated 
with a lower cost of capital.  Similarly, more ‘sustainable’ companies are less risky than those that 
are not, which should be addressed in the context of their operations, often reflecting a rosy 
picture of continued growth, with an expectation of continued profitability (Aras & Crowther, 2008).  
Since financial investment risk probability models are usually based on past experience, they 
remain vulnerable to Black Swan events (Taleb, 2007)13 and are exposed to significant 
unanticipated potential losses, which are not incorporated into most risk models.  Such events are 
usually without precedent, impairing meaningful investment modelling. 
                                           
11 In this context, disinterested parties refer to unbiased, impartial and objective parties. 
12 Principles for Responsible Investment accessed on 30 May 2014 at http://www.unpri.org/about-pri/about-pri/.  
13 Black Swan is a highly improbable but highly consequential event, comprising three principal characteristics – its 
unpredictability; its massive impact; and the desire to reduce the randomness and improve predictability after the fact. 
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2.7.5 Primary CSR reporting approaches 
2.7.5.1 Mandatory and voluntary CSR reporting 
CSR reporting occurs within a particular context, in certain areas and under specific circumstances, 
with variability in global CSR reporting practices being influenced by regional perspectives (Okoye, 
2009).  Companies in developing countries may for example, trust their governments (and 
accordingly regulatory regimes) more than they trust companies, especially when compared to 
developed countries (Okoye, 2009).  Conversely, companies operating in developing countries may 
accordingly oppose strict regulatory regimes, on the basis that imposing CSR interventions could 
increase operating costs.  These companies may prefer supporting perfunctory and relatively weak 
codes of governance instead; often only complying with the minimum requirements, but without 
incurring ‘unnecessary costs’ (Jenkins, 2001; Wells, 2007). 
Despite supporting mandatory governance, Becht et al. (2005) argue that stringent rule 
enforcement may be counterproductive.  Asserting that companies should provide shareholders 
with adequate protection mechanisms, they caution that regulators may not have the necessary 
information to define efficient rules.  Becht et al. (2005) advance two primary reasons for 
regulatory intervention.  Firstly, even when a corporate charter has been designed and 
implemented, it was unlikely to involve all relevant stakeholders, resulting in rules that were likely 
to be inefficient.  Secondly, even when companies respond to the ‘right incentives’ when designing 
efficient rules, they may still want to retain sufficient flexibility to contravene or alter them when 
necessary. 
CSR represents a company’s commitment to improving community well-being, extending beyond 
mere legislative and regulatory compliance and should include moral or ethical behaviour cognisant 
of society’s expectations of business (Kotler & Lee, 2005).  Unlike mandatory externally oriented 
financial reporting, CSR reporting is usually voluntary, resulting in disparate and inconsistent CSR 
reporting practices (Ackers, 2009; Marx & van Dyk, 2011; Rea, 2011).  Voluntary governance 
initiatives involve more than simple pragmatic innovations aimed at enriching the institutional 
environment (UNRISD, 2000) and should therefore establish a platform to institutionalise the 
desired ethical culture corporate to drive the company’s CSR reporting approach. 
2.7.5.2 Mandatory disclosure 
It is suggested that government intervention may be necessary to stimulate and regulate CSR 
reporting (KPMG, 2011).  Companies and governments should collaborate on CSR-related matters 
to develop strong frameworks, set targets and provide a stable regulatory environment for 
sustainable solutions, including a mix of taxes, incentives, laws, regulations and market 
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mechanisms, such as emission trading systems (Force for Good [sa]).  Legislation should result in 
improved corporate citizenship (Van Gass, 2008).  Despite appearing to be in conflict with the 
ideals of voluntarism, King III (IoD, 2009a) emphasises the linkage between good governance and 
the law, suggesting that good governance is not something that exists separately from the law.  
King III (IoD, 2009a: 7) points out that many of the King II recommendations were now “matters 
of law”, having been incorporated into the new Companies Act, 2008.   
Increasing international activity has resulted in the development and introduction of mandatory 
CSR reporting regulations, particularly in northern Europe where certain countries require 
companies to disclose their CSR performance in annual reports (Zorio et al., 2013).  France, for 
example, has introduced the novellas regulations economiques (NRE), which require companies to 
provide CSR indicators in addition to the conventional statutory financial disclosures (Force for 
Good [sa]).  Similarly, directors in the UK are obliged to disclose their material CSR risks 
(CorporateRegister, 2008).  Since some companies will only grudgingly comply with the absolute 
minimum legal and regulatory requirements, Spencer [sa] argues that government should increase 
CSR legislation and regulation, and stringently enforce compliance. 
CSR performance reporting is compulsory for Malaysian publicly listed companies (PwC, 2007).  
The Indian Companies Act takes mandatory CSR to the next level by not only requiring certain 
companies to report on their annual CSR activities, it also for certain companies to establish a CSR 
committee (India, 2013).  Similarly, certain aspects of CSR reporting are mandatory in South Africa 
too (some of these regulations and legislation are reflected in footnote 7).  Despite King III being a 
voluntary governance code, section 7.F.5 of the JSE regulations makes it mandatory for all JSE-
listed companies to apply all the King III principles, or to explain why they have not applied any 
particular principle(s) (as described in section  2.7.7.2) (JSE, 2011; IoD, 2009a & IoD, 2009b).  
Although not usually intended for public consumption, other examples of mandatory CSR-related 
reporting include those relating to safety, health and environmental legislation, the Employment 
Equity Act (no. 55 of 1998) and broad-based black economic empowerment (BBBEE).14 
In the USA however, the much vaunted, but costly to implement, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
(SOX) (Brennan & Solomon, 2008) only requires improved disclosure on the effectiveness of 
internal control over financial reporting (ICFR).  While SOX section 302 requires management to 
certify the effectiveness of its disclosure controls, it is silent on CSR-related risks or controls 
                                           
14 A South African government programme intended to redress the imbalances caused by apartheid providing economic 
opportunities to previously disadvantaged groups.  It includes employment equity, skills development, ownership, 
management, socioeconomic development and preferential procurement. 
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(Kinney & Shepardson, 2011; United States Congress, 2002).  Similarly, despite Christopher Cox15 
arguing that SOX section 404 was intended to “provide meaningful disclosure to investors about 
the effectiveness of a company’s internal controls systems, without creating unnecessary 
compliance burdens or wasting shareholder resources” (Kinney & Shepardson, 2011), SOX is silent 
on any aspects of non-financial governance too (United States Congress, 2002). 
While it may be argued that mandatory regulations are intended to compel companies to increase 
their disclosure levels, anecdotally some companies will always only provide minimal (tick-box) 
compliance, without actually providing stakeholders with anything of value.  Moreover, the 
ineffectiveness of mandatory CSR reporting is exacerbated by the lack of universally agreed 
standards and frameworks and, in extreme cases, may even stimulate a desire to beat the system. 
2.7.5.3 Voluntary disclosure 
In many countries, government’s regulatory CSR role is rendered effectively obsolete through the 
increasing adoption of voluntary corporate and/or industry initiatives for implementing, monitoring 
and reporting CSR (UNRISD, 2000; Utting, 2005).  Without appropriate legislation and regulations, 
many South African organisations have voluntarily adopted the principles of the various iterations 
of the King Code of Governance to improve their governance practices (Ackers, 2009; Esser, 2008; 
Marx & Van Dyk, 2011; Rea, 2011).  While many firms now voluntarily disclose CSR-related 
information on their websites, others publish it in formal reports (Hess & Dunfee, 2007).  CSR 
reporting should therefore remain sufficiently flexible to reflect its different conceptions, and 
illustrate its diverse participants and dimensions (Okoye, 2009).   
It may be argued that legal corporate accountability by transnational companies (TNCs) can be 
enforced through promulgating appropriate regulations and legislation to enhance CSR-related 
disclosures.  To retain control and avoid regulatory interference, TNCs and large companies usually 
favour voluntary management-led annual CSR report disclosures often exceeding the legal or 
regulatory requirements (Okoye, 2009).  Voluntary CSR reporting therefore provides an important 
alternative to increased government regulation of business (Wines, 2008).  Supporting a free 
market system and consequentialism, Wines (2008) argues that corporate regulation is an 
inherently inefficient mechanism that stifles business growth.  Orlitzky et al. (2003) posit that the 
case for governmental regulation and control (acting on behalf of ‘society’) of CSR reporting is 
relatively weak.  They argue that companies (and their shareholders), and not their broader 
stakeholders, tend to benefit from management’s analysis, evaluation and distortion of the 
                                           
15 Christopher Cox was a member of the USA Congress in 2002 and was later appointed chairman of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC). 
 
Page 65 of 338 
 
preferences of multiple constituents.  Assuming instrumental CSR theory (as described in 
section  2.4.3), many companies voluntarily adopt CSR-related programmes based on a cost-benefit 
analysis to prevent government prescribing inflexible CSR accountability mechanisms, which they 
may wish to avoid. 
Archel et al. (2008) suggest that the reasons that companies voluntarily provide CSR reports 
remain unclear.  Instead of discharging their broader stakeholder accountability, companies 
publishing CSR reports may simply want to improve or maintain their reputations (Bebbington, 
Larrinaga & Moneva, 2008).  These companies may not necessarily reflect an increased concern 
about social and environmental issues, but may be more interested in the accrual of instrumental 
benefits to the company (Aras & Crowther, 2008). 
Voluntary CSR initiatives tend to lack the necessary mechanisms for enforcing compliance and 
imposing effective penalties for breaking the ‘rules’.  Archel et al. (2008) caution that the voluntary 
nature of CSR reporting, as well as hierarchical stakeholder structures, may motivate companies to 
provide CSR disclosures in order to strategically meet the interests of their more powerful 
shareholders, while dismissing the interests of those less powerful.  Similarly, Owen et al. (2000) 
warn that voluntary initiatives have largely been unsuccessful in eliciting meaningful responses 
from companies about the environmental and social dimensions of their operations.   
Archel et al. (2008) conclude that the premise of voluntarily reporting CSR may actually impair the 
quality of boundary setting and disclosure.  Therefore, until the introduction of global standards 
that may be consistently applied by companies around the world, comparability will remain a 
challenge for voluntary CSR reporting (IIA, 2010b).  It is proposed that this deficiency may only be 
overcome through the development and implementation of more robust CSR reporting frameworks 
(Force for Good [sa]).  Companies should therefore collaborate effectively to create voluntary 
frameworks and rigorously encourage compliance.  The principle of voluntarism is that successful 
CSR governance initiatives should not be based on an enforcement regime, but rather on 
embedding self-regulation in the corporate fabric, as illustrated by the almost universal acceptance 
of the Hippocratic Oath for physicians, dating back to the 4th century BC. 
2.7.6 Development of CSR reporting practices 
In the late 1980s, the Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of 
Accounting and Reporting (ISAR) began developing environmental accounting and reporting 
practices.  By 1999, ISAR agreed to continue developing environmental accounting and disclosure 
practices and to promote CSR reporting (UNCTAD, 2002).  In the 1990s, private organisations like 
the Institute of Social and Ethical Accountability (AccountAbility) and the New Economics 
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Foundation led the initiative to establish social and ethical accounting, auditing and reporting 
(SEAAR) standards, complementing similar financial functions to reflect triple bottom line 
performance (Owen et al., 2000).   
More recent initiatives included developments by the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), the 
International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) and the Chartered Institute of Management 
Accountants (CIMA) (Reuvid, 2007).  According to King (as cited in Van Gass, 2008), the GRI and 
the Big 4 audit firms are working towards developing a ‘holistic’ reporting standard for non-financial 
company reporting.  This new CSR reporting standard, which King suggests should be ready by 
2018, will improve stakeholder assessment and decision-making.  The Big 4 audit firms concede 
that simply reporting according to the existing IFRS only presents part of the picture.  Non-financial 
reporting standards should therefore be harmonised and developed to improve the quality and 
comparability of CSR reporting practices (Van Gass, 2008). 
2.7.7 CSR reporting standards and frameworks 
2.7.7.1 Background  
CSR reporting practices have largely been driven by the adoption of corporate codes (Okoye, 
2009).  Standardised methods for analysing and measuring CSR performance that are universally 
understood, and consistently and comparably evaluated by interested parties, improve stakeholder 
decision-making (Aras & Crowther, 2008).  On the other hand, the inconsistent interpretation of 
what constitutes CSR may conveniently facilitate corporate disingenuity, especially since corporate 
risk evaluation methodologies often inadequately incorporate CSR-related risks (Aras & Crowther, 
2008).  
To fully recognise and incorporate the costs and benefits associated with CSR-related performance 
into the investment analysis process, requires the types of costs and revenues to be identified 
(Aras & Crowther, 2008).  CSR reporting should therefore provide a balanced perspective that 
recognises both the benefits and costs of the company’s interaction with the environment and 
society extending beyond the traditional financial footprint. 
Increasing recognition of the social and environmental dimensions of company activity as important 
strategic matters, are driving the need to establish appropriate CSR reporting standards (Jenkins, 
2001).  The development and implementation of standardised metrics and reporting principles are 
therefore imperative for the ongoing development of CSR reporting (KPMG, 2011).  This has 
resulted in the emergence of several different frameworks and standards to account for and 
disclose CSR-related performance (Morimoto et al., 2005). 
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Financial analysts, investors and other stakeholders tend to question the reliability, comparability, 
relevance and materiality of CSR disclosures, creating a credibility gap that reduces the usefulness 
of CSR reports (Manetti & Becatti, 2009). This deficiency is exacerbated when companies 
strategically use CSR reporting standards and deliberately fail to disclose their indirect impacts, or 
concealing non-disclosure, contributing to the perceived shallow nature of CSR reporting (Archel 
et al., 2008).  Companies wishing to act responsibly should therefore collaborate to establish and 
implement appropriate universally applicable standards through self-regulation. 
While not exhaustive or mutually exclusive, some of the more prominent approaches, codes, 
standards and frameworks, as well as pertinent South African regulations and legislation dealing 
with CSR-related matters, are briefly described in the sub-sections below.  It is however, 
recognised that the financial, environmental and social dimensions of accounting, reporting and 
assurance remain at different evolutionary stages. 
2.7.7.2 King Code of Governance for South Africa, 2009 (King III) 
Codes of conduct are written statements of principle or policy intended to reflect corporate 
commitment to particular principles and practices (Okoye, 2009).  These usually include guidelines, 
recommendations or rules, issued by companies to, inter alia, enhance their CSR reporting 
practices (Okoye, 2009).  Corporate codes include codes of ethics and codes of conduct, 
representing the most visible signs of a company’s ethical or moral philosophy (Stead, Worrell & 
Stead, 1990).  The development of voluntary codes has been largely unstructured, resulting in their 
inconsistent application and interpretation (ICAEW, 2004).  The importance of corporate codes is 
driven by globalisation, and a need to incorporate universally applicable core principles into the 
corporate governance structure (Singh et al., 2005).  Jenkins (2001) argues that developing 
realistic codes should obviate a need for government regulation, reducing pressure on government 
to control corporate activity.  Jenkins (2001) however, cautions that corporate codes could be 
implemented in ‘bad faith’, without actually changing anything on the ground but simply to deflect 
public criticism. 
The release of the Cadbury Report and Code of Best Practice in the UK in 1992 initiated the 
institutionalisation of voluntary corporate governance practices.  Cadbury argued that proper 
management accountability was imperative to improve company governance practices.  Cadbury 
emphasised that companies themselves were responsible for adhering to a code of best practice, 
as exercised through their boards (Cheffins, 1999).  Since then, several countries, from Algeria to 
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Yemen, have published corporate governance related codes.16 
Under the auspices of the King committee, the Institute of Directors of Southern Africa released the 
first King report and code of governance for South Africa (King I) in 1994 aimed at promoting the 
highest standards of corporate governance.  At the time, King I was ground-breaking and 
introduced an integrated approach to good governance that accommodated the interests of a wide 
range of stakeholders (IoD, 1994; Hendrikse & Hendrikse, 2004).  King I identified three primary 
stakeholder categories, including (i) shareholders; (ii) stakeholders with contractual relations 
(including employees, consumers and suppliers); and (iii) stakeholders without contractual relations 
(including government and local authorities).  King I highlighted the importance of clear, open, 
understandable and transparent stakeholder communication, introducing stakeholder-oriented 
reporting on employee-related matters, environmental issues and social responsibility activities 
(IoD, 1994).  Esser (2008) argues that communication provides a basis for stakeholder protection 
by recognising stakeholder interests, but without imposing any corresponding legal obligation.  
Despite King I advocating shareholder primacy by requiring directors to act in the best interest of 
the company, it also recognises that companies should consider the interests of other stakeholders 
by disclosing pertinent information about the company. 
Responding to pressures of a constantly evolving global socioeconomic and regulatory 
environment, King I was revised when King II was released in 2002.  King II expanded the 
corporate governance concept by moving away from a single (financial) bottom line, towards a 
more inclusive triple bottom line approach, by including aspects relating to the economic, 
environmental and social impacts of a company’s activity.  King II elevated the importance of CSR 
reporting as a core component of corporate governance practice by requiring CSR reporting to be 
integrated with financial reporting (IoD, 2002: 34–36).   
The third King Code on Governance for South Africa (King III) released on 1 September 2009 went 
even further by arguing that the “planet, people and profit were inextricably intertwined” (IoD, 
2009a: 11).  King III became effective from 1 March 2010 for accounting periods ending 28 
February 2011 (IoD, 2009a: 17).  King III adopts a broad principles-based approach to good 
governance, recognising both the ‘enlightened shareholder’ and the ‘stakeholder inclusive’ models 
of corporate governance.  Collectively, these approaches require the board to consider the interests 
of both shareholders and stakeholders.  As described in section  2.4.7, in terms of the enlightened 
shareholder approach companies only accommodate stakeholder interests and expectations based 
                                           
16 According to the European Corporate Governance Institute, 87 different countries have released corporate governance 
code (http://www.ecgi.org/codes/all_codes.php on 7 April 2012). 
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on the instrumental value to companies.  By contrast, stakeholder inclusiveness requires the board 
to consider the legitimate interests and expectations of legitimate stakeholders, on the premise 
that it is in the best interests of the company as a whole and not merely an instrument with which 
to serve shareholder interests (IoD, 2009a). 
CSR primarily involves the simultaneous pursuit of economic prosperity, environmental quality and 
social equity, making it necessary not only to evaluate companies on their economic value, but also 
on the value, or cost of their environmental and social contribution and/or degradation.  King III 
requires the board to report on how companies capitalise on the positive and ameliorate the 
negative aspects of their business operations (IoD, 2009a).  More specifically, King III principle 8.1 
requires the board to recognise that stakeholder perceptions affect corporate reputations (IoD, 
2009a).  The board delegates the responsibility of proactively managing stakeholder relationships 
to management (principle 8.2).  Management in turn, contributes to achieving organisational 
objectives by executing operational risk management strategies and implementing and monitoring 
effective internal controls (Sobel & Reding, 2012).  Despite acknowledging a need to consider 
stakeholder interests in their business dealings, King III principle 8.3 clearly supports the 
‘enlightened self-interest’ argument (as described in section  2.4.3), by emphasising the need to 
balance the interests of the various stakeholder groups, while acting in the company’s best 
interests.  This confirms a universally accepted principle of corporate governance that directors 
have a fiduciary responsibility to exercise their powers bona fide for the benefit of the company (as 
described in section  2.5.2).  Even though King III emphasises the board’s accountability to the 
company, it suggests that the legitimate interests and expectations of stakeholders should not be 
ignored (IoD, 2009a). 
Not only does King III require adopting companies to provide integrated reports improving 
stakeholders’ ability to assess a company’s economic, social and environmental value/cost (IoD, 
2009a), but in the context of this thesis also to have their CSR disclosures independently assured 
(IoD, 2009a).  In this regard, despite King III principle 9.2 requiring sustainability reporting to be 
integrated with financial reporting, principle 9.3 only requires independent assurance of 
sustainability reporting.  However, the South African Companies Act requires widely-held public 
companies to provide audited annual financial statements, and King III principle 3.9 refers to the 
audit committee’s responsibility to appoint the external auditor and to oversee the external audit 
process. 
King III principle 3.5 introduces combined assurance as a mechanism to overcome the information 
asymmetry arising from the agency problem (as described in section  2.4.5).  The glossary to King 
III defines combined assurance as integrating and aligning assurance processes to maximise 
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oversight over company risk, governance and control efficiencies, while optimising overall 
assurance provided to the audit committee within the context of the company’s risk appetite.  
Combined assurance is colloquially referred to as the ‘three lines of defence’, with management, 
internal assurors (such as internal audit) and external assurors (such as external audit) each 
providing the audit committee and/or the board with assurance relating to company different risks 
(PwC, 2009; IoD, 2009b; Sarens et al., 2012).  The audit committee should ensure that the 
combined assurance model not only selects the most appropriate assurors, but also that audit and 
assurance engagements do not result in ‘management by audit opinion’ or ‘death by audit’ (Rea, 
2011: 3).  Combined assurance should reduce information clutter, cut costs, eliminate unnecessary 
duplication, and highlight blind spots or assurance gaps (Deloitte, 2011: 1–2).  Coetzee and Lubbe 
(2011: 30, 41) suggest that the internal audit activity is “the ringmaster in combined assurance and 
the right arm of the non-executive board”. 
Like its predecessors, King III is a principles-based voluntary code of conduct which subscribes to 
an ‘apply or explain’ rather than a ‘comply or else’ approach.  Companies adopting King III are 
accordingly required to apply the King III principles, or explain why they have not.  Despite King III 
being a principles-based voluntary code, JSE (2011) regulation 8.63(a) requires all JSE-listed 
companies to apply all the King III principles, or to explain why they have not.  As such, King III 
has become a de facto mandatory regulation for all JSE-listed companies. 
2.7.7.3 Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
The GRI represents a global network of around 30 000 stakeholders (GRI, 2011b) from over 80 
countries that include companies, governments, non-governmental organisations (NGO), 
consultancies, accounting bodies, business associations, rating agencies, universities and research 
institutes (FEE, 2011).  The GRI Guidelines, initially established in 1997 (McAusland & Fogelberg, 
2010), are currently the world’s most widely used framework for CSR reporting (Black & Quach, 
2009; Eccles et al., 2011).  As such, the GRI is the ‘de facto’ or ‘gold standard’ for global CSR 
reporting, with 80% of G250 and 69% of N100 companies aligning their CSR reporting to the GRI 
framework (Black & Quach, 2009; KPMG 2011).  Companies using the GRI guidelines increased 
from fewer than 50 in 2000, to 376 in 2005 and to over 1 860 by 2010.  The widespread 
acceptance of the GRI is illustrated by the GRI database, which contains 24 155 CSR reports 
(18 596 of which were based on the GRI Framework) from more than 7 456 organisations17 in 85 
different countries, ranging from Albania to Vietnam.  Rea (2011) however, argued that the GRI’s 
list was incomplete, since although many organisations used the GRI guidelines to prepare their 
                                           
17 Extracted from the GRI website on 19 April 2015 at http://database.globalreporting.org/.  
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CSR reports, not all reports were registered with the GRI. 
The GRI issued its first set of reporting guidelines in 2000, the second in 2002 (G2 guidelines), and 
the third (G3 guidelines) in October 2006.  The GRI was subsequently updated in March 2011 
(G3.1 guidelines), with the most recent iteration (G4 guidelines) released in May 2013.  The GRI 
requires all reports produced after 31 December 2015 to be prepared in accordance with the 
GRI G4 guidelines.  The GRI G4 includes the principles for defining report content (materiality, 
stakeholder inclusiveness, sustainability context and completeness) and the principles for ensuring 
report quality (balance, comparability, accuracy, timeliness, clarity and reliability) (GRI, 2013a).  
The GRI guidelines consist of two parts.  The first guides the reporting process (including engaging 
stakeholders, selecting material indicators and committing to high standards of reporting).  The 
second relates to the implementation manual incorporating the reporting indicators (forming the 
basis for the quantitative disclosure of economic, environmental and social issues).  Despite 
referring to the GRI G4, since its implementation is only scheduled after completion of this thesis, it 
is unlikely that the companies in this study would have implemented the GRI G4.   
The GRI G3.1 allows companies to declare their application levels, based on a self-assessment of 
their CSR report content, against 79 predetermined GRI indicators (GRI 2011a).  The three GRI 
application levels (A, B and C) accommodate the needs of beginners, advanced reporters and those 
falling in between.  The lowest application level ‘C’, makes it easy for new reporting companies to 
get started, and progressively improve and transparently progress through to levels ‘B’ and ‘A’.  
Whereas the C level only requires the company to report on ten GRI indicators; B level requires 
reporting on 20 indicators; and the A level requires 50 ‘core’ indicators (and not all 79) to be 
represented.  These representations may either be supported with data or with a ‘valid’ explanation 
of why they have not been disclosed.  In addition, companies may self-declare a ‘plus’ (+) at each 
application level (i.e. C+, B+, A+) if they have used external assurance providers (KPMG, 2008; 
GRI, 2011a; O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005). 
The GRI’s objective is for CSR reporting to become as routine and comparable as financial 
reporting (FEE, 2011).  The GRI provides a balanced framework for reporting CSR, while 
supporting the evaluation of results and impacts within the context of performance codes and 
standards (FEE, 2011).  The GRI contributes to the ongoing development of the guidelines and 
related materials (GRI, 2011a), representing a framework of principles and guidance together with 
relevant disclosures and indicators that organisations use to voluntarily report their CSR 
performance.  The GRI indicators provide a framework to assist companies develop and implement 
a CSR assurance programme (Coyne, 2006).  Archel et al. (2008) however, suggest that companies 
obtaining a GRI compliant label are more likely to do so because of corporate image and 
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reputation, rather than to provide any assurance about reporting quality. 
2.7.7.4 AA1000 AccountAbility series of standards 
The AccountAbility Principles for Sustainable Development first appeared in 1999, in the AA1000 
AccountAbility Framework Standard.  These principles have since been revised to include the four 
core principles of inclusivity, materiality, completeness and responsiveness, underscoring the 
subsequently released AA1000 Assurance Standard (AA1000AS) and the AA1000 Stakeholder 
Engagement Standard (AA1000SES).  The AA1000 principles were later incorporated in a separate 
AA1000 AccountAbility Principles Standard (AA1000APS) in 2008.  AA1000APS comprises the 
principles of inclusivity, materiality and responsiveness.  Despite no longer included as a specific 
principle in the newer versions of the standards, completeness remains key to CSR assurance, 
referring to the extent to which these principles have been achieved (AccountAbility, 2008b).  
Inclusivity ensures materiality and responsiveness, and is the starting point for determining 
materiality, which identifies the most relevant and significant issues facing organisations and 
stakeholders (AccountAbility, 2008b).  Responsiveness includes decisions, actions and performance 
related to the material issues (AccountAbility, 2008b).   
In terms of the AA1000 series of standards, accountability includes transparency (to stakeholders); 
responsiveness (to stakeholder concerns); and compliance (with legislation, regulations, standards, 
codes, principles, policies and other voluntary initiatives) (AccountAbility, 2008b).  As described in 
section  2.5, accountability is about acknowledging, assuming responsibility for, and being 
transparent about the effects of corporate policies, decisions, actions, products and associated 
performance (AccountAbility, 2008b).  Accountability obliges companies to engage stakeholders in 
order to identify, understand and respond to emerging CSR issues and concerns, and to report, 
explain and account to stakeholders for their decisions, actions and performance.  The underlying 
principle is that companies that are accountable will attempt to (AccountAbility, 2008b): 
• develop a corporate strategy based on a comprehensive and balanced recognition of material 
stakeholder issues, concerns and responses 
• establish goals and standards against which the corporate strategy and the resultant 
performance can be managed and evaluated 
• provide legitimate stakeholders with pertinent and credible information about corporate 
strategy, goals, standards and performance to improve effective decision-making. 
The AA1000 series of standards comprises three internationally accepted CSR-related standards.  
These standards are supported by guidance notes on how to apply the standards, together with 
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practical implementation examples.  These AccountAbility standards are briefly described below: 
1. AA1000APS (2008) AccountAbility Principles Standard 
AA1000APS provides a set of principles describing the manner in which corporate 
accountability is understood, governed, administered, implemented, evaluated and 
communicated.  AA1000APS assists organisations to formulate a strategic CSR approach by 
allowing them to focus on material issues.  AA1000APS provides a framework for identifying 
and acting on opportunities, improving non-financial risk management and specifically 
requiring active stakeholder engagement.  This allows companies to improve their identification 
and understanding of the significant CSR issues potentially impacting their performance, and 
developing responsible business strategies and performance objectives. 
2. AA1000SES (2005) Stakeholder Engagement Standard 
AA1000SES supports the right of stakeholders to be heard, requiring companies to respond 
appropriately to stakeholder concerns.  AA1000SES is a principles-based framework for 
engaging stakeholders, providing a robust basis on which to design, implement, evaluate and 
ensure the quality of stakeholder engagement.  It may either be used as a stand-alone 
standard or incorporated into other standards.  AA1000SES applies across a range of 
engagements from micro-level issues on specific engagements to macro-level engagements 
relating to major social concerns, and is applicable to business, civil society, labour 
organisations, public bodies, multi-stakeholder networks and partnerships. 
3. AA1000AS (2008) Assurance Standard 
AA1000AS specifically addresses CSR assurance engagements, by providing a basis for 
assurors to go beyond mere data verification, focusing on issues that are material to both the 
company and its stakeholders.  AA1000AS requires assurance to be based on the nature and 
extent of conformance with the AA1000 series of principles, and on the quality of the disclosed 
CSR information.  It includes the means for capturing and contextualising other verification and 
certification schemes dealing with specific dimensions of CSR, and establishes a platform for 
improving alignment of the non-financial and financial aspects of CSR performance. 
2.7.7.5 International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) 
The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) was established in 1926 and has grown 
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into a NGO comprising a network representing the national standards institutes of 163 countries18 
coordinated by a centralised secretariat in Geneva, Switzerland.19  The ISO positions CSR as the 
responsibility of companies for the impact of their decisions and activities on society and the 
environment, through transparent and ethical behaviour, contributing to sustainable development.  
This includes addressing societal health and welfare; accommodating stakeholder expectations; 
complying with applicable laws and regulations; conforming to international behavioural norms; 
and integrated throughout the company as reflected in its relationships (Black & Quach, 2009). 
The ISO 14000 series of standards,20 released in 1996, introduced environmental management 
systems to control and monitor the environmental impacts of corporate operations (Feldman, 
2012).  In 2010, ISO 26000 (Guidance on Social Responsibility) expanded on ISO 14000 by 
including broader aspects relating to CSR.  ISO 26000 facilitates the transformation of 
environmental management systems into integrated sustainability management systems (Pojasek, 
2011).  Unlike ISO 14000, ISO 26000 is a guidance document and not a management system 
standard,21 and is not intended for certification or regulatory purposes (Pojasek, 2011).  
Nevertheless, despite being a guidance document, Pojasek (2011) suggests that ISO 26000 
resembles the ISO 1400422 guidance by addressing the relevance and significance of CSR ‘core 
subjects’ and ‘issues’ in a manner similar to the manner in which ISO 14004 deals with 
environmental aspects, impacts and significance. 
2.7.7.6 Integrated reporting 
Morimoto et al. (2005) posit that a lack of agreed criteria to define sustainable outcomes implies 
that CSR reporting methodologies inadequately reflect corporate social and environmental 
responsibility, or even indicate whether corporate actions contribute to sustainable development.  
Similarly, Aras and Crowther (2008) argue that CSR reporting is inherently flawed, since financial 
performance has not historically been recognised as an integral component of CSR reporting.  It is 
suggested that the objective of the global initiative for integrated reporting should overcome this 
deficiency by presenting a more comprehensive picture of the company’s activities (Eccles, Cheng 
& Saltzman, 2010; Eccles, Krzus & Watson, 2012; Eccles et al., 2011). 
King III suggests that CSR best practice and integrated reporting can only be achieved when 
                                           
18 South Africa’s ISO signatory is the South African Bureau of Standards (SABS). 
19 Extracted from the ISO website on 17 March 2012 at http://www.iso.org/iso/home.htm. 
20 There are more than 30 standards in the ISO 14000 series, of which only ISO 140001 is a certification standard 
against which a third party can verify organisational conformance (Feldman, 2012: 70). 
21 For example ISO 9001:2008 or ISO 14001:2004 
22 ISO 14004 – Environmental Management Systems – General Guidelines on Principles, Systems and support techniques 
(which is referenced in the bibliography to ISO 26000).   
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company leadership embrace integrated CSR performance and reporting (as described in 
section  2.7.7.2).  Instead of providing separate CSR and financial reports (even when incorporated 
in one annual report), King III (principle 9.2) specifically requires CSR reporting to be integrated 
with the company’s financial reporting (IoD, 2009a).  While King III recommended practice 9.1.4 
requires integrated reporting to convey sufficient information relating to the company’s financial 
and CSR performance, the focus should be on substance over form (recommended practice 9.1.5).  
King III defines integrated reporting as “a holistic and integrated representation of the company’s 
performance in terms of both its finance and its sustainability” (IoD, 2009a: 54).  More 
comprehensively, the IIRC (2013a: 8) requires an integrated report to concisely communicate how 
the reporting company’s strategy, governance, performance and prospects, leads to the creation of 
value over the short, medium and long term.  Integrated company reports are therefore intended 
to increase the trust and confidence of report users, by providing pertinent forward-looking 
information about the company as a whole, thereby improving its operational legitimacy.   
The integrated reporting initiative establishes a basis for developing holistic accounting practices, 
involving both IFRS and contextual practices (Eccles et al., 2010).  By adding new content to 
company annual reports, integrated reporting combines company financial and CSR reports into a 
single document, reconciling the shareholder and stakeholder models of the firm as described in 
sections  2.4.2 and  2.4.3 (Eccles et al., 2010).  Integrated reporting consolidates material 
information relating to the business model, strategy, governance, performance and prospects of 
organisations in a manner that reflects the commercial, social and environmental context within 
which the business operates (IIRC, 2012).  Some companies use the CSR report as the base 
document, supplemented by appropriate financial information (Eccles, 2010).  Integrated reporting 
therefore contributes to annual reports by more comprehensively reflecting the corporate reality 
(i.e. the ‘big picture’).   
The IIRC was established in 2010, representing a global coalition of regulators, investors, 
companies, standard setters, the accounting profession (both professional bodies and audit firms) 
and NGOs.  The objective of the IIRC is to ensure that company reporting evolves to improve 
stakeholder oriented communication about the manner in which the company’s strategy, 
governance, performance and prospects can create value over the short, medium and long term, 
within the context of its external environment.  The IIRC released its first discussion paper on a 
framework for integrated reporting on 12 September 2011.  A prototype framework incorporating 
public comments on the first discussion paper and the practical experience of more than 80 
companies participating in the pilot programme was subsequently issued in November 2012.  A 
consultation draft on the integrated reporting framework was released on 16 April 2013, with the 
final integrated reporting framework being issued in December 2013.  The broad representation of 
 
Page 76 of 338 
 
IIRC participants, including by the major global accounting/auditing bodies, and practitioners 
representing both the Big 4 as well as smaller audit firms, suggests that integrated reporting is 
expected to become the primary global framework for stakeholder reporting.   
Notwithstanding the stated objective of integrated reporting being to improve stakeholder 
communication and identifying a reporting company’s human, social, relationship and natural 
capitals, the final published international integrated reporting framework specifically targets the 
‘providers of financial capital’ (IIRC, 2013b: 7; IIRC, 2013c: 14).  While the integrated reporting 
framework does not completely disregard the interests of broader stakeholders, their importance 
are somewhat trivialised by the comment that ‘all stakeholders interested in an organisation’s 
ability to create value over time’ should also benefit.  Despite this deficiency, integrated reports 
should nevertheless provide sufficient information to stakeholders about how the company has 
influenced the economic life of the community (both positively and negatively) during the period 
under review (IoD, 2009a), albeit from an instrumental perspective.  The declared objective of 
integrated reporting is to concisely incorporate both financial and non-financial information in a 
single (summarised) report.  Integrated reports should therefore concisely communicate company 
performance, providing additional information through linkages to other reports and 
communications (IIRC, 2013a).  In this way, integrated reports complement and do not replace 
existing company reports.  Since integrated reporting is not intended to replace CSR reporting, the 
implication of assuring integrated reporting has not been considered further in this thesis. 
2.7.7.7 Companies Act no. 71 of 2008 
Corporate governance is legally enforced through the provisions of the Companies Act, 2008 (as 
described in section  2.5.1).  Given the significant role of companies in the social and economic life 
of South Africa, section 7(b)(iii) of the Companies Act encourages transparency and high standards 
of corporate governance. 
The Companies Act imposes a duty on directors to discharge their responsibilities not to “gain an 
advantage for the director, or for another person other than the company or a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of the company” (s 76(2)(a)(i)); or “knowingly cause harm to the company or a 
subsidiary of the company” (s 76(2)(a)(ii)).  Moreover, directors “must exercise the powers and 
perform the functions of director in good faith and for a proper purpose; in the best interests of the 
company; and with the degree of care, skill and diligence that may reasonably be expected of a 
person” carrying out the functions of a director; and “having the general knowledge, skill and 
experience of that director” (s 76(3)).  According to Esser (2008), when drafting the Companies 
Act, legislators considered the enlightened shareholder value approach, and argues that the 
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interests of other stakeholders should also be considered (as described in section  2.4.3).  When 
acting in the best interests of the company, directors should therefore not only consider the best 
interests of shareholders, but of stakeholders as well. 
The increased importance of CSR is illustrated by the new South African Companies Act introducing 
the CSR concept, albeit at a rather superficial and unenforceable level (Esser, 2008).  Despite not 
imposing any CSR responsibility or accountability on companies, section 7(k) requires companies to 
balance the rights and interests of all relevant stakeholders.  While emphasising the significant role 
that companies play in national social and economic life, section 7(a)(iii) encourages (but does not 
compel) companies to be transparent or to implement high governance standards.  Section 7(d) 
confirms government’s stated objective of using companies to achieve economic and social 
benefits.  Section 72(4) gives the Minister the right to prescribe that certain companies must have 
a social and ethics committee, if it is in the public’s interest.  How this provision will be interpreted 
in law, or whether it will ever be exercised or enforced, remains questionable.  Finally, 
section 159(3)(b)(iii) provides whistle-blowers with protection where companies have acted in a 
manner that has endangered, or is likely to endanger the health or safety of any individual, or to 
damage the environment.  While it may be argued that these provisions do not go far enough, it 
nevertheless represents a step in the right direction, away from the provisions of the previous 
Companies Act, 1973, and subsequent amendments that did not even acknowledge the stakeholder 
concept. 
King III (IoD, 2009a) emphasises the linkage between good governance and the law by suggesting 
that good governance does not exist separately from the law, implying that governance and the 
law are intrinsically intertwined and cannot be considered separately.  Legal systems therefore 
constantly evolve in response to structural changes in society (Frankel, 1983).  This evolutionary 
process is evidenced by the Companies Act, 2008, incorporating many of the King II principles 
(IoD, 2009a).  Responding to the expectations of society, it is conceivable that South African 
company legislation will similarly be amended to incorporate some, if not all, of the King III 
principles as well, including those related to CSR-related issues.  Force for Good [sa] concurs by 
contending that self-regulation (like King III) is often the springboard from which national 
regulation and legislation can be created. 
2.7.8 CSR reporting characteristics and components 
Transparency and accountability are the fundamental principles underpinning good CSR reporting 
(CorporateRegister, 2008).  Boundary setting for CSR reporting is important to ensure the provision 
of pertinent information required by stakeholders and to avoid companies only choosing to disclose 
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positive CSR performance and to conceal the activities of others with less commendable or even 
adverse CSR records (Archel et al., 2008).  This is particularly relevant for TNCs that may adopt 
different CSR reporting approaches in the developed and developing countries where they operate 
(Archel et al., 2008).   
Effective CSR reporting should not be confined to the reporting company and its subsidiaries, but 
should include all entities over which the reporting company exercises control (Archel et al., 2008), 
which could even include downstream suppliers.  The GRI (2005) requires reporting companies to 
account for the following entity relationships: 
• Contractual relationships requiring specific operating standards and practices which have a 
direct impact on the reporting entity’s CSR performance. 
• Reporting companies that have purchasing agreements which account for a substantial 
proportion of the entity’s sales. 
• Reporting companies that impose downstream contractual obligations relating to aspects of 
CSR performance. 
• Reporting companies where licensed technology or patented products comprise a significant 
part of the entity’s CSR performance. 
However, simply providing voluntary disclosures does not necessarily imply that reporting is 
credible, or even that it reflects the true state of corporate affairs.  The components of CSR are 
influenced by the type of reporting company, the industry sector, the operating country and the 
reasons for engaging in and reporting CSR practices (AccountAbility, 2006).  Moreover, the 
ostensibly voluntary nature of CSR reporting implies that no definitive standard/framework 
presently exists.   
Establishing the scope of reportable CSR activities requires reporting companies to engage with 
stakeholders in identifying, understanding and responding to issues of material concern to both 
reporting companies and their stakeholders (AccountAbility, 2006).  In the absence of a definitive 
CSR reporting framework, the detailed dimensions of the GRI G4 (GRI, 2013a: 44) may be 
regarded as a proxy for a CSR reporting framework.  Using the GRI G4 as a CSR reporting 
guidance partially overcomes the ambiguity and inconsistency of the standards and frameworks 
described above.  The CSR reporting dimensions that should be addressed in CSR reports may be 
concisely categorised as reflected in Table 2.1 below:        
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Table 2.1 – Core reportable CSR dimensions (GRI 2013a, PRI 2013a & PRI 2013b) 
Environmental Social Economic 
• Air/water/physical pollution 
• Bio capacity and ecosystem 
quality 
• Biodiversity 
• Climate change 
• Energy resources and 
management 
• Natural disasters 
• Renewable and non-
renewable natural resources 
• Water resource utilisation 
 
 
• Access to skilled labour 
• Community/consumer/ 
stakeholder relations 
• Crime and safety 
• Democratic change 
• Diversity 
• Education and human capital 
• Employment levels 
• Employee relations 
• Food security 
• Health and safety 
• Human rights 
• Political freedoms 
• Product responsibility 
• Social exclusion and poverty 
• Trust in society/institutions 
• Economic performance 
• Market Presence 
• Indirect Economic Impacts 
• Procurement Practices 
2.7.9 CSR reporting challenges 
Meaningful CSR reports should be as important, detailed, rigorous and reliable as the financial 
statements (Gray & Milne, 2002).  It may however, be argued that existing company reporting 
does not facilitate meaningful investor decision-making (Hummels & Timmer, 2004), with the 
quality of CSR reporting often being poor (Gray & Milne, 2004; Polonsky & Jevons, 2009).  CSR 
reporting seldom cover the more sensitive aspects of CSR performance, often ignoring complex and 
contextual issues.  Gray and Milne (2002) found that CSR reporting tended to cherry-pick the "good 
news".  Similarly, many CSR reports still vaguely describe what CSR entails, sometimes only 
confirming little more than the company will continue to exist in the future, without reflecting on its 
environmental and social dimensions (Aras & Crowther, 2008).  According to Aras and Crowther 
(2008), companies are inadequately equipped to monitor and quantify the environmental and social 
impacts.  Similarly, Archel et al. (2008) found that 70% of CSR reports do not disclose their indirect 
operational impacts.  Where these impacts were disclosed, they tended to focus on the positive 
economic aspects, while ignoring the adverse indirect social, environmental or economic impacts. 
Confirming the flawed nature of the CSR reporting process, Adams and McNicholas (2007) contend 
that despite the potential for CSR reporting to drive change, it does not really occur in practice.  
The availability of accurate and reliable information, as well as the underlying supporting systems, 
processes, policies and strategies, determine the mechanisms used by individuals, society and 
governments to direct activity towards more sustainable and responsible outcomes (Spencer [sa]).  
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Archel et al. (2008) caution against companies that may use CSR reporting opportunistically, ignore 
disclosure requirements and deliberately conceal non-disclosure of pertinent indicators.  Since a 
substantial proportion of CSR activity may exclude impacts that fall outside the ‘strict’ company 
boundaries, companies may fail to accurately disclose their CSR impacts.   
Moreover, the absence of a generally accepted framework for contextual accounting causes many 
CSR reporting challenges, including the decision of which matters to report on, which performance 
metrics to use and how to overcome comparability difficulties (IIA, 2010b; Eccles, 2010).  Despite 
CSR reporting practices being constrained by the lack of broadly acceptable accounting and 
reporting frameworks, the contemporary CSR discourse continues to generate different approaches 
and frameworks.  It is predicted that as the volume of the discourse grows louder, more 
approaches will emerge before a standardised and widely accepted approach and framework will 
be developed. 
2.8 Conclusion 
Since companies are juristic bodies, they require natural persons to act on their behalf.  Within this 
context, it is acknowledged that company management and the board of directors are responsible 
for establishing and implementing company strategy and for embedding the desired corporate 
culture necessary to drive the company’s approach to CSR-related issues.  To protect the interests 
of the company (as principal) and to ameliorate the effects of the agency problem, effective board 
oversight is necessary to ensure that management discharge their fiduciary responsibilities in the 
best interests of the company. 
The approaches to CSR adopted by companies are informed by various social and management 
theories.  In this regard, the pertinent theories considered in this thesis include shareholder 
primacy, stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory, agency theory and slack resource theory.  Despite 
the relative applicability of these theories, the primary theories impacting on CSR were identified as 
being shareholder primacy (particularly from an instrumental perspective) and stakeholder theory.   
Shareholder primacy was found to militate against CSR, by initially arguing that the sole purpose of 
business was to maximise shareholder returns, while complying with society’s norms, rules, 
regulations and laws.  By contrast, stakeholder theory holds that companies should take the 
interests of legitimate stakeholders into account in their operational decision-making, on the 
philosophical premise that CSR is the ‘right thing to do’.  The prevailing corporate reality is that the 
respective CSR approaches of companies fall somewhere along the continuum, reflecting no 
responsibility at the one extreme and maximum responsibility at the other.  The shareholder model 
was subsequently adapted to accommodate CSR-related issues, by introducing the enlightened 
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self-interest model.  In terms of enlightened self-interest, any CSR intervention should only be 
considered if it is in the best interests of the company to do so (by implication for the benefit of 
shareholders).  The instrumentalist perspective emerged from combining these seemingly 
incompatible shareholder and stakeholder theories.   
The primary frameworks, regulations, legislation and guidelines on how companies account for 
their CSR performance were identified as being the GRI, the AA1000 series of standards, King III 
and to a lesser extent the integrated reporting framework.  It was importantly acknowledged that 
these CSR approaches may be either voluntarily adopted or mandatorily imposed.   
The board’s CSR role was described from the perspective of not only acting in the best interests of 
shareholders, but also relating to other stakeholders as well.  Companies are beginning to respond 
to increased stakeholder demands for responsible corporate behaviour by timeously providing 
relevant non-financial information.  Company responses to stakeholder expectations are driving the 
rapid development of CSR accounting and reporting practices.  In the absence of a broadly 
applicable and widely accepted framework, these practices remain the subject of intense debate, 
both academically and within the corporate sector.  Despite the existence of several different 
approaches, tools, frameworks and standards to guide the CSR reporting process, it is predicted 
that the major frameworks and standards will begin to converge over time, improving the usability 
and comparably of reported CSR data. 
The accounting profession has developed its financial accounting practices over several millennia, 
which still continues to evolve.  It is therefore understandable that the tools and techniques used 
to account for non-financial matters are still in the early stages of development.  As such, since the 
evolution of CSR reporting should be regarded as being ‘a journey and not a destination’, it is 
expected that lessons will be learned and processes adapted as practices stabilise over time.  This 
evolutionary process may resolve some of the challenges to CSR reporting outlined in this chapter.  
Although integrated reporting is expected to become one of the primary methods through which 
companies will report on their overall performance, it should be reiterated that integrated reporting 
will complement and not replace CSR reporting, and is accordingly not particularly relevant to this 
study  which focuses on CSR reporting and assurance. 
Whereas the merits and deficiencies of voluntary and mandatory CSR practices and the most 
significant frameworks and standards were considered in this chapter, the underlying assumption is 
that CSR disclosure is expected to increase demonstrating improved corporate accountability.  
Irrespective of the underlying reasons for companies engaging in responsible CSR-related practices 
and disclosing their CSR performance, it is clear that companies are beginning to recognise the 
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importance of non-financial reporting to shareholders while considering the interests of other 
stakeholders as well.  Without stakeholders being confident about the veracity of company CSR 
disclosures, not only will any perceived benefits be forgone, they may even be counterproductive. 
This chapter provides the necessary context for this study by introducing and explaining the 
interrelated topics of CSR performance and reporting, particularly explaining what is meant by CSR.  
At the same time, recognising that that a universally applicable CSR reporting framework does not 
exist against which a meaningful CSR assurance engagement can be undertaken, the chapter 
identifies the CSR dimensions that should be reported and accordingly independently assured.  
Since the specific objective of this thesis is to identify the primary providers of independent CSR 
assurance and understand the emerging CSR assurance practices, this context provides the 
necessary understanding about the CSR phenomenon and the challenges involved in providing 
independent assurance about the veracity of the public CSR performance disclosures.   
It is acknowledged that CSR involves finding a sustainable balance amongst its interrelated, but 
often conflicting, economic, social and environmental dimensions; while simultaneously providing 
shareholders with a viable return on their investment.  Moreover, the lack of a clear CSR definition 
causes confusion about what CSR involves, both from a reporting company and a stakeholder 
perspective.  Notwithstanding the recent growth in the global CSR reporting movement, it is argued 
that this confusion has impaired its widespread adoption and implementation.   
In conclusion, this chapter clearly illustrates that irrespective of the underlying reasons that 
companies disclose their CSR performance, it is becoming an important component of the 
corporate agenda.  The litany of corporate scandals, unethical business practices and green-wash, 
exacerbated by the agency problem, highlights the need for the independent assurance of CSR 
disclosures.  In addition to responding to regulatory pressures, companies should voluntarily 
consider their broader impact on society and the environment in order to maintain their legitimacy 
and to enhance their reputations.  The adoption of an apathetic approach to CSR fails to recognise 
the associated risks and opportunities, exposing the company to avoidable risk.  The primary CSR-
related risks relate to losing legitimacy (potentially impacting the licence to operate), substantial 
remediation costs as well as fines and penalties, and reputational damage that could impair 
company sales and accordingly profitability.   
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3.1 Introduction  
Assurance completes the corporate accountability equation by providing a vital economic link that 
strengthens accountability while reinforcing the trust and confidence of stakeholders about 
company reporting (ICAEW, 2005).  The information asymmetries arising from the principal–agent 
conflict (described in section  2.4.5) and the different motives of agents and principals may result in 
concerns about the reliability of information, impairing the levels of trust between agents and 
principals.  Assurance attempts to mitigate the agency costs associated with information 
asymmetry and the resultant loss of control (Chow, 1982).  Together with expenditure related to 
independent non-executive directors and audit committees, assurance may be considered as a 
‘bonding cost’, with the objective of satisfying stakeholder demands for increased corporate 
accountability, while providing an effective contractual relationship between owners and managers 
(Adams, 1994).   
More specifically, the objective of CSR assurance is to reassure stakeholders that the information 
contained in CSR disclosures is trustworthy and may be relied upon (Jones et al., 2014).  The 
independent verification of CSR disclosures promotes balanced corporate reporting and provides 
report users with assurance about the relevance, completeness, validity and integrity of CSR 
disclosures.  CSR assurance therefore involves the entire process through which companies 
determine and measure their social and environmental impacts, reporting thereon to affected 
stakeholders (Owen et al., 2000).  It should however, be noted that verification is not an end in 
itself, but merely one of many tools that aim to improve corporate transparency and accountability.   
A CSR assurance report is the published opinion reflecting the result of an assuror’s verification 
processes examining the veracity and completeness of a CSR report (CorporateRegister, 2008).  
Although the CSR reporting drive is steadily gaining momentum, CorporateRegister (2008) found 
that most reports were not independently reviewed, or assured.  Similarly, Nkonki’s 2011 
integrated reporting awards (Financial Mail, 2011) found that very few South African companies 
had their 2010 CSR disclosures assured.  Nkonki, however, predicted that the provision of 
independent CSR assurance will accelerate in response to the increased demand. 
As established by several researchers, around the world, the primary providers of CSR assurance 
are the audit profession, certification bodies and specialist consultancies (Ackers, 2009; 
Al-Hamadeen, 2007; CorporateRegister, 2008; Manetti & Becatti, 2009; Marx & van Dyk, 2011; 
O’Dwyer, Owen & Unerman, 2011).  As described in section  3.2.3.6, the audit profession includes 
both external and internal auditors.  The primary objective of an external audit is to provide 
external stakeholders (primarily shareholders) with independent assurance on the reliability of the 
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primarily financial disclosures contained in the AFS (Reding et al., 2011).  By contrast, the objective 
of internal audit is to assist internal company stakeholders (management and the board) achieve 
the company’s objectives through the provision of a combination of independent assurance and 
advisory services.  
Traditionally, the primary type of stakeholder oriented assurance was provided by external auditors 
reporting to shareholders on the reliability of the AFS.  Today, it is increasingly being recognised 
that other stakeholders may also have a legitimate interest in the company’s activities, similarly 
requiring verified information about the company’s non-financial performance.  This assertion is 
confirmed by Mitchell and Hill (2010), who observed a widespread stakeholder need for external 
CSR assurance. 
This chapter builds on from the description on CSR reporting in chapter two, by examining the 
manner through which stakeholders obtain confidence that a company’s CSR disclosures may be 
relied upon.  The chapter commences by introducing the concept of CSR assurance, motivating a 
need for CSR assurance, establishing the providers of independent CSR assurance and identifying 
the primary components of CSR assurance.  Since the dominant providers of CSR assurance are the 
audit profession (Ackers, 2009; Al-Hamadeen, 2007, Manetti & Becatti, 2009; Marx & van Dyk, 
2011), the chapter concludes by examining the CSR assurance role of the audit profession. 
3.2 Corporate social responsibility assurance 
3.2.1 Background 
Merriam-Webster defines ‘audit’ as “the final report of an audit engagement or methodical 
examination and review”, while the Compact Oxford English Dictionary defines ‘audit’ as being “an 
official inspection of an organisation’s accounts; or to make an audit of”.  To provide the necessary 
context to this thesis, it may therefore be concluded that ‘accounting’ is about providing a record or 
explanation of performance, whereas ‘auditing’ is about the methodological examination of an 
organisation’s records and practices to establish the authenticity of the reported information.  An 
audit should accordingly result in the production of a final written report in which an independent 
opinion or conclusion is expressed about the veracity of corporate accounting and reporting 
(including non-financial reporting). 
While the International Framework for Assurance Engagements (IFAE)23 (SAICA, 2012) includes 
the verification of both financial and non-financial information, the terms ‘assurance’, ‘assure’ and 
                                           
23 Issued by the IAASB. 
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‘assuror’ are used to generically refer to non-financial information, whereas the terms ‘auditing’, 
‘audit’ and ‘auditors’ usually relate to financial information.  Being constrained by international 
auditing standards (ISAE 3000 in particular), auditor assurors tend to avoid using the term ‘audit’ 
(usually referring to financial audits) for their CSR assurance engagements, instead preferring to 
use ‘assurance’ which conveys a lower level of endorsement (Al-Hamadeen, 2007; Owen & 
O’Dwyer, 2004).  By comparison, certification bodies and specialist CSR consultants are more likely 
to use the term ‘verification’.  Therefore, for the purpose of differentiation, this thesis uses the 
term ‘auditor’ to refer to members of the conventional audit profession (Ackers, 2009), whereas 
‘assuror’ generically refers to other assurance providers.  To distinguish between CSR assurance 
provided by auditors and by non-auditors, this thesis refers to ‘auditor assurors’ and ‘non-auditor 
assurors’, respectively. 
Despite still being largely unregulated and not a mandatory legislative or regulatory requirement, 
the demand for independent CSR assurance is growing (ICAEW, 2008).  In response, CSR 
assurance practices are rapidly evolving (Perego, 2009).  Approaches to CSR assurance include the 
independent verification, audit, consultancy, accountancy and/or stakeholder commentary models 
(Al-Hamadeen, 2007).  The independent verification model represents an assurance process 
separate from the report preparer, which has not been compromised by any consultancy 
relationship.  The audit or accountancy model focuses on the consistency and accuracy of CSR 
report information, in terms of which the assuror issues an assurance report covering pertinent 
aspects of the assurance process or assurance findings.  The consultancy model reflects a variety 
of relationships between the assuror and the report preparer, with the assuror assisting the 
reporting company to produce the CSR report while also providing CSR assurance thereon.  The 
consultancy or stakeholder commentary model focuses more on the completeness, fairness and 
overall balance of CSR disclosures in the assurance report, while providing commentary on 
systems, reporting and performance weaknesses, thereby assisting the reporting company improve 
its CSR-related processes (O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005).  Despite IFAC (2006) supporting independent 
CSR assurance by external parties, they acknowledge that internal audit actively contributes to the 
integrity of CSR reporting.   
Presupposing that CSR data and assertions can be verified, Al-Hamadeen (2007) suggests that 
assurance involves more than simply providing a statement commenting on reported CSR 
information.  It should also refer to the underlying processes and systems generating the reported 
information (Al-Hamadeen, 2007; Morimoto et al., 2005).  Reported information should therefore 
be recorded, compiled, analysed and disclosed in a manner that facilitates the provision of 
assurance about the reliability, accuracy and completeness of the underlying CSR data.  Morimoto 
et al. (2005) argue that it is necessary to use both quantitative and qualitative assurance 
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approaches to verify the integrity of CSR data and improve the balance amongst the social, 
environmental and economic objectives of companies.  CSR assurance includes evaluating all 
aspects of CSR systems and performance and should therefore include on-site inspections and 
management system reviews to establish compliance with the predetermined criteria set out in the 
codes and standards that the reporting company identifies with.   
Companies voluntarily providing independent CSR assurance tend to be larger, since they tend to 
engage in more activities that have an impact on the environment and have more stakeholders 
who are concerned with the non-financial effects of their operations (Moroney, Windsor & Aw, 
2012; Nitkin & Brooks, 1998).  This observation confirms the slack resource arguments presented 
in section  2.4.6 that larger companies have the spare resources to provide independent CSR 
assurance.  In South Africa, King III principle 9.3 (as described in section  2.7.7.2) specifically 
requires CSR disclosures to be independently assured (annually by implication).  A recent study by 
Deloitte (2012) found that only 27% of South African companies provided independent CSR 
assurance.   
Improving reporting company responses to stakeholder demands, requires CSR assurors to go 
beyond conventional audit practice by considering aspects of performance that are not usually 
covered in company financial disclosures (Swift & Dando, 2002).  Audit firms usually issue 
conventional ‘audit reports’ relating to highly regulated and reasonably comparable company AFS.24  
By contrast, CSR assurance reports covering non-financial information are usually neither 
regulated, nor comparable.  Moreover, the ambiguity and inconsistency of the terms used in CSR 
assurance reports makes it difficult for stakeholders to determine the exact nature, purpose and 
scope of the assurance engagement, or the precise meaning of the resultant assurance opinion(s).   
CSR reporting should provide stakeholders with confidence about the relevance, usefulness, 
reliability and completeness of CSR-related disclosures (Dando & Swift, 2003).  To enhance 
decision-making, it is therefore necessary for CSR reports and, accordingly CSR assurance reports 
to be addressed to stakeholders.  Within this context, CorporateRegister (2008) identifies two areas 
of difficulty: 
1. There are no generally accepted methodologies for collecting, evaluating and reporting non-
financial company performance data.  Furthermore, the underlying processes are often 
opaque, complex and company-specific, impairing the ability of report users to assess the 
                                           
24 Stating that the AFS “present fairly, in all material respects, the financial position of the Company and their financial 
performance and their cash flows for the year ended … in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS), and in the manner required by the Companies Act ...”. 
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extent to which a CSR report reflects real company performance.  Therefore, until reporting 
companies can clearly and consistently define the scope of their CSR disclosures, a CSR 
assuror will be unable to define the assurance engagement scope.  
2. Similarly, there is no accepted approach for providing non-financial assurance, although 
AA1000AS (as described in section  3.2.6.2) and ISAE 3000 (as described in section  3.2.6.3) are 
emerging as the primary CSR assurance standards (Ackers, 2009; Manetti & Becatti, 2009; 
Marx & Van Dyk, 2011).  Until the various CSR assurors agree on what assurance should entail 
and how it should be communicated, simply because a CSR report has been ‘verified’ by some 
type of assurance process does not necessarily indicate that the assurance engagement scope 
and quality will be comparable (CorporateRegister, 2008). 
While the CSR assurance reports of leading assurors may address important principles such as 
completeness, materiality and accuracy, others may only mention that the underlying systems have 
been checked, or refer to assurance over some limited aspect of the CSR report (Ackers, 2009; 
CorporateRegister, 2008; Manetti & Becatti, 2009).  Although CSR assurors are appointed by the 
company and are accordingly accountable to the company and not to its stakeholders, the 
fundamental objective of CSR assurance should be to improve CSR disclosure credibility for the 
benefit of all stakeholders (Owen et al., 2000).  CSR assurors should therefore take cognisance of 
legitimate stakeholder interests when preparing the assurance report.  To provide stakeholders 
with confidence about the veracity of information contained in company CSR disclosures, CSR 
assurance engagements and accordingly the CSR assurance report should clearly define and/or 
require the following (Al-Hamadeen, 2007; CorporateRegister, 2008; Nitkin & Brooks, 1998): 
• measurable standards against which to evaluate CSR performance 
• the subject matter of the engagement  
• the objective of the assurance engagement 
• the scope of the assurance engagement  
• the parties that should collect, evaluate and report non-financial data 
• how should non-financial data be collected 
• a trained and competent assurance team 
• an independent and objective assurance team 
• scheduling regular assurance engagements to cover all material issues at all operational sites 
• the assurance engagement method 
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• the extent of assurance provided 
• the release of a progress report on the CSR engagement to internal or external stakeholders, 
or to both 
• a conclusion and an opinion about  the veracity of the CSR disclosures   
• the public release of the final CSR assurance report for use by affected stakeholders. 
The nature and scope of the CSR assurance engagement varies significantly according to several 
factors, including the company’s reporting experience, the size and scale of its operations, the 
available budget and the stakeholder requirements (CorporateRegister, 2008).  The IFAE issued by 
the International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), defines an assurance 
engagement as one in which an independent assurance provider “expresses an opinion designed to 
enhance the confidence of intended users, other than the responsible party about the evaluation or 
measurement of the subject matter, against specific criteria” (FEE, 2003; SAICA, 2012: 
Framework).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 – The four dimensions of assurance (ACCA & AccountAbility, 2004: 16) 
The framework depicted in Figure 3.1 outlines the four primary assurance dimensions and identifies 
critical assurance-related components that should be considered (ACCA & AccountAbility, 2004).  
These issues representing the primary characteristics of CSR assurance are summarised below: 
(i) Assurance functionality (i.e. establishing the reason that assurance is provided and identifying 
the intended beneficiaries)  
(ii) The extent to which evidence can be obtained during the assurance engagement (i.e. 
1. Assurance appetite  2. Assurance methodology 
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identifying the assurance standards and/or frameworks used and determining the level of 
assurance provided)  
(iii) The assurance subject matter and the scope of the assurance engagement (i.e. identifying 
the issues that are covered by the assurance engagement and the extent to which these are 
verifiable)  
(iv) Aspects relating to the assuror (i.e. identifying the assurance provider and the competencies 
required to conduct a meaningful assurance engagement and to provide a credible opinion).  
3.2.2 The need for CSR assurance 
It is submitted that unscrupulous companies may be tempted to make false claims about their CSR 
performance in order to capitalise on the positive benefits associated with strong CSR perform 
being perceived to be a responsible corporate citizen.  Pile (2008) warns that companies making 
false and/or unsubstantiated claims about their CSR performance are likely to experience a 
backlash when stakeholders realise that they have been misled.  Within a CSR context, this 
‘window dressing’ is referred to as ‘green-wash’ (Alves, 2009; Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Hamann & 
Kapelus, 2004; Laufer, 2003; Lyon & Maxwell, 2011; Polonsky, Landreth & Garma, 2010).  Green-
wash or ‘linguistic hijacking’ may be described as a cynical intention to deceive by selectively 
disclosing positive CSR-related information and concealing others.  This hypocrisy represents the 
practice of professing beliefs, feelings or virtues that are not really held or possessed (The Free 
Dictionary25). 
Companies disclosing CSR information may therefore not necessarily be good corporate citizens, 
but may simply wish to favourably influence the perceptions of stakeholders, including consumers 
and investment analysts (Aras & Crowther, 2008; Okoye, 2009; Teoh & Shiu, 1990).  The illusion of 
responsible corporate behaviour could provide uninformed investors with an unjustified positive 
image about the company, reducing the associated cost of capital (Aras & Crowther, 2008).  To 
address stakeholder concerns about green-wash, the integrity of corporate CSR disclosures should 
be independently assured, which requires extending accountability beyond shareholders to include 
stakeholders as well (Nitkin & Brooks, 1998).  Cramer et al. (2004) however, argue that CSR has 
moved beyond mere window dressing and is more comprehensively beginning to reflect CSR issues 
that are material to both reporting companies and their stakeholders. 
Independent CSR assurance enhances the quality of voluntary CSR reporting (Sierra, Zorio & 
Garcia-Benau, 2013).  Reporting companies are therefore increasingly relying on assurance to 
                                           
25 http://www.thefreedictionary.com/hypocrisy accessed online on 5 October 2011. 
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improve the credibility and transparency of their CSR disclosures (Kolk & Perego, 2010; Perego, 
2009).  Since independent assurance increases user confidence about the veracity of CSR 
disclosures (FEE, 2002; Zorio et al., 2013), it may be considered a fundamental element for 
establishing the veracity of CSR reporting (Manetti & Toccafondi, 2012).  Independent CSR 
assurance attempts to bridge the credibility gap arising from a lack of stakeholder confidence in 
both the reported data and the sincerity of reporting companies (Owen & O’Dwyer, 2004).   
O’Dwyer and Owen (2005) however caution that the benefits of emerging CSR reporting practices 
are not universally acknowledged due to managerial capture26, at the expense of stakeholder 
accountability and transparency.  Providing independent external assurance reduces the risk of 
managerial capture (Martinov-Bennie & Hecimovic, 2011).  
Users of company annual reports perceive statutory (primarily financial) information as more 
credible than contextual non-financial information.  The former is subject to audit, whereas the 
latter is usually not (Gouws & Cronjé, 2008).  As stakeholders demand credible, comparable and 
transparent CSR reports, independent CSR assurance has become an important characteristic of a 
good CSR report (CorporateRegister, 2008).  Without some form of assurance, CSR reports only 
provide stakeholders with limited value, possibly only representing what may be the unverified 
assertions of company management (Jenkins, 2001; Utting, 2005).  Notwithstanding variations in 
assurors, approaches and assurance opinions (Ackers, 2009; ICAEW, 2004), the provision of 
independent CSR assurance legitimises CSR practices and helps bridge the credibility and 
expectation gap between stakeholders and reporting companies (Al-Hamadeen, 2007; 
CorporateRegister, 2008; ICAEW, 2004).  Since a wide variety of stakeholders require information 
about the manner through which companies discharge their social, environmental, economic and 
ethical responsibilities, CSR assurance enhances stakeholder confidence about the veracity of the 
CSR disclosures (Jones et al., 2014).  Stakeholder trust and confidence in company information is 
enhanced when companies provide assurance that CSR reports are transparent and contain 
relevant, accurate, reliable and credible information (Marx & Van Dyk, 2011).  CSR assurance 
further mitigates the risk of organisations merely claiming to be accountable, instead of presenting 
the actual situation (Eccles et al., 2008).  In addition to increasing the credibility of CSR 
disclosures, independent CSR assurance also (Al-Hamadeen, 2007): 
(i) improves public perceptions about the veracity of the reporting company’s CSR activities  
(ii) promotes continuous improvements in control and reporting systems enhancing both the 
                                           
26 Managerial capture refers to management controlling the CSR reporting process and influencing the outcome, thus 
undermining the intended accountability (O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005). 
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reporting process and CSR report content 
(iii) transfers learning and knowledge from the assurors to the reporting company.   
CSR assurance engagements could assist the reporting company comply with relevant legislation 
and regulations; identify risk (which could avoid substantial remediation costs and penalties, as well 
as potential litigation against the company) (CorporateRegister, 2008); improve the company’s 
image among stakeholders; and improve relationships with regulatory authorities through effective 
self-regulation (Sawyer, Dittenhofer & Scheiner, 2003).  Some companies may provide CSR 
assurance to facilitate comparability with other companies.  At the same time, CSR assurance 
enhances their eligibility for CSR reporting awards or schemes (Al-Hamadeen, 2007), improving the 
company’s reputation management.  While both Tiger Brands Limited27 and Sasol Limited28 
intentionally position themselves as having a strong ethical culture and being concerned about 
consumer interests and perspectives, both have been convicted of engaging in unethical practices 
at the expense of consumers through price fixing/collusive practices.   
The accountability relationship between an assuror and the reporting company may be compared 
to the agent–principal relationship (as described in section  2.4.5), and establishes the basis for the 
assurance relationship (Al-Hamadeen, 2007).  CSR assurance may assist companies avoid the risk 
of their principals being exposed to ‘moral hazards’ caused by the agent acting against the 
principal’s best interest.  An example of this risk may be when company managers pursue short-
term profitability objectives to capitalise on incentive programmes, while constraining the longer-
term growth potential of the business to the detriment of shareholders.  Boards are appointed by 
shareholders to reduce the information asymmetry resulting from the agency problem (as 
described in sections  2.4.5 and  2.5.2).  As described in sections  2.5.2 and  2.7.7.2, King III requires 
South African company boards to consist of a majority of independent non-executive directors.  
Therefore, given the growing importance of CSR-related issues, it is argued that the board requires 
confidence that CSR disclosures (for which they are accountable) may be relied upon.  Improving 
company accountability is therefore a fundamental objective of CSR assurance (Owen et al., 2000).  
Effective CSR assurance requires a tripartite relationship amongst the reporting company, the 
intended report user(s) and the assurance provider (Al-Hamadeen, 2007). 
Institutional investors do not usually base their investment decisions on unverified CSR disclosures 
in annual reports, although they tend to be favourably considered when they have been quantified, 
                                           
27 For more information relating to the Tiger Brand’s case refer to the 2008 Annual Report, p. 42. 
28 More information relating to the Sasol cases refer to http://www.iol.co.za/news/world/sasol-faces-r3-7bn-price-fixing-
penalty-1.418567 (EU fine of €318.2 million in 2008) and http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/92103/20101214/sasol-to-
pay-16-3-mln-for-price-fixing.htm (R111 million in 2010). 
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focus on specific issues and have been obtained from disinterested parties29 (Graves & Waddock, 
1994; Teoh & Shiu, 1990; Waddock & Graves, 1997).  The ICAEW (2008) cautions that the value of 
CSR assurance reports may change when stakeholders lose confidence about the quality and 
reliability of the information provided.  
Kolk and Perego (2010) assert that in stakeholder-oriented societies,30 management were more 
likely to provide independent CSR assurance as part of their stakeholder relationship management.  
Moreover, they suggest that the demand for voluntary assurance appears to be greater in countries 
with weaker legal regimes, where assurance serves as a substitute for enforcement.  Depending on 
the company, sector, nature, tone and style of report, certain CSR reports may however be 
perceived as being sufficiently credible without a need for independent assurance 
(CorporateRegister, 2008).   
3.2.3 CSR assurance providers 
3.2.3.1 Background  
The question about who should provide independent assurance characterises the contemporary 
CSR assurance discourse (Martinov-Bennie & Hecimovic, 2011).  Unlike the oligopolistic financial 
audit market dominated by the Big 4 audit firms, there is currently no consensus about 
whom/which parties should provide independent CSR assurance, the assurance approach that 
should be adopted, or even the competencies the assuror should possess (Al-Hamadeen, 2007; 
Sierra et al., 2013).  The largely unregulated voluntary CSR assurance market therefore exhibits a 
higher level of competition and is accordingly subject to fewer legal constraints and enforcement 
mechanisms (Sierra et al., 2013).  According to Wiertz (2009), report credibility is enhanced when 
users can identify the assuror and the assurance engagement type. 
Around the world, the primary providers of CSR assurance may traditionally be divided into 
certification bodies, specialist consultancies and the Big 4 audit firms (Marx & van Dyk, 2011; 
O’Dwyer et al., 2011).  This is confirmed by an analysis of almost 650 global assurance reports in 
2007, revealing that the dominant global assurors were the Big 4 audit firms (40%), followed by 
certification bodies (25%) and specialist CSR consultancies (24%), with the remaining 11% being 
divided amongst five other minor assurors (CorporateRegister, 2008: 28).  Similarly, in a study of 
34 global CSR assurance reports issued in 2007, Manetti and Becatti (2009: 293) found that the 
Big 4 audit firms produced 71% of assurance reports, with the remaining 29% being produced by 
                                           
29 In this context, disinterested parties refer to unbiased, impartial and objective parties. 
30Stakeholder-oriented societies include Norway and Denmark, whereas the USA represents a shareholder orientation 
and accordingly has a weaker emphasis on social issue s (Kolk & Perego, 2010: 186). 
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other uncategorised assurors.  These results are in line with a 2008 South African study finding 
that the Big 4 audit firms produced 80% of CSR assurance reports, followed by specialist CSR 
consultancies with 20% (Ackers, 2009: 12).  By contrast, Al-Hamadeen (2007: 134) found that 
UK-based FTSE100 companies were assured by CSR consultancy firms (69%), audit firms (20%) 
and certification bodies (11%) in 2004. 
The heterogeneity of CSR reporting, assurance and assurance providers have produced several 
different approaches to CSR assurance provision.  O’Dwyer and Owen (2005) argue that a clear 
distinction should be made between the CSR assurance approaches adopted by auditor assurors 
and by non-auditor assurors.  Auditor assurors tend to be more cautious, focusing on the 
consistency of CSR report information with the underlying datasets, while providing lower levels of 
assurance (O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005; Perego & Kolk, 2012; Wiertz; 2009).  By comparison, non-
auditor assurors tend to adopt a more evaluative approach by focusing more on completeness, 
fairness and overall balance in their assurance reports, but providing higher assurance levels 
(O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005; Perego & Kolk, 2012; Wiertz; 2009).   
Auditor assurors tend to leverage their financial auditing expertise to provide a competitive 
advantage, whereas non-auditor assurors usually have greater CSR assurance expertise, especially 
relating to the complexity of environmental and social processes (Perego, 2009).  Perego (2009) 
contends that the Big 4 auditor assurors place greater emphasis on report format and standardised 
assurance procedures than other assurors, and are accordingly reluctant to provide unambiguous 
and precise opinions given the inherent uncertainties of CSR reporting and assurance.  The 
reluctance of auditor assurors to report on compliance and to provide high levels of assurance is 
substantiated by the absence of mandatory CSR reporting and assurance guidelines.   
By contrast, non-auditor assurors usually provide more elaborate and informative recommendations 
for improvement and comprehensive assurance opinions (Perego, 2009; Perego & Kolk, 2012).  
Suggesting that CSR assurance quality is directly related to the type of assurance provider, Perego 
and Kolk (2012) however, assert that audit firms and certification bodies tend to provide better 
quality (i.e. more reliable) assurance opinions.  Other researchers found no difference in the CSR 
disclosure quality of companies using auditor assurors and those using non-auditor assurors 
(Moroney et al., 2012; Sierra et al., 2013).  The quality of CSR reporting and assurance is therefore 
not necessarily influenced by the type of CSR assuror, but by the reporting company and the 
specific CSR assuror (or branch) selected, and the pre-negotiated terms of reference and scope.  
De Beelde and Tuybens (2013) however, posit that the quality of CSR assurance by auditor 
assurors and specialist CSR assurors is converging, suggesting that the CSR assurance market will 
continue to be fragmented by diverse assurors. 
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CSR report users may derive different levels of confidence from CSR assurance reports provided by 
the various types of CSR assurance provider (De Beelde & Tuybens, 2013).  While the choice of a 
CSR assurance provider may reflect regional heterogeneity, it is broadly influenced by the needs of 
legitimate stakeholders; the assuror’s perceived independence, credibility and expertise; the value 
accruing to the reporting company; and the engagement cost (De Beelde & Tuybens, 2013).  
3.2.3.2 Assurance provided by the preparer  
Potential conflicts of interest arise when the party preparing and drafting the CSR report, also 
provides assurance thereon.  Within the context of independence and objectivity (as described in 
section  3.2.5.3), the question arises as to whether an assuror could and would criticise, document 
and publish their own deficiencies.  Confirmation that this type of assurance is not usually regarded 
as acceptable is illustrated by only 150 such reports of a total of 4 733 assurance reports having 
been issued globally over the past 15 years (CorporateRegister, 2008: 7).  
3.2.3.3 Assurance provided by expert/stakeholder panels  
Reporting companies may establish an independent advisory board, or panel of interested parties 
to examine the CSR report and provide a statement of their findings and opinions.  Despite lacking 
methodological rigour, the acceptability of this approach is usually enhanced by the credentials and 
perceived independence of the participants and the strength of their collective views 
(CorporateRegister, 2008).  However, since the panel may not necessarily possess the expertise, 
access, time or ability to meaningfully critique and/or evaluate the CSR report or the underlying 
data, the risk exists that the panel may accept the information provided at face value.  Even 
though an expert opinion may be perceived as providing authoritative support to a CSR report, 
doubts may persist about the extent to which the expert(s) had access to the primary data 
necessary for an informed evaluation (Jones et al., 2014).  It is therefore argued that this approach 
does not constitute proper assurance, since assurors should use ‘professional scepticism’ during an 
assurance engagement (SAICA, 2012: ISAE 3000).  Conflicts of interest may also arise when 
underrepresented stakeholder groups feel marginalised (CorporateRegister, 2008).   
The general unacceptability of assurance by stakeholder panels is illustrated by only 11 of the 650 
assurance reports produced during 2007 being provided by stakeholder panels (CorporateRegister, 
2008).  Despite first emerging in 1999, by 2007 only 38 such statements had been published. 
3.2.3.4 Assurance provided by individuals 
Individuals may also issue assurance reports, often without declaring the methodology used or 
providing evidence of investigation.  While using well-known CSR experts may build stakeholder 
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trust, the reliability of the information provided and/or the integrity of the underlying systems is not 
usually evaluated.  According to the CorporateRegister database, by 2007, only 536 such reports 
had been produced.  While these ‘opinion statements’ may be seen as a low cost assurance option, 
it is expected that these will be replaced over time by assurance reports from the more mainstream 
CSR assurors (CorporateRegister, 2008). 
3.2.3.5 Assurance provided by consultancy firms and certification bodies 
The explosion of the provision of CSR assurance by non-auditors is driving efforts to define 
universal CSR assurance standards (CorporateRegister, 2008; Jenkins, 2001; Owen & O’Dwyer, 
2004).  Many of the reports issued by these assurors may however, be confidentially produced for 
their principals, without being made publicly available, thus impairing transparency.  Consultants 
appear to provide higher levels of assurance, providing added value to the CSR reporting process 
by focusing on improving CSR processes, potentially impairing independence (O’Dwyer & Owen, 
2005).  A shortcoming of some of these reviews is that the assurance engagement information may 
be obtained from management (and not from the staff working with the systems), possibly 
involving brief and perfunctory factory walk-through inspections, potentially depicting a false reality 
(Jenkins, 2001).  While specialist CSR assurance providers may possess higher levels of 
CSR-related expertise than auditor assurors, the confined scope of their assurance engagements 
may not accommodate the interests of all stakeholders (De Beelde & Tuybens, 2013).   
3.2.3.6 Assurance provided by the audit profession 
Independence and objectivity are the philosophical foundations of the audit profession (Maury, 
2000).  The audit profession is typically associated with its traditional role of AFS attestation.  The 
lack of a historical CSR attestation role by the audit profession (Loots, 1989) is completely 
understandable, since CSR assurance has only recently become a prominent item on the global 
corporate agenda.  Percy (1997) argues that assurance is a fundamental corporate governance 
element, with the public believing that auditors have responsibilities that extend beyond simply 
reporting on the AFS, introducing the ‘audit expectation gap’ described in section  3.3.3.5.  Auditor 
assurors should adopt a responsible attitude to environmental and social issues by providing all 
stakeholders with confidence that all the disclosures in company annual reports may be relied 
upon.  It is however, acknowledged that auditor assurors (the non-Big 4 firms in particular) may 
not necessarily possess the relevant competencies to undertake an effective CSR assurance 
engagement (De Beelde & Tuybens, 2013).  
Expanded services provided by the audit profession may strategically bridge the credibility gap that 
characterises CSR reporting (Manetti & Becatti, 2009).  Auditor assurors may enhance CSR report 
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credibility by providing assurance that (i) complies with rigorous ethical standards; (ii) utilises a 
defined framework and standards covering the entire assurance engagement; (iii) deploys the 
requisite skills and expertise to undertake the assurance engagement; (iv) complies with 
professional standards; (v) and has appropriate internal quality control procedures (ICAEW, 2008).   
Big 4 auditor assurors were less inclined to provide positive assurance opinions, primarily due to 
the ambiguity and complexities associated with providing assurance on their large complex 
corporate clients (Mock et al., 2007).  Furthermore, Big 4 assurors tended not to disclose 
recommendations for improvement in their CSR assurance reports, unless by prior arrangement 
with management (Mock et al., 2007).  Perego (2009) suggests that the Big 4 auditor assurors 
provide a higher quality of assurance, with their standardised CSR assurance approach improving 
comparability, even possibly reducing the costs associated with each assurance engagement 
(Mock et al., 2007).  
De Beelde and Tuybens (2013) attribute the following reasons for reporting companies using 
auditor assurors to provide independent assurance on their CSR disclosures: 
• The fundamental financial auditing principles apply to CSR assurance engagements as well. 
• Auditor assurors are perceived as being more independent than non-auditor assurors. 
• Auditor assurors are perceived as being more credible than non-auditor assurors. 
• Auditor assurors are perceived to provide a higher quality of assurance than non-auditor 
assurors, due to their mandatory global application of well-developed auditing standards, 
stringent ethical and independence requirements, and rigorous quality control mechanisms.  
The audit profession is represented by both external and internal auditors.  External auditors have 
a statutory obligation to provide the reporting company’s shareholders with independent assurance 
about the reliability of the AFS (Reding et al., 2011).  By contrast, the primary objective of internal 
audit is to voluntarily assist companies achieve their business objectives through the provision of 
independent assurance and advisory services.  The internal audit activity plays a strategic role by 
providing top management and the board (the internal stakeholders) with independent assurance 
that all material risks have been identified and are being effectively mitigated.  At the same time it 
plays a strategic role by providing advisory services to assist management improve their business 
operations and governance processes (Cascarino & Van Esch, 2007). 
As described in section  3.2.3, prior research found that auditor assurors are the primary providers 
of independent CSR assurance (Ackers, 2009; Al-Hamadeen, 2007; CorporateRegister, 2008; 
Manetti & Becatti, 2009; Marx & van Dyk, 2011; O’Dwyer et al., 2011).  Within this context, since 
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this study focuses on independent CSR assurance, it is pertinent that section  3.3 specifically 
examines the role played by the audit profession in the provision of independent CSR assurance.   
3.2.4 Intended audience for CSR assurance reports 
The addressee of the CSR assurance report identifies the party or parties for whom it is intended 
(Wiertz, 2009).  It is nevertheless recognised that parties other than the intended users, may also 
rely on the CSR assurance report.   
The practice whereby AFS auditors address their audit reports to shareholders is aligned to one of 
the objectives of the Companies Act, namely, to protect shareholder rights (s 7(i)).  This is 
supported by the statutory interaction between auditors and shareholders expressed in terms of 
section 93(1)(c) of the Companies Act; and paragraphs 20 and 21 of the International Standard on 
Auditing (ISA) 700, which require auditors to ‘ordinarily’ address their audit reports to those for 
whom the report is produced.  Auditors therefore usually address their audit reports for AFS audit 
engagements to the shareholders of the company, or to those charged with company governance.   
By comparison, since CSR performance includes the company’s impacts that extend beyond the 
shareholders, it may be argued that assurance reports relating to CSR assurance engagements are 
similarly intended for broader stakeholder consumption, and should accordingly be addressed to 
the stakeholders (Wiertz, 2009).  Many CSR assurors do not however, address their assurance 
reports to their stakeholders (Ackers, 2009).  This practice is confirmed by Al-Hamadeen (2007), 
who suggests that unlike AFS audit reports where legal requirements prescribe that audit reports 
must be addressed to shareholders, no similar obligation exists for CSR assurance reports. 
O’Dwyer et al. (2011) identify the three primary audiences for CSR reports (and by implication the 
addressees of CSR assurance reports) as being: 
• executives and management of the reporting company  
• company stakeholders who may use those reports  
• internal technical divisions of the assurance provider that are responsible for approving the 
wording of CSR assurance reports, prior to their release.   
Concerned about establishing the veracity of company CSR disclosures, these three audiences are 
driving efforts to develop and/or refine CSR assurance practices (O’Dwyer et al., 2011).  
Al-Hamadeen (2007) however, found that many CSR assurance reports did not indicate an 
addressee and where addressees where identified, without exception they were internal company 
stakeholders.  Al-Hamadeen’s (2007) study found no instances where assurance reports were 
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addressed to non-shareholder stakeholders, despite acknowledging that they also rely on the CSR 
and CSR assurance reports.  The revised ISAE 3000, which is mandatory for auditor assurors and 
becomes effective after 15 December 2015, confines the possible users of non-financial assurance 
reports to major stakeholders with significant and common interests.   
Confirming a stakeholder primacy orientation, prior research suggests that despite the reporting of 
CSR performance arguably being intended for consumption by broader stakeholders, they are often 
not the intended audience for CSR assurance reports.  While the intended users of CSR and CSR 
assurance reports may be identified by agreement between the assurance practitioner and the 
reporting company, it is suggested that this CSR assurance anomaly can only be overcome through 
the imposition of mandatory stakeholder-oriented laws or regulations.  
3.2.5 Characteristics of CSR assurance 
3.2.5.1 Background  
While CSR assurance practices vary considerably, company attitudes to CSR assurance depends on 
the demands of society, are influenced by what society is prepared to trust and the nature of the 
risk31 to which the company may be exposed (Al-Hamadeen, 2007).  Despite Al-Hamadeen (2007) 
finding a correlation between the increased provision of CSR reports and the demand for 
independent CSR assurance, Eccles et al. (2012) argue that the significant growth in CSR reporting 
is not replicated by CSR assurance growth.  It is submitted that this divergence may be attributed 
to the respective researchers using different study populations.  Moreover, although CSR reporting 
was already an established practice, CSR assurance provision remained an emerging phenomenon. 
Stakeholders require confidence that the assuror(s) undertaking the assurance engagement have 
the necessary skills and knowledge; and possess the requisite integrity, independence and 
impartiality (CorporateRegister, 2008).  Independent CSR assurance assists to operationalise 
corporate stakeholder responsibilities (Owen et al., 2000).  CSR assurance reports should address 
issues relating to the materiality and completeness of CSR disclosures, thereby ensuring that all 
significant company impacts have been considered (Adams & Evans, 2004; Al-Hamadeen, 2007).   
Cohen et al. (2011) argue that companies should acknowledge the misalignment between the 
information provided by the company and what investors (as well as stakeholders) require.  The 
                                           
31 Assurance engagement risk is the risk that assurors may provide inappropriate conclusions because of material 
misstatements in the reported information (ICAEW, 2007: 14).  Components of engagement assurance risk include (i) 
inherent risk (susceptibility of the information to material misstatement); (ii) control risk (the risk that material 
misstatements will not be prevented or detected timeously by internal controls; and (iii) detection risk (the risk that 
assurors will not detect material misstatements). 
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impact of this mismatch is exacerbated by potential errors and/or irregularities in corporate 
reporting, or by management malfeasance.  Moreover, stakeholder concerns about the impact of 
CSR information on the broader economy and the reporting company, increases the need for 
independent assurance about the veracity of company disclosures upon which stakeholders rely for 
effective decision-making. 
3.2.5.2 CSR assuror competencies 
To improve stakeholder confidence about the reliability of CSR reports, professional and credible 
assurors with appropriate qualifications and using suitable assurance methodologies should verify 
information contained in the management prepared CSR report, against supporting documentation 
(Al-Hamadeen, 2007).  Moroney et al. (2012) submits that the expertise of the assurance provider 
is frequently used as a proxy for assurance quality.  In this regard, the GRI G4 (2013b) 
recommends that assurance should be provided by competent groups or individuals external to the 
organisation that follow professional assurance standards, and apply systematic, documented and 
evidence-based processes.  Where germane to the assurance scope, assurors increase user 
confidence in CSR reporting by disclosing their competencies (Al-Hamadeen, 2007).  Establishing 
CSR report credibility requires more than professionalism, accuracy and technical competence; the 
legitimacy of the assurance provider is equally important (Owen et al., 2000).   
Auditor assurors have a duty to “maintain professional knowledge and skill at the level required to 
ensure that a client or employer receives competent professional services based on current 
developments in practice, legislation and techniques and act diligently and in accordance with 
applicable technical and professional standards” (SAICA, 2010).  While this is a specific requirement 
for the audit profession, it is submitted that this requirement should similarly apply to non-auditor 
assurors.  This is appropriate, since AA1000AS (frequently used by non-auditor assurors) prohibits 
assurors from accepting assurance engagements when they lack the necessary competencies.  It is 
however, acknowledged that some assurors may lack the necessary technical knowledge and skills 
to undertake an effective CSR assurance engagement (Huggins, Green & Simnett, 2011; Perego & 
Kolk, 2012).  It is accordingly necessary for assurors to disclose competency-based information 
about their ability to undertake the assurance engagement (AccountAbility, 2008a).  Where 
applicable, these disclosures should include competence in: (i) the AccountAbility principles (as 
described in section  2.7.7.4); (ii) CSR reporting and assurance practices and standards; (iii) specific 
CSR subject-related matter; (iv) the stakeholder engagement process; and (v) legal aspects 
relating to the assurance process; while having the necessary infrastructure, systems and oversight 
mechanisms to ensure the quality of the assurance process.   
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3.2.5.3 Independence and objectivity 
Independence may be defined as the objective discharge of responsibilities in a manner that is free 
from influence, persuasion or bias (Al-Hamadeen, 2007).  IFAC (SAICA, 2012) identifies two 
independence dimensions, namely, ‘independence of mind’ and ‘independence in appearance’.  
Independence of mind describes a state of mind allowing individuals to act with integrity and to 
exercise objectivity and professional scepticism32 when formulating an opinion.  By comparison, 
independence in appearance refers to avoiding significant facts and circumstances, allowing a 
reasonable and informed person to conclude that the integrity, objectivity or professional 
scepticism of the assurance provider has been compromised.  Objectivity refers to a state of mind 
allowing individuals to make emotionally and psychologically detached judgements, based on a 
meaningful evaluation of the available evidence relating to the area being reviewed/assured 
(Spencer Pickett, 2010).  Assurors are expected to be objective, competent and free of commercial 
influence, while realistically assessing the engagement subject matter and avoiding merely 
reflecting management’s wishes (Percy, 1997).  
An expert providing an independent opinion about the veracity of CSR disclosures accordingly helps 
reinforce the credibility of information (ICAEW, 2008).  Independence is considered to be one of 
the most important indicators of assurance quality, which is enhanced when assurors comply with 
the relevant professional and ethical requirements (Al-Hamadeen, 2007).  Concerns about the 
assurors’ independence and their ability to objectively and impartially assess the information 
provided undermines the objective of the assurance service provided (Chandler & Edwards, 1996) 
and impairs the credibility of the resultant CSR assurance report (Wiertz, 2009).  The assurance 
provider’s independence is therefore a fundamental characteristic for credible CSR assurance 
engagements (De Beelde & Tuybens, 2013).   
Instead of referring to ‘independent’ assurors, the GRI (2011a; 2013b) requires ‘external assurors’ 
to be independent from the organisation.  In this regard, external assurors include groups or 
individuals undertaking assurance engagements, who are not unduly constrained by their 
relationship with the organisation or its stakeholders, and who are capable of providing an 
independent and impartial opinion on the report.   
Despite an assuror appearing to be independent, the real question should be about whether more 
robust assurance could be provided when the assuror actually accounts to corporate management, 
which not only defines the scope of the assurance engagement but also pays for the assurance 
engagement (also refer to the description on page 48) (O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005).  Ashbaugh 
                                           
32 Professional scepticism is an attitude involving a questioning mind and a critical evaluation of evidence. 
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(2004: 144) concurs, suggesting that the “dog will not bite the hand that feeds it”, posing a 
challenge to independence of mind.  According to Chandler and Edwards (1996), this dilemma is 
nothing new, having been a contentious issue in the financial auditing environment for many years.  
Corporate management have effectively controlled this process at least since the Victorian era, with 
shareholders merely rubber stamping their actions and leaving the auditors exposed to undue 
management influence33.  Perego (2009) suggests that audit firm size may be regarded as a proxy 
for auditor quality and independence, partially explaining why Big 4 auditor assuror opinions tend 
to be held in such high regard.  While this may be theoretically attributed to Big 4 audit firms 
usually regarding all clients as being equally important, at the same time the consequences and 
impacts of incorrect assurance opinions are greater.  In addition, Big 4 audit firms are more 
capable of using internal mechanisms to ensure the consistent quality of their assurance reports.     
Deegan, Cooper and Shelly (2006) found that few assurance reports clearly disclosed the 
independence of the assuror.  Al-Hamadeen (2007) suggests that this trend was changing, finding 
that 56% of CSR assurance reports issued in the FTSE100 in the United Kingdom over a five-year 
period, explicitly stated that the assurance process was independent, with the occurrence 
frequency increasing over the period.   
3.2.5.4 CSR assurance levels 
The nature and scope of CSR assurance engagements and CSR assurance reports tends to be wide.  
Some assurors may simply review the CSR report and perform rudimentary desktop research, while 
others may conduct comprehensive audits at multiple sites, over protracted periods, even possibly 
generating different assurance levels for various CSR components (CorporateRegister, 2008).  
Irrespective of the nature of the assurance engagement, it is important to communicate the results 
in the CSR assurance report.  The heterogeneity of non-financial data introduces a need to provide 
different levels of assurance according to the various types of CSR disclosures and the assurance 
engagement objectives (CorporateRegister, 2008).   
The concept of an ‘assurance level’ derives from the audit profession, and describes the work 
underlying an assurance engagement (Christensen, Glover & Wood, 2013).  Given that an 
assurance engagement does not verify every transaction, it is impossible for any assuror to provide 
absolute assurance about the completeness and integrity of every detail contained in disclosures 
(Reding et al., 2013).  Instead, based on the assurance engagement risk, an assurance level may 
be declared according to the quality of the reporting company’s systems and evidence, the scope of 
work performed and the time spent on the engagement (Al-Hamadeen, 2007).  Disclosing the 
                                           
33 This relates directly to the description of agency theory (as described in section  2.4.4). 
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assurance level may clarify the aim of the assurance engagement to report users, by indicating the 
level of risk involved in the assurance engagement and the particular assurance engagement 
circumstances; hence, justifying the procedures deployed when gathering assurance evidence.  
Disclosing the assurance level should indicate the extent of reliance that stakeholders may place on 
the contents of the CSR report.   
CSR assurors either provide ‘reasonable assurance’ or ‘limited assurance’ (Wiertz, 2009).  In this 
context, a limited assurance engagement and the resultant assurance opinion reflects a narrower 
scope of work than one providing reasonable assurance.  Al-Hamadeen (2007) suggests that some 
assurors may be deterred from providing reasonable assurance due to the complexity of the 
specific engagement, which may in turn increase engagement assurance risk,34 consequently 
exposing the assuror to potential liability.  The GRI G4 (2013b) advocates ‘reasonable’ rather than 
‘limited’ assurance by requiring assurors to assess whether company CSR disclosures provide a 
reasonable and balanced representation of performance, taking the veracity of reported CSR 
performance and the selection of overall report content into account.  
Limited assurance engagement opinions are expressed in the negative form, suggesting that 
sufficient work had been performed to indicate that ‘nothing had come to the assuror’s attention to 
cause them to believe that the reported data do not accurately reflect the reporting company’s CSR 
performance’ (Ackers, 2009; Manetti & Becatti, 2009; Marx & Van Dyk, 2011).  By contrast, 
reasonable assurance engagement opinions, expressed in the positive form, indicate that the 
assuror had performed sufficient work to indicate that the reported information reasonably 
reflected the reporting company’s actual CSR performance.  Eccles et al. (2012) cynically illustrate 
the difference by suggesting that positive assurance indicated that ‘the company did it right’, while 
negative assurance revealed that ‘nothing leaped out at the assuror as being terribly wrong’.   
Perego and Kolk (2012) found a positive correlation between the type of assurance providers and 
the CSR assurance level provided.  Prior research suggests that auditor assurors were more likely 
to provide limited assurance on CSR issues than non-auditor assurors (Ackers, 2009; 
CorporateRegister, 2008; Manetti & Becatti, 2009; Marx & Van Dyk, 2011).   
Instead of reasonable and limited assurance levels, AccountAbility (2008a) advocates a different 
approach by identifying two different engagement assurance levels, being high and moderate 
levels.  AccountAbility recognises that different subject matter may be accommodated in one 
assurance engagement, with high levels of assurance being provided over some areas and 
                                           
34 Assurance engagement risk is defined as the “risk that the practitioner expresses an inappropriate conclusion when 
the subject matter information is materially misstated” (SAICA, 2008: Gloss 2).  
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moderate assurance levels for others.  While high assurance levels may provide users with greater 
confidence in company disclosures about the subject matter, moderate assurance levels enhance 
user confidence about the veracity of company disclosures.  In terms of AA1000AS, the evidence 
required for high assurance levels is gathered from a combination of internal and external sources, 
requiring extensive evidence-gathering procedures.  As indicated in sections  3.2.5.5,  6.13 and  6.16, 
these assurance levels mean different things and imply different levels of confidence that users 
should place on the underlying CSR disclosures, increasing user confusion about the extent to 
which the CSR assurance reports may be relied upon.   
Al-Hamadeen (2007) suggests that substantiated assurance requires a qualified and objective 
assuror to systematically and formally evaluate and verify the subject matter and report the results 
thereof.  By comparison, in unsubstantiated assurance the assuror subjectively evaluates the 
subject matter, based on experience or expertise, instead of through a systematic and detailed 
evaluation of the underlying performance measurement and management processes 
(Al-Hamadeen, 2007).   
CSR reports often contain non-financial information that is inherently difficult to verify.  Moreover, 
since the information systems producing the information reflected in CSR reports is presently not 
designed to reliably measure the required information, it is difficult to provide high levels of 
assurance (Martinov-Bennie & Hecimovic, 2011). 
The wide and heterogeneous nature of the possible subject matter comprising the CSR assurance 
universe makes it particularly difficult to predetermine the assurance level, especially given the 
complex combination of available quantitative and qualitative data (Manetti & Becatti, 2009).  The 
assurance level provided is influenced by the extent of tests performed, internal control system 
limitations and the intrinsic nature of the subject matter.  This complexity is exacerbated by the 
indicative but not conclusive nature of evidence gathering, compounded by the assuror’s subjective 
discretion when collecting evidence and drawing opinions.  Auditor assurors may therefore tend to 
avoid providing reasonable assurance for CSR disclosures, instead strongly preferring to provide 
limited assurance, or at best combining reasonable assurance for some more objectively verifiable 
aspects, with limited assurance for other aspects that may be more complicated to verify (Manetti 
& Toccafondi, 2012).  
3.2.5.5 CSR assurance opinions 
While the terms ‘opinions’ and ‘conclusions’ tend to be used interchangeably, this thesis uses 
‘conclusion’ in the broader context and ‘opinion’ to refer to the assuror’s view as expressed in the 
assurance report on the veracity of the CSR disclosures.  Where CSR assurance is provided, the 
  
Page 105 of 338 
 
GRI G4 (2013b) requires assurors to produce a written publicly available assurance report providing 
an opinion or set of conclusions, describing the responsibilities of the report preparer and the 
assurance provider, and summarising the work performed.  Aligned to the assurance levels 
described in section  3.2.5.4, the CSR assurance opinions may be categorised as limited or 
reasonable. 
An assuror increases the credibility of the CSR information provided by expressing an opinion on 
the veracity of public disclosures, based on an evaluation of a company's performance against 
suitable predetermined criteria and standards (AccountAbility, 2008a).  An assurance report should 
accordingly clearly indicate the assuror’s opinion about the assurance subject matter.  The 
assurance opinion provided is therefore a key aspect of the CSR assurance engagement 
(Al-Hamadeen, 2007).   
AA1000AS is intended to provide assurors with guidelines about issuing an assurance opinion 
relating to a company’s disclosed CSR performance (AccountAbility, 2008a).  ISAE 3000 requires 
the assurance report to clearly express the assuror’s opinion about the subject matter (paragraph 
46) and provide the context for the assurance engagement.  CSR assurance opinions may be 
influenced by several factors, including the assurance level pursued; the assurance engagement 
objective(s); and any limitation(s) on the assurance engagement scope.  CSR assurance opinions 
should address the systems, processes and underlying data together with any assertions made, 
and should be based on evaluating evidence relating to the pre-agreed criteria, which should be 
concisely and unambiguously presented (AccountAbility, 2008a).   
When the assurance engagement covers several aspects of a CSR report, separate opinions may be 
provided on each (ISAE 3000, paragraph 49(j)).  Depending on the materiality or pervasiveness of 
the assurance evidence, CSR assurance opinions may be categorised as follows: 
• Unqualified opinion(s) – when the assurance evidence supports the disclosures made.  
• Qualified or adverse opinion(s) – when the assurance evidence does not support the 
disclosures made. 
• Qualified opinion(s) or disclaimer(s)35 – when the engagement scope is limited. 
• Where the assuror finds that the reporting criteria are unsuitable, or that the subject matter 
is inappropriate for the assurance engagement, it may be necessary to express a qualified or 
adverse opinion, or even a disclaimer. 
                                           
35 In this context, a disclaimer of opinion indicates that an assurance either lacked independence or was unable to 
gather sufficient evidence to form an opinion (Ashbaugh, 2004). 
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• Under certain circumstances, the assuror should even consider withdrawing from the 
assurance engagement. 
The voluntary nature of CSR assurance may result in management of the reporting company not 
being inclined to disclose opinions that may question the accuracy and completeness of their CSR 
reports, or to withhold the publication of qualified reports (Deegan et al., 2006).  Owen and 
O’Dwyer (2004) point out that there are clear distinctions between the opinions provided by audit 
professionals and consultants.  They argue that consultant opinions tend to provide a greater level 
of assurance, especially in terms of its greater robustness and enhanced commentary.   
This thesis predicts that following the implementation of King III, the demand for CSR assurance in 
South Africa will continue growing, with auditor assurors continuing to be the primary providers of 
CSR assurance.  The dominance of the Big 4 audit firms is however, expected to decline over time 
as more parties (both non-auditor assurors and non-Big 4 auditor assurors) begin actively providing 
independent CSR assurance in response to the increased demand.  Despite auditor assurors 
tending to provide lower levels of assurance, it may be argued that CSR assurance provided by 
auditor assurors is perceived by stakeholders as being more credible than assurance provided by 
non-auditor assurors possibly as a result of the: 
• combination of the strong audit profession brands (especially by the Big 4 audit firms) 
• rigorous assurance methodologies deployed 
• strict application of globally recognised assurance standards36 
• adopting an inherently more conservative assurance approach. 
3.2.6 Standardised CSR assurance approaches 
3.2.6.1 Background  
Although several assurance standards and approaches dealing with CSR matters have emerged in 
recent years, none are universally accepted (ICAEW, 2008).  While some assurors may use 
professional engagement standards that have been developed over extended periods through 
rigorous, independent and transparent processes, others rely on subjective judgement to 
determine the nature, timing and extent of assurance procedures and the content of assurance 
reports (IFAC, 2006).  Standardisation improves comparability by establishing a uniform platform 
and common terminology which will reduce report user confusion (Al-Hamadeen, 2007; Owen 
                                           
36 In this regard, the IFAE and ISAE 3000 issued by the IAASB particularly apply.   
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et al., 2000).  Providing information relating to the standards and guidelines used in the CSR 
assurance engagement process assist users to understand the nature and extent of the assurance 
provided (Al-Hamadeen, 2007).  The variation in CSR assurance standards may cause assurors to 
combine different heterogeneous operating instruments and even to mix possibly conflicting 
guidelines and standards, thereby increasing user confusion (Manetti & Toccafondi, 2012). 
CSR assurance provides a mechanism for evaluating economic, social and environmental planning; 
facilitating economic decision-making; and identifying social and environmental needs as being 
significant criteria for resource allocation (Owen et al., 2000).  Rigorous CSR verification procedures 
should be developed, based on attestation principles, but drawing heavily on financial auditing 
procedures (Al-Hamadeen, 2007; Owen et al., 2000).  Three dominant approaches to non-financial 
assurance have emerged in the absence of universally accepted principles or standards.  These are 
AA1000AS, ISAE 3000 and the GRI Guidelines (CorporateRegister, 2008; Perego, 2009).   
CSR assurance should shift from being a collection of discreet audits of individual CSR components 
to more closely represent the integrated and systemic nature of CSR-related issues (Grafé-Buckens 
& Beloe, 1998).  Given its interrelated nature, CSR assurance should therefore more holistically 
reflect the environmental, social, economic and human performance of company operations.  In 
the absence of universally applicable CSR assurance standards, the various CSR assurance-related 
frameworks and standards from other disciplines should be adapted and applied (ICAEW, 2004).   
While the assurance provider should be an independent expert, the evaluation of CSR report 
reliability should extend beyond merely checking calculations to incorporate the assessment of the 
adequacy of organisational compliance with fundamental CSR principles (Sierra et al., 2013).  The 
ICAEW (2004) concludes that a typical independent assurance report should identify the: 
• assurance engagement objectives and scope 
• respective responsibilities of management and the assuror 
• assurance methodology deployed 
• stakeholder engagement process  
• opinion regarding the completeness and fairness of the company performance disclosures 
against predetermined targets, while providing recommendations for improvements.   
To advance the professionalism and uniformity of the CSR movement, current SEAAR interventions 
are attempting to converge the disparate social, ethical, environmental, accounting, reporting and 
assurance standards.  O’Dwyer et al. (2011) argue that the structural and content standardisation 
of CSR assurance reports reduces stakeholder confusion that may arise from the generalised, 
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vague and limiting nature of assurance opinions, stimulating a need for clearer and less ambiguous 
assurance reports and conclusions.  Clear guidance or regulations, requiring cooperation between 
the professional bodies and other parties involved in the provision of CSR assurance, are 
accordingly necessary to overcome the uncertainties inherent in existing CSR assurance practices 
(Deegan et al., 2006).  For example, the IAASB, GRI and AccountAbility should cooperate to 
collaboratively develop comprehensive CSR assurance guidelines.   
3.2.6.2 AA1000AS  
The AA1000 Assurance Standard (AA1000AS) issued by The Institute of Social and Ethical 
Accountability (AccountAbility) is the only internationally recognised standard specifically designed 
to provide CSR assurance (AccountAbility, 2008a; Al-Hamadeen, 2007).  Being a principles-based 
standard, AA1000AS provides assurors with sufficient flexibility to adapt to different organisations 
and sectors (CorporateRegister, 2008).  AA1000AS addresses CSR report credibility through the 
principles37 of inclusivity,38 materiality39 and responsiveness40 (AccountAbility, 2008a).  Unlike 
ISAE 3000 (as described in section  3.2.6.3) that was specifically developed by the audit profession 
for use by its members, AA1000AS is a non-proprietary assurance standard intended for use by all 
CSR assurors (Manetti & Becatti, 2009).  AA1000AS has been designed to complement the GRI 
principles (AccountAbility, 2008a).  Al-Hamadeen (2007) argues that AA1000AS is the only standard 
that effectively aligns the CSR assurance engagement with the material interests of stakeholders, 
by specifically requiring the assurance engagement to consider a stakeholder perspective.   
In order to provide an assurance opinion, AA1000AS assurance engagements should evaluate the 
nature and extent of the reporting company’s adherence to the AA1000APS principles and the 
quality of publicly disclosed CSR performance information (AccountAbility, 2008a).  Instead of 
simply evaluating CSR performance where data are readily available, the assuror should identify the 
most important CSR issues (CorporateRegister, 2008) and the methodology available for their 
verification.  In addition to providing an assurance opinion, AA1000AS’ forward-looking orientation 
requires assurors to move beyond merely reviewing historical performance by providing 
observations and recommendations to improve identified deficiencies, thereby adding value to both 
the intended users and the reporting company (AccountAbility, 2008a).   
                                           
37 Whereas completeness was included as a principle in the 2003 edition of the standard, the 2008 revision concluded 
that completeness involved the depth and breadth to which the other principles have been achieved and was 
embedded in the explanation and criteria for each of the other principles. 
38 Inclusivity means recognising the right of stakeholders to be heard and the obligation of organisations to respond. 
39 Materiality is about the relevance and significance of an issue to a corporation and its stakeholders. 
40 Responsiveness is an organisation’s response to stakeholder issues that affect its sustainability performance and is 
realised through decisions, actions and performance, as well as stakeholder communication. 
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In order to provide a clear overview of the assurance process and establish the context for the 
assurance opinions, AA1000AS requires the assurance engagement scope and the extent of work 
undertaken to be clearly communicated.  To improve credibility, an AA1000AS assurance report 
should clearly indicate the assuror’s independence and competencies (CorporateRegister, 2008). 
AA1000AS identifies two different assurance levels.  Type 1 assurance relates to whether the report 
contains the right information (i.e. are all the material issues covered, or is the report complete) by 
evaluating the nature and extent of the company’s adherence to all three of the AA1000APS 
principles.  By contrast, Type 2 assurance addresses whether the report disclosures are correct (i.e. 
reliable, accurate and complete).  While Type 1 assurance allows assurors to rely on information 
provided by management and not necessarily to independently verify the information, Type 2 
assurance requires assurors to verify the CSR report against reliable evidence.  In addition to 
evaluating the nature and extent of the reporting company’s adherence to the AA1000APS (as in 
Type 1 assurance), Type 2 assurance also evaluates the reliability of specified sustainability 
information.   
The selection of the CSR performance information that should be assured is based on the assuror’s 
assessment of materiality and should be meaningful to the intended assurance report users.  Both 
Type 1 and Type 2 engagements allow an assurance engagement to provide either a ‘high’ or a 
‘moderate’ level of assurance, or a combination of the two.  The assurance levels agreed between 
the assuror and the reporting organisation should therefore be documented in the assurance 
agreement, with the assurance report disclosing the reasons for any deviation.  Since different 
subject matter may be addressed in one assurance engagement, high assurance levels could be 
provided for some aspects of a CSR report and moderate levels for others.   
3.2.6.3 ISAE 3000 
The International Standard on Assurance Engagements 3000 (ISAE 3000), also known as the 
standard for Assurance Engagements Other Than Audits or Reviews of Historical Financial 
Information, was specifically developed by the audit profession, for use by its members.  Members 
of the global audit profession are obliged to comply with the IFAC Code of Ethics for Professional 
Accountants and the IAASB standards (Al-Hamadeen, 2007), which contain important provisions 
relating to competence, due care and objectivity.  Based on the framework underpinning the IAASB 
standards used for AFS audits (ICAEW, 2004), ISAE 3000 provides the audit profession with 
guidance on how to apply the necessary principles and procedures to conduct non-financial 
assurance engagements (Al-Hamadeen, 2007; Manetti & Becatti, 2009). 
Unlike AA1000AS, ISAE 3000 is a generic standard for non-financial assurance and has not been 
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specifically designed to provide assurance on CSR reports (Ackers, 2009; FEE, 2006; Manetti & 
Becatti, 2009).  Therefore, even though the audit profession’s CSR assurance role is expected to 
continue growing, it may be argued that ISAE 3000 may actually impair meaningful CSR assurance.  
Instead, the predicted growth of CSR assurance by auditor assurors may be attributed to other 
attributes of the audit profession, including the perceived credibility and strong brands of the audit 
profession generally, and of the Big 4 audit firms41 in particular.  This credibility is enhanced by the 
perceived rigorous assurance methodologies that have been carefully honed by the global audit 
profession over many years (Ackers, 2009). 
ISAE 3000 requires assurors to understand the needs of intended assurance report users when 
discharging their assurance engagement responsibilities (ICAEW, 2008).  Since assurors should 
have the necessary skills to undertake specific assurance engagements, assurance practitioners 
involved in CSR assurance engagements often utilise multidisciplinary teams when undertaking 
specific assurance engagements.  In this regard, ISA 620 provides auditors with guidance for using 
the work of independent experts, when that work is used to assist the auditor to obtain sufficient 
appropriate evidence relating to the assurance engagement. 
While ISAE 3000 does not propose a standardised format, it provides for both short form (i.e. a 
basic list of elements) or long form (i.e. including additional items such as the terms of 
engagement and findings) assurance reporting.  ISAE 3000 provides two assurance levels, namely, 
‘reasonable’ and ‘limited’ which are directly linked to the engagement risk (Al-Hamadeen, 2007; 
CorporateRegister, 2008).  The ISAE 3000 assurance level descriptors inherently undermine the 
acceptability of assurance provided by auditor assurors (O’Dwyer et al., 2011).  Limited assurance 
opinions may however, underplay the extent of the engagement work actually performed and the 
extent to which stakeholder-related issues were addressed, impairing their usefulness to potential 
users (O’Dwyer et al., 2011).  
As in AA1000AS, ISAE 3000 specifically requires assurors to recommend improvements to the 
company’s non-financial reporting as well as to the underlying processes and systems 
(Al-Hamadeen, 2007).  Despite ISAE 3000 having originally been intended for the audit profession, 
other assurors are also referencing ISAE 3000 (Ackers, 2009; CorporateRegister, 2008). 
ISAE 3000 has recently been reviewed with a revised version being released in December 2013.  
Despite this revision, ISAE 3000 remains a generic standard for non-financial assurance.  To date, 
the audit profession has still not developed an assurance standard that specifically addresses CSR 
                                           
41 The Big 4 audit firms are Deloitte & Touché, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC). 
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reporting.  Since the revised ISAE 3000 is due for implementation for assurance reports issued on 
or after 15 December 2015, it has not been analysed in greater detail in this thesis.  
3.2.6.4 Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
Although the GRI is a reporting guideline and not an assurance standard, it is often referenced in 
CSR assurance reports.  Therefore, despite being described in section  2.7.7.3, it is included in this 
section, but within an assurance context.  Interestingly, McAusland and Fogelberg (2010) found 
that only few CSR reports based on the GRI framework were externally assured.   
In addition to any internal resources to enhance report credibility, the GRI G4 recommends that 
reporting companies provide external assurance on their CSR disclosures (GRI, 2013a).  Where 
companies disclose that their CSR reports were prepared ‘in accordance’ with the GRI Guidelines, 
and especially where the report, or parts thereof, were externally assured, GRI section 3.3 and 
guideline G4-32 require the GRI Content Index to refer to the external assurance report.  While not 
prescribing external assurance, GRI G4 guideline G4-33 requires reporting companies to disclose 
their current policy and practice on external CSR assurance.  In addition to self-declaring their GRI 
level, reporting companies may have an external assuror provide an independent opinion on the 
self-declaration, and/or the GRI check the validity of their self-disclosures (GRI, 2011a).  Even 
though the GRI may examine the assurance report, it will not attempt to verify whether the 
assurance engagement has met any of the stipulated assurance criteria.  
Despite reporting companies using a variety of approaches to enhance report credibility, the GRI 
(2011a) recommends that the assurance engagement should be conducted by competent groups 
or individuals external to the company.  While some of these engagements may use professional 
assurance standards, others may involve proprietary approaches following a systematic, 
documented and evidence-based process, which may not necessarily be incorporated into any 
specific standard.  The key attributes for independent assurance using the GRI Reporting 
Framework are that the assurance engagement should: 
• be conducted by groups or individuals external to the company who are demonstrably 
competent in both the subject matter and assurance practices 
• be implemented in a systematic, documented and evidence-based manner, and characterised 
by the use of defined procedures 
• provide a reasonable and balanced representation of company performance, taking account 
of the veracity of the data presented, as well as the overall selection of the report content 
• utilise independent and objective assurors where the relationship amongst the reporting 
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company, its stakeholders and the assurance provider does not impair the assuror’s ability to 
provide an independent and impartial opinion on the CSR disclosures 
• assess the extent to which the reporting company has applied the GRI Reporting Framework 
• provide an assurance opinion or a set of opinions, and the assuror’s statement describing the 
nature of the relationship between the report preparer and the assurance provider. 
3.3 The audit profession’s CSR assurance role 
3.3.1 Background  
As described in section  3.2.3 auditor assurors are the primary providers of independent CSR 
assurance and it is predicted that the status quo will continue into the foreseeable future (as 
described in section  3.2.5.5).  It is accordingly appropriate to include a section that examines the 
characteristics of the audit profession.  This is particularly necessary within the context of the 
prescribed regulatory framework and the public’s expectations of auditors.  Moreover, as previously 
stated, the audit profession is represented by both internal and external auditors, each arguably 
with its own characteristics and responsibilities.   
Auditing is widely acknowledged as one of the world’s oldest professions.  Auditing commenced 
when one party assumed stewardship over the property of another.  Porter, Simon and Hatherly 
(2003) suggest that the accuracy and reliability of information reported should be subjected to 
some sort of critical review (i.e. an audit).  While the literature is unclear about how long auditing 
has existed, recorded evidence of ‘tick and check’ patterns goes back over 5 500 years to the 
ancient Egyptians (Cascarino & Van Esch, 2007), the Babylonians from 2285 to 2242 BC (Gouws & 
Cronjé, 2008) and the Chinese in the Hsia Dynasty between 2206 BC and 1766 BC (Loots, 1989).  
This was followed some time later by the ancient Greek and Roman civilisations.   
The word ‘auditor’ probably derives from the Latin word audire – ‘to hear’ (Jackson & Stent, 2012), 
or auditus – ‘the hearing’ (Cascarino & Van Esch, 2007).  Owing to the low literacy rates at the 
time, auditing was probably initially done orally, resulting in ‘auditor’ acquiring a secondary, but 
more common meaning as “one who satisfies himself as to the truth of the accounting of another” 
(Taylor, Kritzinger & Puttick, 1983). 
Through their ‘attestation’ function, the audit profession has historically been the primary provider 
of relevant, high quality accounting information for public decision-making.  Attestation is usually 
associated with issuing a signed report, rendering an objective opinion about whether the 
disclosures were fairly presented (i.e. unbiased) and free from material misstatements (i.e. 
anything that could influence decision-making).  The acceptability of the audit report and opinion is 
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based on the assumption that it was provided by a competent, independent, objective party.  
Independence has become the normative standard for auditing, ensuring credible, reliable and 
trustworthy reporting, usually produced by corporate management, upon which stakeholders may 
rely for informed decision-making (Maury, 2000).  Conceptually, auditing requires a clearly defined 
object of the audit process; independence from the matter being audited; an examination of the 
supporting evidence; and drawing a conclusion or providing an opinion based on the evidence 
gathered (Al-Hamadeen, 2007). 
Independent assurance provides the reporting company with value-added benefits, while meeting 
stakeholder expectations and complying with internationally recognised guidelines such as the GRI 
and AA1000 series of standards (CorporateRegister, 2008).  It is suggested that the principles and 
processes traditionally associated with financial auditing should equally apply to non-financial 
assurance (Al-Hamadeen, 2007; ICAEW, 2004; Owen et al., 2000).  A comprehensive CSR 
assurance report should therefore identify areas to improve the underlying management systems, 
data collection, report content, or the scope, boundaries or approach adopted for the assurance 
engagement.  In 1999 and 2002, the FEE issued two discussion papers relating to the provision of 
assurance on CSR reports (Al-Hamadeen, 2007), which propose three CSR assurance approaches: 
(i) Accountancy – based on financial auditing and utilising IFAC standards and guidelines. 
(ii) Social audit – based on evidence sourced from outside the company and focusing primarily 
on assurance of the management systems that provide CSR performance information. 
(iii) Consultancy – in terms of which advisory services are provided to help in improving 
management systems and non-financial performance. 
Percy (1997) argues that auditors have two CSR responsibilities.  Their first involves identifying 
material CSR issues that could affect the AFS.  The second involves providing stakeholders with 
independent assurance about the veracity of CSR reports prepared by management.  Effectively 
addressing these issues allows auditors to demonstrate their due consideration of the expectations 
of broader stakeholders, addressing the expectation gap.  According to Dando and Swift (2003), 
possible overreliance on financial auditing models that inadequately evaluate qualitative non-
financial CSR dimensions may result in questionable robustness of assurance practices. 
3.3.2 Internal audit 
The IIA (2010b: 5) defines internal auditing as “an independent, objective assurance and 
consulting activity designed to add value and improve an organization’s operations.  It helps an 
organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate 
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and improve the effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance processes”.  While 
internally provided assurance may be a cheaper alternative to external assurance, it may lack the 
credibility that external stakeholders may require (Jones et al., 2014).  Although the IIA (2010b) 
suggests that internal audit’s CSR-related role may be determined by the extent to which CSR has 
been entrenched in the corporate fabric (i.e. the CSR maturity level), this role has not yet been 
clearly defined, and may include the following: 
• Auditing – providing assurance about the adequacy of CSR-related internal controls and the 
veracity of CSR-related disclosures. 
• Facilitation – facilitating management’s self-assessment of CSR-related controls and results, 
based on a risk assessment and prompting remedial action to improve controls. 
• Consultation – providing advisory services relating to the design and implementation of CSR 
programmes and reports, or serving as a technical advisor on CSR-related matters. 
Complying with a risk-based auditing approach, as mandated by the IIA Standards, requires the 
internal audit activity to understand the CSR-related risks and controls, as determined by the 
company’s CSR maturity level (IIA, 2010b).  In this regard, the CAE should ensure that the audit 
plan includes coverage of material CSR-related issues (IIA, 2010a).  In order to effectively 
discharge their CSR-related responsibilities, internal auditors should therefore ensure that they 
have the necessary knowledge and skills to understand CSR-related governance, risks and controls 
(IIA, 2010a).  Sawyer et al. (2003) argue that internal auditors should already be reviewing 
compliance with legislation and regulations; determining the propriety of social and environmental 
issues; and ensuring adequate and proper disclosure.  At the same time, internal auditors should 
ensure that CSR risks are effectively mitigated; CSR interventions are efficient, effective and 
economical; and company CSR-related decisions are based on reliable and complete information.  
The CAE should therefore understand the CSR risks, and incorporate that knowledge into the 
internal audit activity’s audit universe, audit plan and audit approach (IIA, 2010a).  Unlike external 
auditors whose reporting efforts are primarily aimed at external stakeholders, the internal audit 
activity focuses on internal stakeholders, including the: 
• The engagement client – operational staff and management, whose functions could be 
improved by the audit engagement results. 
• The board and top management – that require independently verified information about the 
company’s operations for which they are accountable. 
The International Professional Practice Framework (IPPF) of the IIA provides the internal audit 
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activity with authoritative guidance on independence, objectivity, competence, proficiency and due 
professional care (IIA, 2013).  An internal audit activity that conforms to the IPPF can therefore 
provide management and the board with independent assurance about CSR programmes and 
reporting (IIA, 2010b).  This was confirmed by KPMG (2008) finding an increasing trend for internal 
auditors to review CSR data.  Just as compliance with the IAASB standards is mandatory for 
auditors in public practice (SAICA, 2012), compliance with the International Standards for the 
Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (IIA Standards) is mandatory for internal auditors.  IIA 
Standard 2010 requires the internal audit activity to establish risk-based plans that ensures that the 
priorities of the internal audit activity are consistent with the organisation’s goals.  IIA Standard 
1210 requires internal audit activities collectively lacking the necessary skills and knowledge to 
decline CSR-related engagements (IIA, 2010a).   
The specialised nature of CSR implies that most auditors (both internal and external) should 
possess all the necessary competencies to effectively perform meaningful CSR assurance 
engagements.  This deficiency may be overcome by co-opting the necessary skills, or outsourcing 
or co-sourcing these services to specialists when required (Sawyer et al., 2003).  To maintain 
objectivity, these CSR experts should be independent from the area being assured (IIA, 2010a).  
Where external service providers perform CSR assurance engagements, internal auditors could be 
seconded to the assurance team to facilitate their knowledge and skill development.  Partnering 
internal auditors with CSR experts (either within or external to the company) provides an 
opportunity for internal auditors to acquire the necessary knowledge and skills through skills 
transfer (IIA, 2010b). 
While King III (as described in section  2.7.7.2) may have intended CSR reports to be assured by 
independent external assurors, the present wording of King III principle 9.3 simply refers to 
‘independent assurance’ (IoD, 2009a).   Contradictorily, recommended practice 3.4.4 requires the 
audit committee to recommend the board to engage an ‘external’ assurance provider on material 
sustainability issues.  IIA Standard 1100 requires internal auditors to be independent.  This 
independence is reinforced by the IIA’s definition of internal audit, specifying its independent and 
objective nature, Moreover, IIA Standard 1110 requires the CAE to report to an organisational level 
that allows the internal audit activity to fulfil its responsibilities and to confirm the internal audit 
activity’s independence to the board.  It is therefore submitted that CSR assurance provided by the 
internal audit activity may actually meet the requirement of the King III principle, despite not 
complying with the recommended practice.   
Al-Hamadeen (2007) however, argues that since internal audits are not undertaken by independent 
external parties, they do not provide independent assurance.  Al-Hamadeen’s argument does not 
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however, consider whether internal audit engagements outsourced to external parties (in terms of 
IIA Standard 2070) constitute independent assurance as envisaged.  Nevertheless, as previously 
stated, assurance provided by the internal audit activity is typically directed at the internal 
stakeholders tasked with corporate governance, adding value by facilitating an improvement in 
operational performance, instead of providing external stakeholders with assurance that company 
disclosures may be relied upon. 
3.3.3 External audit  
3.3.3.1 Background  
Broadly speaking, an external audit is performed by external experts, independent of the auditee, 
in accordance with requirements that are defined by, or on behalf of, the parties for whose benefit 
the audit is conducted (Brown, 1962; Jackson & Stent, 2012; Peecher, Solomon & Trotman, 2010; 
Porter et al., 2003).  The primary objective of external or statutory audits42 (required by 
legislation43), is to provide an informed opinion on the fair presentation of the AFS.  Auditors certify 
that the audited AFS have been presented in an unbiased manner and are free from material 
misstatements, or not, as the case may be (Maury, 2000).  Since shareholders receive confidence 
from the audit profession’s oversight over the veracity of the annual report disclosures, external 
auditors have almost exclusively focused on the AFS when discharging their statutory audit 
responsibilities (Percy, 1997).   
Recent corporate governance developments, more demanding stakeholders, the introduction of 
non-financial performance measures and revised corporate reporting requirements and standards, 
require new types of audit.  In addition to auditing the conventional financial disclosures, auditors 
are now also expected to provide assurance on the non-financial components of the annual report, 
often containing CSR-related information (Percy, 1997; Sierra et al., 2013).  Stakeholders may 
therefore believe that the responsibility of auditors extends beyond mere AFS attestation, implying 
that auditors are obliged to consider the broader interests of stakeholders.   
Auditing is conceptually underpinned by a clearly defined audit objective; independence from the 
audit subject matter; performance of technical work relating to documentation examination and 
evidence gathering; and provision of an opinion based on the evidence gathered (Al-Hamadeen, 
2007).  As described in section  3.2, in order to differentiate external auditors from other parties or 
bodies claiming to be ‘auditors’, this thesis uses the term ‘auditor’ or ‘auditor assuror’ to refer to 
                                           
42 Audit professionals are represented by Chartered Accountants (CAs) and Certified Public Accountants (CPAs).  
43 In South Africa, section 30(2)(a) of the Companies Act, 2008, requires the AFS of public companies to be audited.  In 
this context the auditing profession is regulated by the Auditing Profession Act, 2005.  
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members of the external audit profession. 
The global audit profession is rapidly undergoing major change.  Due to the largely saturated 
financial audit market, the services provided by audit firms are evolving, expanding their range of 
services from simply providing financial audit services to increasingly providing consulting and non-
financial assurance services (Maury, 2000; Sierra et al., 2013).  This diversification is illustrated by 
the revenue streams of large auditing firms now including tax planning, compliance and forensic 
audits, outsourced internal audits, consulting services, information systems and human resource 
recruitment, with fees for non-audit services representing 32% of audit firm revenue (Ashbaugh, 
2004).  This expanded range of services however, introduces a potential conflict of interest, which 
became evident after the collapse of Enron and WorldCom, where the same external auditing firms 
also provided additional services.  This risk to independence and objectivity has been partially 
addressed in the USA with the promulgation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), which prohibits 
external auditors from performing AFS audits for their clients and providing additional assurance 
services (Asthana, Balsam & Kim, 2009). 
Where audit firms lack the specialist skills required for specific CSR assurance engagements, the 
auditing and assurance standards (ISA 620 and ISAE 3000 in particular) explicitly allow auditors to 
be assisted by interdisciplinary experts during their assurance engagement (as described in 
section  3.3.3.4).  Huggins et al. (2011) concur by arguing in favour of using multidisciplinary 
assurance teams comprising an appropriate mix of assurance and subject-matter expertise.  These 
multidisciplinary assurance teams must however, be led by an auditor assuror who remains 
responsible for the assurance engagement.  Recognising the diverse list of possible experts and 
their respective roles, Manetti and Becatti (2009) attempt to reduce the confusion by providing 
three alternative CSR assurance models: 
• Undivided responsibility – based on the ISAE 3000 perspective on using experts.  The auditor 
who retains sole responsibility for the entire engagement signs the assurance report. 
• Multidisciplinary cooperation with joint responsibility – based on auditors and external experts 
cooperating on all phases of the engagement.  One collaborative assurance report is issued 
for which both the auditor and the expert(s) take collective responsibility. 
• Separate engagements for each discipline – based on the reporting company contracting two 
(or more) separate assurors to address different aspects of the assurance engagement.  
Despite possible cooperation on the assurance engagement between the auditor and the 
external expert(s), separate reports are usually issued. 
The expansion of services to include CSR assurance represents an opportunity for the audit 
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profession to capitalise on new markets (ICAEW, 2004).  According to the ICAEW (2004), auditors 
are pre-eminently qualified to provide CSR assurance by building on initiatives such as the IAASB 
Framework and ISAE 3000, while working together with other interdisciplinary experts.  
Competence and relevant expertise are prerequisites for establishing the type of assurance service 
that will be provided.  Audit firms (the Big 4 in particular) are perceived as the preferred providers 
of non-financial information assurance, especially when professional reputation and integrity are 
considered important (Al-Hamadeen, 2007).  Moreover, Sierra et al. (2013) argue that providing 
both CSR assurance and AFS audit services produces synergies, while at the same time enhancing 
the audit firm’s image and reputation.   
The ICAEW (2004) cautions that unless the audit profession stops neglecting CSR-related issues, its 
involvement in key areas such as strategic planning, statutory requirements and taxation, internal 
and external reporting, as well as in assurance, may consequently be reduced.  Similarly, without 
the audit profession developing definitive assurance standards for its CSR assurance engagements, 
it is likely that the criteria for CSR assurance engagements will be provided by non-auditor 
disciplines (ICAEW, 2004). 
3.3.3.2 The regulatory auditing environment 
The South African Companies Act, 2008, obliges all public companies44 (and certain other 
categories of companies) to have their AFS audited (s30(2)(a)) by a registered auditor (s90(2)(a)).  
Registered auditors in South Africa are regulated by the Independent Regulatory Board for Auditors 
(IRBA) operating in terms of the Audit Profession Act, 2005.  To demonstrate their professional 
competence and due care, section 130 of the code of professional conduct for chartered 
accountants, imposes the following obligations on all registered auditors45 (SAICA, 2010): 
• Maintaining and developing the knowledge and skills necessary to provide a competent and 
professional service. 
• Acting diligently according to established technical and professional standards when providing 
professional services. 
• Exercising sound judgement when applying professional knowledge and skill when providing 
professional services. 
• Continuing awareness of relevant technical, professional and business developments to 
                                           
44 The Companies Act defines a public company as a profit company that is not state-owned, a private company or a 
personal liability company (South Africa, 2008b: 30). 
45 In South Africa, registered auditors are designated as chartered accountants. 
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ensure that auditors possess the requisite capabilities to competently discharge their 
responsibilities. 
• Carefully, thoroughly and timeously complying with the engagement requirements. 
• Taking reasonable steps to ensure that those working in a professional capacity under the 
auditor’s authority are appropriately trained and supervised. 
• Ensuring that clients, employers and other users of professional audit services are aware of 
the limitations inherent in the service. 
• Declining any engagement that the auditor is not competent to perform, unless the auditor is 
advised and assisted by appropriate ‘experts’, thus enabling them to satisfactorily undertake 
the engagement. 
Unlike mandatory AFS auditing, CSR assurance by the auditor assurors is currently voluntarily 
provided in South Africa, with neither the Companies Act, 2008, nor the Audit Profession Act, 2005, 
requiring auditors to undertake CSR assurance engagements.  As indicated in sections  2.7.5.2 
and  2.7.7.2, the JSE regulations require all JSE-listed companies to adopt the King III principles on 
an ‘apply or explain’ basis.  Within this context, King III principle 9.3 requires reporting companies 
to provide independent assurance on their CSR disclosures, introducing a de facto regulation for 
companies to comply with.   
Globally, auditors are obliged to comply with the principles of the IAASB and the IFAE.  These 
principles include the International Standards on Auditing (ISAs); the International Standards on 
Review Engagements (ISREs); and the International Standards on Assurance Engagements 
(ISAEs).  ISA 720 stipulates that where annual reports contain non-financial information, the 
auditor must read this information to ensure that there are no material inconsistencies between the 
AFS and other information which may undermine the credibility of the audited AFS.  Except where 
specifically required, the audit opinion does not usually cover this information.   
ISA 700 requires the auditor’s report in respect of AFS audits to be addressed to those for whom 
the report is prepared.  By contrast, ISAE 3000 which covers non-financial assurance engagements 
is rather vague, simply stating that the assurance report should identify the party or parties to 
whom the report is addressed.  It does however, ambiguously suggest that the report should 
consider all intended users (paragraph 49(b)).  Dubious about corporate accountability to broader 
stakeholders, O’Dwyer and Owen (2005) suggest that since auditor assurors usually address their 
CSR assurance reports to the management of the reporting company, they only provide internal 
stakeholders with CSR assurance, thereby disregarding broader stakeholders.  The ICAEW (2008) 
however, cautions that despite assurors not accepting any responsibility to parties who were not 
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directly party to the assurance engagement that may rely on the CSR assurance report, this does 
not eliminate the risk of legal action from these ‘non-intended’ users.  It is therefore necessary for 
auditor assurors to carefully assess the risks associated with particular engagements before 
deciding on whether to accept the assurance engagement, and the engagement terms. 
The IAASB principles require all verification activities provided by auditors to specifically indicate 
the level of assurance provided (Manetti & Becatti, 2009; SAICA, 2012).  This reduces uncertainty 
between report user perceptions about the verification process and its actual effectiveness.  
ISAE 3000 (as described in section  3.2.6.3) specifically requires assurance opinions on limited 
assurance engagements to be expressed in the negative form (as described in section  3.2.5.5), 
suggesting that the assurance report does not necessarily address the reporting company’s entire 
performance in a truthful and correct manner (Manetti & Becatti, 2009).  It may therefore be 
argued that negatively oriented CSR assurance reporting (as described in sections  3.2.5.4 
and  3.2.5.5) does not adequately add value or communicate effectively to stakeholders.   
While the lack of a definitive mandatory regulatory framework for CSR assurance engagements 
may have stimulated competition amongst Big 4 audit firms, at the same time it has created a 
barrier to entry for smaller (non-Big 4) audit firms (Sierra et al., 2013).  This particularly applies to 
reporting companies with higher media profiles tending to leverage the use of Big 4 firms to assure 
their CSR disclosures (De Beelde & Tuybens, 2013). 
3.3.3.3 The auditor’s framework for assurance engagements (IFAE) 
As stated in section  3.3.3.2, registered auditors are obliged to comply with the IFAE which provides 
the audit profession with a framework for conducting assurance engagements.  It is accordingly 
considered appropriate to provide a brief overview of pertinent IFAE provisions (SAICA, 2012).  The 
IFAE proposes a tripartite relationship for assurance engagements involving the auditor, the 
reporting company and the intended users.  While all three parties should be involved in 
determining the requirements of the assurance engagement, the IFAE specifies that the auditor 
alone should be responsible to establish the nature, timing and extent of audit procedures utilised. 
The subject matter covered by an assurance engagement may include both financial and non-
financial performance; physical characteristics; systems and processes; and behaviour.  It is 
therefore necessary for the subject matter to be identifiable and capable of consistent evaluation 
against the established criteria.  The evidence gathered informs the assurance opinion provided.  
The subject matter characteristics may consist of varying degrees of qualitative or quantitative 
data; objectivity or subjectivity; be historical or future-oriented; or relate to a particular date or 
period.  These characteristics influence the precision with which the subject matter may be 
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evaluated against the criteria and the persuasiveness of the available evidence. 
The criteria against which the subject matter is evaluated establish the benchmark for assessing 
performance within the context of the auditor’s professional judgement.  Assurance conclusions 
derived from evaluating the evidence against the criteria may however, be subject to 
interpretation, and could be contextually sensitive to the specific engagement circumstances.  
Relevant evaluation criteria include judgementally assessing the characteristics of relevance, 
completeness, reliability, neutrality and understandability.  It is accordingly important for intended 
users to be provided with these criteria to improve their understanding of how the subject matter 
was evaluated. 
Auditors should apply professional scepticism to ensure that sufficient appropriate evidence, free 
from material misstatement, is collected about the subject matter.  Professional scepticism requires 
auditors to critically assess the validity of the evidence obtained and to be aware of evidence that 
may contradict or indicate that the disclosures are not trustworthy.  Whereas sufficiency is an 
indicator of the quantity of evidence, appropriateness relates to the quality of the evidence.  
Materiality indicates the auditor’s assessment of the factors that may influence decision-making by 
intended users.  Assurance engagement risk relates to the risk that the auditor may express an 
inappropriate conclusion as a result of an undetected material misstatement of the subject matter.  
The quantity and quality of the available evidence is influenced by the characteristics of the subject 
matter and the engagement circumstances.  The assurance process concludes when the auditor 
issues a written report reflecting the conclusion(s) or opinion(s), relating to the extent to which the 
assurance evidence gathered supports the disclosures that were subject to the assurance 
engagement. 
3.3.3.4 Auditor competencies and skills  
As indicated in section  3.3.3.3, the audit profession is compelled to comply with the IFAE, which 
includes the auditing standards that regulate the audit work performed.  In addition to the 
stringent educational and experiential requirements prescribed for entry into the audit profession, 
members ongoing participation in continuing professional development (CPD) programmes are 
mandatory to retain their certification.  In order to provide particular services, auditor assurors 
must comply with certain competency benchmarks (Huggins et al., 2011).  The strict quality control 
requirements of the audit profession, ideally positions it to undertake CSR assurance engagements, 
albeit at a price premium (Huggins et al., 2011).   
The complexity of CSR related issues suggests that auditors may lack the necessary time, 
autonomy or skills to really understand and appreciate the relevant dynamics of CSR in order to 
  
Page 122 of 338 
 
competently undertake CSR assurance engagements (Gouws & Cronjé, 2008; Manetti & Becatti, 
2009; Utting, 2005).  As described in section  3.2.5, auditors assigned to CSR assurance 
engagements must understand the business, have the necessary technical knowledge about the 
CSR processes and systems, and deploy suitable verification methodologies and expertise (Owen 
et al., 2000).  CSR assurors should therefore not only develop new competencies through 
education and training (Al-Hamadeen, 2007), but also experientially (Percy, 1997).  To ensure that 
relevant and reliable CSR information is timeously provided, auditors should constantly update and 
maintain their legal and regulatory knowledge about the businesses with which they are associated 
(SAICA, 2012).   
It is unlikely that audit firms will ever have (or need) all the specialist skills required for all types of 
CSR assurance engagements.  Where auditor assurors lack requisite skills, this deficit can be 
addressed through consulting experts (ICAEW, 2004).  ISAE 3000 explicitly provides for auditors to 
use interdisciplinary experts to assist during the assurance engagement.  The auditor assuror 
should assign tasks to the various experts, evaluate the adequacy of human resource deployment, 
determine the available sources of information and the collection methods used, as well as review 
the conclusions reached by each expert.  While the entire team should collaborate on the 
assurance engagement, the auditing standards46 require the auditor to ultimately accept 
responsibility for expressing the final opinion(s) in the assurance report, based on the diverse 
evidence gathered and interpreted by the experts (Manetti & Becatti, 2009).  Auditors may also 
address the skills deficit by working closely with other interdisciplinary experts with the objective of 
transferring skills (Percy, 1997).  Addressing the knowledge and skills deficit is particularly 
necessary during the audit profession’s early involvement in CSR assurance, while they develop the 
necessary competencies.   
According to Gouws and Cronjé (2008: 128), the majority of accounting/auditing academics (63%) 
believed that the existing accounting and auditing curriculum does not adequately equip students 
to deal with the ambiguity of non-financial information contained in annual reports.  Anecdotally, 
informal discussions with South African accounting and auditing academics revealed that the 
current curriculum for chartered accountants, as prescribed by the South African Institute of 
Chartered Accountants (SAICA), is too intensive to provide the necessary latitude to incorporate 
CSR-related issues into the academic accounting curriculum. 
Given the thorough financially oriented skills training and development regimen for auditors, it is 
unlikely that typical auditors would have the necessary knowledge and skills to participate in CSR 
                                           
46 International Standard on Auditing (ISA) 620 in particular. 
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assurance engagements.  Auditors involved in CSR assurance engagements should therefore 
supplement their skills, knowledge and expertise relating to the subject matter being assured.  
They should, for example, acquaint themselves with matters such as carbon accounting, and 
environmental and social issues.  The diverse nature of CSR-related issues, the complexity and 
heterogeneity of CSR assurance requires multidisciplinary input, for example in respect of 
accounting, management, engineering, environmental, economic and legal functions (Manetti & 
Toccafondi, 2012).  
3.3.3.5 Stakeholder expectations of auditors 
To effectively discharge their responsibilities, auditors should also provide assurance on the non-
financial disclosures in the annual report (Percy, 1997).  The auditor’s responsibility should 
therefore extend beyond mere attestation of the AFS, for the benefit of shareholders, by also 
considering the non-financial disclosures that are of interest to broader stakeholders.  While the 
strongest support for external CSR assurance was from trade unions, chartered accountants, 
environmental groups and bankers respectively, the lowest demand was from financial analysts 
(Mitchell & Hill, 2010).   
Existing audit practice produces an ‘audit expectation gap’ between the services provided by 
auditors and the stakeholders’ expectations of auditors (Lin & Chen, 2004; Percy, 1997).  While the 
extent of this gap is the subject of intense debate, according to the American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants (AICPA), the ‘expectation gap’ represents the difference between public 
expectations and needs, and what auditors believe that they can reasonably accomplish (Haniffa & 
Hudaib, 2007; Lin & Chen, 2004). 
Auditors can bridge this expectation gap by ensuring that the expectations and needs of legitimate 
stakeholders are considered and that each interested party benefits from the audit opinions 
provided (Maury, 2000).  Haniffa and Hudaib (2007) however, caution that the nature of the 
expectation gap and the remedies available to mitigate the liability and credibility issues in one 
country, may not work in another.   
3.4 CSR assurance challenges 
In their examination of CSR assurance reports, Deegan et al. (2006) found considerable variation in 
the titles used for assurance reports, the nature and extent of work performed, the parties to 
whom the assurance reports are addressed, the criteria and standards underpinning the assurance 
process, and the impact of limitations on the scope of the assurance engagement.  Despite CSR 
assurance reports arguably providing report users with some level of confidence, the variations in 
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terminology compound uncertainty, especially when users presume that the different terms imply 
different assurance levels (O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005).  Even the inconsistency of CSR assurance 
report titles contributes to report user confusion (Al-Hamadeen, 2007).  Improving the quality and 
comparability of information should therefore address concerns arising from the lack of consistent 
and comparable CSR assurance standards and the proliferation of diverse assurors, thereby 
encouraging stakeholders to rely on the underlying CSR report (PwC, 2005). 
Utting (2005) suggests that overall CSR reporting and assurance quality was quite poor, often not 
accurately depicting actual CSR performance.  CSR reports may lack the necessary indicators to 
meaningfully measure CSR performance and impacts, often concealing negative performance 
(Utting, 2005).  The considerable variation in CSR assurance methodologies and terminologies by 
the various CSR assurance providers makes it unlikely that existing assurance practices would 
provide external users with added value (Al-Hamadeen, 2007).  Moreover, variances in the volume, 
character and detail of different CSR disclosures of reporting companies, compounded by the lack 
of consensus about how CSR data should be collected, evaluated and reported, impairs the ability 
of assurors to provide meaningful and comparable CSR assurance reports (Jones et al., 2014).   
There is a risk that CSR reporters may control the assurance process, resulting in ‘managerial spin’, 
instead of reflecting a sincere commitment to greater corporate transparency and accountability 
(Al-Hamadeen, 2007).  Management may, for example, selectively disseminate information in order 
to manage their corporate image, rather than meaningfully reflect enhanced stakeholder 
transparency and accountability (Owen et al., 2000; Utting, 2005).  Insincere management 
interests and commercial motivations may therefore raise doubts about the credibility of CSR 
accounting and reporting initiatives (Owen et al., 2000).  Moreover, since reporting companies 
appoint the assurors, they could impose restrictions on the assurance engagement, resulting in the 
assurors effectively reporting to the company rather than to the stakeholders (O’Dwyer, 2005).  
This reporting dilemma is highlighted by the tendency of some assurors to specifically address their 
assurance reports to their principals, and deliberately excluding other parties that may rely thereon 
(as described in section  3.2.3).  This assertion is confirmed by Al-Hamadeen (2007) who posits that 
assurance practices often have a strong management orientation and benefit the reporting 
company to the exclusion of external users.  The poor involvement of stakeholders in the 
assurance process, management-imposed limitations on the assurance scope, the appointment of 
the assuror by the reporting company, the incompleteness of reported information and the 
assuror’s inability to unambiguously express an opinion, may therefore undermine CSR assurance 
practices (Adams & Evans, 2004).   
Stakeholders are usually unable to evaluate the effectiveness of the CSR assurance process unless 
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the engagement results, limitations on scope and the opinions are clearly communicated in the 
assurance report (Ackers, 2009; Manetti & Becatti, 2009).  Despite providing assurors (and 
reporting companies) with a choice between reasonable and limited assurance, ISAE 3000 does not 
exclude or explicitly require various parts of a CSR assurance report to provide different assurance 
levels or to use different verification procedures.  The assuror should therefore clearly indicate on 
which parts of the CSR report they provide reasonable assurance, which they provide limited 
assurance and which they do not provide any assurance (Manetti & Becatti, 2009).  While this may 
appear to be a pragmatic approach, the provision of multi-level assurance could compound CSR 
report user confusion.  According to the FEE (2011), the confusion resulting from multi-level 
assurance can only be overcome when assurors provide limited assurance on the entire document, 
clarifying exactly which aspects of the CSR report has been covered by the assurance engagement. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Whereas the second chapter described the CSR concept and the reporting of CSR performance, this 
chapter completes the CSR accountability cycle by describing the need to provide stakeholders with 
confidence about the veracity of the reporting company’s CSR disclosures.  Independent assurance 
of CSR disclosures improves stakeholder confidence about the veracity of the underlying 
disclosures while ameliorating the risk of companies using green-wash to falsely disclose their CSR 
performance, or deliberately concealing deficient CSR performance.   
Pertinent aspects of the literature review relating to CSR assurance are depicted in Table 3.1.  This 
synopsis represents the primary characteristics of CSR assurance against which the results of the 
three empirical phases are considered and described in chapters 5 and 6.   
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Table 3.1 – Synopsis of key aspects of CSR assurance 
Benefits of CSR 
assurance  
Primary CSR 
assurance 
providers 
CSR assurance 
components 
Intended 
audience of 
CSR assurance 
reports 
Frameworks, 
laws and 
regulations  
• Reduces green-wash 
• Reduces the risk of 
managerial capture 
• Enhances stakeholder 
trust and confidence in 
the veracity of company 
CSR disclosures   
• Improves public 
perception about the 
truthfulness of the 
reporting company’s 
activities  
• Promotes continuous 
improvement in control 
and reporting systems 
to improve both the 
reporting process and 
the content of CSR 
reports 
• Transfers learning from 
the assurors to the 
reporting company 
• Improves regulatory 
and legislative 
compliance 
• Improves comparability 
of CSR reports    
• Auditor 
assurors 
• Internal 
auditors 
• Certification 
bodies 
• Specialist CSR 
assurors 
• CSR assuror 
competencies  
• CSR assuror 
independence 
• CSR assurance levels 
• CSR assurance 
opinions 
• CSR assurance 
standards 
- AA1000AS 
- ISAE 3000 
• The CSR assurance 
engagement subject 
• The CSR assurance 
engagement 
objective  
• The CSR assurance 
engagement 
• Confirmation that all 
material issues are 
covered 
• Publication of the 
CSR assurance report 
for use by affected 
stakeholders 
• Reporting 
company 
executives and 
management  
• Board of 
directors 
• Shareholders 
• Stakeholders 
• King III 
principle 9.3 
• JSE regulation 
8.63(a) 
• GRI G4 
Globally, the primary CSR assurance providers were identified as being audit firms (the Big 4 in 
particular), certification bodies and specialist CSR assurance providers.  The characteristics of 
emerging CSR practices were described within the context of CSR assurance reports.  In this 
regard, this chapter considers CSR assurance reports in terms of its intended audience; the 
competencies and expertise that CSR assurance providers should possess; the prerequisite for the 
assurance providers to be independent and objective; the various assurance levels and the 
resultant CSR assurance conclusions and opinions provided.  The two primary CSR assurance 
standards presently utilised by CSR assurors were identified as AA1000AS and ISAE 3000.  Despite 
frequently being referred to in CSR assurance reports, it was argued that the GRI is a CSR 
reporting framework and not an assurance standard.  Recognising that despite the objective of 
independent CSR assurance being to improve the confidence of both reporting companies and their 
stakeholders about the veracity of the underlying CSR disclosures, some of the challenges 
impairing the realisation of this objective were briefly considered. 
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Since auditor assurors are the primary CSR assurance providers, and are expected to remain so in 
the foreseeable future, the chapter concludes by specifically examining the audit profession within 
the context of its CSR assurance role.  In this regard, the audit profession comprises both internal 
and external auditors.  This thesis argues that both internal and external auditors meet the King III 
requirement as independent CSR assurance providers.  The development of the audit profession 
and its perceived stakeholder responsibilities were described, as were the auditor’s regulatory 
environment and the mandatory components of the international framework for assurance 
engagements.  The existence of an expectation gap between the services provided by auditors and 
stakeholders’ expectations of an audit were acknowledged; the emerging nature of CSR assurance 
was explored; and the approaches adopted by auditors to develop their capacity to perform CSR 
assurance engagements were considered.   
The inconsistent application of diverse CSR assurance standards, frameworks and practices 
increases report user confusion and undermines the expected benefits for both reporting 
companies and stakeholders.  This highlights the need to develop a specific CSR assurance 
standard that is universally applicable in order to addresses existing inadequacies. 
In conclusion, the fundamental characteristic of independent CSR assurance provided by any 
assurance provider is that any conclusion reached and opinion provided must be based on 
verifiable evidence.  This rigour should reassure stakeholders that the underlying CSR disclosures 
are trustworthy and may be relied upon.  Even though global provision of independent assurance 
on CSR disclosures still remains at relatively low levels, it does reflect an upward trend.  It is 
predicted that King III and the JSE regulations will accelerate this upward trend in South Africa.   
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4.1 Introduction 
The emerging nature of CSR assurance makes it appropriate to use an exploratory research 
approach to improve the understanding of the nature and characteristics of the underlying 
phenomena (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010).  To provide the necessary context, this chapter 
acknowledges that the preceding chapters provide an overview of the CSR reporting and assurance 
discourse and introduces a conceptual framework for this study.  Drawing on this conceptual 
framework, this chapter aligns the research objectives to the discourse highlighted in the preceding 
literature review chapters.  In particular, this chapter: 
• identifies the aims and objectives of this thesis 
• outlines the research problem, defines the research topic and identifies and conceptualises 
the thesis title 
• describes the primary research paradigms and substantiates the selection of the research 
design adopted for this thesis 
• identifies the research population and substantiates the sampling method deployed 
• describes the primary techniques used for data gathering 
• considers the limitations inherent in the research approach adopted 
• concludes by explaining how the empirical results are presented, analysed and described 
An underlying assumption of this thesis is that despite active involvement by the Big 4 audit firms 
in CSR assurance provision, the majority of the audit profession are still not involved in any CSR-
related issues.  This lack of involvement is despite a growing expectation by stakeholders that the 
audit profession should be more actively involved in CSR.  Auditors are expected to provide 
stakeholders with independent assurance that the reporting company’s’ non-financial performance 
and accountability disclosures may be relied on.  Auditors should therefore visibly play a more 
definitive and important role in providing stakeholders with assurance about the veracity of what 
are ostensibly voluntary CSR disclosures. 
4.2 Research method and design 
4.2.1 Background  
Research methodology considers and explains the logic behind selecting particular research 
methods and techniques (Welman, Kruger & Mitchell, 2011) and refers to the methods, techniques 
and procedures used to implement the research design or research plan (Babbie & Mouton, 2011).  
The research design in turn, provides the framework that indicates how the research process 
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addresses the underlying research problem.  Within this context, two major aspects of research 
design should be considered (Babbie & Mouton, 2011).  Firstly, the researcher must clearly 
articulate what should be established.  Secondly, the most appropriate manner to address the 
research objectives should be determined.  The core elements of the research design used in this 
study are considered and described in the sub-sections below. 
This research is conducted in three distinct phases, each utilising different research approaches.  
The first phase involved reviewing recently published company annual and/or CSR reports to 
understand the extent to which independent CSR assurance was being provided.  In the second 
phase, a survey instrument was distributed to internal stakeholders at reporting companies to gain 
insights into reporting company perceptions about CSR reporting and assurance.  In the final 
phase, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the primary South African CSR assurance 
providers identified in the first research phase.  Collectively, the three research phases may be 
described as being a descriptive exploratory study.  
4.2.2 Research rationale 
As described in section  2.5.2, existing corporate governance practices clearly identify the board as 
the organisational level entrusted by shareholders and mandated by law, with the fiduciary 
responsibility of ensuring that the principles of effective corporate governance are being 
consistently applied.  As described in section  2.7.7.2, in terms of King III a board should consist of 
a majority of independent non-executive directors with all audit committee members being 
independent non-executive directors.  Since the board is appointed primarily to safeguard the 
interests of shareholders (as described in section  2.4.5), the agency problem gives rise to the 
question about how the board obtains confidence that management’s disclosures are trustworthy 
and may be relied upon.   
Companies are required to report to shareholders on their financial performance and financial 
position by producing annual financial statements (AFS).  It is a mandatory requirement for the 
AFS of public companies to be audited by registered auditors.  Responding to increased stakeholder 
demands for broader corporate accountability, many companies are also voluntarily disclosing their 
non-financial impacts on the economy, society and the environment.  Independent assurance on 
these CSR disclosures reduces the risk of green-wash, and provides users of CSR reports with 
confidence that these CSR disclosures may be relied upon. 
4.2.3 Research objectives 
As stated in sections  2.7.7.2 and  3.3.3.2, the provision of independent CSR assurance is a de facto 
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mandatory requirement for all companies listed on the JSE.  The objective of this South African 
exploratory research study is to identify the characteristics of CSR assurance at JSE-listed 
companies.  Since assurance is not provided in a vacuum, but in order to provide report users with 
confidence that the underlying CSR disclosures may be relied upon, the following secondary 
objectives arise: 
• establishing the extent to which JSE-listed companies have complied with the JSE regulations 
requiring JSE-listed companies to provide independent assurance on their CSR disclosures   
• understanding the reasons that reporting companies disclose their CSR performance  
• understanding the reasons that reporting companies provide independent assurance on their 
CSR disclosures 
• exploring the reasons that reporting companies select particular CSR assurance providers 
• identifying the primary providers of independent assurance on CSR reporting 
• understanding the CSR assurance role of internal audit 
• comparing the practices of auditor assurors with those of non-auditor assurors, within the 
context of the objectives identified above 
• understanding the implications of various CSR assurance practices adopted by the primary 
assurance providers 
• identifying the primary standards and/or frameworks used in CSR assurance engagements 
• determining whether appropriate universally applicable frameworks exist for the provision of 
independent assurance on CSR disclosures.  Should such a framework not exist, further 
objectives include: 
- identifying the factors inhibiting the development of such a framework 
- identifying the key elements that should be incorporated into such a framework 
Within this context, this exploratory research seeks to 
• establish prevailing South African CSR assurance practices 
• compare the CSR assurance practices of the various CSR assurors in South Africa 
• understand the extent to which existing CSR assurance practices contribute to the veracity of 
CSR disclosures 
  
Page 132 of 338 
 
4.2.4 Thesis proposition 
This exploratory study aims to improve the understanding of the emerging CSR assurance 
phenomena, rather than to collect detailed, precise and replicable data that may be used to 
accurately predict the phenomena across the entire population (Babbie & Mouton, 2011).  A 
hypothesis is a statement or proposition that may be unambiguously tested using quantifiable 
statistical techniques (Welman et al., 2011).  Since the primarily exploratory mixed methods 
approach adopted for this study is rooted in interpretivism, hypothesis testing is considered 
inappropriate.  The alternative approach adopted for this thesis is the submission of a ‘thesis 
statement’, which identifies the central argument of a work, and is capable of being challenged, 
either for or against, by a knowledgeable person in the field (Hofstee, 2006).  Within this context, a 
‘thesis’ may be described as a statement, theory, position or proposition advanced and maintained 
by argument, or one advanced without definitive proof (Oxford; Merriam-Webster; Cambridge).  
The following propositions are advanced for this thesis: 
• Stakeholders require companies to disclose their impacts on the economy, environment and 
society.  
• These disclosures should be independently assured to provide users with confidence about 
the veracity of the underlying company CSR disclosures. 
• CSR assurance provision will increase following the promulgation of the JSE regulations 
requiring JSE-listed companies to apply the King III provisions. 
• New entrants will begin providing independent CSR assurance to meet the increased demand. 
• Despite these new entrants, the audit profession will continue to be the primary collective 
providers of independent CSR assurance.   
• Despite tending to provide lower levels of CSR assurance, the audit profession will continue 
to be perceived as providing more credible assurance than non-auditor assurors. 
• Although auditor assurors are expected to remain the primary providers of independent CSR 
assurance, the extent of this dominance will diminish over time.   
Given that the board represents one of the primary company stakeholders, especially in respect of 
its mandated fiduciary responsibilities (as described in section  2.5.2), it too requires independent 
assurance that company CSR disclosures may be relied upon.  This need is heighted by the agency 
problem (as described in section  2.4.5).  In line with its exploratory nature, this thesis accordingly 
attempts to present coherent arguments relating to the thesis propositions advanced, instead of 
providing statistically valid and tested hypotheses.  It is accordingly recognised that other 
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knowledgeable persons in the field may differ with the interpretation and conclusions reflected in 
this thesis.  These diverse interpretations are exacerbated by the interdisciplinary nature of this 
thesis, with the interpretation potentially being influenced by the respected core disciplines of the 
researchers and/or readers. 
4.2.5 Research paradigms 
4.2.5.1 Background  
The dominant paradigms used in scientific research are positivism (quantitative) and interpretivism 
(qualitative).  Pragmatism is emerging as an appropriate paradigm for exploratory research by 
introducing a mixed methods approach utilising both qualitative and quantitative methods and 
mixing the two when appropriate (Goldkuhl, 2012; Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Leech, 
Dellinger, Brannagan & Tanaka, 2010; Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005).  While qualitative research 
usually involves inductive reasoning and quantitative research relies on deductive reasoning, the 
reasoning in mixed methods research relies on induction and/or deduction based on the specific 
research questions (Morse, Niehaus, Wolfe & Wilkins, 2006).  Pragmatism requires researchers to 
retain sufficient flexibility in their research methodology and collaborate with other researchers who 
hold multiple epistemological perspectives (Leech et al., 2010).  Research is accordingly viewed as 
a holistic endeavour, requiring prolonged engagement, persistent observation and triangulation 
(Leech et al., 2010). 
Irrespective of the paradigmatic orientation, all research in the social sciences attempts to identify 
emerging phenomena relating to the study subject and to substantiate any assertions made in the 
context of the environment within which the research is undertaken (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 
2004).  While specific methodologies tend to be associated with particular research paradigms, it is 
not uncommon for the objectives, scope and nature of enquiry to be consistent across different 
research methods and paradigms (Leech et al., 2010; Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005). 
For completeness and contextually, the two primary research paradigms (i.e. qualitative and 
quantitative) and the emerging mixed methods paradigm used in this study are described in the 
sub-sections below.  Quantitative and qualitative researchers each tend to view their own 
paradigms as being the most suitable research approach, resulting in the emergence of a 
controversial incompatibility thesis, which holds that the qualitative and quantitative research 
paradigms cannot and should not be mixed (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Onwuegbuzie & 
Leech, 2005).  This thesis however, adopts a different approach by advocating that the 
incompatibility thesis is countered by paradigm pluralism (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2012) and by a 
third approach involving a revised mixed methods paradigm (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).   
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4.2.5.2 Quantitative paradigm 
Quantitative researchers adopt a positivist approach by regarding social interventions as being 
entities, in a similar manner that physical scientists treat physical phenomena (Johnson & 
Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  Positivism is a metatheory based on the assumption that social sciences 
research should emulate research in the natural sciences (Babbie & Mouton, 2011).  Positivist 
research searches for universal laws of human behaviour, measurement quantification, in which the 
researcher must be objective (Babbie & Mouton, 2011).   
Ontologically, the quantitative paradigm holds that there is usually ‘only one truth’; an objective 
reality existing independently of the observer and waiting to be discovered (Sale, Lohfeld & Brazil, 
2002).  Epistemologically, researchers should be separated from the entities being observed, 
maintaining their independence and objectivity.  This enables the researcher to study a 
phenomenon without influencing, or being influenced by it.  Independence requires researchers to 
eliminate their biases and remain emotionally detached and uninvolved during the study.  In reality 
though, despite quantitative research being underpinned by the principles of independence and 
objectivity, all research contains an element of subjectivity.  This subjectivity may be in the 
selection of research tools and techniques, or even in the interpretation of the results, as 
encapsulated by the aphorism, ‘lies, damned lies and statistics’.  It is accordingly necessary to 
ensure the rigour of the research and validating the data collected (Williams, 2007). 
The characteristics of quantitative research include focusing on deduction, confirmation, 
theory/hypothesis testing, explanation, prediction, standardised data collection and statistical 
analysis (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  Quantitative sample sizes tend to be much larger than 
qualitative research samples, often requiring sophisticated statistical techniques to collect and 
analyse the data (Sale et al., 2002).  Since quantitative researchers tend to interpret the results 
and conclusions within the context of the entire study population, it is necessary to ensure that the 
samples drawn represent the population being studied.  Quantitative research may use advanced 
inferential statistical tools to reflect causal relationships between two or more variables (Babbie & 
Mouton, 2011). 
4.2.5.3 Qualitative paradigm 
Qualitative research assumes that reality is a constructed, multidisciplinary and constantly changing 
concept; without the existence of a single immutable truth that may be observed and measured 
(Merriam, 1995).  Exploratory studies frequently use qualitative research methods to understand 
the phenomena identified by the study and provide a rigorous approach to theory development 
(Birkinshaw, Brannen & Tung, 2011). 
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Using inductive reasoning, or interpretivism, qualitative research holistically involves a process of 
discovery (Morse et al., 2006; Williams, 2007).  Unlike positivism, interpretivism is a metatheory 
based on the assumption that human phenomena are fundamentally different to natural 
phenomena (Babbie & Mouton, 2011).  In this regard, some of the critical differences relate to the 
inherent nature of human behaviour and historicity, which require different research methods from 
that used for studying natural phenomena.  Babbie and Mouton (2011) suggest that the objective 
of interpretivism is to interpret or understand human behaviour, and not necessarily to explain or 
predict it.  Merriam (1995) asserts that qualitative research is ideal to: 
• clarify and understand phenomena and situations where the operating variables cannot easily 
be identified beforehand 
• establish creative approaches for considering pre-existing conditions 
• understand participant perspectives about their respective roles and responsibilities 
• establish the history of a situation 
• build theory, hypotheses or generalisations 
Qualitative researchers tend to reject positivism, instead arguing that constructivism, idealism, 
relativism, humanism, hermeneutics and postmodernism are superior research approaches in the 
social sciences (Sale et al., 2002).  Qualitative research involves an element of subjectivity, since 
the diverse nature of reality may require qualitative researchers to provide their own interpretation 
of somebody else’s reality (Merriam, 1995).  Qualitative researchers are usually concerned with the 
changing nature of reality created experientially (in terms of which the researcher and the research 
subject mutually interact) (Sale et al., 2002).  Qualitative research therefore plays an important 
role in interpreting and understanding the complex plurality of research contexts (Birkinshaw et al., 
2011).   
Ontologically, multiple constructed realities are common, with time and context-free generalisations 
being neither desirable nor possible (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  As a result, qualitative 
research tends to be value-bound implying that a detailed cause and effect analysis is not feasible.  
Qualitatively, logic usually flows from specific to general (with the data inductively explaining the 
underlying phenomena).  Epistemologically, reality cannot be independent of mind without an 
external referent to which claims of truth may be compared (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  The 
major characteristics and tools of qualitative research are induction, discovery, exploration and 
theory/hypothesis generation, with the researcher being the primary ‘instrument’ for data collection 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
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4.2.5.4 Mixed methods paradigm 
For more than a century, quantitative and qualitative researchers have debated the merits of their 
respective paradigmatic approaches to research (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  Sale et al. 
(2002) however, suggest that quantitative and qualitative research approaches are merely tools to 
address important research questions that may only be answered through their effective 
integration.  Researchers who use either quantitative or qualitative approaches exclusively, may 
miss important insights about pertinent information relating to important characteristics of the 
research subject, which may only emerge from the other (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  
Researchers constantly question the appropriateness of various research approaches within specific 
situations, and especially when considering whether to mix or combine research approaches 
(Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
Traditionally, research in the accounting sciences relied exclusively on quantitative research 
methodologies (Mazzola, Walker, Shockley & Spector, 2011).  Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) 
suggest that even though quantitative measures may be objectively driven by theory, quantitative 
measures could still reflect the researcher’s bias.  Although, quantitative and qualitative paradigms 
have historically dominated empirical scientific research, a mixed methods approach combining 
aspects of positivism and interpretivism is beginning to emerge as a third research paradigm 
(Johnson, Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007).  This revised approach to mixed methods research may 
be defined as a category of research where the researcher mixes or combines elements of both 
quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language 
within a single study (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; Onwuegbuzie & Johnson, 2006).   
Mixed methods research should accordingly be regarded as an extension of, rather than a 
replacement for, quantitative and qualitative research approaches.  Mixed methods research draws 
heavily on the respective strengths of the one approach while minimising the weaknesses of the 
other (Williams, 2007).  Philosophically, mixed methods research makes use of a combination of 
pragmatism, induction, deduction and abduction and relies on the most appropriate set of 
explanations to understand the research results (Williams, 2007).  Rejecting methodological 
dogmatism, the objective of mixed methods research is to legitimise the simultaneous use of 
multiple approaches to comprehensively answer the research questions, rather than confining the 
researcher to using either a qualitative or quantitative approach. 
The principle underlying mixed methods research requires the collection of multiple data by 
deploying a combination of various research strategies, approaches and methods in such a manner 
that the resultant combination complements the strengths and minimises the non-overlapping 
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weaknesses of each approach (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).  Mixed methods researchers do 
not therefore only collect and analyse numerical data (customary in quantitative research), but also 
narrative data (the norm in qualitative research), in order to address the research question in a 
particular study (Williams, 2007).  By combining quantitative and qualitative elements, mixed 
methods research improves the breadth and depth of understanding the emerging phenomena and 
enables the corroboration of data from multiple sources (Johnson et al., 2007).  While the one 
research approach tends to complement the other, today’s interdisciplinary, complex and dynamic 
research environment makes it particularly appropriate to promote epistemological and 
methodological pluralism.  Mixed methods research may therefore be regarded as being superior to 
single method research, since adding qualitative to quantitative data facilitates a deeper 
understanding of the research phenomena, by probing the perspectives and meanings of the 
participants (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). 
A single method research approach (either qualitative or quantitative) is unlikely to adequately 
address the research objectives of this study, which seeks to explore and understand the emerging 
CSR assurance phenomena.  The exploratory nature of this thesis, involving the analysis and 
interpretation of both qualitative and quantitative data from multiple sources, supports the decision 
to use a mixed methods research paradigm for this study.  Moreover, mixed methods research is 
ideally suited to combine elements of both qualitative and quantitative data collection and analysis, 
within the context of the theoretical frameworks, from an exploratory or interpretative perspective, 
and not necessarily to achieve robust predictions.  This study utilises an integrated mixed methods 
paradigm by performing a quantitative and qualitative content analysis of CSR assurance reports 
(establishing the observed phenomena), a primarily quantitative survey of reporting company 
respondents (providing a reporting company perspective of CSR reporting and assurance) and 
through qualitative interviews with assurors (introducing an assuror’s perspective). 
Instead of using separate qualitative and quantitative approaches linked through triangulation, this 
thesis accordingly deploys an integrated mixed methods approach.  Triangulation of different 
research methods is not merely a validation tool or strategy, but should represent an alternative to 
validation (Denzin, 2012).  Moreover, effective methodological triangulation is seldom used in 
mixed methods research (Sale et al., 2002).  Since qualitative and quantitative paradigms may not 
necessarily study the same underlying data, simply combining the two approaches may not be a 
feasible alternative (Sale et al., 2002).   
Despite using a mixed methods research approach, and since the objective of qualitative research 
is to interpret and understand the phenomena being studied, this thesis has a primarily qualitative 
focus, deploying inductive reasoning.  Despite Denzin (2012) and Sale et al. (2002) suggesting that 
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triangulation may be inappropriate for mixed methods research, this study recognises that cross 
referencing the results of the various phases facilitates the validation of the various observations of 
the different empirical research phases.  This also improves the understanding of the CSR reporting 
and assurance phenomena. 
4.2.6 Research population and units of analysis 
In the broadest sense, the research population for this study includes all entities operating in South 
Africa, including sole proprietors, partnerships, private and public companies, and government 
entities.  As described in sections  1.7 and  1.8, for the purpose of this study it is appropriate to 
confine the study population to only JSE-listed public companies.  This delineation is justified by the 
JSE requiring all listed companies to adopt the King III principles.  At 30 April 2012, there were 376 
companies listed on the JSE, representing a total market capitalisation of R6 889 billion.  The 
completeness of the study population was established by extracting the reporting companies from 
the Sanlam I-Trade website.47   
The units of observation in this study include JSE-listed companies, both in terms of their published 
annual and/or CSR assurance reports, and survey respondents representing the same companies.  
To introduce an assurance provider’s perspective, the primary providers of independent CSR 
assurance in South Africa represented a secondary research population.  Participant assurance 
providers were confined to those providing CSR assurance to the identified JSE-listed companies.  
The observations in this study relate to JSE-listed public companies, as well as to the independent 
CSR assurors at these companies. 
Given the exploratory mixed methods approach adopted in this study, within the context of the 
research population as described, the information sources used for the various empirical research 
components include published company annual, CSR and CSR assurance reports; responses to a 
survey questionnaire at the reporting companies; as well as transcripts of semi-structured 
interviews with CSR assurors.  To ensure the comparability of the data from the various empirical 
research phases, the same reporting companies were used for each of the three empirical research 
phases.  The empirical research phases covered similar periods, with assurance provider 
participants being selected from the primary assurors identified during the content analysis of the 
CSR assurance reports. 
                                           
47 Accessed on 30 April 2012 at https://www.sanlamitrade.co.za/.   
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4.2.7 Research sample/study participants 
Probability sampling methods ensure that the selected sample is representative of the population 
from which it was drawn, with each population unit having an equal chance of selection (Welman 
et al., 2011).  In probability sampling, the study results can be generalised across the entire study 
population.  By contrast, in purposive non-probability sampling, each unit in the population does 
not have an equal chance of being selected.  This lack of representivity implies that any inferences 
drawn from non-probability samples cannot be generalised across the entire population, making 
the use of inferential statistical tools inappropriate. 
Unlike probability sampling primarily used in quantitative research, non-probability sampling tends 
to be associated with qualitative research, in terms of which the researcher purposively selects a 
sample without intending to draw conclusions about the entire population from which the sample 
was drawn.  In non-probability sampling it is more important to understand the characteristics of 
the phenomena being studied.  Qualitative researchers therefore tend to use their own knowledge 
of the population characteristics to select a purposive non-probability sample (Babbie & Mouton, 
2011).  Therefore, given the exploratory nature of the study and prior research finding that larger 
companies were more likely to have the resources to provide independent assurance on their CSR 
disclosures, this research uses purposive non-probability (non-statistical) sampling and not 
probability (statistical) sampling methods to select the companies being studied (as described in 
section  2.4.6) (Ackers, 2009; CorporateRegister, 2008; KPMG, 2011).   
It is important to note that purposive sampling is not simply about obtaining information from 
those who are readily or conveniently available, but rather about obtaining pertinent information 
from specifically targeted respondent groups.  Respondents are selected to provide the desired 
information, either because they are the only ones who have it, or because they conform to some 
criteria set by the researcher (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010).  Unlike convenience sampling, also 
associated with qualitative research, purposive sampling includes an element of subjectivity while 
providing researchers with some control over the selection process (Barbour, 2001).   
To delineate the study into a manageable sample, only the largest 200 JSE-listed companies48 were 
included in the purposively selected sample used in this thesis (Welman et al., 2011).  The decision 
to only examine the annual, CSR and CSR assurance reports of the largest companies was based 
on slack resource theory (as described in section  2.4.6), which holds that larger companies are 
more likely to have the ‘spare resources’ to provide independent assurance on their CSR 
                                           
48 Pertinent information pertaining to the corporations comprising the top 200 companies is included in Annexure 1. 
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disclosures.  Within this primary sample of 200 companies, one company was subsequently delisted 
(making the annual report unavailable), and seven companies incorporated their various corporate 
reports into the annual publications of their holding companies.  Therefore, after cleaning the data, 
the sample was subsequently revised to only 192 companies.  Even though this revised sample 
only represented 53% of JSE-listed companies on 30 April 2012, at that time the largest 200 JSE-
listed companies accounted for 99.3% of the total market capitalisation of the JSE. 
Table 4.1 – Alignment of research population, sample and empirical phases 
 Phase 1 – Content 
Analysis 
Phase 2 – Research survey Phase 3 – Semi-
structured interviews 
Research 
population 
JSE-listed companies JSE-listed companies CSR assurance providers at 
JSE-listed companies 
Empirical 
research 
sample 
200 largest JSE-listed 
companies  
200 largest JSE-listed companies Purposively selected sample 
of 6 independent CSR 
assurance providers at the 
200 largest JSE-listed 
companies 
Information 
source / type 
of data 
Annual, CSR and CSR 
assurance reports 
Responses to survey 
questionnaires from the following 
reporting company respondents: 
• company secretary 
• chairperson of the board 
• independent non-executive 
directors 
• chairperson of the audit 
committee 
• independent audit committee 
members 
• members of the CSR committee 
• chief executive officer (CEO) 
• chief financial officer (CFO) 
• chief risk officer (CRO) 
• executive manager responsible 
for CSR 
• CAE/internal audit manager 
• external audit manager/partner 
• managing 
partner/member/manager of 
the external CSR assurance 
provider 
Interview responses from the 
following CSR assurance 
provider participants: 
• the Big 4 auditor assurors 
• a mid-tier auditor assuror 
• an independent specialist 
CSR assuror 
Periods 
covered by 
research 
Years ended 2007/8, 
2010/1 and 2011/2 
August 2011 to May 2012 December 2012 to March 
2013 
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As described in section  4.2, the empirical research component was undertaken in three phases.  
Although all three phases considered the CSR assurance characteristics of the same companies, it 
is necessary to examine the specific samples and participants used in each research phase.  
Table 4.1 summarises key information about the research population, sample and 
respondents/participants for each of the three research phases.   
The first phase examined the published annual, CSR and CSR assurance reports of the largest 200 
JSE-listed companies to establish the extent of independent CSR assurance provided and to 
establish its characteristics.   
The second phase involved purposively inviting respondents at the same reporting companies 
identified in the first phase, to complete an online survey instrument.  Potential survey respondents 
were selected on the assumption that they could meaningfully respond to the survey questions, 
given the responsibilities usually associated with their respective roles at the reporting companies. 
The third phase involved examining the independent assurance reports identified in the first phase, 
to determine the primary providers of independent CSR assurance.  To proportionally represent the 
perspectives of the CSR assurance providers (based on the frequency of assurance provided by the 
various assurors), only senior officials at the respective assurance providers identified in the first 
phase were interviewed in the third phase.  Collectively, the assurors interviewed provided 86% of 
CSR assurance reports in 2011/2 (n = 43); 90% in 2010/1 (n = 38); and 83% in 2007/8 (n = 15).  
In this regard, the following six participants were selected for semi-structured interviews: 
• the partners and/or directors at each of the Big 4 audit firms (justified by the collective 
dominance of the Big 4 auditor assurors) 
• a partner at one of the mid-tier audit firms 
• the owner/principal assuror of the primary specialist CSR assuror 
The integrated mixed methods approach adopted for this thesis considers different data extracted 
from various populations and using different tools.  The quantitative research component of this 
study analysed data collected using a self-administered research survey questionnaire distributed to 
participants at the top 200 JSE-listed companies.  Using the same population and sample as the 
quantitative survey component, the qualitative data components were extracted from a content 
analysis of recently available annual, CSR and/or CSR assurance reports.  To understand the 
perspective of CSR assurance providers, semi-structured interviews were conducted with the 
primary CSR assurors identified in the content analysis described above.  To ensure the consistency 
of the data across the various data gathering and analysis techniques, the same core sample of the 
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top 200 JSE-listed companies was used for both the content analysis of CSR assurance reports and 
the survey questionnaire distributed to respondents.  Furthermore, the CSR assurance providers 
interviewed were identified from the same sample of the top 200 JSE-listed companies as used for 
the content analysis. 
4.2.8 Data collection methods 
4.2.8.1 Background  
Irrespective of the research paradigm adopted, data collection methods should be based on a 
systematic and replicable49 observation of the phenomena (Welman et al., 2011).  Although the 
study may be replicable, it is acknowledged that the results may differ, particularly given the 
interpretivist approach adopted for this research.  As described in section  4.2.5.4, this thesis uses 
an exploratory mixed methods research approach, incorporating both qualitative and quantitative 
components.   
As previously described, the empirical data in this study were collected in three distinct phases.  To 
establish the prevailing CSR assurance practices, the first phase involved sourcing and analysing 
recently published annual, CSR and CSR assurance reports.  To gain insights into the perspectives 
of internal stakeholders at reporting companies, the second phase involved the use of a survey 
questionnaire distributed to purposively selected respondents at the reporting companies covered 
by this study (as identified in  4.2.7).  Despite being a primarily quantitative tool, this survey 
instrument contains both quantitative and qualitative elements.  The third and final phase used 
semi-structured interviews with the major CSR assurors (identified in the first phase) to provide an 
assuror’s perspective.  Collectively, the analysis and interpretation of the various data gathered 
during the three empirical research phases provide the evidence against which the thesis 
proposition may be evaluated.  Although the data has been collected in three separate phases, the 
primary data covers comparable periods.   
4.2.8.2 Phase 1 – content analysis of CSR assurance reports 
Simplistically, a content analysis may be described as the quantitative analysis of qualitative data 
(Welman et al., 2011).  The primary research approach adopted for this study expands on this 
concept by critically analysing the information contained in company CSR assurance reports and, to 
a lesser extent, company annual and/or CSR reports. 
                                           
49 Replicability is not necessarily restricted to repeating the events or phenomena, but rather to the ability to duplicate 
the procedures, analyses and conclusions, allowing other researchers to arrive at a similar conclusion (Welman et al., 
2011: 190).   
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This research phase examines the most recent annual or CSR reports of the selected companies to 
identify published CSR assurance reports available at the study date.  In addition, since the study 
commenced prior to the implementation of King III, the content analysis forms part of a 
longitudinal study to identify the prevalence of CSR assurance and its emerging characteristics 
during the period 2007 to 2012.  This period covers reporting periods both prior to (i.e. 2007/8) 
and after (i.e. 2010/1 and 2011/2) King III implementation.   
As indicated in section  4.2.7, the research sample is confined to the top 200 JSE-listed companies.  
While this represented only 53% of all JSE-listed companies, it accounted for 99% of the total 
market capitalisation of the JSE.  The dynamic nature of the stock exchange implies that although 
most of the same companies appeared on the top 200 lists for 2008 and 2012, there were some 
differences.  Nevertheless, this thesis assumes that the top 200 have similar characteristics and are 
accordingly reasonably comparable.  
The first part of the content analysis involved scrutinising the published annual reports, CSR reports 
and/or websites of the respective companies studied, to establish whether their CSR disclosures 
were independently assured and particularly whether the results of any CSR assurance processes 
were readily available for stakeholder consumption.  To understand the impact of King III on the 
extent of CSR assurance provided, the annual, CSR and CSR assurance reports of the top 200 
companies in April 2008 (prior to King III implementation) were examined and compared to those 
of subsequent periods (after King III implementation).  Since internal auditors also provide 
independent assurance on CSR performance, albeit for internal company stakeholders (as 
described in section  3.3.2), these reports were perused to understand whether the internal auditing 
activity played an active CSR assurance role. 
The second part of the content analysis involved a critical review of publicly available CSR 
assurance reports, in order to identify the type of assurance provider and the emerging CSR 
assurance trends.  The diverse practices of the various assurors were compared to understand the 
role of the auditor assuror.  In particular the following components of published CSR assurance 
reports were examined:  
• the parties to whom the CSR assurance report is addressed 
• the titles of the CSR assurance report  
• the scope of the CSR assurance engagement 
• the standards, guidelines and frameworks used in the CSR assurance engagement 
• the assurance provider 
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• the assurance provider’s independence 
• the assurance provider’s competencies 
• any limitations on the liability of the CSR assurance provider 
• the levels of assurance provided 
• the assurance opinion(s) provided 
• the recommendations for improvement provided  
4.2.8.3 Phase 2 – research survey questionnaire 
A self-administered research survey instrument was used for the second empirical phase of this 
study.  This questionnaire was distributed to purposively selected officials involved in governance 
and CSR-related functions at the top 200 JSE-listed companies identified for this study (as 
described in section  4.2.7).  Respondents invited to complete the online survey, were purposively 
selected (as described in section  4.2.7) on the assumption that they could meaningfully respond to 
the survey questions, given the responsibilities usually associated with their respective roles at the 
reporting companies.  Responses to this questionnaire provided insights into the perspective of 
reporting companies about the emerging CSR phenomena identified by the content analysis in the 
first phase.  These responses also provide reasons for reporting companies using particular CSR 
assurance providers.   
Despite the diversity of potential company respondents (reflected in Table 4.1), it was anticipated 
that only one official would probably respond on behalf of the company (usually the company 
secretary).  Anecdotally, the so called c-suite50, audit committee members and directors, do not 
usually respond to surveys.  Despite acknowledging that more than one respondent from the same 
company might respond, multiple responses from the same companies were not expected to 
significantly distort the research findings.  Moreover, since the content analysis in the first phase 
identified the primary characteristics of CSR assurance, the survey phase seeks to understand the 
underlying reasons for the identified practices.  This potential methodological deficiency was 
therefore not expected to invalidate this interpretative phase of the study. 
Although the external auditors and external CSR assurors were included as potential survey 
respondents, the survey covering letter and, accordingly, the hyperlink to the research survey 
questionnaire were only sent to reporting companies and not directly to assurors.  Prospective 
                                           
50 The ‘c-suite’ is the collective term used to describe executive management with ‘chief’ in their titles (i.e. chief 
executive officer, chief financial officer, chief information officer, chief risk officer, chief operating officer, etc.). 
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respondents may therefore be realistically described as representing a group of internal company 
stakeholders.  Respondents were encouraged, but not compelled, to respond and reassured that 
their individual responses would be treated anonymously and confidentially.  The survey 
questionnaire used a combination of 32 nominal,51 interval52 and ordinal questions (obtained using 
a 7-point Likert-type scale)53.  These were appropriately supplemented by open-ended questions 
(as reflected in Annexure 3).   
The survey questionnaire was systematically developed from pertinent issues emerging from the 
literature review.  As a result, several of the survey questions relate to the corporate governance 
and CSR reporting practices of the reporting companies, but were not necessarily directly related to 
CSR assurance provision.  These questions were included to provide contextual background and 
provide important insights into aspects of CSR aimed at improving the understanding of CSR 
assurance practices.  These questions were categorised into the following five core sections: (i) 
demographics; (ii) CSR practices; (iii) governance and risk management; (iv) CSR assurance; and 
(v) internal audit.  The responses to certain questions in sections (ii) and (iii) that were not 
considered germane to this study and that did not significantly affect the outcomes of the study 
were excluded from this thesis. 
Being an online research survey questionnaire, the covering letter sent to potential respondents 
(refer to Annexure 2) contained a hyperlink that took respondents directly to the web-based, self-
administered online survey (refer to Annexure 3).  Respondents were required to capture their 
responses to the survey questions by directly into an online survey manager54.  The first email 
requesting participation was sent to potential respondents in August 2011.  In order to improve the 
response rate, several follow-up letters, emails and reminders continued to be sent until May 2012.  
These follow-up requests also asked respondents who had already completed the survey not to 
duplicate their responses by completing the survey more than once.   
To ensure the validity of the data input by respondents, the input parameters were correctly 
labelled, requiring the input variables and variable values to be captured according to a predefined 
range of input criteria.  Responses to survey questions were captured directly by the respondents 
into the online database created for the survey, further reducing the risk of invalid data capturing 
                                           
51 Nominal data – numbers are only used to identify different categories of people, objects or other entities, without 
actually reflecting a particular quantity.  For example, 1 may represent male whereas 2 may represent female (Leedy & 
Ormrod, 2005: 254). 
52 Interval data – reflects standard and equal units of measurement, where the difference in the numbers explains the 
differences in the characteristic being measured (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005: 254).  
53 Ordinal data – where the assigned numbers reflect a particular order or sequence, where people, objects or other 
entities fall along a continuum of a particular variable (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005: 254).   
54 MyNetResearch was the free online website used for this purpose. 
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and/or finger trouble.  The aggregated survey data were downloaded into an Excel spreadsheet 
format for further analysis.  The comparability of results and the contextual understanding of the 
study were improved by selecting the same companies for both the content analysis and the 
questionnaire distribution.  At the same time, the mixed methods research approach adopted was 
validated by collecting both the quantitative and qualitative data separately, but during a similar 
period (as described in section  4.2.5.4). 
It is acknowledged that the results of survey questionnaires may be distorted by possible 
respondent bias (Podsakoff, MacKenzie & Podsakoff, 2012).  The survey responses may therefore 
not actually represent the phenomena being studied, but merely the perspectives of those who 
actually responded, or even those who may wish to misrepresent the situation by providing 
answers they believe were expected.  The pressure for companies to disclose their CSR 
performance and to provide independent assurance thereon may therefore result in the extent of 
CSR assurance arising from the survey being overstated.  Given the interpretive nature of this 
exploratory study, understanding the characteristics of the emerging CSR reporting and assurance 
phenomena are considered more important than definitively depicting the status quo and/or 
robustly predicting the application of the trend across the entire population. 
4.2.8.4 Phase 3 – semi-structured interviews with CSR assurors 
The third and final empirical phase of this thesis involved semi-structured interviews with a 
purposive sample of parties representing the primary CSR assurors identified during the content 
analysis in the first phase.  Interviews have become the main method of collecting qualitative data 
(Englander, 2012).  According to Qu and Dumay (2011), semi-structured interviews are the most 
common of all qualitative research methods.  The interviews seek to understand the specific 
experiences relating to qualitative, open accounts about the subject matter (Qu & Dumay, 2011).  
The interviewer seeks to obtain new insights into the studied phenomena, by remaining open to 
new and unforeseen phenomenon instead of imposing ready-made frameworks or categories (Qu & 
Dumay, 2011). 
In semi-structured interviews, the researcher is guided by a list of themes and questions, which 
may vary from one interview to the next (Welman et al., 2011).  As described in section  4.2.7, 
interviews were held with senior officials (i.e. partners, directors or owners) at the Big 4 audit 
firms, a mid-tier audit firm and the dominant specialist CSR assuror.  Despite this thesis arguing 
that CSR assurance by internal audit may meet the King III requirement to be an independent CSR 
assurance provider, since the perspectives of internal auditors were already probed in the survey in 
phase two, it was considered appropriate to exclude internal auditors from this research phase. 
  
Page 147 of 338 
 
Unlike everyday conversations or philosophical dialogues, where participants are on an equal 
footing, the research interview is characterised by an asymmetry of power in which the researcher 
is in charge of questioning an interviewee who participates voluntarily (Qu & Dumay, 2011).  
Interviews are more conducive to developing a qualitative understanding of what is ostensibly a 
complex social phenomenon (Qu & Dumay, 2011).  Semi-structured interviews provide an 
opportunity for interviewees to respond in their own terms and in the way that they think and use 
language, which assists researchers understand the way interviewees perceive the social world 
being studied (Qu & Dumay, 2011).  Both the interviewer and interviewee participate in the 
interview, producing questions and answers through a discourse of complex interpersonal talk (Qu 
& Dumay, 2011). 
According to Alvesson (2003), the three primary interview perspectives are (i) neopositivism55, 
romanticism56 and localism57.  The interview approach adopted in this research phase can best be 
described as a combination of romanticism and localism.  In this regard, the interviewer establishes 
rapport with the interviewee and encourages the interviewee to reveal their authentic experiences, 
within a specific context (Qu & Dumay, 2011).  It is however, recognised that different interviewers 
may evoke different responses from the same interviewee based on the way questions are asked 
and probed, which is different to structured interviews that assume that the same objective truth 
will be told irrespective of whom conducts the interview, provided the right questions are asked 
and the same structures are followed (Qu & Dumay, 2011).  The localist perspective does not 
perceive the interview process to be a neutral tool to evoke rational responses and uncover truths, 
but rather a situated event in which the interviewer creates the reality of the interview situation.  
The informal conversational style adopted during the interviews was considered appropriate for this 
primarily qualitative mixed methods research phase, with the research paradigm recognising the 
researcher’s role as an integral part of the research process (Babbie & Mouton, 2011).  At the 
commencement of each interview, permission was obtained from the interviewee to digitally record 
the meeting.  In addition to the digital recording, brief notes were also taken during the interviews.  
The interviewees were assured that their individual responses would be treated collectively and 
anonymously.  In this regard, the individual responses were incorporated into the thesis in a 
                                           
55 In terms of neopositivism, research interviews are tools to establish a context-free truth by producing objectively 
relevant responses, with minimal bias.  The interview process is may therefore be regarded as a ‘pipeline for knowledge 
transmission’. 
56 Romanticism views research interviews as a human encounter, encouraging interviewees to reveal their authentic 
experiences by establishing rapport, trust and commitment between the interviewer and interviewee.  The interviewee 
becomes a ‘productive source of knowledge’, and not simply a repository of opinions and emotions. 
57 Localism is based on understanding interviews in a social context, and not merely a tool to collect data in isolation.  
Localism holds that interviews are empirical phenomena which should be examined since the narratives produced are 
‘contextual accounts’ of the phenomenon. 
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manner that prevents the respective identities of the individual interviewees from being linked to 
their specific responses.  Interviewees were informed about the research objective and the 
research approach adopted, as well as how their responses would contribute to improving the 
quality of the research by providing important insights from an assurance provider’s perspective. 
Since researchers should have sufficient knowledge about a subject in order to collect meaningful 
interview data, it is appropriate that the interviews were only conducted after the literature review 
and the first two empirical phases (Qu & Dumay, 2011).  This established the extent of CSR 
assurance provided as well as its characteristics.  It also provided insights into the perspective of 
reporting companies, which in turn guided the questions that were posed to participants.   While 
the semi-structured interviews were guided by the questions in the research survey described in 
phase two, and aligned to the exploratory interpretive nature of this thesis phase, where 
considered appropriate the interview questions posed were adapted in response to the individual 
responses of participants.  To gain deeper insights into the CSR assurance phenomena, where 
considered necessary, interview participants were probed to provide further information.  Semi-
structured interviews involve the use of guiding questions aimed at identifying themes in a 
consistent and systematic manner interposed with probing questions to elicit more specific 
responses (Qu & Dumay, 2011).  In this regard, the broad guiding questions posed to interview (in 
terms of the themes identified in section  4.2.9) included: 
• Which stakeholders rely on CSR disclosures? 
• Why do companies disclose their CSR-related performance? 
• Should government enact legislation compelling companies to mandatorily disclose their CSR-
related performance and to have these independently assured? 
• Why do companies provide independent assurance on their CSR disclosures? 
• Why do certain companies resist providing independent CSR assurance? 
• What are the factors that reporting companies take into account when selecting an 
independent CSR assurance provider? 
• What competencies should an independent CSR assurance provider possess? 
• Why do certain CSR assurance providers limit their liability to non-intended report users? 
• Which assurance standards should be used on a CSR assurance engagement? 
• What should be included in a CSR assurance report? 
• What is the CSR assurance role of the internal audit activity? 
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• Since the audit profession are the primary providers of independent CSR assurance, is the 
existing auditing/accounting curriculum adequate? 
It is however, acknowledged that a methodological shortcoming of this empirical phase is that 
interview participants may be tempted to favourably position their own firms by providing the ‘right 
answers’.  The assurance provider participant’s responses may not therefore necessarily reflect the 
actual situation on the ground, but merely the position that the participant wishes to advance.  
Conceding this methodological shortcoming, the analysis and description of the assuror responses 
in this thesis phase maintains the anonymity of interview participants to reduce the impact of 
possible participant bias.  In this regard, the assuror participants were not identified nor were they 
linked to any of the individual statements made.  The manner in which the data have been 
recorded and analysed is not intended to definitively quantify CSR assurance practices.  Instead, it 
is considered more important to gain deeper insights into the emerging CSR reporting and 
assurance phenomena and to validate the results of the other empirical phases. 
4.2.9 Data analysis and interpretation 
Since there is usually no single ‘right’ way to analyse data, data should be analysed and interpreted 
within the context of the specific research objectives (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005).  Even though 
surveys are usually paradigmatically associated with quantitative research, they often contain 
qualitative interpretive components (i.e. such as open-ended questions) that cannot be analysed 
using conventional quantitative techniques.  The responses to the open-ended questions should 
therefore be classified into categories and then combined.  Although interviews are usually 
considered to be qualitative, certain elements require quantitative analysis.  Similarly, the content 
analysis contains both qualitative (e.g. analysing the words used) and quantitative (e.g. 
establishing the frequency of an observation) components.      
Parametric statistics are appropriate for analysing interval or ratio scale data, or data falling within 
a normal distribution.  By contrast, non-parametric statistics are more appropriate for ordinal rather 
than interval data, or where the distributions may be skewed (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005).  While there 
are many different and sophisticated tools that may be used to statistically analyse data, this study 
primarily utilised descriptive statistics (particularly the measures of central tendency) to analyse the 
responses to the survey questionnaire.  Moreover, the exploratory mixed methods research 
approach adopted involved integrating both qualitative and quantitative data to understand the 
nature of the emerging CSR reporting and assurance phenomena (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; 
Onwuegbuzie & Johnson, 2006; Williams, 2007).  The use of advanced inferential statistical 
analysis, usually associated with hypothesis testing, is accordingly not considered appropriate for 
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this study.  Despite the various research approaches adopted in this study, all three research 
phases broadly deal with similar research populations and data pools, covering similar periods.  
While the tools and techniques used to analyse and interpret the research data depend on the type 
of data, within the context of the research objectives the data analysis approach adopted for the 
different phases of this study is briefly described below. 
Despite having collected the empirical data in this study in three separate phases, an integrated 
data analysis was performed.  The results and description have accordingly been presented in two 
separate chapters.  The first results chapter (chapter 5) describes the characteristics of CSR 
reporting, whereas the second (chapter 6) specifically considers aspects relating to CSR assurance.  
• Phase 1 – The data extracted by the content analysis of CSR assurance reports in this phase 
were qualitatively and quantitatively analysed on a spreadsheet according to the primary 
dimensions reflected in section 4.2.7.1.  These dimensions informed the main themes used to 
analyse and interpret the research observations in phase 1.   
The quantitative data collected in the first phase were analysed in order to establish the 
extent to which independent CSR assurance was provided in the 2007/8, 2010/1 and 2011/2 
reporting periods.  The established CSR assurance frequencies were further analysed in terms 
of the: 
- market capitalisation  
- industry sector represented 
- company size 
- type of assurance provider 
- the assurance standards referenced 
- the type of the type of assurance opinion provided 
The qualitative data collected in the first phase were analysed and described in terms of the 
following primary themes: 
- the extent to which the internal audit activity is involved in the provision of CSR 
assurance 
- the assurance provider’s independence 
- the competencies of the assurance provider  
- limitations on the CSR assurance provider’s liability 
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- the title of the CSR assurance report  
- the CSR assurance engagement scope 
- the intended audience for the CSR assurance report 
- the CSR assurance engagement 
- the levels of assurance provided 
- the assurance opinion(s)  
- the recommendations for improvement  
The first part of the content analysis involved scrutinising the published annual reports, CSR 
reports and/or websites of the respective companies studied to establish whether their CSR 
disclosures were independently assured and particularly whether the results of any CSR 
assurance processes were readily available for broader stakeholder consumption.  To 
understand the impact of King III on the extent of CSR assurance provided, the annual, CSR 
and CSR assurance reports of the top 200 companies in April 2008 (prior to King III 
implementation) were examined and compared to those of subsequent periods (after King III 
implementation).   
Since internal auditors also provide independent assurance on company CSR performance, 
albeit restricted to internal company stakeholders (as described in section  3.3.2), the annual 
and/or CSR reports were perused to understand whether the internal auditing activity played 
an active CSR assurance role.  As described in section  4.2.5, despite adopting a mixed 
methods paradigm, this research included a significant qualitative component.  
• Phase 2 – The data collected by the research survey in this phase (as described in 
section  4.2.7) were downloaded into an Excel spreadsheet directly from the online survey 
database for statistical data analysis.  Recognising that these research findings are intended 
to provide important insights from reporting company officials to understand the nature of 
the emerging CSR assurance phenomena, it is not to draw inferences that can be applied to 
the entire population.  It is accordingly acknowledged that the results are not generalisable 
owing to the purposive non-representivity of the companies selected for the study.  It was 
therefore considered inappropriate for this study to utilise advanced inferential statistical 
techniques.  Instead, descriptive statistics describing the body of data in terms of the points 
of central tendency58 and the extent of variability (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005) were used to 
                                           
58 Including mode – the most frequently occurring single number or score; median – the numerical centre of a set of 
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understand the emerging CSR reporting and assurance characteristics (Welman et al., 2011). 
It should be noted that only survey responses on questions directly relating to CSR reporting 
and assurance have been included in the analysis and description in chapters 5 and 6.  
Survey responses to questions involving broader CSR practices, governance and risk 
management that are not directly related to the CSR assurance dimensions covered by this 
study, have been excluded from this thesis.   
• Phase 3 – the semi-structured interviews conducted with the primary CSR assurance 
providers (as described in  0) in this phase were recorded, transcribed and analysed, with the 
significant themes being identified and interpreted.  The transcripts were compared to the 
notes taken during the interview to ensure completeness.  The interview results were 
categorised according to the core CSR assurance characteristics identified in the content 
analysis of the first phase, which informed the themes used to analyse the data.  To ensure 
that the data from the various empirical phases are aligned, the questions posed to reporting 
company representatives in the survey questionnaire were used to guide the semi-structured 
interviews with assurance providers.  Moreover, the interview transcripts were analysed and 
grouped into similar categories as those used in the other two empirical phases.  The themes 
used to collate and analyse the interview data are: 
- stakeholders that rely on company CSR disclosures 
- reasons reporting companies disclose their CSR performance 
- reasons reporting companies provide independent assurance on their CSR disclosures 
- reasons reporting companies resist having their CSR disclosures independently assured 
- limitation on the liability of assurance providers to broader stakeholders 
- parties that should provide independent CSR assurance 
- competencies that CSR assurance providers should possess  
- important components of CSR assurance reports  
- assurance standards used in CSR assurance engagements 
- role of the internal audit activity in the provision of independent CSR assurance  
- whether CSR disclosures and assurance should be mandatory or voluntary 
                                                                                                                                            
data; and mean – the single point at which the two sides of a distribution ‘balance’. 
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- adequacy of the auditing/accounting curriculum to prepare auditor assurors to provide 
CSR assurance 
To maintain confidentiality and interview participant anonymity, it was considered 
inappropriate for the interview responses to be classified according to the type of assurance 
provider that would allow readers to link particular participants to their specific responses.  
This was considered particularly necessary since only one specialist CSR assuror and one mid-
tier auditor assuror were interviewed.  Given the participation by senior representatives of all 
the Big 4 auditor assurors, this measure was not considered necessary when describing Big 4 
responses.  Without mentioning the name of the audit firm, Big 4 responses may be 
attributed to any one of the four participants.  Furthermore, collectively identifying the 
responses of Big 4 participants is justified by the content analysis establishing that the Big 4 
auditor assurors were the primary providers of independent CSR assurance in the study.  
In summary, the analysis and interpretation of the results of the three empirical research phases 
addresses the following thesis propositions advanced that (in section  4.2.4):  
• stakeholders require companies to disclose their impacts on the economy, environment and 
society 
• CSR disclosures should be independently assured 
• CSR assurance provision will continue to increase 
• new entrants will start to provide independent CSR assurance 
• despite providing lower levels of CSR assurance, the audit profession will continue to be 
perceived as providing more credible assurance than non-auditor assurors 
• that the audit profession will continue to be the primary collective providers of independent 
CSR assurance  
• the extent of the dominance of auditor assurors will diminish over time  
4.3 Survey response rate 
As described in section  4.2.7, the 200 reporting companies purposively selected for this study was 
subsequently reduced to 192 companies, which attracted a total of 39 responses, representing a 
20.3% response rate.  As stated in section  4.2.3, the purpose of this exploratory study is to 
understand the nature of the emerging CSR assurance phenomenon and identify its characteristics.  
In this regard, since the content analysis of annual, CSR and CSR assurance reports represents the 
primary data collection instrument, the survey improves the understanding of the CSR reporting 
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and assurance phenomenon by providing insights from a reporting company perspective.  The 
survey results are accordingly not intended to be generalised across the population. 
Therefore while the survey response rate may be poor, it assists to understand the CSR assurance 
phenomenon and does not invalidate the study.  Nevertheless, suggested reasons for the poor 
survey response rate may include survey fatigue (Adams & Umbach, 2012), the survey instrument 
not reaching the intended respondents, or respondents not understanding the survey questionnaire 
(Warshawsky, 2014).  These reasons may contribute to respondent bias in terms of which only 
respondents who agreed with CSR reporting and assurance practices completed the survey 
questionnaire, possibly skewing the results.  Since these data were intended to provide insights 
into the phenomena emerging from the content analysis, possible respondent bias is not expected 
to significantly influence the study results. 
Since the survey instrument was designed to compel all respondents to complete the first 24 
questions, it is appropriate that all 39 respondents answered these questions.  By contrast, 
questions 25 to 32 were optional and were originally intended for optional completion by internal 
auditing practitioners.  In this regard, only between eight and ten responses were received in 
respect of these optional questions, representing a response rate of between 21 and 26% of total 
respondents, or between 4 and 5% of the selected companies.   
To determine the appropriateness of the purposive selection of survey respondents described in 
section  4.2.7, the first question probed the type of organisation represented by the respondent.  
Since the study sample and population were confined to JSE-listed companies, all survey 
respondents appropriately represented JSE-listed companies.  
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Figure 4.1– Company position held by survey respondents 
Aligned to the purposive sampling approach (Babbie & Mouton, 2011; Sekaran & Bougie, 2010) 
adopted for this phase of the study, in order to establish the suitability of respondents to complete 
the survey questionnaire, the second question asked them to describe their position in the 
company.  As indicated by Figure 4.1, survey respondents represented executive managers 
responsible for CSR (n = 9); CAEs (n = 8); members of the CSR committee (n = 4); company 
secretaries (n = 7) and 11 representing other positions.  Included in the broad category ‘other’ 
were chief financial officer (n = 1); CSI senior specialist (n = 1); sustainability manager (n = 2); 
sustainability director (n = 1); sustainability reporting/group reporting manager (n = 2); social and 
labour plan group manager (n = 1); executive assistant for public affairs (n = 1); and risk and 
sustainable development manager (n = 1).  Based on these responses, it may be concluded that all 
respondents were sufficiently knowledgeable to competently complete the survey questionnaire, 
thus validating the use of purposive sampling.  
4.4 Research rigour/reliability 
4.4.1 Background  
Thomas and Magilvy (2011) distinguish between trustworthiness and reliability/validity by arguing 
that trustworthiness usually refers to qualitative research, whereas reliability or validity tends to 
apply quantitatively.  Reliability establishes whether a particular technique, applied repeatedly to 
the same subject matter, would yield the same result each time (i.e. repeatability) (Babbie & 
Mouton, 2011; Welman et al, 2011).  Reliability does not however, necessarily guarantee accuracy, 
since two researchers observing the same event could still draw different conclusions (Welman 
23% 
21% 
10% 
18% 
28% 
Executive manager responsible for CSR Chief audit executives CSR committee member Company secretary or deputy Other
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et al., 2011).  It is therefore important to ensure that participants are only asked questions for 
which they are likely to know the answer.  By comparison, trustworthiness refers to the extent to 
which empirical measures adequately reflect the real meaning of the phenomena being studied (i.e. 
the credibility of the findings) (Babbie & Mouton, 2011; Welman et al., 2011).  
Onwuegbuzie and Johnson (2006) suggest that validity is not about establishing a singular truth 
but rather about ensuring the quality of the research, its components, the conclusions drawn, and 
the resultant applications.  The research quality is evaluated by the research community and may 
therefore have subjective, interjective and objective components and influences.  Moreover, since 
qualitative and quantitative paradigms do not necessarily study the same phenomena, certain 
phenomena may be more suited to qualitative enquiry, whereas others may be more suited to 
quantitative research (Sale et al., 2002).  Even when the qualitative and quantitative paradigms 
use common terminology to refer to phenomena, they may not have the same meaning (Dellinger 
& Leech, 2007).  The diverse terms used to evaluate and describe research validity depend on the 
research paradigm adopted (as described in section  4.2.5) and introduce a validation framework 
incorporating both established and emerging validity terminologies from the quantitative, 
qualitative or even mixed methods paradigms (Dellinger & Leech, 2007). 
Although this research utilises a mixed methods research paradigm, the mechanisms used to 
ensure the validity of the quantitative components, and the trustworthiness of the qualitative 
components of this study are described in the sub-sections below.  To identify the manner through 
which the rigour of this study is ensured, the final sub-section concludes by presenting an overview 
of the validation and/or reliability measures used in the three research paradigms of this study. 
4.4.2 Quantitative research validity 
Quantitative research validity may be established through three types of validation procedures, 
namely (i) content validity; (ii) criterion-related validity; and (iii) construct validity (Dellinger & 
Leech, 2007).  Content validity requires establishing a measurement instrument to reflect the 
domain being studied.  Criterion-related validity may be demonstrated when measurement scores 
are hypothesised and correlated with other constructs.  Construct validity overlaps with both 
content and criterion-related validity by requiring researchers to demonstrate that the results of the 
research instruments actually measure the intended constructs.  Construct validity is not however 
restricted to measurement-related issues, but could include other validity evidence including 
design-related validity and statistical inference validity (Dellinger & Leech, 2007).  In addition, 
internal validity may be established by controlling specific threats that could provide alternative 
explanations for the outcomes being studied, whereas external validity reflects the extent to which 
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the study results may be generalised to different places or persons. 
The content and criterion-related validity of the quantitative component of the interview phase of 
the study was achieved through ensuring that the significant issues relating to both CSR and CSR 
assurance arising from the literature review informed the survey questionnaire to ensure that the 
questions posed were relevant and addressed the specific criteria being studied.  The construct 
validity was achieved by maintaining control of the survey response database, downloading the 
survey responses directly into the SPSS statistical software package for analysis.   
In addition, the validity of the quantitative component of the content analysis was achieved 
through a thorough scrutiny of all annual, CSR and CSR assurance reports for the period covered 
by the study to establish the characteristics of disclosed CSR assurance practices amongst the 
companies studied.  These observations were captured on an Excel spreadsheet to establish the 
occurrence frequencies.   
4.4.3 Qualitative research trustworthiness 
People’s personal experiences tend to be seen through different cultural, experiential, 
environmental and other contextual lenses, causing qualitative researchers to argue that a single, 
generalisable, external truth may not be possible (Thomas & Magilvy, 2011).  Although traditionally 
associated with quantitative data, the principle of validity remains contentious for qualitative 
research too (Dellinger & Leech, 2007).  Qualitative researchers however, tend to regard validity as 
being conceptually unclear and ambiguous.  Whereas quantitative research uses the term ‘validity’ 
to ensure the appropriateness of the instrument, the construct and the resultant data; this is 
usually replaced by the ‘trustworthiness’ in qualitative research (Babbie & Mouton, 2011; 
Onwuegbuzie & Johnson, 2006).  In a qualitative context, the following trustworthiness objectives 
emerge (Babbie & Mouton, 2011; Guba, 1981, Merriam, 1995; Thomas & Magilvy, 2011): 
• credibility or truth-value (as the replacement for internal validity) 
• transferability or applicability (as the replacement for external validity) 
• dependability or consistency (as the replacement for reliability) 
• confirmability or neutrality (as the replacement for objectivity). 
Qualitative research uses subjective, interpretive and contextual data, unlike quantitative research 
that attempts to control these factors (Thomson, 2011).  Credibility is established when the study 
results represent an accurate description or interpretation that other similarly experienced persons 
would recognise (Babbie & Mouton, 2011; Merriam, 1995; Thomas & Magilvy, 2011).  
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Transferability refers to the extent to which the study findings may be applied to other situations or 
contexts, or use different subjects or participants (Babbie & Mouton, 2011; Merriam, 1995; Thomas 
& Magilvy, 2011).  Dependability relates to the extent to which the research findings are replicable 
and whether another researcher could follow the decision trail (Babbie & Mouton, 2011; Merriam, 
1995; Thomas & Magilvy, 2011).  Confirmability reflects the extent to which the findings reflect the 
study focus in an unbiased manner (Babbie & Mouton, 2011).  The qualitative researcher should be 
reflective and maintain a sense of awareness and openness to the study and the unfolding results 
(Thomas & Magilvy, 2011). 
The qualitative components of the three empirical phases draw on the primary themes identified in 
the literature review to ensure the credibility of the data collected.  Unlike quantitative research, it 
is not uncommon for qualitative research to involve an element of subjectivity, since the diverse 
nature of reality may require qualitative researchers to provide their own interpretation of 
somebody else’s reality (Merriam, 1995).  Qualitative researchers are therefore usually concerned 
with the changing nature of reality and not to establish an immutable truth.  Neutrality is 
accordingly not considered to be imperative for qualitative research.  The primary tools used to 
establish the trustworthiness of the qualitative component of the study includes: 
• Credibility, which include 
- prolonged engagement and persistent observation of the study objects – elements of this 
thesis included a longitudinal study conducted over a period of five years 
- triangulation – the results of the three empirical research phases were integrated in a 
mutually reinforcing manner  
- referential adequacy – copies of CSR assurance reports were filed, with their core 
characteristics having been analysed on a MS Excel spreadsheet; the survey responses 
were stored on an online database, with a copy exported into a MS Excel spreadsheet; 
and the interviews were digitally stored and transcribed copies filed 
• Transferability was established by using purposive sampling to  
- select the reporting companies studied 
- identify the respondents at the selected reporting companies  
- identify the assuror participants who were able to provide data that could meaningfully 
address the research questions 
- provide sufficiently detailed descriptions and explanations that provide deep insights into 
the CSR reporting and assurance phenomena being studied 
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• Dependability was confirmed by 
- triangulating the results of multiple research phases 
- examining comparable research objects over a similar study period 
- reflecting the extent to which the research evidence could be replicated 
• Confirmability indicates the extent to which the findings impartially reflect the study focus.  In 
this regard, the research audit trail included  
- copies of all annual and CSR assurance reports of the selected companies 
- an online database containing the raw survey data captured by respondents 
- digital copies and detailed transcripts of interviews held with assurance providers 
4.4.4 Mixed methods research validity and trustworthiness 
The manner in which research data are analysed, depends on the specific research approach(es) 
adopted.  Mixed methods research combines aspects of both quantitative and qualitative research 
paradigms that have complementary strengths and non-overlapping weaknesses (Onwuegbuzie & 
Johnson, 2006).  Similarly, since the mixed methods research approach used in this study 
comprises both quantitative and qualitative components, it is important that the research rigour 
considers the primary attributes relating to both validity and trustworthiness (as described in 
sections  4.4.2 and  4.4.3.  Mixed methods researchers should therefore be thoroughly conversant 
with multiple research methods and become paradigmatic generalists, capable of mixing and 
matching various design components to provide the best opportunity to answer their specific 
research objectives. 
Establishing the rigour of mixed methods research usually requires a separate assessment of the 
quantitative and qualitative dimensions (Dellinger & Leech, 2007).  To validate mixed methods 
research, problems relating to representation, integration and legitimation should first be overcome 
(Onwuegbuzie & Johnson, 2006).  Representation refers to the difficulty of using text and/or 
numbers to capture experiences, while legitimation refers to the difficulty in obtaining findings 
and/or drawing inferences that are credible, trustworthy, dependable, transferable and/or 
confirmable.  These concerns are intensified by problems of data integration.  Dellinger and Leech 
(2007) suggest that interpretive rigour components comprise (i) interpretive consistency; 
(ii) theoretical consistency; (iii) interpretive agreement; (iv) interpretive distinctiveness; and 
(v) integrative efficacy.  To overcome these deficiencies, the quality of inferences drawn may be 
used to assess the validity of mixed methods studies in order. 
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Despite establishing the rigour of the various observations from the different research phases 
separately, triangulation (as described on page 137) not only validates the research findings, but 
also improves the understanding of the emerging CSR reporting and assurance phenomena.  In 
this context, triangulation may be defined as the combination of different methodologies within a 
single study of the same phenomena, which may incorporate within-methods59 or between-
methods60 triangulation (Johnson et al., 2007).  In addition to the validation and trustworthiness 
measures described in sections  4.4.2 and  4.4.3, the mixed methods research rigour of this study is 
enhanced by (Onwuegbuzie & Johnson, 2006): 
• collecting both the quantitative and qualitative data separately, at approximately the same 
point in time 
• acknowledging that neither the quantitative nor the qualitative data analysis should build on 
the other during the data analysis stage 
• only consolidating the results from each type of analysis after both sets of data have been 
collected and analysed separately, not at the data integration stage 
• drawing a meta-inference, integrating all the inferences made relating to the interpretation of 
the separate quantitative and qualitative data components collected, within the two chapters 
where the empirical research results are analysed and interpreted 
The exploratory nature of this thesis and the emerging nature of the study objects implies that the 
emerging CSR assurance phenomena are not yet clearly understood, supporting the decision to use 
exploratory mixed methods for this thesis.  This allows for the deployment of various research tools 
and techniques deemed appropriate for each empirical phase.  In this way the study attempts to 
provide an overall balanced perspective of the study object within the context of the observed 
phenomena, underscored by the perceptions of both reporting companies and CSR assurance 
providers.  It is accepted that qualitative research incorporates an element of subjectivity, resulting 
in the researcher interacting directly with the research subject (Sale et al., 2002; Merriam, 1995).  
It is also acknowledged that the interpretation of the results of the empirical research may be 
influenced by the researcher’s primary discipline, and that other researchers from different 
disciplinary and contextual backgrounds may interpret the same phenomena differently 
(Birkinshaw et al., 2011). 
                                           
59 Within-methods triangulation refers to the use of either multiple qualitative or multiple quantitative approaches.   
60 Between-methods triangulation refers to the use of both qualitative and multiple quantitative approaches. 
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4.4.5 Research rigour conclusion 
As described in the sub-sections above, since personal experiences are seen through an individual’s 
own diverse lenses, this thesis asserts that a universal, generalisable, external truth does not exist 
to adequately answer the research questions posed in this thesis.  Based on their own lenses, other 
researchers or experts may draw different inferences and conclusions from the data collected and 
analysed in each research phase.  The mixed methods research approach adopted for this study 
requires both the validity of the quantitative data component and the trustworthiness of the 
qualitative data component to be ensured.  It is however, accepted that evaluating a research 
study may differ from one evaluator to another, since value judgements are required to assess the 
meaning of data or inferences drawn from that data (Leech et al., 2010). 
The mixed methods research approach, comprising both qualitative and quantitative components, 
combined with the exploratory nature of the research and the poor understanding of both the 
conceptual framework and the emerging CSR assurance phenomena, suggests that although the 
underlying theory remains poorly developed, it was rapidly evolving.  It is accordingly considered 
appropriate to inductively interpret the research results, despite containing a quantitative survey 
component which usually requires deductive reasoning.  Without disregarding quantitative validity, 
the qualitative bias inherent in this study makes it more appropriate to establish research 
trustworthiness.  In several instances secondary data were used to establish the reasonableness of 
the empirical observations.  In this manner, the research approach adopted provides a balanced 
perspective of the phenomena being studied, supported by research results reflecting observed 
phenomena and confirmed by reporting company respondent perceptions as well as by assurance 
providers. 
4.5 Ethical research considerations 
Prior to the commencement of this study, the thesis proposal was reviewed and approved by the 
two doctoral promoters as well as by an experienced external doctoral evaluator.  The approved 
research proposal was subsequently submitted to the research ethics committee of the University 
of South Africa (Unisa) for ethical clearance.  The research project only commenced after receipt of 
the necessary ethical clearance from the university.  In addition to the ethical clearance by Unisa, 
other ethical considerations related to the three empirical research phases described in 
section  4.2.7 included: 
• The first content analysis phase consisted of a review of published information, not involving 
human subjects and accordingly did not require specific ethical approval.   
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• In the second survey phase, the covering letter that was sent to all potential respondents 
clearly stated that participation in the survey was entirely voluntary and confirmed that the 
privacy and anonymity of the respondents would be safeguarded.   
• Similarly, in the interviews of the third phase, participants were contacted telephonically and 
asked whether they were prepared to voluntarily participate in the semi-structured 
interviews.  Participants were advised of their right to discontinue participating at any stage.  
Prior to the commencement of the interviews, participants were assured that they would not 
be individually identified as interview participants.  In addition, permission to digitally record 
the interview was obtained before each interview commenced.  Despite recording the 
interviews, participants were assured of their anonymity and that their respective responses 
would be treated confidentially. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter introduced and described the primary research paradigms used in this study, 
specifically motivating the use of a mixed methods approach.  In particular, the research topic, 
research problem and research objectives briefly introduced in chapter 1, were described and 
justified in greater detail.  The rationale for using a thesis approach to understand the phenomena 
being studied and not a hypothesis to definitively prove a ‘single truth’ was substantiated.  Further, 
the methodological issues associated with this thesis were broadly introduced, with particular 
reference to the research paradigms, research population, sampling and data collection, data 
analysis techniques, research rigour and ethical considerations.  Delineating the research 
population to the top 200 JSE-listed companies was motivated using a combination of the JSE 
listing requirements and slack resource theory, and supported by secondary evidence from prior 
studies. 
Despite the limitations of the research paradigm used, the exploratory nature of the research and 
the objective of gaining insights into the contextual nature of the emerging CSR reporting and 
consequently, the CSR assurance phenomena were highlighted.  This interpretive approach may be 
classified as ‘hermeneutics’ which refers to ‘the science of interpretation’.  This thesis accordingly 
considers it more important to examine and understand significant emerging CSR assurance trends, 
than to estimate CSR assurance prevalence across the entire population and to predict future 
trends.  This inductive approach improves the understanding of the reasons for the increased 
demand for, and provision of, CSR assurance.   
A mixed methods approach, using both qualitative and quantitative techniques, is accordingly 
considered appropriate for this study.  Empirical data were sourced from publicly available sources, 
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from respondents at CSR reporting companies and from CSR assurance provider participants.  Of 
particular importance to this study is the fact that the evidence gathered during the empirical 
research approaches outlined in phases one to three are aligned to the common research objective.  
In this regard, the various CSR assurance providers operating at JSE-listed companies were 
identified from the content analysis in the first phase.  Moreover, their respective CSR assurance 
characteristics were identified and compared, within the context of the primary standards, 
guidelines and frameworks deployed, from the perspective of their implications.  This alignment 
was achieved with reference to the framework for assurance engagements identified in Figure 3.1. 
In conclusion, within the context of the reporting companies included in this study, the collective 
objective of the three research phases of this thesis introduces readers to the historical 
development and the present state of the CSR assurance discourse; identified the prevailing CSR 
assurance situation at JSE-listed companies; ascertained the rationale for companies reporting CSR 
performance and providing independent assurance thereon; and considered insights from a CSR 
assurance provider perspective.  While chapters 2 and 3 provided the contextual and conceptual 
framework for this study, chapters 5 and 6 presents a detailed analysis of the empirical component 
described in phases one to three.  
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5.1 Introduction 
This exploratory study aims to understand the nature of the emerging CSR assurance phenomenon 
and identify its characteristics (as described in section  4.2.3).  As described in section  4.2.7, the 
exploratory mixed methods research empirical approach adopted for this thesis was undertaken in 
three separate phases.  The first phase used a content analysis of annual, CSR and CSR assurance 
reports to determine the extent of CSR assurance provided by reporting companies and to identify 
the primary characteristics of CSR assurance.  Since assurance is arguably provided in order to 
provide stakeholders with confidence that the underlying CSR disclosures may be relied upon, it 
cannot be examined in isolation.  Therefore although this research focuses on CSR assurance, it is 
nevertheless contextually appropriate to first understand the nature of the CSR reporting 
phenomenon that forms the basis of the CSR assurance engagement.   
Although the data gathered in each empirical phase were analysed and interpreted separately, the 
data are interrelated and improve the interpretation of the phenomena emerging from the other 
empirical phases.  Even though the content analysis in the first phase yielded no data directly 
relating to CSR reporting, this chapter describes, analyses and interprets the results of the survey 
of reporting company respondents and the interviews with CSR assurance provider.  This chapter 
therefore describes the results from the second and third phases, but not the first phase. The 
results of the survey of reporting company respondents in the second phase provide important 
insights into the CSR reporting phenomenon, from a reporting company perspective.  Similarly, the 
semi-structured interviews provide CSR reporting insights from an assurance provider’s perspective.   
This chapter describes pertinent observations relating to CSR governance and reporting.  In 
particular, the stakeholders that rely on company CSR disclosures are identified, the reasons that 
reporting companies disclose their CSR performance are investigated, and perspectives on the 
mandatory vs. voluntary CSR reporting discourse are obtained.  Figure 5.1 (extracted from 
Figure 1.2 in section  1.14) depicts the alignment of the CSR reporting related research objectives 
with the relevant empirical research phase(s), and indicating where the results are described.   
 
 
Figure 5.1 – Alignment of research objectives, empirical phases and results 
This section includes both verbatim and paraphrased quotations extracted from the survey 
responses or by CSR assurors, both reflected in “quotation marks”.  Unless otherwise indicated, all 
data and graphs included in this chapter were extracted from an analysis of the survey instrument 
Research objective 3 
Understand the reasons for 
disclosing CSR performance  
Empirical research phase 
Phase 2 –survey 
Phase 3 – interviews  
 
Results sub-sections 
5.2 – stakeholders relying on CSR reports 
5.3 – reasons for disclosing CSR performance 
5.4 – attributes of CSR reports  
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results and the semi-structured interviews with CSR assurance providers.  
5.2 Stakeholders relying on CSR reporting 
By identifying their key stakeholders, reporting company survey respondents in phase two provided 
important insights into the reasons for disclosing their CSR performance.  The dimensions of a 
survey question relating to the stakeholders that may rely on CSR disclosures were not mutually 
exclusive.  Respondents were accordingly allowed to indicate more than one option, resulting in the 
cumulative total exceeding 100%.  As indicated in Figure 5.2, respondents to this question 
indicated that the following stakeholders rely on company CSR disclosures: 
• activists – 82% (n = 32) 
• trade unions – 79% (n = 31) 
• government – 69% (n = 27) 
• existing customers – 56% (n = 22) 
• employees – 54% (n = 21) 
• institutional investors – 54% (n = 21) 
• rating agencies – 49% (n = 19) 
• potential (new) customers – 46% (n = 18) 
• media – 44% (n = 17) 
• shareholders – 38% (n = 15) 
• NGOs – 38% (n = 15) 
• suppliers – 13% (n = 5) 
• other – 41% (n = 16) 
• not applicable – 3% (n = 1) 
Other identified stakeholders included bodies such as the JSE SRI index; investment structures with 
specific mandates; financial institutions; community members; and all stakeholders.  One 
respondent however, cynically commented that  
“The publishing of information is aimed at all the groups above, but there is great doubt that 
some of them place any reliance on it, either because they do not want to engage (activists) 
or it is not important (investors).  As to the media, they only focus on what drives a story, 
not what you publish (unfortunately).”   
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Counterintuitively, the data appear to indicate that government and civil society were perceived to 
be the primary audiences for CSR reports, and not the shareholders.  This may confirm the 
instrumental theory perspective (as described in sections  2.4.2 and  2.4.3) that companies may be 
reporting their CSR performance, primarily to comply with regulatory and legislative requirements 
and to enhance corporate legitimacy (as described in section  2.4.4), by being perceived as 
responsible corporate citizens.  These disingenuous motivations for disclosing CSR performance 
may increase the risk of companies using green-wash to falsely represent their CSR performance 
(as described in section  3.2.2).  This may in turn drive the need to establish the veracity of 
company CSR disclosures through the provision of independent assurance (as described in 
section  3.2).   
 
Figure 5.2 – Stakeholders relying on CSR disclosures (survey responses) 
Despite acknowledging the importance of CSR assurance reports to all stakeholders, assuror 
participant responses appear to confirm the propensity for reporting companies to adopt a 
shareholder primacy approach (as described in section  2.4.2) (Freeman, 1994), particularly from an 
instrumental perspective (as described in section  2.4.7) (Morimoto et al., 2005; Owen et al., 2000).  
Assuror interview participants unanimously agreed that the primary stakeholders having an interest 
in company CSR reports were management, the board of directors and investors, and not other 
stakeholders (as described in sections  2.4.2 and  2.4.3) (Ackers, 2009; Al-Hamadeen, 2007; IIA, 
2010b; O’Dwyer et al., 2011; Ramasamy & Yeung, 2009; Trudel & Cotte, 2009; Wiertz, 2009).  
Emphasising the importance of stakeholder engagement, one assuror commented that companies 
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should engage with stakeholders to establish who were most critical and to understand how they 
would benefit.  While the majority of assurors recognised the importance of employees and 
organised labour as important stakeholders, some differed on whether employees or organised 
labour actually looked at CSR performance information. 
It is suggested that the perceptual difference between a shareholder (identified by the interviews) 
and a stakeholder (identified by the survey) orientation may be attributed to possible survey 
respondent bias (as described on page 146) and a propensity to provide the ‘right answer’.  The 
prevalence of shareholder primacy, as advocated by assurors, is confirmed by the majority of CSR 
assurors addressing their CSR assurance reports to their principals, (i.e. management, the board 
and the shareholders) and not the broader shareholders (as described in section  6.10).  In 
addition, certain companies may leverage their CSR performance instrumentally to improve the 
legitimacy of their companies.  One participant however, insisted that the CSR assurance report 
was really intended for broader stakeholders, and not for the company’s board and shareholders. 
Confirming shareholder primacy, the assuror participants responded that where companies had 
many institutional investors, their requirements had to be taken into account.  This was particularly 
necessary when the company was looking to raise capital on the stock market, as indicated by the 
statement that “institutional investors are where the money is.  We always tell our clients: do it for 
the money.  Obviously it is the bottom line”.   
5.3 Reasons for disclosing CSR performance  
The literature suggests that companies are beginning to respond to increasing global stakeholder 
concerns about the adverse effects of corporate activity, by reporting on their non-financial impacts 
on the economy, environment and society (as described in sections  2.2 and  2.7).  Company CSR 
performance and reporting practices are therefore moving beyond the moral or ethical arguments 
and recognising the merits of the CSR business case (as described in section  2.6) (Utting, 2005).    
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Figure 5.3 – Reasons companies disclose CSR-related performance (survey responses) 
As illustrated in Figure 5.3, survey respondents identified the following reasons that companies 
disclose their CSR performance: 
• A majority of 36 respondents (92%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 11), strongly agreed 
(n = 14) and agreed (n = 11)} with the assertion that CSR reporting assists the company to 
project a positive corporate image (reputation management); three (8%) were uncertain 
(neither agreeing nor disagreeing); and none (0%) disagreed. 
• A majority of 36 respondents (92%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 17), strongly agreed 
(n = 10) and agreed (n = 9)} with the assertion that CSR reporting reflects the company’s 
commitment to responsible corporate citizenship; two (5%) were uncertain; and one (3%) 
disagreed. 
• A majority of 35 respondents (90%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 15), strongly agreed 
(n = 10) and agreed (n = 10)} agreed} with the assertion that CSR reporting resulted from 
the application of King III; three (8%) were uncertain; and one (3%) disagreed.  
• A majority of 34 respondents (87%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 13), strongly agreed 
(n = 11) and agreed (n = 10)} with the assertion that CSR reporting demonstrates improved 
transparency; three (8%) were uncertain; and two (5%) disagreed. 
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• A majority of 34 respondents (87%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 7), strongly agreed 
(n = 13) and agreed (n = 14)} with the assertion that CSR reporting provides information 
about how the company was managing its CSR-related risks; four (10%) were uncertain; and 
one (3%) disagreed. 
• A majority of 32 respondents (82%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 9), strongly agreed 
(n = 13) and agreed (n = 10)} with the assertion that CSR reporting reflects the reporting 
company’s commitment to improved stakeholder responsibility; five (13%) were uncertain; 
and two (5%) disagreed. 
• A majority of 32 respondents (82%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 10), strongly agreed 
(n = 8) and agreed (n = 14)} with the assertion that investors want to know the company’s 
CSR track record and risks; six (15%) were uncertain; and one (3%) disagreed. 
• A majority of 30 respondents (77%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 6), strongly agreed 
(n = 14) and agreed (n = 10)} with the assertion that CSR reporting positions the company 
to compete favourably in global markets; six (15%) were uncertain; and three (8%) 
disagreed. 
• A majority of 29 respondents (74%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 9), strongly agreed 
(n = 10) and agreed (n = 10)} with the assertion that CSR reporting reflects the reporting 
company’s commitment to improved stakeholder accountability; seven (18%) were uncertain; 
and three (8%) disagreed. 
• A majority of 29 respondents (74%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 6), strongly agreed 
(n = 9) and agreed (n = 14)} with the assertion that CSR reporting is a useful marketing and 
public relations tool; seven (18%) were uncertain; and three (8%) disagreed. 
• A majority of 28 respondents (72%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 2), strongly agreed 
(n = 9) and agreed (n = 17)} with the assertion that customers want to know the company’s 
CSR track record, six (15%) were uncertain and five (13%) disagreed. 
• Only 17 respondents (44%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 1), strongly agreed (n = 7) 
and agreed (n = 9)} with the assertion that suppliers want to know the company’s CSR track 
record; 17 (44%) were uncertain; and five (13%) disagreed. 
• Other reasons advanced for the provision of CSR-related information included, “it is simply 
the right thing to do” or even the cynical comment from one respondent that “legislation and 
public sentiment drive companies to display a positive social impact, even if this is for window 
dressing”.  The qualitative comments in this section improve the understanding of the 
reasons for the emerging CSR reporting and assurance phenomena, since respondents 
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actually had to think about their responses instead of merely ticking the ‘right box’ from a list 
of predetermined options. 
While the survey respondents overwhelmingly agreed with the assertions, even when they did not 
agree, they tended to provide a neutral response, neither agreeing nor disagreeing.  The highest 
rate of disagreement with any of the assertions in this question was only by five respondents 
(13%), suggesting that CSR performance should not be disclosed.  As CSR becomes more 
embedded into corporate practice, it is expected that respondents will become more aware of its 
impact, thus improving the quality of responses even further. Aligned to the survey responses, 
interviewees suggested that companies disclose their CSR performance due to a combination of 
King III adherence, maintaining a licence to operate, demonstrating responsible corporate 
citizenship and maintaining their investment attractiveness.  Despite assuror participants 
suggesting that their engagement principals were the primary stakeholders relying on company 
CSR disclosures (as described in section  5.2), assurors confirm that stakeholders have a right to 
reliable information on CSR-related performance.  The reasons provided by assuror participants are 
broadly aligned to the survey responses of reporting company respondents (reflected in 
Figure 5.3).  This perspective is illustrated by assuror comments such as: 
• “Stakeholders want to know how much companies have invested in the community”. 
• “They are not doing it to show that they are good corporate citizens any longer.  It’s about 
keeping the doors open to run as a business”. 
• “Asset managers want to see strong governance, strong financial performance and some 
form of acknowledgement that they fall in line with society”. 
• “While initially a fair amount of companies provided CSR disclosures as part of a tick-box 
exercise, it is becoming more of an industry-like expectation, with everyone else doing it”. 
• “After getting on the bandwagon, companies are now recognising that it may be a strategic 
advantage, and are beginning to see the cost savings and the need for improvement”. 
From the above, confirming the broad findings of several authors  (Aras & Crowther, 2008; Archel 
et al., 2008; Black & Quach, 2009; Creyer & Ross, 1997; Eccles et al., 2011; Gouws & Cronjé, 
2008; Hummels & Timmer, 2004; Lii & Lee, 2012; Morimoto et al., 2005; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Page 
& Fearn, 2005; Ramasamy & Yeung, 2009; Trudel & Cotte, 2009; Utting, 2005; Zorio et al., 2013), 
the survey and interview responses identified the primary reasons for disclosing CSR-related 
performance as being: 
• stakeholders have a right to the information 
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• it reflects the company’s commitment to good corporate citizenship 
• it assists the company project a positive corporate image (reputation management) 
• it is a King III requirement 
• it demonstrates improved transparency 
• it provides information about how the company manages its CSR-related risks   
5.4 Attributes of CSR reports 
In order to conduct a CSR assurance engagement, it is imperative that CSR assurors understand 
the nature of the CSR assurance phenomenon.  In this regard it is contextually appropriate to 
briefly consider some aspects of CSR reporting.  In particular, this section describes perspectives on 
the titles used for CSR reports, identifies the parties that should approve CSR reports, and 
considers whether CSR reporting should be a mandatory requirement. 
 
Figure 5.4 – CSR report titles (survey responses) 
As reflected in Figure 5.4, responses to a survey question on the titles used for CSR reports reveal 
that 19 respondents (49%) indicated that their respective companies called their CSR disclosures a 
“sustainability report”; two companies (5%) called it a “CSR report”; one company (3%) called it a 
“CSI report”; 15 companies (39%) called it something else; and two respondents (5%) indicated 
that the question did not apply to their respective companies.  The category ‘other’ include the 
related terms of “integrated annual report”; “sustainability report”; “carbon disclosure project 
submission”; “governance and sustainability report”; “sustainability development report”; 
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“governance report”; “integrated report”; “social and labour plan report”; and “the good business 
journey report”.  Since the majority of CSR-related disclosures were included in ‘sustainability 
reports’ and only two were included in a ‘CSR report’, this would appear to confirm the emerging 
reporting company trend of preferring to use the term ‘sustainability’ (as described on page 36).  
This supports the assertion by Gray and Milne (2002) that true sustainability will remain elusive due 
to the inherent unsustainability of profit seeking business, within the context of its resource base, 
and the cumulative effect of all activity on the carrying capacity of given ecosystems.  Therefore, 
as previously indicated, CSR remains the preferred term used in this thesis.  
Assuror participants indicated that despite this lack of standardisation, the different terms used to 
refer to the CSR phenomena (as indicated in section  2.2) are evolving.  The evolutionary nature of 
the CSR reporting and assurance discourse and the confusion caused by the various terms used to 
describe CSR-related issues are illustrated by assuror participants identifying their approach with 
comments such as: 
• “I no longer talk about sustainability, or triple bottom line, or CSR or CSI; I now talk about 
linking corporate leadership and values with long-term strategy”.   
• “CSR relates more to corporate citizenship and sustainability relates more to risk, in terms of 
long-term viability”.   
• “Even the term ‘sustainability’ is confusing, as it used to mean economic, social and 
environmental.  This is basically the triple bottom line.  That is now outdated.  Even John 
Elkington is not talking about that.  I have got a very simple formula.  It is governance and 
strategy that has to be linked to risks and also a bit of opportunities and KPIs linked to long-
term viability”. 
• “We have completely moved away from CSR, because everybody wants to tell you about 
their CSI.  So we don’t need CSI.  We have actually found that using key non-financial 
indicators in our opinion is more appropriate.  I know it kind of puts it relative to financial 
which is not ideal, but it is a term that is being debated internationally.  We have found that 
the definition of sustainability is a word that has been a little bit overused.  So either people 
think green or you run into the argument that corporate sustainability does not depend on 
social sustainability.  So you will see in our opinions that we do not refer to sustainability.  It 
says non-financial indicators.  I don’t know what the right answer is, but I believe we don’t 
use the term CSR anymore”. 
Despite the apparent intention of CSR reporting being to demonstrate the manner through which 
companies account to their broader stakeholders, it is suggested that the divergent perspectives 
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provided by reporting company respondents and assurors may be attributed to respondent bias (as 
described on page 146).  It is therefore likely that the assurors interviewed were provided the ‘real 
reasons’ that companies report their CSR performance, whereas reporting company survey 
respondents were providing the ‘right answers’.  This observation appears to confirm that 
companies report their CSR performance for instrumental reasons and not because it is the ‘right 
thing to do’, increasing the risk of green-wash (as described on page 90).  Moreover, the assertion 
that neither CSR nor sustainability appropriately describes company non-financial reporting (Gray & 
Milne, 2002) suggests that a new reporting paradigm is required.  While some may argue that the 
integrated reporting initiatives will fill this void, as argued in section  2.7.7.6, that integrated 
reporting will supplement and not replace CSR reporting. 
 
Figure 5.5 – Audit committee approval of CSR disclosures (survey responses) 
As stated in sections  2.5.2 and  2.5.3, since the board has a fiduciary responsibility to ensure 
effective corporate governance (including i.r.o. CSR) practices, it is appropriate that the audit 
committee, acting on behalf of the board, approves the CSR disclosures in the same way that it 
approves the AFS prior to publication.  Responding to a question about whether the audit 
committee approves the CSR disclosures prior to publication, Figure 5.5 reveals that a majority of 
23 respondents (59%) confirmed that the CSR disclosures of their respective companies were 
approved by the audit committee prior to publication; four (10%) did not; four (10%) were 
uncertain; three (8%) referred to ‘other’; while five (13%) indicated that the question did not apply 
to their respective companies.  The category ‘other’ includes CSR disclosures being approved by the 
board, the risk management committee and the sustainability committee. Despite indicating that 
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the audit committee did not approve CSR disclosures prior to publication, these ‘other’ responses 
appear to suggest that approval was not considered unimportant, but was dealt with by other 
structures within the company.  
 
Figure 5.6 – CSR disclosures should be a mandatory requirement (survey responses)  
Responding to a question relating to mandatory and voluntary CSR reporting, Figure 5.6 reveals 
that 21 respondents (54%) agreed that government should promulgate legislation compelling 
companies to disclose their CSR performance; nine respondents (23%) disagreed; and nine 
respondents (23%) were uncertain.  Mandatory legislation and regulation could facilitate the 
standardisation of CSR reporting and assurance practices, which would accelerate the development 
of CSR reporting and assurance practices.  This standardisation should enhance report usability and 
comparability.  Despite the majority of respondents favouring government legislation, company 
management’s aversion to government regulation and intervention (as described in section  2.7.5)  
and  makes it is unlikely that companies would lobby government to intervene, instead preferring 
the vagaries of self-regulation (as described in section  2.7.5.3).  Mervyn King, the widely 
acknowledged advocate of good governance (both globally and in South Africa) rejects government 
intervention and strongly supports voluntarism as reflected in King III (IoD, 2009a) and the GRI.     
Predictably, several interview participants suggested that CSR reporting (and/or assurance) should 
be a mandatory requirement as posited by Ho and Wong (2001).  Arguing that non-financial and 
financial reporting (which is legislated) should not be treated differently; one participant stated that 
“you got to have company’s financial statements audited on an annual basis.  So why is this any 
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different?”  The participant however, conceded that there was still a long way to go, especially 
since CSR reporting standards were at an early stage of development, as illustrated by the 
comment that financial reporting took “the accountants a 100 years to get to the point.  We kind of 
have to work at 10 times that pace”.     
Other participants pointed out that some aspects of CSR reporting were already mandatory in 
South Africa.  Examples cited include employment equity, occupational health and safety, 
transformation and BBBEE.  Participants suggested that carbon accounting and disclosure was also 
going to become necessary because of “carbon taxes and things like that”.  It was however, 
proposed that other aspects should continue on “a voluntary sort of basis from the perspective of 
what is material to each company”.  On the other hand, confirming the principle of voluntarism, 
Windsor (2006) argues that, to be effective, CSR disclosure and assurance should be embraced as 
a living breathing policy in the organisation.  Compulsory compliance simply because there is 
something that can be reported may therefore not achieve the objective. 
Participants pointed out that CSR reporting (and/or assurance) was mandatory in some countries 
around the world.  Examples cited included India (mandatory for the top 100 companies), France 
(mandatory for all listed companies) and the New York Stock Exchange (mandatory for all listed 
companies).  Participants stated that it would probably become mandatory for the JSE-listed 
companies too.  Despite the de facto mandatory nature of CSR reporting (and assurance) resulting 
from the application of King III and the JSE regulations, its application remains voluntary (Ackers, 
2009; Esser, 2008; Jenkins, 2001; Marx & Van Dyk, 2011; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Rea, 2011; Williams 
& Zinkin, 2008; Wood, 1991).  JSE-listed companies that do not adhere to the King III principles 
can simply explain why they have not done so. 
5.5 Conclusion 
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, although the study focus is on CSR assurance and not 
on CSR reporting, CSR reporting has introduced to provide the necessary context for the detailed 
discourse on CSR assurance in chapter 6.  While not ignoring the importance of shareholders, 
survey respondents overwhelmingly confirmed the assertion in section  2.7, that non-shareholder 
stakeholders were the primary intended audience of company CSR reports.  This observation is 
directly aligned to stakeholder theory (as described in section  2.4.3) which states that business 
should account to various groups in society that may have a legitimate interest in the non-financial 
operational impacts of company (Freeman, 1984).  By contrast, and despite acknowledging the 
importance of all stakeholders, assurance providers interviewed indicated that company 
management and shareholders were the primary users of CSR reports.  The divergent views of 
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company survey respondents and assuror interview participants may be attributed to a combination 
of survey respondent bias together with certain companies only disclosing their CSR performance 
as an instrument to establish their legitimacy amongst stakeholders and to enhance their 
reputation (as described in section  2.4.4).   
Survey respondents indicated that the main reasons that companies disclose their CSR performance 
is to be perceived as responsible corporate citizens, and by implication to project a positive 
corporate image and maintaining a licence to operate.  Other significant factors include: applying 
the King III principles; improved risk management; improved reputation management; and 
improved competitive positioning.  These observations are confirmed by the assurance providers 
interviewed.  Juxtaposing the reasons for reporting CSR with the intended users of CSR reports, 
appears to confirm instrumentalism described in the previous paragraph.    
Despite the myriad of titles used for CSR reports, and even though this thesis uses the term CSR 
report, the most common title used was sustainability report.  The preference for ‘sustainability’ is 
confirmed by King III which is widely acknowledged as the global leader of corporate governance 
practices, and often globally emulated.  Despite expecting integrated reporting to contribute to the 
manner in which companies report their performance, as previously stated, it is not intended to 
replace CSR reporting.  Placing CSR within a broader corporate governance context, survey 
respondents indicated that the audit committee or some other senior management structure 
approved the CSR report before its publication.  
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6.1 Introduction 
Whereas chapter 5 provides the necessary context for CSR assurance, this chapter more specifically 
examines the study results within the context of the core characteristics of CSR assurance.  In this 
regard, as stated in chapter 4, the primary objective of this study may be summarised as being to 
establish the extent to which the largest 200 JSE-listed have complied with the JSE regulations by 
providing independent CSR assurance as advocated by King III.  Within this context, this chapter 
describes the results of the content analysis of CSR assurance reports (phase 1), the survey of 
reporting company responses (phase 2), and interviews with CSR assurance providers (phase 3).  
While the data gathered in each phase were collected and analysed separately, the data are 
interrelated.  As a result, the manner in which the results of the three phases are integrated in this 
chapter provides a richer description of the CSR assurance phenomena being studied. 
Since it may be argued that company CSR performance should be available to the broader 
stakeholders, the content analysis observations were appropriately extracted in two stages from 
publicly available information.  The first stage included a scrutiny of the annual/CSR assurance 
reports of the selected companies to establish whether they provided independent assurance on 
their CSR disclosures.  The second stage involved a detailed evaluation of the CSR assurance 
practices published in the identified CSR assurance reports.  The first stage of this research phase, 
established the frequency with which the selected reporting companies provide CSR assurance, 
while the second stage provided a detailed analysis and description of the observations emerging 
from the content analysis of CSR assurance reports.  The study revealed that, where provided, CSR 
assurance reports were included in the company annual and/or CSR reports.  Some CSR assurance 
reports were however, only available on the internet and in two instances the reporting companies 
had to be contacted directly to provide copies of their CSR assurance reports, as these were not 
available on the internet nor were they included in the annual/CSR reports. 
The content analysis included a limited longitudinal study relating to reporting periods both prior to 
and after King III, to understand its impact on CSR assurance practices.  This decision is 
substantiated by Ackers’ (2009) prediction that CSR assurance provision would increase following 
the implementation of King III in 2010.  The 2007/8 data therefore provided the base year for the 
study, and was subsequently compared to more recent post-King III data for 2010/1 and 2011/2.  
The data presented in this chapter identifies emerging CSR assurance trends that provide a basis 
for comparison across the various reporting periods.  Unless germane to the study, only the results 
of the most recent data (i.e. 2011/2) are analysed and described.  Where data relating to previous 
periods (other than 2011/2) are included for contextual purposes, this has been indicated as such. 
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The purpose of the survey of respondents at reporting companies in the second phase was to 
understand the characteristics of CSR assurance that emerged from the content analysis in the first 
phase.  The perspectives of respondents to the survey questionnaires provide important reporting 
company insights into the reasons for the content analysis observations.  The analysis of the survey 
results also attempts to understand the reasons for the apparent paradox in terms of which auditor 
assurors were collectively the primary providers of independent CSR assurance, despite appearing 
to provide lower levels of assurance than non-auditor assurors.   
The semi-structured interviews held with the primary assurance providers identified in the content 
analysis provide additional insights into the CSR assurance phenomena, but from an assuror’s 
perspective.  Despite relatively few companies in the study providing independent assurance on 
their CSR disclosures, several participant assurors indicated that they had already been providing 
independent CSR assurance for their client companies for around 15 years.  Therefore, despite its 
relative topicality, it is clear that CSR assurance is not a new South African phenomenon.    
The results of all three empirical phases are grouped together in this chapter under the broad 
themes identified in the literature review.  In this regard, the results of the content analysis are 
described in each sub-section first, followed by the survey and interview responses respectively.  
Where an element has not been covered in one or more of the empirical phases, the relevant sub-
section has been excluded.  Each sub-section concludes with an integrated synopsis and 
description of the results of the three empirical phases. 
To ensure alignment between the various phases of the research, the content analysis in the first 
phase established the extent of CSR assurance provided, identified the primary assurance providers 
and determined the primary characteristics of CSR assurance.  These data, together with the 
literature review, informed the questions posed to reporting company respondents in the survey in 
the second phase, and to assurance providers in the semi-structured interviews in the third phase.  
Since all three phases examined the CSR assurance practices of the same companies during similar 
reporting periods, the results of the three separate empirical phases therefore validate each other. 
The alignment of the CSR assurance related research objectives, research phases and results 
description is depicted graphically in Figure 6.1 (extracted from Figure 1.2 in section  1.14).  This 
diagram enhances the ability of readers of this thesis to understand which empirical phase(s) were 
used to achieve each research objective, as well as to identify the sub-section where the research 
findings are described.  
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This section includes both verbatim and paraphrased quotations extracted from CSR assurance 
reports, the survey responses or by CSR assurors, both reflected in “quotation marks”.  Unless 
otherwise indicated, all data and graphs included in this chapter were extracted from an analysis of 
the survey instrument results and the semi-structured interviews with CSR assurance providers.  As 
described in section  4.2.5, despite the mixed methods paradigm adopted in this study, this thesis 
follows a primarily interpretive qualitative approach.  Within this context, Merriam (1995) asserts 
that qualitative research is interpretive and involves an element of subjectivity, justifying using a 
paraphrased interpretation of the data where appropriate.  Unless otherwise indicated, all data and 
graphs included in this chapter were extracted from the content analysis data. 
6.2 Extent of independent CSR assurance provision 
6.2.1 Background  
Following the implementation of King III and the JSE regulations, this section describes pertinent 
observations from the three empirical phases of this research relating to the extent to which 
reporting companies provided independent CSR assurance.  The results of each phase are 
described in separate sub-sections, with a concluding sub-paragraph integrating the observations 
from the different phases. 
6.2.2 CSR assurance report content analysis 
Figure 6.2 reveals that 50 reporting companies provided independent assurance on their CSR 
disclosures for the fiscal period ending 2011/2, compared to 42 for the period ending 2010/1, and 
only 18 for the period ending 2007/8.  This growth trend confirms Nkonki’s prediction that the 
South African CSR assurance rate would increase (as described in section  3.1).  When considering 
the extent of independent CSR assurance provided at the selected companies, 26% of the 192 
companies in the study provided independent CSR assurance in 2011/2, compared to 22% in 
2010/1 and 9% in 2007/8.  The 26% CSR assurance rate in 2011/2 compares favourably with the 
27% established by Deloitte’s (2012: 52) South African study.   
To understand how the South African independent CSR assurance rate compares globally, when 
only confining the 2007/8 study results to the top 100 JSE-listed companies 17 companies (17%) 
provided independent CSR assurance.  Although not directly comparable, South African CSR 
assurance demand is contextualised by comparing these results to the CorporateRegister (2008) 
study of the top 100 companies in 2007.  This illustrative comparison revealed that despite the 
South African provision of CSR assurance lagging behind the 57% of UK and 29% of Japanese 
companies of one year earlier, it exceeded that of Australia (12%), Germany (11%) and the USA 
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(11%) (also depicted in Figure 6.2).  At the same time, adjusting the study from the top 200 to the 
top 100 confirms the slack resource premise (as described in section  2.4.6) that larger companies 
are more likely to provide independent CSR assurance, since only one of the additional 100 
companies provided independent CSR assurance (Jenkins, 2001; Jones et al., 2014).  To facilitate 
comparison, when examining the CSR assurance rates for the largest 100 companies in 2011/2 and 
2010/1, the CSR assurance improved from 26% to 42% in 2011/2 and from 22% to 35% in 
2010/1.  This trend for a disproportionately higher CSR assurance rate by larger companies is also 
reflected in Table 6.1 and Figure 6.5.  
 
Figure 6.2 – South African CSR assurance provision measured against CSR assurance in 
five other countries (Sources: this study and CorporateRegister, 2008: 33)   
Figure 6.3 depicts the extent to which independent CSR assurance is provided by the selected 
reporting companies, as a percentage of the total market capitalisation of the JSE and the market 
capitalisation of the selected companies.  Even though only 26% of the top 200 JSE-listed 
companies provided independent CSR assurance in 2011/2, this represented 69% of the total 
market capitalisation of the JSE (61% in 2010/1 and 43% in 2007/8).   
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Figure 6.3 – CSR assurance rates in terms of market capitalisation 
Figure 6.4 reflects the primary JSE industry sectors represented by the reporting companies that 
have provided independent assurance on their CSR disclosures.  In 2011/2, the resources sector 
(collectively comprising mining, forestry and chemicals) provided 38% of published CSR assurance 
reports (45% in 2010/1 and 56% in 2007/8).  This observation is aligned to the finding by 
Fernandez-Feijoo et al. (2014) that environmentally sensitive companies were more likely to report 
on their CSR performance.  This was followed by the financial services sector (banking, insurance, 
financial services and real estate) and the industrial sector (construction and goods & services), 
representing 18% each (14% and 19% respectively in 2010/1; and 17% and 11% in 2007/8); the 
consumer sector (retail, food & beverage, automobiles & parts and travel) with 14% (14% in 
2010/1 and 11% in 2007/8); and telecommunications with 10% (5% in 2010/1 and 0% in 2007/8).   
The primary reason for the disproportionate provision of independent CSR assurance by the 
resources, financial service and industrial sectors may be ascribed to attempts to legitimise 
business operations and to protect society and the environment from the adverse consequences of 
corporate operations.  While the resources industry collectively (including oil & gas) provided 62% 
of the independent CSR assurance statements in 2007/8, by 2011/2 this proportion was reduced to 
40%.  During this period the financial services, industrial and telecommunications sectors increased 
their proportion of independent CSR assurance provision.  This observation is aligned to previous 
research establishing that the highly visible ‘polluting industries’ were traditionally the most active 
providers of independent CSR assurance (Al-Hamadeen, 2007; Fernandez-Feijoo et al., 2014; 
Perego & Kolk, 2012; Sierra et al., 2013).  This was later followed by growth in the banking, 
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consumer, insurance, manufacturing, mining, and oil and gas sectors.  Companies in all these 
sectors tend to operate in highly regulated environments aimed at protecting social interests.  It is 
posited that some companies may use independent CSR assurance to ameliorate the adverse 
consequences of their operations, while contributing to social well-being and instrumentally 
preserving both their literal and figurative ‘licences to operate’. 
 
Figure 6.4 – Distribution of CSR assurance in terms of the broad JSE industry sector 
Although the provision of independent CSR assurance grew by a cumulative 177% over the three-
year period between 2007/8 and 2010/1, and by 19% between 2010/1 and 2011/2, the proportion 
of JSE-listed companies providing independent CSR assurance nevertheless remains low.  Even 
though the initial large increase between 2007/8 and 2010/1 may be attributed to King III 
implementation, it is clear that most of the JSE-listed companies studied still did not comply with 
the de facto JSE regulatory requirement to provide independent CSR assurance with effect from 
the 1 March 2010 (as described in section  2.7.7.2).  While some companies indicated that they 
provided CSR assurance in the narrative of their annual reports, a scrutiny of these companies’ 
annual/CSR reports revealed that they may have been referring to the verification of specific CSR 
elements, and not to the overall CSR report.  These CSR elements include broad-based black 
economic empowerment (BBBEE), carbon footprint, GHG emissions and health and safety.  The 
resultant assurance opinions were however, not usually published in a publically available CSR 
assurance report.  Despite the King III ‘apply or explain’ requirement, several companies did not 
indicate their reasons for not providing independent CSR assurance in their annual/CSR reports.   
Since the focus of this research was to identify CSR assurance trends, the study did not attempt to 
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quantify the number of companies that did not provide independent CSR assurance, nor the 
number of companies that did not explain why they did not.  Where companies provided reasons 
for not having their CSR disclosures independently assured, these included that they were not 
ready to do so but were developing their capacity to do so in future (as illustrated in Figure 6.11); 
that it was reviewed by internal audit; that it was not legally required; or that it could not be 
financially justified.  Examples of these reasons extracted from the 2011/2 annual/CSR reports 
included the following: 
• “it would be premature to obtain external assurance until the group’s recording systems are 
mature” 
• “we are preparing to have the CSR report independently assured” 
• “environmental issues are not material in the group or its operations” 
• “assurance of integrated reports is still a relatively new concept to all companies incorporated 
in South Africa and not all information included in an integrated report is legally required to 
be assured” 
• “material sustainability information has been reviewed by internal audit, which was 
considered to be a more cost effective alternative”. 
As described in section  2.4.6, this thesis acknowledges the circular argument about whether 
responsible CSR practices improve company performance, or whether enhanced company 
performance facilitates improved CSR practices.  Confirming the assertion that larger companies 
were more likely to provide independent CSR assurance, Table 6.1 and Figure 6.5  provide an 
analysis of CSR assurance provision according to company size for 2007/8, 2010/1 and 2011/2.  
Despite the ‘virtuous cycle’ referred to above, these observations appear to substantiate the slack 
resource assertions (Bourgeois, 1981; Jenkins, 2001; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Saleh, 2009; Waddock & 
Graves, 1997).   
While Figure 6.5 reveals that more large companies were likely to provide CSR assurance than 
smaller companies, this distribution appears to be changing as more companies across the 
spectrum start implementing the provisions of King III more fully.  Therefore, while many reporting 
companies indicated that they were not yet ready to provide external CSR assurance, it is expected 
that providing reasons for non-disclosure will become unnecessary as more companies (including 
those not listed on the JSE) start providing independent CSR assurance reports, even if only to 
conform with the King III principles (as indicated in sections  5.3 and  6.3, and by Figure 6.10).  This 
prediction is based on the underlying rationale that stakeholders (especially investors) were likely 
to place greater value on companies that respond to stakeholder demands for greater company 
accountability and transparency, by more comprehensively applying King III (and having their CSR 
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disclosures independently assured), and being sceptical of those continually providing explanations 
(or excuses) for why they have not done so.  
Table 6.1 – CSR assurance report frequency according to company size 
Company size range 2007/8 2010/1 2011/2 
1 to 40 14 20 25 
41 to 80 3 9 12 
81 to 120 - 7 6 
121 to 160 1 5 5 
161 to 200 - 1 2 
Total 18 42 50 
 
Figure 6.5 – Distribution of CSR assurance according to company size 
6.2.3 Reporting company survey 
To distinguish between CSR assurance provided to internal users (including management and the 
board), and assurance provided on public CSR disclosures intended for broader external 
stakeholder consumption, 21 respondents (54%) confirmed that their CSR assurance reports were 
published; three respondents indicated that their CSR assurance reports were not published (8%); 
and 15 respondents indicated that the question did not apply to their companies (38%) as reflected 
in Figure 6.6.  The three unpublished CSR reports may be due to respondents referring to CSR 
assurance provided by internal audit or certification bodies, for the benefit of internal stakeholders 
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or to meet some regulatory requirement, and not for publication to broader stakeholders outside of 
the company.  The inference being that 18 companies (46%) either did not provide independent 
CSR assurance or did not publish their CSR assurance reports.  This observation may be compared 
to responses to the question about whether external CSR assurance was provided (see Figure 6.7), 
which established that 16 respondents (41%) did not provide independent assurance on their CSR 
disclosures.   
 
Figure 6.6  – Publication of CSR assurance reports 
To establish the number of companies that provided CSR assurance, Figure 6.7 reveals that a 
majority of 23 reporting company respondents (59%) indicated that their companies provided 
external assurance on their CSR disclosures; 15 respondents (39%) indicated that their companies 
did not; while one respondent (3%) indicated ‘other’.  The ‘other’ response indicated that the 
“financial content is externally assured”, reflecting an extremely limited scope for the CSR 
assurance engagement.   
While Figure 6.2 reveals that only 26% of companies in the content analysis provided independent 
CSR assurance in 2011/2, 56% of survey respondents indicated that their respective companies 
provided CSR assurance.  A possible reason for the divergence in the results of the two phases may 
be attributed to respondent bias as described in sections  4.2.8.3 (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004; 
Podsakoff et al., 2012).  The survey result may therefore not necessarily depict the actual extent of 
CSR assurance in the study population, but may merely represent the perspectives of those who 
actually responded, or even those who may wish to misrepresent the situation by providing 
answers they believe are expected.  However, the interpretive nature of this exploratory study 
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means that it is more important to understand the characteristics of the emerging CSR reporting 
and assurance practices than to definitively identify the extent of CSR assurance provision.  An 
alternative explanation for the discrepancy could be that respondents may be referring to CSR 
assurance provided to internal stakeholders only, such as by the internal audit activity (as 
described in section  3.3.2), or relating to one of the ISO standards (as described in 
section  2.7.7.5).  These internally oriented assurance reports may not necessarily result in the 
publication of an independent CSR assurance report for use by external stakeholders.   
 
Figure 6.7 – External assurance of CSR disclosures 
To establish how long respondents’ companies had been providing external CSR assurance for, 
respondents were required to indicate when their respective companies started having their CSR 
disclosures externally assured.  As indicated in Figure 6.8, 18 respondents (46%) indicated that the 
question was not applicable, suggesting that those companies were not currently providing 
independent assurance on their CSR disclosures.  This is aligned to the results depicted in 
Figure 6.6, which found that 54% of companies provided CSR assurance.   
Although still in its infancy, it is clear that the provision of external CSR assurance is not a new 
phenomenon, as suggested by five survey respondents (13%) who indicated that their respective 
companies had been providing external CSR assurance for more than seven years (i.e. before 
2006); two respondents (5%) for seven years (i.e. since 2006); four respondents for six years (i.e. 
since 2007); three respondents (8%) for five years (i.e. since 2008); two respondents (5%) for 
four years (i.e. since 2009); and five respondents (13%) for three years (i.e. since 2010).  
Although several companies did not provide external CSR assurance at the time of the study, 
59% 
38% 
3% 
CSR disclosures are externally assured CSR disclosures are not externally assured Other
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others only started after 2010 (after King III implementation), while some were already providing 
external CSR assurance prior to King III implementation.  
 
Figure 6.8 – Year during which company started providing external CSR assurance 
Despite the King III and JSE requirements, many companies still do not have their CSR disclosures 
independently assured.  Figure 6.9 reveals that 24 respondents (62%) disclosed that they were 
already either providing independent CSR assurance, or intended doing so by 2012.  To identify 
when ‘non-compliant’ companies will provide independent CSR assurance, three respondents (8%) 
indicated that their companies would provide CSR assurance by 2013; five respondents (13%) by 
2014; one respondent by 2015 (3%); while six respondents (15%) indicated that they would 
comply after 2015.  The option that companies ‘would comply’ after 2015 may however, simply 
imply that respondents recognised the ‘need’ for independent CSR assurance.  Respondents may 
therefore simply have been ‘ticking the box’ because that is what was expected, but without having 
any meaningful intention to do so.  Nevertheless, these observations appear to indicate that 
respondents recognised the importance of independent CSR assurance on the corporate agenda, 
even if only to favourably influence stakeholder opinions (Aras & Crowther, 2008; Okoye, 2009; 
Teoh & Shiu, 1990) and/or to comply with society’s expectations, regulations and/or legislation. 
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Figure 6.9 – When independent CSR assurance will be provided 
6.2.4 Assurance provider interviews  
The future orientation of CSR reporting and, accordingly CSR assurance, is further illustrated by an 
assuror commenting that: “I also wonder will happen in the field of carbon credits and other things 
coming in.”  There is little doubt that the demand for and provision of CSR assurance will continue 
to grow as illustrated by the statement: “I think people want more assurance.”  Implying that the 
growth of CSR assurance depends on the activities of the CSR assurance provider, a participant 
stated that “CSR assurance will continue to grow as long as the assurance providers don’t mess it 
up.  If they continue to diminish its value, then it will sort of disappear.”   
6.2.5 Analysis and integration of results 
As previously explained, the initial source of empirical data for this study was the content analysis 
of published CSR assurance reports in the first phase.  This established the CSR assurance rate and 
identified the emerging characteristics of CSR assurance.  The survey questionnaire in the second 
phase provided important insights from a reporting company perspective into the reasons for the 
emerging phenomena observed in the first phase. 
The content analysis established that 26% of the studied companies provided independent CSR 
assurance.  The survey results assist to understand the reasons for the identified phenomena.  
Therefore, although possible respondent bias in the surveys is acknowledged, the exploratory 
mixed methods research approach adopted for this study compensates for possible respondent bias 
44% 
10% 
8% 
8% 
13% 3% 
15% 
2010 y/e 2011 y/e 2012 y/e 2013 y/e 2014 y/e 2015 y/e after 2015 y/e
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and does not necessarily invalidate the responses to the question posed.   
It is argued that the increase in CSR assurance provision over the five year period covered by the 
content analysis reflects the adoption of the King III principles which is a de facto requirement for 
JSE listed, as is evident by the increase of 177% over the reporting periods before and after 
King III implementation, slowing down thereafter.  While several companies already provided CSR 
assurance before King III, the assertion that King III contributed to the acceleration is supported 
by the survey results which found that the largest increase was during 2010 (the implementation 
date of King III).  Respondents at companies that were not providing CSR assurance at the time of 
the study indicated that they were developing their capacity to do so in future.      
The propensity for larger companies to provide independent CSR assurance described in 
section  3.2 (Moroney et al., 2012; Nitkin & Brooks, 1998) is confirmed in Table 6.1 and Figure 6.5.  
This finding is aligned to slack resource theory which posits that larger companies are more likely 
to have the ‘slack resources’ to devote to ‘non-core’ activities such as CSR assurance as described 
in section  2.4.6 (Bourgeois, 1981; Driver & Thompson, 2002; Saleh, 2009; Waddock & Graves, 
1997).   
Since King III, which requires independent CSR assurance, is the ‘gold standard’ for corporate 
governance and de facto mandatory requirement for JSE- listed companies (as described in 
section  2.7.7.2), the provision of independent CSR assurance will continue to grow, as companies 
start to more comprehensively implement the King III provisions, as illustrated by the 19% growth 
between CSR assurance provided 2010/1 and 2011/2 (as described on page 186). 
6.3 Reasons for providing independent CSR assurance 
6.3.1 Reporting company survey 
On the assumption that independent assurance of CSR disclosures is considered important, using a 
7-point Likert-type scale, Figure 6.10 illustrates that the primary reasons advanced by respondents 
for their companies providing independent assurance on their CSR disclosures, include: 
• The majority of 35 respondents agreed {(90%) very strongly agreed (n = 10), strongly 
agreed (n = 13) and agreed (n = 12)} with the assertion that CSR assurance provides 
stakeholders with verified CSR disclosures that may be relied upon, while four respondents 
(10%) were uncertain and none disagreed. 
• The majority of 33 respondents agreed {(85%) very strongly agreed (n = 15), strongly 
agreed (n = 9) and agreed (n = 9)} with the assertion that CSR assurance demonstrates the 
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company’s commitment to improved corporate transparency, while four respondents (10%) 
were uncertain and two respondents (5%) disagreed. 
• The majority of 32 respondents (82%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 12), strongly 
agreed (n = 10) and agreed (n = 10)} with the assertion that CSR assurance demonstrates 
the company’s commitment to ‘good corporate citizenship’, while five respondents (13%) 
were uncertain and two respondents (5%) disagreed. 
• The majority of 29 respondents (74%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 9), strongly agreed 
(n = 12) and agreed (n = 8)} with the assertion that CSR assurance demonstrates the 
company’s commitment to improved stakeholder responsibility, while seven respondents 
(18%) were uncertain and three respondents (8%) disagreed. 
• The majority of 29 respondents (74%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 10), strongly 
agreed (n = 10) and agreed (n = 9)} with the assertion that CSR assurance demonstrates 
the company’s commitment to improved stakeholder accountability, while seven respondents 
(18%) were uncertain and three respondents (8%) disagreed. 
• The majority of 27 respondents (69%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 8), strongly agreed 
(n = 10) and agreed (n = 9)} with the assertion that CSR assurance is required by King III, 
while six respondents (15%) were uncertain and six respondents (15%) disagreed {disagreed 
(n = 5) and strongly disagreed (n = 1)}. 
In summary, the primary reasons advanced by respondents about why their companies provide 
CSR assurance appear to be because it provides verified CSR disclosures that may be relied upon 
by stakeholders; followed by CSR assurance demonstrating the company’s commitment to 
improved corporate transparency and to being a ‘good corporate citizen’; with compliance with 
the King III principles receiving the lowest score (despite the majority of respondents still being 
in agreement).  While it may appear that respondents believed that their companies were 
providing CSR assurance for all ‘the right reasons’, instead of being forced to do so, it is 
recognised that these results may be skewed by possible respondent bias (as described in 
section  4.3).   
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Figure 6.10 – Reasons for providing CSR assurance (n = number of responses) 
Conversely, to understand the reasons that some companies did not provide independent CSR 
assurance, Figure 6.11 reveals that 20 respondents (51%) indicated that the question did not apply 
to their respective companies.  This response appears to be inversely related to the finding that 
54% of companies published their CSR assurance reports as depicted in Figure 6.6 and the 59% of 
companies that provided external CSR assurance as depicted in Figure 6.7.   
Reasons advanced for not providing CSR assurance included nine respondents (23%) indicating 
that their companies were developing the capacity to do so in the future; six respondents (15%) 
suggesting that the process was too expensive; five respondents (13%) indicating that CSR 
assurance provides little value to stakeholders; four respondents (10%) suggesting that the 
process was too time consuming to add value; four respondents (10%) indicating that it was not 
necessary since internal audit reviewed CSR performance; three respondents (8%) indicating that it 
was not a legal requirement; three respondents (8%) stating that it was not considered important; 
two respondents (5%) suggesting that stakeholders trusted their disclosures; one respondent (3%) 
suggesting that stakeholders do not rely on their CSR disclosures for decision-making; and two 
respondents (5%) providing other reasons.  These ‘other’ reasons included low materiality or, that 
their companies were establishing performance management systems to track CSR performance 
(which is aligned to the finding that companies were developing their CSR capacity).  The most 
common reasons advanced by respondents for not providing independent CSR assurance confirm 
that companies were developing their capacity to provide independent assurance on their CSR 
disclosures in the future.  Therefore, as companies strive to develop their capacity to more fully 
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apply the King III principles and the JSE regulations, independent CSR assurance provision will 
continue to grow.   These reasons are aligned to the reasons disclosed by reporting companies in 
their annual/CSR reports for not providing independent CSR assurance (see page 187), which were 
included in the content analysis of the first phase.  These observations confirm the poor quality of 
CSR reporting and assurance (Utting, 2005), which does not add value to stakeholders 
(Al-Hamadeen, 2007).      
 
Figure 6.11 – Reasons for not providing CSR assurance (n = number of responses) 
Attempting to identify the stumbling blocks to CSR assurance provision, a question using a 7-point 
Likert-type scale provides negatively oriented assertions about CSR assurance.  As summarised in 
Figure 6.12, the responses to this negatively oriented question include: 
• The majority of 22 respondents (56%) disagreed {very strongly disagreed (n = 3), strongly 
disagreed (n = 12) and disagreed (n = 7)} with the assertion that CSR assurance adds little 
value to stakeholders, five respondents (13%) were uncertain, 12 respondents (31%) agreed 
{agreed (n = 8), strongly agreed (n = 2) and very strongly agreed (n = 2)}.   
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• The majority of 20 respondents (51%) disagreed {very strongly disagreed (n = 1), strongly 
disagreed (n = 8) and disagreed (n = 11)} with the assertion that CSR assurance reports do 
not provide stakeholders with confidence that the company’s CSR disclosures were complete, 
accurate, reliable and valid, six respondents (13%) were uncertain, 13 respondents (33%) 
agreed {agreed (n = 10), strongly agreed (n = 2) and very strongly agreed (n = 1)}. 
• The majority of 20 respondents (51%) disagreed {very strongly disagreed (n = 2), strongly 
disagreed (n = 9) and disagreed (n=9)} with the assertion that CSR assurance reports were 
unnecessary, since their companies had impeccable reputations as ‘responsible corporate 
citizens’, 13 respondents (33%) were uncertain and six respondents (15%) agreed. 
• Only 15 respondents (39%) disagreed {very strongly disagreed (n = 2), strongly disagreed 
(n = 3) and disagreed (n = 10)} with the assertion that CSR assurance was too expensive to 
provide stakeholders with meaningful benefits, while nine respondents (23%) were uncertain 
and 15 respondents agreed {agreed (n = 11), strongly agreed (n = 2) and very strongly 
agreed (n = 2)}. 
• Only 15 respondents (39%) disagreed {very strongly disagreed (n = 1), strongly disagreed 
(n = 4) and disagreed (n = 10)} with the assertion that CSR assurance was too expensive to 
provide any meaningful benefit to the company, while nine respondents (23%) were 
uncertain and 15 respondents {agreed (n = 11), strongly agreed (n = 2) and very strongly 
agreed (n = 2)}. 
The responses to this question are not as emphatic as responses to other questions in this section 
of the survey.  In summary, despite the majority of respondents acknowledging the importance of 
CSR assurance (as described earlier in section  3.2.2), they also suggested that CSR assurance was 
too expensive to provide either stakeholders or to the company with meaningful benefits.   
This paradox may be explained by instrumental theory, which holds that companies may only be 
doing the ‘right things’ in order to improve their competitive positioning, to maintain their corporate 
legitimacy, and/or to comply with imposed legal, regulatory or industry regulations (as described in 
section  2.4.2).  By contrast, a marginal majority of respondents indicated that CSR assurance 
added value to stakeholders by providing confidence that the company’s CSR disclosures were fair, 
with several respondents disagreeing with the assertion that the company’s reputations as 
‘responsible corporate citizens’ made CSR assurance unnecessary.  Although implementing the 
King III provisions has emerged as an important reason for providing CSR assurance, the most 
important reasons provided may collectively be attributed to a desire to be perceived as responsible 
corporate citizens, albeit for instrumental reasons (Hummels & Timmer, 2004; Morimoto et al., 
2005; Palazzo & Scherer, 2006).       
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Figure 6.12 – Factors impeding CSR assurance provision (n = number of responses) 
6.3.2 Assurance provider interviews 
The interviews revealed that assurors believed that it was not sufficient for companies to simply 
disclose non-financial information; it was more important for stakeholders to know that the CSR 
disclosures were independently assured so that they may place reliance thereon (Alves, 2009; Aras 
& Crowther, 2008; Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Kolk & Perego, 2010; Lyon & Maxwell, 2011; Manetti 
& Toccafondi, 2012; Martinov-Bennie & Hecimovic, 2011; Okoye, 2009; Perego, 2009; Polonsky et 
al., 2010; Sierra et al., 2013; Teoh & Shiu, 1990).  This perspective was illustrated by the following 
comment: “People are going to starting to look at sustainability reports to see if those numbers 
that have been such a bone of contention recently, have actually been independently assured.”   
In addition, companies also benefit from having their CSR disclosures independently assured by 
enhancing “their own confidence in the information”.  A participant stated that this was especially 
true with respect to “the bigger companies, where reports are produced by a head office that 
consolidates the results from multiple operations around the world”, allowing the CEO to “stand 
with his hand on his heart”, confident about the integrity of the company’s disclosures.  Another 
participant stated that external assurance helps to avoid the pitfalls of setting KPIs, objectives and 
targets based on inaccurate and incomplete numbers that “do not make any sense”.  A participant 
cautioned that the information relating to the assurance engagement should be relevant and 
reliable in order for CSR assurance to provide meaningful value as indicated by the comment that 
“if you’ve got information that is not really meaningful, then it adds zero value”.  A participant 
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commented that when assurors concentrate on material issues, reporting companies receive 
greater value for money.  This could be regarded as being the ‘bang for their buck’.   
Independent CSR assurance partially addresses the information asymmetry arising from the agency 
problem (described in section  2.4.5), as illustrated by the comment that “in the same way that 
financial information needs to be assured, boards cannot make informed decisions on information 
that has not been independently assured”.  These concerns are heightened by accountability 
concerns with “board members now saying we got to have proper numbers otherwise we are 
personally liable”.  These concerns were confirmed by an assuror participant who stated that 
“Mervyn King recently mentioned that there is a lot of pressure on having each director sign off the 
integrated report in his name.  This is the pressure by the international community.  It is not in the 
exposure draft,61 but this is what has been called for.  Now if you are dealing with that level, most 
directors like the 30 or 40 directors that run the majority of the large companies in South Africa, 
are not going sign off (disclosures) without proper assurance”.  
Compliance was identified as an important reason for providing independent CSR assurance, 
particularly since King III and the JSE regulations require independent CSR assurance (as described 
in section  2.7.7.2).  It was suggested that companies would find it increasingly difficult to continue 
using the same excuse over and over again for not fully implementing all the King III principles.  
One participant posited that several companies only provided independent CSR assurance to 
comply with the GRI and to get the ‘+’ added to their indicator (as described in section  2.7.7.3).  
This may indicate that the assurance provided was not necessarily robust, as implied by the 
statement that “there are companies that just do this with a tick-box, as well to say: we have done 
the assurance.  And that’s it”.  Other participants suggested that CSR assurance practices were 
beginning to mature and to provide meaningful benefits as reflected in the statement that “several 
companies have now moved beyond that, and are starting to see lots more value from the entire 
CSR assurance process itself”. 
Peer pressure, in terms of which companies provide independent CSR assurance because other 
companies in the industry were doing so, may also be a factor, as reflected by statements such as: 
“I have come clean and what are you doing about it?”; or “for some it is about keeping up with the 
Joneses to simply indicate that they have an assurance report”; or finally that “CSR assurance puts 
you in a favourable light”.  Collectively, the assurors’ reasons are aligned to reporting company 
survey responses that independent CSR assurance provides verified CSR disclosures that may be 
                                           
61 In this regard, the assuror participant was referring to the draft Integrated Reporting Framework described in 
section  2.7.7.6. 
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relied upon by stakeholders, and reflects the company’s commitment to improved transparency and 
to being a ‘good corporate citizen’ (as depicted in Figure 6.10). 
As indicated in sections  2.4.7 and  3.2.2, reporting companies may provide independent assurance 
on their CSR disclosures for compliance and instrumental reasons to position their companies 
favourably.  Acknowledging that the majority of companies covered by this study did not provide 
independent assurance on their CSR disclosures at the time of the study, assuror participants 
advanced the following reasons that some reporting companies resist providing independent CSR 
assurance (Adams & Evans, 2004; Al-Hamadeen, 2007; FEE, 2011; O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005; Owen 
et al., 2000; Utting, 2005). 
• CSR assurance presents a challenge for company systems that collect and report on the data, 
since “it is not just about the numbers”; it also involves interrogating the systems in place to 
report the numbers.  The systems of some companies may therefore not yet be ready for 
independent CSR assurance, as reflected in the comment that “they would rather get their 
house sorted out first.  Let internal audit have a look at all of this for a year or two.  Then 
once they are ready, expose it to external assurance”. 
• CSR assurance cannot be done until the evaluation criteria have been clearly defined, with 
appropriate mechanisms in place to monitor performance, as indicated by “you have to have 
proper criteria in place and their own guidelines”.  Interviewees confirmed the observation in 
Figure 6.11 that some companies were confident about their numbers and did not need 
anybody to else to look at them.  Conversely, other companies may be concerned that 
independent CSR assurance could reveal that their disclosures “might not be all that it stacks 
up to be” or that “the number that was being presented was completely not assurable”. 
• Similarly, while some company survey respondents may believe that CSR assurance was too 
expensive to provide meaningful benefits, assurors also suggested that companies do not 
appreciate the benefits that independent CSR assurance can provide as reflected in the 
comment that “these people don’t understand it.  I don’t hear the same comment being 
made about having your financial statements audited is too expensive and it doesn’t add 
value anyway”.  Since financial statement auditing is a statutory requirement for public 
interest companies (as defined in the Companies Act, 2008), this comment may not be 
particularly relevant.  Although AFS audits are a mandatory requirement, this observation 
nevertheless confirms the perception that auditing and assurance do not add value to either 
the company or its stakeholders.  To overcome these adverse perceptions assurors should 
educate their respective client companies and their stakeholders about the assurance process 
and the accruing benefits. 
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• Since CSR assurance relates to aspects affecting several operational areas, resistance may 
also come from operational managers, as illustrated by the comment that “we are often not 
dealing with people that are used to being audited.  So it is not like going to a financial guy, 
who is used to being audited.  Sometimes they get a bit upset I think, about how rigorous 
our processes are”. 
• Senior management may believe that CSR assurance is an unnecessary expense and “still see 
it as a nice to do.  They don’t relate it to risk and risk management.  So they say – well, I’m 
not spending money.  It’s a money thing”.  Some companies that do not provide independent 
CSR assurance, may argue that since no one has picked up that it is not being done, they do 
not need to do it, particularly since their shareholders have indicated that they don’t care 
about non-financial issues and only want financial information. 
• Although some companies recognise the importance of CSR assurance, at the same time the 
primary reason for not providing such assurance may be attributed to the relative CSR 
immaturity of many companies.  The necessary data collection and reporting systems are 
therefore unlikely to be ready to withstand the scrutiny of a robust assurance process.  This 
is compounded when reporting companies do not adequately define their evaluation and 
reporting criteria, impairing the ability to conduct a meaningful CSR assurance engagement.  
CSR assurance rates are accordingly expected to increase as company CSR processes mature 
and as companies develop their CSR reporting capacity (ICAEW, 2008; Mock et al., 2007; 
Perego, 2009). 
• Other negative factors impeding independent CSR assurance provision include concerns 
relating to uncovering green-wash; the perception that CSR assurance does not add value to 
company CSR disclosures, particularly from a cost perspective; and since CSR assurance was 
not a mandatory requirement.  As depicted in Figure 6.11, these assuror responses are 
aligned to reporting company survey respondents confirming that their respective companies 
were developing the necessary capacity to do so in the future, or that CSR assurance was too 
expensive to provide meaningful benefits to either stakeholders or to the company.   
6.3.3 Analysis and integration of results 
As indicated in Figure 6.10, the objective of independent CSR assurance is to provide stakeholders 
with confidence about the relevance, usefulness, reliability and completeness of CSR-related 
disclosures as described in section  3.2 (Al-Hamadeen,2007; CorporateRegister, 2008; Dando & 
Swift, 2003), and to mitigate against green-wash (Alves, 2009; Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Hamann 
& Kapelus, 2004; Laufer, 2003; Lyon & Maxwell, 2011; Polonsky et al., 2010).  Compliance with the 
JSE regulations and accordingly King III, or positively influencing stakeholder perceptions (Aras & 
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Crowther, 2008; Okoye, 2009; Teoh & Shiu, 1990) and improving legitimacy (Morimoto et al., 
2005; Palazzo & Scherer, 2006; Suchman, 1995) were also identified as CSR assurance drivers by 
both reporting company respondents and assuror interviewees. 
Assurance providers suggested that independent CSR assurance also improved the confidence that 
reporting companies have about their own CSR data, while informing their KPIs, objectives and 
targets.  Moreover, independent CSR assurance improves the ability of the board of directors to 
discharge their governance oversight responsibilities as described in sections  2.5.2 and  2.5.3, 
mitigating the impact of the agency problem (Black & Quach, 2009; Blair, 2005; Esser, 2008; 
Fairfax, 2005; Sarens et al., 2012).   
While some survey respondents indicated that CSR assurance was unnecessary and could not be 
financially justified, several recognised its importance revealing that they were building their 
capacity to do so in future.  Similarly, when identifying stumbling blocks that should be overcome, 
respondents confirmed that CSR assurance does not add value to the company or its stakeholders, 
primarily due to the associated high costs (De Beelde & Tuybens, 2013).  This particularly applies 
to the high costs associated with CSR assurance engagements (Mock et al., 2007), which was also 
confirmed by CSR assurors.  
6.4 Providers of independent CSR assurance 
6.4.1 CSR assurance report content analysis 
As indicated in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.13, the CSR assurance reports for the companies selected 
for this study indicate that auditor assurors remain the collective primary providers of independent 
CSR assurance across all three reporting periods covered by the study.  The Big 4 audit firms 
issued 31 assurance reports in 2011/2, representing 62% of all CSR assurance reports in the study 
(2010/1: 29 – 69% and 2007/8: 14 – 78%).  In addition, mid-tier audit firms issued two assurance 
reports – 4% (2010/1: 2 – 5% and 2007/8: nil); with an internal audit activity issuing one 
assurance report – 2% (2010/1: 1 – 3% and 2007/8: 1 – 6%).  In respect of the CSR assurance 
reports issued by the Big 4 audit firms, two were jointly assured by more than one Big 4 audit firm; 
and one CSR assurance report from a Big 4 audit firm was combined with an expert opinion.  The 
audit profession’s dominance in CSR assurance provision is confirmed by several researchers 
(Ackers, 2009; CorporateRegister, 2008; Manetti & Becatti, 2009; Marx & Van Dyk, 2011; O’Dwyer 
et al., 2011).  Other providers of independent CSR assurance included 15 assurance reports by 
specialist CSR assurance providers, representing 30% of CSR assurance reports (2010/1: 10 – 24% 
and 2007/8: 3 – 17%); and one by a certification body – 2% (2010/1: 0 and 2007/8: 0). 
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While more companies are having their CSR disclosures independently assured, and even though 
the Big 4 audit firms collectively continue to dominate CSR assurance provision, this dominance 
appears to be waning (from 78% in 2007/8 to 62% in 2011/2), as other assurance providers 
(primarily specialist CSR assurors and non-Big 4 audit firms) more actively engage in the provision 
of independent CSR assurance.  Al-Hamadeen’s (2007) observation that certification bodies were 
the primary providers of independent CSR assurance, may be attributed to a regional difference 
and the extent to which certification bodies are entrenched in the UK.  Unlike the 
CorporateRegister (2008: 40) study, which found that certification bodies provided 25% of CSR 
assurance reports, certification bodies were not found to be significant South African role players.  
It is expected that the South African CSR assurance market will consolidate to include 
predominantly auditor assurors and specialist CSR assurors.  Within this context, the CSR assurance 
growth by non-auditor assurors is expected to slowly erode the dominance of auditor assurors (as 
described on page 206). 
When juxtaposing the audit firms responsible for each company’s statutory annual audits against 
the CSR assurance providers identified for 2011/2, in 50% of cases (n = 25) the same audit firm 
provided both the independent audit report (i.r.o. AFS) and the independent CSR assurance report.  
This observation suggests that reporting companies prefer using the same audit firm for assurance 
of both the financial and non-financial components of company reporting.  This revelation appears 
to be aligned to the objective of bridging the ‘audit expectation gap’ (as described in 
section  3.3.3.5), by providing stakeholders with coordinated assurance over the complete annual 
report (Al-Hamadeen, 2007; CorporateRegister, 2008; ICAEW, 2004; Lin & Chen, 2004; Percy, 
1997).  It is accordingly suggested that using the same assuror to provide assurance over both the 
financial and non-financial disclosures improves the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of 
resource deployment of both financial audit and CSR assurance processes.  Despite the improved 
efficiency of using the same assurance provider for both AFS audits and CSR assurance 
engagements, caution should be exercised to ensure the independence and objectivity of both 
engagements and avoid conflicting situations.   As indicated in Figure 6.15, this observation is 
confirmed by 51% of survey respondents preferring to use the same auditor assurors for both their 
AFS audit and CSR assurance engagements.   
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Table 6.2 – CSR assurance report frequency by assuror type 
Type of assuror 2007/8 2010/1 2011/2 
Assurance by a Big 4 audit firm 14 26 28 
Assurance by a mid-tier audit firm - 2 2 
Joint assurance by two Big 4 audit firms - 2 2 
Assurance by an internal audit activity 1 1 1 
Joint assurance by Big 4 audit firm & CSR consultancy - 1 1 
Assurance by a specialist CSR assuror 3 10 15 
Assurance by a certification body - - 1 
Total 18 42 50 
Despite the collective dominance of auditor assurors and the entry and expansion of non-Big 4 
assurors, the types of CSR assurors appear to be consolidating to include mainly auditor and 
specialist CSR assurors.  An analysis of the individual assurors (in Table 6.3) reveals that the 
individual CSR assuror base is expanding as new assurors start providing independent CSR 
assurance.  Although the Big 4 audit firms collectively remain the dominant CSR assurors, when 
considered separately PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) emerged as the dominant Big 4 auditor 
assuror in 2011/2, namely, 18% (n = 9).  Reviewing the independent CSR assurance growth over 
the five-year period, despite the growth in CSR assurance by PwC from five in 2007/8 to nine by 
2011/2, their proportion of CSR assurance reports actually declined from 28 to 18% over the same 
period.  When the joint assurance engagement with Ernst & Young (EY) is added, PwC remained 
the assuror that issued most of the independent CSR assurance reports, having issued ten (20%) 
assurance reports.  By comparison, CSR assurance by Integrated Reporting & Assurance Services 
(IRAS), previously known as SustainabilityServices, grew exponentially from only one in 2007/8 to 
nine by 2011/2, representing an increase from 6% to 18% of CSR assurance reports issued over 
the same period.  
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Figure 6.13 – CSR assurance provision by assuror type 
Table 6.3 – CSR assurance report frequency by assuror 
Assuror’s name 2007/8 2010/1 2011/2 
PricewaterhouseCoopers – PwC (Big 4 audit firm) 5 8 9 
Integrated Reporting & Assurance Services (IRAS)  1 7 9 
KPMG (Big 4 audit firm) 3 7 8 
Deloitte & Touché – Deloitte (Big 4 audit firm) 2 6 6 
Ernst & Young – EY (Big 4 audit firm) 4 5 6 
Environmental Resources Management (CSR consultancy) - 2 3 
EY and PwC (2 Big 4 audit firms) - 1 1 
KPMG and Deloitte (2 Big 4 audit firms) - 1 1 
PKF (mid-tier audit firm) - 2 1 
Indyebo Incorporated (mid-tier audit firm) - - 1 
Internal audit activity  1 1 1 
Corporate Citizenship (CSR consultancy) 1 1 1 
Maplecroft & KPMG (CSR consultancy & Big 4 audit firm) - 1 1 
Trialogue (CSR consultancy) 1 - - 
CA-Governance (CSR consultancy) - - 1 
Bureau Veritas (certification body) - - 1 
Total 18 42 50 
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6.4.2 Reporting company survey 
Before reviewing the providers of independent CSR assurance at the companies represented by the 
survey respondents, it is appropriate to first obtain the respondents’ views on the most suitable 
parties to do so.  Similarly, it is important to understand the factors that reporting companies take 
into account when selecting an independent CSR assurance provider.    
As summarised in Figure 6.14, responses to a 7-point Likert-type scale question, seeking to 
understand the respondents’ perspectives on the entities that are most suitable for providing 
independent CSR assurance, included: 
• The majority of 33 respondents (85%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 6), strongly agreed 
(n = 6) and agreed (n = 21)} with the assertion that specialist CSR assurance consultancies 
were best suited to provide CSR assurance, four respondents (10%) were uncertain and two 
respondents (5%) disagreed. 
• The majority of 26 respondents (67%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 6), strongly agreed 
(n = 5) and agreed (n = 15)} with the assertion that internal audit was best suited to provide 
CSR assurance, seven respondents (18%) were uncertain and six respondents (15%) 
disagreed. 
• A majority of 22 respondents (56%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 3), strongly agreed 
(n = 8) and agreed (n = 11)} with the assertion that the Big 4 audit firms are the most 
suitable providers of CSR assurance, 10 respondents (26%) were uncertain and seven 
respondents (18%) disagreed {disagreed (n = 4), strongly disagreed (n=1) and very strongly 
disagreed (n = 2)}. 
• The majority of 19 respondents (49%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 2), strongly agreed 
(n = 5) and agreed (n = 12)} with the assertion that certification bodies were best suited to 
provide CSR assurance, 17 respondents (44%) were uncertain and three respondents (8%) 
disagreed {strongly disagreed (n = 2) and very strongly disagreed (n = 1)}. 
• Confirming the dominance of the Big 4 audit firms, the assurance providers identified as 
being least suitable to provide CSR assurance were non-Big 4 audit firms, with only 13 
respondents (33%) agreeing {strongly agreeing (n = 4) and agreeing (n = 9)} with the 
assertion that other audit firms were best suited to provide CSR assurance; 17 respondents 
(44%) being uncertain, and nine respondents (23%) disagreeing {disagreeing (n = 4), 
strongly disagreeing (n = 4) and very strongly disagreeing (n = 1)}. 
Despite a lack of consensus about the parties that should provide independent CSR assurance 
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(Al-Hamadeen, 2007), the majority of respondents appear to believe that specialist CSR assurance 
consultancies were the most suitable providers of independent CSR assurance.  This may be 
ascribed to their perceived specialist knowledge of some of the more complex dimensions of CSR 
and the higher levels of assurance provided and their propensity to add value to the CSR reporting 
process through the provision of recommendations for improvement (as described in section  6.15).  
This observation supports the assertion that CSR assurance reports produced by specialist CSR 
assurors provide greater value than auditor assurors (O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005).  This observation is 
however not supported by the content analysis, which found that the primary providers of CSR 
assurance at the selected companies were members of the audit profession.  As described in 
section  6.4.1, auditor assurors issued 66% of the CSR assurance reports in 2011/2, compared to 
specialist CSR assurors that only issued 30%.  This incongruence may be attributed to a 
combination of the following factors:  
• the Big 4 audit firms have been actively providing CSR assurance for around 15 years (at the 
time of the study) 
• the established financial auditing relationships between reporting companies and audit firms 
• the auditor assurors’ access to deep pools of resources 
• the perceived credibility and brands of the audit profession 
At the same time, a compounding factor may be the relatively few independent CSR assurors at 
present (especially with a credible track-record).  As the CSR assurance market matures and as 
more specialist CSR assurors start providing independent CSR assurance, it is predicted that that 
the CSR assurance growth by specialist CSR assurors depicted in Figure 6.13 will continue to grow.  
As a result, the current dominance of the Big 4 auditor assurors will slowly be eroded as evidenced 
by the significant recent growth in CSR assurance provision.  This predicted migration to specialist 
CSR assurors will better reflect the preference of reporting company respondents to use specialist 
CSR assurors.   
While respondents indicated that the Big 4 auditor assurors were only the third most suitable 
external CSR assurors (as reflected by 56% of responses), non-Big 4 audit firms were perceived to 
be the least suitable (as indicated by only 33% of responses).  Apart from Al-Hamadeen (2007), 
who found that specialist CSR assurors were the primary providers of CSR assurance, other 
researchers have observed that auditor assurors were the primary CSR assurance providers 
(Ackers, 2009; CorporateRegister, 2008; Manetti & Becatti, 2009).  While preference for the Big 4 
auditor assurors in South Africa may be due to a combination of the strength of the Big 4 audit firm 
brands and their access to a deep pool of specialist/expert resources, smaller audit firms may not 
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have the same brand recognition or access to the necessary expertise or competencies to apply the 
provisions of ISA 620 (using the work of an expert).   
Notwithstanding the predicted growth by specialist CSR assurors described above, this thesis 
argues that auditor assurors will collectively remain the primary providers of independent CSR 
assurance. 
 
Figure 6.14 – Entities suitable to provide CSR assurance (n = number of responses) 
In order to gain insights into the factors that influence a reporting company’s decision to appoint a 
CSR assuror, a 7-point Likert-type scale question required respondents to indicate their most 
important reasons for selecting a CSR assuror.  The majority of respondents agree that the 
alternative propositions advanced for this question all represent factors that collectively contribute 
to their respective companies selecting a CSR assurance provider, albeit to varying degrees.  As 
summarised in Figure 6.15, responses to this question include: 
• A majority of 35 respondents (90%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 11), strongly agreed 
(n = 12) and agreed (n = 12)} with the assertion that the assuror’s access to the necessary 
competencies was an important factor, three respondents (8%) were uncertain, while one 
respondent (3%) disagreed (AccountAbility, 2008a; Al-Hamadeen, 2007; De Beelde & 
Tuybens, 2013; GRI, 2013b; Huggins et al., 2011; Moroney et al., 2012; Perego, 2009; 
Perego & Kolk, 2012).  Without access to the necessary skills, assurors will not be in a 
position to conduct a meaningful CSR assurance engagement, and will accordingly be unable 
to produce a credible CSR assurance report.   
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• A majority of 34 respondents (87%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 1), strongly agreed 
(n = 17) and agreed (n = 16)} with the assertion that providing value-added CSR-related 
advice during the assurance engagement was an important factor, while five respondents 
(13%) were uncertain (De Beelde & Tuybens, 2013; Mock et al., 2007; Perego, 2009).  To an 
extent, these responses illustrate the developmental stage of CSR reporting (and assurance) 
prevailing in many South African companies, with reporting companies expecting assurors to 
assist them to develop their CSR reporting practices. 
• A majority of 34 respondents (87%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 3), strongly agreed 
(n = 20) and agreed (n = 11)} with the assertion that the reputation of the assuror was an 
important factor, while five respondents (13%) were uncertain (De Beelde & Tuybens, 2013; 
Owen et al., 2000).  By comparison, the previous question established that auditor assurors 
were only the third preferred provider of independent CSR assurance (behind specialist CSR 
assurors and internal auditors).  This observation confirms the results of the CSR assurance 
report content analysis (as described in section  6.4.1), which established that the Big 4 
auditor assurors collectively provided most of the CSR assurance reports in this study; this 
may primarily be ascribed to the perceived strong credibility of the Big 4 audit firms (as 
described on page 272).   
• A majority of 32 respondents (82%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 7), strongly agreed 
(n = 14) and agreed (n = 11)} with the assertion that the assuror specialises in CSR was an 
important factor, five respondents (13%) were uncertain, while two respondents (5%) 
disagreed (De Beelde & Tuybens, 2013; Moroney et al., 2012; O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005; 
Perego & Kolk, 2012; Sierra et al., 2013).  Aligned to the finding that assurors should have 
the requisite competencies to conduct an effective assurance engagement, specialist CSR 
assurors are presumed to have the requisite knowledge and skills.   
• A majority of 30 respondents (77%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 6), strongly agreed 
(n = 9) and agreed (n = 15)}, with the assertion that the assuror’s ability to complete the 
engagement within the required timeframe was an important factor, eight respondents 
(21%) were uncertain, while one respondent (3%) disagreed.  This observation is aligned to 
the ability of the company to publish their annual, integrated or CSR reports timeously. 
• A majority of 30 respondents (77%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 2), strongly agreed 
(n = 9) and agreed (n = 19)} with the assertion that the assurance standard(s) referenced 
by the assuror was an important factor, while nine respondents (23%) were uncertain 
(Al-Hamadeen, 2007; CorporateRegister, 2008; Deegan et al., 2006; ICAEW, 2008; IFAC, 
2006; Manetti & Toccafondi, 2012; O’Dwyer et al., 2011; Owen et al., 2000; Perego, 2009; 
SAICA, 2010).  This observation confirms the need to develop standardised and comparable 
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assurance practices in order to overcome the impact of the lack of consistency and 
standardisation described in section  3.2.6 (Al-Hamadeen, 2007; Deegan et al., 2006; O’Dwyer 
et al., 2011: Owen, et al., 2000). 
• A majority of 29 respondents (74%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 4), strongly agreed 
(n = 7) and agreed (n = 18)} with the assertion that the alignment of CSR assurance and 
certification services was an important factor, although seven respondents (18%) were 
uncertain, while three respondents (8%) disagreed.  This confirms the content analysis 
finding that 50% of CSR assurance reports were issued by the same audit firm that also 
provided the AFS audit report as described in section  6.4.1.  This observation may be 
attributed to improved assurance engagement efficiency by leveraging economies of scale 
and reducing the impact of duplication of assurance efforts.   
• A majority of 27 respondents (69%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 1), strongly agreed 
(n = 8) and agreed (n = 18)} with the assertion that the assuror’s ability to assist the 
company develop its own capacity was an important factor, ten respondents (26%) were 
uncertain, while two respondents (5%) disagreed.  This observation is aligned to the maturity 
phase of company CSR practices, and confirms the need for assurors to provide reporting 
companies with value-added CSR-related advice to improve their CSR practices as described 
above.  This confirms the finding that some companies do not provide CSR assurance due to 
building their capacity to do so in future as depicted in Figure 6.11.  
• A majority of 26 respondents (67%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 1), strongly agreed 
(n = 9) and agreed (n = 16)} with the assertion that the assurance engagement cost was an 
important factor, while ten respondents (26%) were uncertain, while three respondents (8%) 
disagreed (De Beelde & Tuybens, 2013).  Even though the majority of respondents indicated 
that the cost of assurance was an important factor, it did not appear to be a driving factor 
but helps to explain the rapid CSR assurance growth by IRAS that has significantly lower 
infrastructural costs, and can accordingly provide CSR assurance at a lower cost.  This 
assertion is confirmed by the assuror interviews in section  6.4.3. 
• A majority of 23 respondents (59%) agreed {strongly agreed (n = 5) and agreed (n = 18)} 
with the assertion that the level of assurance provided was an important factor, 12 
respondents (31%) were uncertain, while four respondents (10%) disagreed (Al-Hamadeen, 
2007; CorporateRegister, 2008; Manetti & Toccafondi, 2011; Martinov-Bennie & Hecimovic, 
2011; Perego & Kolk, 2012; Wiertz, 2009).  While the high proportion of ‘uncertain’ responses 
may be attributed to respondents not being fully au fait with CSR assurance, this observation 
nevertheless confirms the assertion that reasonable assurance engagements provided higher 
levels of assurance and accordingly provided users with greater confidence than limited 
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assurance engagements (as described in sections  3.2.5.4,  3.2.5.5,  6.13 and  6.16).   
• A majority of 20 respondents (51%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 2), strongly agreed 
(n = 5) and agreed (n = 13)} with the assertion that the assuror’s global reach was an 
important factor, 16 respondents (41%) were uncertain, while three respondents (8%) 
disagreed.  This observation suggests that the operations of many of the respondents’ 
companies were based entirely in South Africa, or that the impacts of their international 
operations were not considered to be significant, obviating the need for a global presence.  
• A majority of 20 respondents (51%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 3), strongly agreed 
(n = 8) and agreed (n = 9)} with the assertion that companies prefer using the same 
auditors for both their AFS audits and CSR assurance engagements was an important factor, 
13 respondents (33%) were uncertain, while six respondents (15%) disagreed {disagreed (n 
= 4), strongly disagreed (n = 1), and very strongly disagreed (n = 1)} (FEE, 2011; ICAEW, 
2004; Manetti & Becatti, 2009; Percy, 1997; Sierra et al., 2013).  This finding is aligned to the 
content analysis finding that 50% of CSR assurance reports were issued by the same audit 
firm that also provided the AFS audit report as described in section 6.4.1.  This observation 
implies that reporting companies expect auditor assurors to have diverse skills and 
competencies for the different types of assurance engagements that they provide, possibly 
undermining the ability to benefit from economies of scale and avoiding duplication of effort. 
• Only 17 respondents (44%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 1), strongly agreed (n = 4) 
and agreed (n = 12)} with the assertion that external auditors were experts at all types of 
audits was an important factor, eight respondents (21%) were uncertain, while 14 
respondents disagreed {disagreed (n=13), and very strongly disagreed (n=1)}.  Despite the 
collective dominance of auditor assurors in the provision of CSR assurance (as described in 
section  6.4.1), this observation confirms the finding that non-Big 4 auditor assurors are not 
necessarily perceived to have the necessary knowledge and skills to provide credible CSR 
assurance.      
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Figure 6.15 – Reasons for selecting a CSR assuror (n = number of responses) 
To identify the primary providers of CSR assurance, survey respondents were asked to indicate the 
types of organisation that provided CSR assurance services at their respective companies.  As 
illustrated in Figure 6.16, the most common CSR assurance providers were external auditors with 
21 responses (54%); internal auditors with 14 responses (36%); specialist CSR assurors with seven 
responses (18%); certification bodies with four responses (10%); and one respondent (3%) 
suggested ‘other’ assurance providers.  Thirteen (33%) respondents indicated that the question did 
not apply to their respective companies.  In summary, the responses to this question which were 
not mutually exclusive (resulting in the cumulative responses exceeding 100%), confirmed that 
CSR assurance was provided by a variety of assurors.  The responses to this question confirm the 
findings of CorporateRegister (2008), Manetti and Becatti (2009) and Ackers (2009) that auditor 
assurors were the primary providers of CSR assurance, as observed by the content analysis (as 
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depicted in Tables 6.2 and 6.3, and by Figure 6.13 in section  6.4.1).  It however, contradicts the 
responses to a question on the preferred CSR assurors (as depicted in Figure 6.14), which found 
that specialist CSR assurors and internal auditors were preferred over auditor assurors.  Suggested 
reasons for these divergent views are explored in section  6.4.4. 
While the responses appear to indicate significant involvement by internal audit (as described in 
sections  3.3.2 and  6.5), as the second most preferred provider of CSR, this assurance is usually 
directed at internal company stakeholders.  It is not usually meant for broad public distribution in 
company publications like the annual, integrated or CSR reports (Al-Hamadeen, 2007; O’Dwyer 
et al., 2011) and is usually intended for use by internal stakeholders and to improve performance 
and assist in the internal governance process (IIA, 2010b).  This thesis nevertheless acknowledges 
that the internal audit profession plays an important CSR role as described in section  3.3.2.  
Moreover, this assurance is usually provided in addition to CSR assurance by external assurors, or 
as an interim measure while companies develop their CSR reporting practices and prepare for the 
provision of external CSR assurance, or as an integral part of combined assurance (Coetzee & 
Lubbe, 2011).  Even though internal audit usually provides independent CSR assurance to internal 
company stakeholders, its primary CSR role is to “help an organisation accomplish its objectives by 
bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk 
management, control, and governance processes”, as encapsulated in the official definition of 
internal auditing (IIA, 2010b: 5).  It is therefore suggested that internal audit has a more 
prominent role to play during the early stages, as implied by the comments included in company 
annual reports (referred to in section  6.5).   
While the responses indicate that four certification bodies (10%) provided assurance on CSR 
disclosures, this is not validated by the results of the content analysis (as described in 
section  6.4.1), which only identified one CSR assurance report issued by a certification body (2%).  
A possible reason for this discrepancy is that the survey respondents may have been referring to 
assurance provided to internal stakeholders, on selected aspects of CSR.  These CSR assurance 
services may, for example, relate to the implementation of quality, environmental, CSR and 
occupational health and safety management standards (as described in sections  2.7.7.5 
and  3.2.3.5) (Black & Quach, 2009; O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005).  As with internal audit reports, and 
despite its ‘public purpose’ as reflected in company promotional and marketing campaigns, the 
assurance reports of certification bodies may only be intended for internal use and not for public 
consumption.  This particularly applies when the certification body is only providing assurance on 
limited aspects of the relevant certification standards (e.g. ISO and/or FSC), and not on the entire 
CSR report.        
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Figure 6.16 – CSR assurance providers (n = number of responses) 
6.4.3 Assurance provider interviews 
The contemporary academic discourse and the first two empirical phases of this thesis clearly 
identify several different types of entity that provide independent assurance on company CSR 
disclosures (Ackers, 2009; Al-Hamadeen, 2007; CorporateRegister, 2008; Manetti & Becatti, 2009; 
Marx & Van Dyk, 2011; O’Dwyer et al., 2011).  To understand the factors that companies take into 
account when selecting a specific assurance provider, assuror participants were prompted to 
provide their perspective on why their own organisations were chosen as assurors by their 
respective clients.  Despite acknowledging the methodological bias caused by the majority of 
interviewed assurors representing the Big 4 audit firms, since this phase aims to understand the 
reasons for the emerging CSR assurance practices, these interviewees appropriately provide the 
proportionate opinions of the primary providers of independent CSR assurance.  
The reasons advanced by CSR assurors that reporting companies consider when selecting a CSR 
assurance provider were identified as being the engagement cost; the assuror’s track record, 
experience, expertise and reputation; the assurance engagement methodology; the depth of the 
assuror’s resource pool; their assuror’s global presence; the strength of the assuror’s brand; the 
economies of scale when the assuror also performs the financial audit; and the value that the 
assuror could provide, especially in terms of improving company governance processes.  These 
reasons are more fully illustrated in the following statements by participant assurors: 
• Criticising the ability of smaller assurors to undertake a meaningful CSR assurance 
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engagement, one participant stated that: “One man and his fax machine can come in a lot 
cheaper than we can.  Because we have to go with the full audit experience, we now do 
everything that the financial guys do, which obviously increases costs”.  
• The relative experience of the more established CSR assurance providers is illustrated by: 
“We have been doing this since 1998 and have a good track record of working with big 
companies”. 
• Confirming the importance of controlling costs while providing an effective CSR assurance 
service and leveraging specific skills, an assuror participant commented that: “You need to 
use the cheapest resource for the engagement, which in our case is South Africa.  For 
example, the Australian fees are phenomenally expensive and our clients have requested us 
not use them anymore.  So we now send an entirely South African team to Australia.  Due to 
language difficulties, in Chile and Brazil we use local people with language skills with whom 
we work very well.  In Canada they do not have enough of certain resources, so we will 
combine a Canadian CA62 with our scientists.  You can mix and match the team, because 
even in South Africa, we are very conscious of having a mixed team of CAs and scientists”. 
• The objective of trying to standardise global CSR assurance practices is illustrated by the 
statement that: “we are working towards one global methodology, so it does not matter 
where we are, we are able to serve our multi-national clients using our colleagues in 
Australia, Peru or even South Africa to visit various sites”.   
• Reflecting on capacity development, one participant stated that: “we don’t just see it as only 
making money.  Thought leadership that we put into this, is our way of giving back”. 
• Globally, reporting companies may choose CSR assurors because of the strong brand 
recognition of the firm or the individuals associated with particular assurors.  Companies with 
an international footprint prefer using the internationally recognised brands, as illustrated by 
the comment that: “we are where they are.  Our footprint matches their footprint”.  
Supporting the notion that reporting companies prefer using parties with whom they already have 
a relationship, a participant confirmed that their financial auditing clients prefer using the same 
audit firm for their CSR assurance engagement, because their financial auditors were already 
familiar with their businesses as observed in section  6.4.2.  This established relationship, possibly 
nurtured over several years, may improve the cost-effectiveness of both the AFS audit and the CSR 
assurance engagement by leveraging off the shorter learning curves and resultant economies of 
scale.  The tendency to use the same audit firm for both the financial audit and CSR assurance 
                                           
62 Chartered Accountant.  
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services, presents an opportunity “to offer quite a holistic view on the full annual report that goes 
out”.  These assertions are validated by the content analysis finding that 50% of reporting 
companies studied used the same audit firms for both their AFS audits and CSR assurance 
engagements (as described in section  6.4.1).  
Implying possible green-wash, one participant suggested that the appointment of an assuror 
depended on the CSR indicators selected.  While some companies may select indicators that are 
easy to assure and simply require ticking all the boxes, other more responsible reporting 
companies select indicators that they believe represented critical information relating to their 
respective organisations.  Supporting shareholder primacy, assurors may be selected on the basis 
of how serious the reporting company was about disclosing its key sustainability or non-financial 
information.  The inherent weakness of the interview research sample implies that each assurance 
provider category would typically promote their own organisation(s) or category of assurors in a 
biased manner.  More reliable reasons are provided by reporting company survey respondents (as 
reflected in Figure 6.15). 
To counter the widely held perception that assurance engagements by Big 4 audit firms were more 
expensive than non-Big 4 assurors, a participant suggested that the Big 4 audit firms typically 
attempt to provide their full range of products in order to maximise revenue generation.  
Pressurising reporting companies to make use of the ‘full range of services’, even if they are not yet 
ready to receive that level of services which may result in them not receiving the value expected.   
6.4.4 Analysis and integration of results 
Confirming the findings of other researchers, the survey found that auditor assurors were the 
primary providers of independent CSR assurance (Ackers, 2009; CorporateRegister, 2008; Manetti 
& Becatti, 2009; Marx & Van Dyk, 2011; O’Dwyer et al., 2011).  All audit firms have an immediate 
customer to whom they can provide CSR assurance services.  Audit firms all have existing clients 
with whom they already have an established relationship and to whom they can provide CSR 
assurance services by motivating the need for integrated reporting and assurance practices.  The 
underlying rationale being that reporting companies would find it easier to use assurors with whom 
they were already familiar.  The auditor assuror’s ability to provide CSR assurance therefore 
presents a huge opportunity for the audit profession to capitalise upon.  This is an especially 
pertinent observation given an anticipated decline in AFS audit engagements resulting from the 
uncertainty about the effect of the Companies Act, 2008, on the demand for AFS audits, and the 
resultant impact on audit firms.  
Despite the dominance of auditor assurors established by the content analysis, survey respondents 
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however, expressed a preference for specialist CSR assurors even though the majority conceded 
that auditor assurors actually provided CSR assurance at their respective companies.  It is posited 
that this incongruence may be ascribed to the relative newness of CSR assurance, only few 
specialist CSR assurors with credible track records, and the entrenched position and strong brand 
association with the audit profession (the Big 4 in particular).  It is submitted that the declared 
preference for specialist CSR assurors is due to their perceived specialised knowledge and skills, 
lower assurance engagement costs, and their tendency to provide reporting companies with much 
needed assistance by providing recommendations for improvement as well as higher assurance 
levels.  As new specialist CSR assurors begin providing independent CSR assurance and existing 
specialist CSR assurors increase their traction, the extent of the audit profession’s collective 
dominance will continue to be eroded. 
The primary reasons advanced by respondents that reporting companies use when selecting a CSR 
assuror include the assuror having the ability to access the requisite skills; the extent to which the 
assuror is able to assist the company to improve its own CSR reporting practices; the reputation of 
the assuror that could be leveraged to improve the credibility of their CSR disclosures; and the fact 
that the assuror specialises in CSR-related matters (Al-Hamadeen, 2007; De Beelde & Tuybens, 
2013).  Despite the important need for assurors to have the requisite competencies, the content 
analysis observations suggest that reporting companies and auditor assurors presume that CSR 
report users perceive auditor assurors and particularly, the Big 4 audit firms, as having the required 
competencies and credibility to undertake CSR assurance engagements thereby enhancing the 
credibility of their CSR disclosures (Perego, 2009).  They may therefore not see any need to 
specify, identify and confirm these competencies.   
By comparison, despite some specialist CSR assurors being perceived as CSR assurance ‘experts’, 
the relative anonymity of their organisational or personal brands may explain the reasons that non-
auditor assurors tend to describe their organisational and practitioner competencies and expertise 
more comprehensively than auditor assurors.  The respondents’ perception that the CSR assuror 
should assist the reporting company to improve its CSR practices, confirms the expectation that 
CSR assurors should add value to the reporting company by identifying and reporting on areas 
requiring improvement as described in section  3.2.3 (Gonella, Pilling & Zadek, 1998; Jones et al., 
2014; Perego, 2209; Perego & Kolk, 2012; O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005).  As described in section  6.15, 
this ‘value-added’ component is usually contained in the CSR assurance report recommendations 
and/or the confidentially issued ‘management report’.  This strong need for ‘assistance’ implies that 
reporting companies acknowledge that their CSR practices and, accordingly, their CSR disclosures 
are still undeveloped (as described in section  2.7.6).  
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The prevailing practice of auditor assurors confidentially providing management with reports 
containing their detailed observations and recommendations for improvement (as described in 
section  6.15) illustrates the information asymmetry caused by the agency problem (Blair, 2005; 
Maury, 2000).  The agency problem increases the risk that survey respondents may have provided 
biased perspectives of their respective reporting companies.  This observation further highlights a 
significant inadequacy in the existing CSR assurance reporting practices, since ‘uninvolved’ users 
would not be aware of, or privy to, the contents of the detailed reports provided to management, 
thereby undermining the objective of independent CSR assurance.  Even though companies may 
consider several different factors when choosing a CSR assurance provider, this decision may 
simply be motivated by the reporting company’s underlying reason for providing CSR assurance. 
Some audit firms are responsible for both the AFS audit and CSR assurance engagement at the 
same reporting companies, as evidenced by 50% of CSR assurance reports being issued by the 
same audit firm that provided the AFS audit report.  This is aligned to 51% of survey respondents 
confirming that they preferred using the same audit firm for both AFS audit and CSR assurance 
engagements.  Similarly, an interviewed assuror confirmed that their financial auditing clients 
preferred using them for their CSR assurance engagement, because their financial auditors were 
already familiar with the company and its operations. 
Some reporting companies may for example, select an auditor assuror instead of a non-auditor 
assuror as a result of a combination of the associated public relations benefit, the perception that 
the assuror could help to improve the quality of CSR practices, the strong brand association with 
the audit profession (the Big 4 audit firms in particular), as well as the company’s established 
relationships with members of the auditing profession (as described in sections  6.3 6.4).  This 
proposition may be illustrated by a significant comment in the Capitec Bank Integrated Report for 
2012 (p. 79): “the prestigious international firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc., acts as external 
auditors”.  Similarly, the decision by Merafe Resources to change its assurors from IRAS (in 2011) 
to KPMG (in 2012) may illustrate the preference for ‘prestigious’ Big 4 audit firm assurors.  These 
positive perceptions about auditor assurors are further enhanced by the perceived rigorous 
assurance methodology developed by the global audit profession over many centuries and 
entrenched through highly regulated and structured educational and vocational training 
programmes (Wiertz, 2009: 7).  The perception that the highly regulated auditor assurors provide 
better quality assurance than non-auditor assurors is enhanced by the prescribed requirement for 
auditor assurors to participate in continuing professional development/education (CPD/CPE), which 
is not a mandatory requirement for the largely unregulated non-auditor assurors.  Conversely, the 
decision by Royal Bafokeng Platinum to change its assurors from PwC (in 2011) to IRAS (in 2012) 
or by Consolidated Infrastructure Group’s decision to change assurors from PKF (in 2011) to IRAS 
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(in 2012), may have been influenced by a combination of the specialised CSR skills of the assuror, 
the engagement cost and/or perceived value added to the company.  It is, however, acknowledged 
that as circumstances change over time, that the factors used by companies to select an assurance 
provider may similarly change. 
As the CSR assurance process unfolds and non-Big 4 assurors develop their capacity and establish 
their credibility, it is predicted that there will be a closer alignment between the actual providers of 
CSR assurance providers, the preference for CSR assurance to be provided by specialist CSR 
assurors, and the disclosed reasons for selecting a CSR assurance provider.  Nevertheless, this 
thesis argues that auditor assurors will collectively remain the primary providers of independent 
CSR assurance. 
6.5 Internal audit 
6.5.1 CSR assurance report content analysis 
As indicated in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 and by Figure 6.13, the internal audit activity produced one CSR 
assurance report in each of 2011/2, 2010/1 and 2007/8, but not necessarily for the same company.  
While the number of CSR assurance reports issued by the internal audit activity remained constant 
across all three periods reviewed, the proportion of CSR assurance reports by the internal audit 
activity, has declined from 5% in 2007/8 to 2% in both 2010/1 and 2011/2 as a percentage of all 
CSR assurance provided.  Despite this trend, there is no evidence to suggest that the actual 
involvement of internal audit in CSR assurance has diminished.  On the contrary, it may be argued 
that internal audit’s involvement in CSR assurance may actually have increased as a result of 
adopting a risk-based auditing approach as required by the IIA Standards and King III (as 
described in section  3.3.2).  This internal audit role may however, be for the benefit of internal 
stakeholders and has thus not necessarily been disclosed.   
In their 2007 sustainability report (p. 78) (prior to the period covered by this study), Massmart’s 
Internal Audit Services issued a conventional CSR assurance report, similar to that issued by 
external assurors, informing readers that the assurance engagement was conducted according to 
AA1000AS (as described in section  3.2.6.2).  Adapting this approach in their 2008 sustainability 
report, Massmart included an Internal Audit Verification Statement, signed by the Massmart 
Internal Audit Services, confirming that they were:  
“satisfied to report that the data presented in the scorecards fairly represents the position of 
Massmart’s sustainability performance for the year ending 30 June 2008” (p. 45). 
At that stage Massmart justified their decision to use internal audit and not an external assurance 
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provider, with the comment that:  
“we remain of the firm opinion, given their intimate knowledge of the group and our 
information systems, that Massmart Internal Audit Services is better placed than any external 
organisation to verify the statistical scorecard information contained in this report” (p. 37).   
By 2012 however, the CSR assurance role of Massmart’s internal audit activity was relegated to the 
following note in the annual report: “The King III Report requires that the company’s sustainability 
report be audited by an independent external professional”.  Even though Massmart’s sustainability 
report had not been audited, they confirmed that the key sustainability metrics had been verified 
by their internal audit activity by performing certain agreed procedures (p. 145).   
Although FirstRand did not provide assurance on its 2007/8 CSR disclosures, it subsequently 
followed the approach initially adopted, but subsequently abandoned by Massmart (as described 
above).  FirstRand’s internal audit activity provided an Independent assurance report on selected 
non-financial information in its 2012 annual report (p. 110).  Unlike Massmart, FirstRand did not 
disclose the assurance standard used, instead indicating that the assurance engagement 
considered the GRI G3 sustainability reporting criteria (as described in section  2.7.7.3), the JSE SRI 
index (as described in section  2.7.4), BEE transformation requirements  (as described in 
sections  2.7.5.2,  5.4 and  6.2.2) and King III (as described in section  2.7.7.2 0). 
The scope of the CSR assurance engagement included identifying material qualitative and 
quantitative report components, and verifying the accuracy and validity of selected material 
statements against supporting evidence.  Although ISAE 3000 (as described in section  3.2.6.3) 
distinguishes between ‘reasonable’ and ‘limited’ assurance engagements, it was not referenced in 
the actual CSR assurance report.  The CAE issued a ‘negatively-framed limited assurance opinion’ 
worded “nothing has come to our attention that causes us to believe that the identified 
sustainability information selected for our review has not been prepared, in all material respects, in 
accordance with the defined reporting criteria”.  The disclosure that various CSR components were 
assured by a range of different parties seems to indicate that FirstRand’s internal audit activity 
played a key role in coordinating combined assurance, as envisaged by Coetzee and Lubbe (2011). 
Although CSR-related issues are often included in the scope of internal audit activities, the 
engagement objective is not generally to provide assurance to external stakeholders, but is 
intended to provide assurance to internal users, with the dissemination of the resultant reports 
being similarly confined to internal users only.  This is aligned to internal audit’s objective of 
providing management and the board with independent assurance that material risks have been 
identified and are being effectively mitigated, as required by the IPPF (IIA, 2013).  While the 
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detailed scrutiny of every word in the annual and CSR reports falls outside the scope of this 
research, examples of companies that reported that their internal audit activities were involved in 
CSR-related issues include ABSA, Clicks, Distell, Investec, Reunert, Santam and Sappi.  The scope 
of the internal audit activity’s CSR-related involvement often included reviewing, testing and 
validating non-financial data, systems and procedures, but usually without publishing their CSR 
assurance report to external stakeholders.   
The extent of the internal audit activity’s involvement in CSR-related matters appears to be driven 
by the relative CSR maturity of the company, as illustrated by comments such as “this has proved 
to be valuable in entrenching sustainability throughout the organisation”.  The discourse about the 
appropriateness of internal auditors providing independent CSR assurance is probably encapsulated 
in the 2012 Massmart comment that King III requires the company’s CSR report be audited by an 
independent external professional, confirming Al-Hamadeen’s (2007) assertion that CSR assurance 
engagements should be undertaken by external assurance providers.   
6.5.2 Reporting company survey 
As described in section  4.3, although eight questions were asked in this section, the responses to 
each were included in a single graph as depicted in Figure 6.17.  This section seeks to gain insights 
into the perspective of respondents at reporting companies about the CSR assurance role of 
internal audit.  Unlike the previous sections of this survey, which required all respondents to 
respond to each question, the questions in this section were optional and were only intended to be 
answered by CAEs or internal audit managers.   
Despite receiving a total of 39 responses to the survey, only between eight and ten respondents 
(between 21% and 26% of the total responses received) respectively, answered the various 
questions in this section.  It should however, be noted that the demographic profile (as described 
in section  4.3) established that only eight internal auditors (21%) responded to the survey.  
Although this section of the survey questionnaire was intended for internal audit practitioners only, 
it is clear that non-internal auditors responded as well.  A detailed analysis of the responses 
received reveals that the non-internal auditor respondents included company secretaries, CSI 
specialists, CFOs, executive CSR managers, and/or members of the CSR committee.  Therefore, 
despite not being internal auditors, these respondents are presumed to be sufficiently 
knowledgeable about internal audit’s role at their respective companies, to prevent their respective 
answers being excluded.  At the same time, two respondents who indicated that they were internal 
auditors did not respond to these questions.   
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Figure 6.17 – Internal audit’s role in CSR matters (n = number of responses) 
As depicted in Figure 6.17, a question to determine internal audit’s CSR governance role received 
ten responses (26% of total responses and 5% of the population sample).  Eight respondents 
(80% – all of whom where internal auditors) indicated that internal audit played an active CSR 
governance role, while two respondents (20% – both being non-internal auditors) indicated that it 
did not.  Providing deeper insights into the responses to this question, additional responses relating 
to this role provided in the open-ended section highlighted the following:  
• confined to advisory services 
• participating in training for familiarisation with CSR-related issues  
• have dedicated resources to handle CSR 
• limited CSR components 
• compliance with CSR processes, policies and procedures  
• regulatory compliance 
• included in the scope of the risk-based audit plan 
• ethical issues will be subjected to future audits 
The responses to a question to determine whether internal audit had completed a recent CSR 
assurance engagement is summarised in Figure 6.17.  A total of nine responses (23% of total 
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responses) were received to this question.  Six respondents (67% – five of whom were internal 
auditors) confirmed that they had recently completed a CSR audit, while three respondents (33% – 
one being an internal auditor) indicated that they had not.  While one respondent indicated that 
they had already been auditing CSR for five years, additional comments by respondents in the 
open-ended section of the question identified the following CSR roles for internal audit: 
• determining the CSR risk to the business 
• assessing the impact of non-adherence to policies and procedures  
• conducting internal audit reviews on the processes for collecting non-financial data used for 
reporting to regulatory and governance bodies 
• continuous auditing of CSR processes to assess the adequacy of the control environment and 
verify the accuracy and validity of data disclosed in the governance and sustainability report 
While the nature of internal audit’s CSR assurance role does not clearly emerge from the content 
analysis (as described in section  6.5), the responses to this question confirmed internal audit’s 
involvement in CSR-related assurance engagements.  Internal audit’s role may therefore be as part 
of the conventional risk-based audit cycle and/or at the year end to verify the CSR disclosures. 
A total of nine respondents (23% of total responses) indicated that internal audit had provided CSR 
consulting services, revealing that four respondents (44% – all of whom were internal auditors) 
confirmed that internal audit provided CSR-related consulting services, while five respondents 
(56% – two of whom were internal auditors) did not.  Responses to the open-ended question 
identified the scope of internal audit’s consulting role (as described in section  3.3.2) (IIA, 2010b), 
as assisting in the development of the environmental social and governance framework; facilitating 
the assessment of materiality; and providing limited advisory services.  These responses confirm 
the assertion that internal audit assists reporting companies to develop their capacity to 
meaningfully disclose CSR performance.  
A question to determine whether internal audit had assisted certification bodies on assurance 
engagements related to certification schemes yielded a total of eight responses (21% of total 
responses).  Two respondents (25% – one of whom was an internal auditor and one who was not), 
indicated that internal audit had assisted certification bodies to provide assurance on certification 
schemes, while six respondents (75% – four of whom were internal auditors and two were not) did 
not.  Respondent comments in the open-ended section of the question identified internal audit’s 
role in certification body engagements as relating to the ISO and OHSAS standards, some of which 
have CSR implications (as described in section  2.7.7.5).  
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A question to establish whether internal audit had assisted external assurance providers in their 
CSR assurance engagements received a total of eight responses (21% of total responses).  Three 
respondents (38% – all representing internal auditors) confirmed that their internal audit activity 
had assisted external assurors in their CSR assurance engagements, and five respondents (62% – 
two of whom were internal auditors and three who were not) did not.  It cannot be concluded from 
this low response rate that internal audit does not provide CSR assurance, but merely that internal 
and external CSR assurance providers appear to operate independently, disregarding the 
advantages that may arise from the deployment of the combined assurance model identified in 
King III (refer to section  2.7.7.2).  This may result in the duplication of aspects of the respective 
CSR assurance engagements by internal and external assurors.  Alternatively, the respondents may 
simply be indicating that their respective companies did not provide external assurance on their 
CSR disclosures.  It should however, be noted that combined assurance does not necessarily 
involve internal and external auditors assisting each other on audits, even though they may rely on 
each other’s work.  The objective of combined assurance is to ensure that overall exposure to 
material risk has been covered by the ‘three lines of defence’ (as described in section  2.7.7.2). 
Nine respondents (23% of total responses) answered the question attempting to establish whether 
their internal audit activity complied with the IIA Standard 2130 on governance, requiring the 
internal audit activity to consider governance issues that will impact the achievement of 
organisational objectives.  Although the number of the IIA standard on governance changed to 
2110 after the survey questionnaire had been designed and distributed, this amendment was not 
expected to significantly influence the survey responses.  Eight respondents (89% – all of whom 
were internal auditors) confirmed their compliance and one respondent indicated non-compliance 
(11% – a non-internal auditor).  While all internal auditor respondents confirmed compliance, even 
though compliance with the IIA Standards is mandatory for all practising internal auditors, the 
2010 CBOK study revealed that the extent of compliance differed across different regions around 
the world (IIA, 2011).    
The question relating to internal audit’s ability to be more actively involved in CSR governance, 
received a total of nine responses (23% of total responses).  Seven respondents (78% – all of 
whom were internal auditors) confirmed that they could be more actively involved in CSR 
governance, one respondent (11% – a non-internal auditor) was uncertain and another (11% – a 
non-internal auditor) indicated that internal audit could not.  This result confirms that internal 
auditors realise the importance of ensuring that CSR-related issues were incorporated into the 
scope of their activities.  Analysing the respondent comments in the open-ended section of the 
question clearly reveal that internal audit’s position within the company and its intimate knowledge 
of the business could assist companies to develop their CSR capacity and competence, especially as 
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company CSR processes mature.  It was however, acknowledged that internal audit’s ability to 
assist companies develop their CSR governance and reporting practices would be enhanced by 
devoting resources to developing the competencies of individual internal auditors and through the 
establishment of a specific CSR-related qualification. 
The final survey question, seeking to establish whether internal audit had the existing capacity to 
play a more proactive CSR governance role, received a total of nine responses (23% of total 
responses).  Six respondents (67% – all of whom were internal auditors) confirmed their capacity 
to increase internal audit’s CSR governance role, while no respondents indicated that they did not 
have the capacity to do so and three respondents (33% – none of whom were internal auditors) 
were uncertain.  It is expected that, as company CSR practices mature, internal audit will play a 
more active CSR role, by providing assurance to internal company stakeholders and/or advisory 
services in order to develop the capacity of companies to report more comprehensively on their 
CSR performance.  This is aligned to the internal audit activity’s consulting role, as reflected in the 
IIA’s definition of internal auditing, which emphasises the need to add value and improve the 
organisation’s operations and help it accomplish its objectives (IIA, 2013: 2).   
In addition, to clarify responses to the survey questions, respondents were requested to provide 
additional comments on sections that were not adequately covered by the survey questionnaire.  
Pertinent responses to this open-ended question reflect the diversity of CSR-related issues and 
confirm that aspects of CSR were already mandatory and, accordingly, already subject to some 
type of assurance requirement. 
6.5.3 Assuror interviews  
Although the role of internal audit was not explored in depth in this phase, the only responses 
relating to internal auditing’s CSR assurance role were as a component of the broader corporate 
governance mechanisms implemented by the company.  This is illustrated by the comment that 
“investors want to know whether internal audit is looking at the non-financial information as well”.  
Confirming Al-Hamadeen’s (2007) perspective (as described in section  3.3.2), participants 
overwhelmingly agreed that internal audit did not qualify to provide CSR assurance to external 
stakeholders.  They suggested that even though internal audit was ‘independent’, it was not 
external, and that although King III refers to ‘independent’ CSR assurance, what it actually meant 
was externally provided assurance. 
6.5.4 Analysis and integration of results 
While King III-recommended practice 3.4.4 requires the board to “engage an external assurance 
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provider on material sustainability issues”, the present wording of principle 9.3 simply requires CSR 
reporting and disclosure to be independently assured.  As described in section  3.3.2, although it 
may be argued that internal audit is ‘independent’ and accordingly qualifies to provide ‘independent 
CSR assurance’, the objectives of internal audit effort are usually directed at internal stakeholders.  
By comparison, within a CSR context, the objectives of external assurance are usually intended for 
external stakeholders.  This confirms Al-Hamadeen’s (2007) assertion because, since internal audits 
are not performed by external parties, it is not a sufficiently independent assurance provider from 
an external stakeholder perspective.   
Although internal audit may comply with the King III requirement for independent CSR assurance, 
this thesis argues that a CSR assurance engagement undertaken by internal audit is simply an 
extension of conventional risk-based internal auditing.  Since both King III and the IIA Standards 
require risk-based auditing, it may be assumed that internal audit’s involvement in CSR may 
actually be increasing as companies begin moving away from simple controls-based or compliance 
auditing.  In this regard, it should be reiterated that internal auditors are responsible to assist the 
company achieve its objectives (including those related to CSR), while simultaneously providing 
independent and objective assurance to internal stakeholders charged with corporate governance. 
The content analysis (described in section  6.5) disclosed that the internal audit activity of several 
companies had audited or reviewed CSR-related performance in their published annual, integrated 
and/or CSR reports, albeit to a limited extent or without publishing a CSR assurance report.  This is 
aligned to the assuror interviews that found that independent CSR assurance should provide by a 
party external to the company.  Similarly, the survey responses reflected a lack of clarity on 
whether internal audit’s CSR activities complement or substitute externally provided CSR assurance.   
While internal audit’s CSR role has not yet been clearly defined, this role continues to rapidly 
evolve.  It is suggested that internal auditing may provide a more cost-effective and value-adding 
alternative to external CSR assurance, especially during the developmental phase as companies 
build their capacity to provide external CSR assurance.  This transitional role is aligned to the 
objective of internal auditing, which is to assist organisations accomplish their objectives by adding 
value and improving operations through a systematic, disciplined approach to evaluating and 
improving the effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance processes (IIA, 2013).  
As part of the global audit profession, the internal audit activity is identified as having a clear CSR 
assurance role (as indicated in section  3.3.2) (IIA, 2010a & 2010b; KPMG 2008; Sawyer et al., 
2003).  Even though one instance was found where the internal audit activity issued an 
independent CSR assurance report (as described in section  6.5), the conceptual CSR role of internal 
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audit is primarily intended to benefit internal company stakeholders.  The provision of independent 
CSR assurance to a reporting company’s broader stakeholders is therefore not internal audit’s 
primary CSR role.   
6.6 Most important components of CSR assurance reports 
Reporting company respondents were asked to identify the components of CSR assurance reports 
that reporting companies consider most important.  As summarised in Figure 6.18, responses to 
this question include the following: 
• A majority of 37 respondents (95%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 4), strongly agreed 
(n = 12) and agreed (n = 21)} with the assertion that the depth of work undertaken is an 
important component of a CSR assurance report, while two respondents (5%) were 
uncertain. 
• A majority of 36 respondents (92%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 6), strongly agreed 
(n = 13) and agreed (n = 17)} with the assertion that disclosure of the assurance 
engagement activities undertaken is an important component of a CSR assurance report, 
while three respondents (8%) were uncertain. 
• A majority of 35 respondents (90%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 6), strongly agreed 
(n = 16) and agreed (n = 13)} with the assertion that assurance report clarity is an 
important component of a CSR assurance report, while two respondents (5%) were uncertain 
and two respondents (5%) disagreed. 
• A majority of 35 respondents (90%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 6), strongly agreed 
(n = 15) and agreed (n = 14)} with the assertion that the assurance provider’s reliability 
(reputation) is an important component of a CSR assurance report, two respondents (5%) 
were uncertain, while two respondents (5%) disagreed.  This observation is strongly 
correlated to the responses to the question depicted in Figure 6.15, which found that the 
assuror’s reputation was an important variable. 
• A majority of 35 respondents (90%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 8), strongly agreed 
(n = 11) and agreed (n = 16)} with the assertion that the audit opinion provided (i.e. 
qualified, unqualified or disclaimed) is an important component of a CSR assurance report, 
while three respondents (8%) were uncertain and one respondent (3%) disagreed. 
• A majority of 33 respondents (85%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 8), strongly agreed 
(n = 9) and agreed (n = 16)} with the assertion that the assurance standard (framework) 
utilised is an important component of a CSR assurance report, while five respondents (13%) 
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were uncertain while one respondent (3%) disagreed.  This observation is aligned to the 
responses to the question depicted in Figure 6.15, which found that the assurance standard 
referenced was an important factor when selecting an assuror.  
• A majority of 31 respondents (80%) agreed {very strongly agreed (n = 2), strongly agreed 
(n = 8) and agreed (n = 21)} with the assertion that the disclosure of any limitations on 
assurance scope is an important element of a CSR assurance report, while seven respondents 
(18%) were uncertain, and one respondent (3%) disagreed. 
Respondents perceived all the variables provided in the question as being important components of 
a CSR assurance report, albeit to a varying extent.  Specific variables considered to be important 
relate to assurance report clarity; the extent of work undertaken; the transparency of assurance 
activities; and predictably, the CSR assurance opinion provided (Adams & Evans, 2004; 
Al-Hamadeen, 2007; Eccles, 2010; Kolk & Perego, 2010; Manetti & Becatti, 2009; Marx & Van Dyk, 
2011; Morimoto et al., 2005; Nitkin & Brooks, 1998; Perego, 2009; O’Dwyer & Owen, 2005; Owen 
et al., 2000; Owen & O’Dwyer, 2004; Wiertz, 2009). 
 
Figure 6.18 – Important CSR assurance report elements (n = number of responses) 
6.7 CSR assurance report titles 
The report title should succinctly indicate the nature of the assurance engagement.  Despite the 
content analysis identifying four different types of CSR assurance provider, no particular type of 
assuror prescribes a specific title for its assurance reports.  Moreover, the study found that even 
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the same assuror used different terms to describe its own assurance reports.   
Although the most commonly used report title by all types of assuror is ‘independent assurance 
report’; the use of ‘independent assurance report on selected sustainability information’ that 
provides users with a more complete picture of the assurance report objective and content is 
growing in popularity (especially amongst auditor assurors).  Other titles used include ‘assurance 
report, independent third party assurance reports’, or ‘statement of assurance’.  In one instance, 
the assuror (Maplecroft – Gold Fields) referred to their report as being ‘second party: assurance on 
reporting’.  In the same report, Gold Fields also included a ‘third party assurance report on selected 
sustainability information’ issued by KPMG. 
Although the IFAE clearly distinguishes between auditing and assurance engagements, three CSR 
auditor assurors specifically include the term ‘auditor’ in the titles of their CSR assurance reports.  
In this regard, Deloitte called its reports to Bidvest an: ‘independent auditor’s limited assurance 
report’ and, to Barloworld: a ‘report of the independent auditors’.  Similarly, Indyebo calls its report 
to Discovery Holdings: an ‘assurance report of the independent auditors’.  The titles of other CSR 
assurance reports correctly referred to ‘assuror’ and not to ‘auditor’ (Ackers, 2009; Al-Hamadeen, 
2007; Owen & O’Dwyer, 2004). 
Despite ISAE 3000 section 49(a) specifically requiring auditor assurors to use a title clearly 
indicating that the report is an independent assurance report, a few auditor assurors disclosed their 
independence in the body of the report, instead of the title.  Disclosing the assuror’s independence 
in the CSR assurance report title allows assurors to clearly illustrate their desire to highlight the 
importance of the independence dimension, improving stakeholders’ perceptions about the 
assuror’s objectivity and accordingly their ability to place reliance on the CSR disclosures.    
6.8 CSR assurance engagement scope  
6.8.1 CSR assurance report content analysis 
The scope of the CSR assurance engagement illustrates the diverse nature of the CSR activities 
that companies should report on (Adams & Evans, 2004; Al-Hamadeen, 2007; Archel et al., 2008; 
GRI, 2005; Marx & van Dyk, 2011; Utting, 2005) and should identify the extent to which company 
CSR-related disclosures have been independently verified.  The engagement scope should 
therefore disclose the CSR-related areas of company performance that were covered by the 
assurance engagement, as well as the areas that were excluded.  To establish the CSR-related 
areas that are material to the respective reporting companies, the assuror should not only be 
familiar with the industry within which the company operates but, more importantly, should also 
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possess the technical knowledge and skills required to undertake the engagement (as described in 
sections  3.2.5 and  3.3.3.4) (AccountAbility, 2008a; Al-Hamadeen, 2007; GRI, 2013b).  What may 
be considered important in one company or industry may however, be unimportant in another.  For 
example, effluent or emission control would be more important for manufacturing companies than 
for banks.  While this thesis does not provide a detailed analysis of the technical aspects relating to 
the CSR assurance engagement, it does attempt to provide an overview of key aspects relating to 
the CSR assurance engagement scope.  Depending on the reporting company, the diverse scope of 
the CSR-related activities covered by assurance engagements included, but were not limited to:  
• all disclosures in the CSR report  
• the sustainability risk management framework 
• the extent to which the GRI framework is applied  
• energy, waste and water data usage and disposal 
• emissions control (including greenhouse gas and carbon dioxide equivalent)  
• the company’s adherence to its own sustainability principles, industry sustainability principles 
and/or to applicable industry charters 
• industrial relations and conflict management 
• job creation  
• employment-related disclosures within the context of local, indigenous and diversity 
employment practices  
• registered HIV cases and number of employees participating in anti-retroviral therapy  
• employee training and development  
• safety issues, occupational injuries, illnesses and fatalities  
• operational impacts on communities  
• community engagement and development 
• environmental incidents 
• CSI spend  
• downstream suppliers, etc.   
In addition, illustrating the breadth of their assurance engagements, some assurors disclose the 
number of sites they visited and/or the number of remote reviews performed.  Despite these 
disclosures, unless specifically identified by assurors, report users may not be able to establish the 
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sites that were visited or reviewed, the percentage of total operations represented by these sites, 
or even the basis for selecting these sites.       
Paradoxically, as reflected in the CSR assurance reports, the scope of CSR assurance engagements 
are determined by the reporting companies and not by the assurance provider, by any industry, 
regulatory or statutory bodies, or even by the stakeholders.  Therefore, since the assurance 
engagement scope is determined by reporting companies, it may impair the ability of report users 
to establish whether the CSR assurance report meaningfully verifies the reporting company’s 
material CSR disclosures (Adams & Evans, 2004; Al-Hamadeen, 2007; Owen et al., 2000; Utting, 
2005).  This deficiency is further complicated by the inconsistent scope of CSR assurance 
engagements, exacerbated by company and/or industry nuances and incomplete disclosure of the 
engagement scope, undermining the ability of report users to understand exactly which aspects of 
the CSR report were assured and which were not.  The limited scope of some CSR assurance 
engagements may, for example, be illustrated by Corporate Citizenship indicating that the scope of 
its assurance engagement for SABMiller “did not extend to a complete audit of the report’s 
contents”.  Similarly, PwC disclosed that the subject matter of its CSR assurance engagement for 
MTN was confined to the quality of the services provided, CSI spend, survey of employee culture, 
fraud management framework and the whistle-blower hotline data.  In this regard, PwC 
emphasised that they had “not conducted any work outside of the agreed scope”.  The scope of 
PKF’s assurance report in respect of the Allied Technologies CSR assurance engagement was 
confined to the GRI indicators, but without any disclosure of the indicators that had been included 
or excluded.  These examples suggest that the CSR assurance engagement scope may not 
necessarily cover the company’s material issues, particularly from the perspective of what the 
company’s stakeholders may consider important.   
While CSR assurors should have knowledge of the industry and the necessary technical skills to 
undertake a CSR assurance engagement, report users should also be sufficiently knowledgeable 
about the reporting company and the industry within which it operates.  Possessing this knowledge 
improves interpretation of the CSR and CSR assurance report and enhances users’ understanding 
of the areas that were covered by the assurance engagement and which areas were not.  To 
address this deficiency, organisations such as the PRI are providing training and workshops such as 
the PRI Responsible Investment Research Forum that was held in Singapore on 20 November 2013 
to educate investors about CSR-related issues.  Institutional investor signatories to the PRI commit 
to act in the best long-term interests of their beneficiaries and accept that environmental, social 
and corporate governance issues can affect the performance of their investment portfolios.  
In addition to issues relating to the assurance engagement scope, the diverse nature and depth of 
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assurance procedures further impair CSR assurance report clarity and usability.  Therefore, despite 
contending that CSR assurance should provide legitimate stakeholders with confidence that the 
underlying company CSR disclosures may be relied upon, this thesis suggests that CSR assurance is 
really intended to benefit informed investors and not non-investor stakeholders.  This assertion is 
supported by the observation that the primary providers of independent CSR assurance (i.e. auditor 
assurors) usually address their CSR assurance reports to the company, deliberately excluding ‘non-
intended’ users from relying on their assurance reports (as described in sections  6.10 and  6.11).  
6.8.2 Reporting company survey 
The reasons companies resist providing independent CSR assurance as depicted in Figures 6.11 
and 6.12 are confirmed by the confusion relating the scope of CSR assurance engagements 
described above.  While Figure 6.18 and section  6.6 reveal that the survey respondents considered 
the extent of work undertaken and the disclosure of any limitations on assurance scope as 
important CSR assurance report elements, the nature of the coverage of CSR assurance reports 
should be clear.  These observations imply that existing CSR assurance practices and the resultant 
CSR assurance reports do not meet stakeholder requirements or expectations of reporting 
companies.   
6.8.3 Assuror interviews  
Despite recognising that several aspects of a CSR assurance report were important, assuror 
interview participants disagreed about which they were.  They however, agreed that the most 
important aspect of a CSR assurance report was the scope, which should address the most relevant 
issues that are material to the reporting company.  As a result, the assurance report could be very 
misleading when the CSR assurance engagement scope was not clearly defined.  Conversely, when 
the assurance engagement scope is clear and all the material issues have been included, it 
indicates exactly what was evaluated during the assurance engagement.  This results in an 
assurance report and a resultant assurance opinion that adds value to stakeholders.  The 
importance of ensuring that the scope reflects all issues that are material to a reporting company is 
illustrated by the following comments: 
• “I want to see that the scope leads to material issues to the company”.   
• “The mines must start talking about socio-economic and socio-political issues” affecting their 
employees and the neighbouring communities. 
• “British American Tobacco must talk about the health hazards of using their product”. 
• “Measuring electricity is not material to long-term viability of a bank.  They only measure 
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electricity, water and that sort of stuff because they want to be seen as being good corporate 
citizens”. 
Notwithstanding the importance of the CSR assurance report components reflected in section  6.6 
and Figure 6.18, assurors interviewed concluded that it was imperative for both the reporting 
company and the assurance provider to understand exactly what the indicators were actually 
asking for.  This was articulated by an assuror who stated that “when doing assurance, what you 
test for is accuracy, consistency, completeness and reliability.  And what we are looking at are the 
quality of procedures, systems and controls in place”. 
Recognising the importance of scope, a participant emphasised the importance of the assuror’s 
credibility by commenting that “the credibility of the assurance provider, which is not always linked 
to the name and I don’t think that can only be meant to be the Big 4.  But, I think you need a 
credible organisation and I think you need a scope that does not mock the intent”. 
One assuror questioned the value of the assurance provided by some assurors, suggesting that “it 
was not proper assurance.  It was almost a rubber stamping, tick-box exercise.  You cannot 
provide meaningful assurance for as little as R20 000.  For meaningful assurance you require 13 
person-days to go through everything that you need to do and provide the feedback that needs to 
happen”.  While this statement was intended to legitimise the assurance approach adopted by this 
assuror and to justify its assurance approach and fees, the definitive reference to ‘13 days’ for an 
assurance engagement implies that even this assurance provider may be adopting a similar ‘tick-
box’ approach to assurance.  In this regard, it is argued that the nature and scale of the reporting 
company’s operations should determine the extent of assurance work performed and, accordingly, 
the duration and cost of the assurance engagement.  
6.8.4 Analysis and integration of results 
Since independent CSR assurance is intended to provide stakeholders with confidence that the 
underlying CSR disclosures may be relied upon, it is imperative that the CSR assurance 
engagement scope covers all material CSR-related issues.  Disclosing the scope of the CSR 
assurance engagement, informs stakeholders about the extent to which CSR-related performance 
disclosures can be relied upon (Adams & Evans, 2004; Al-Hamadeen, 2007; Owen et al., 2000; 
Utting, 2005).  Conversely, when the scope is not disclosed, stakeholders are unable to establish 
the aspects of CSR performance that have been assured, and accordingly the disclosures that 
should be relied upon. 
The diversity and inconsistency of the disclosure of the CSR assurance engagement scope reflected 
  
Page 234 of 338 
 
in section  6.8.1 impair the ability of stakeholders to understand which CSR-related aspects have 
been assured, which in turn makes it difficult to compare one company’s performance against 
another.  Moreover, even when the scope is disclosed the complexity and technical nature of some 
CSR-related components imply that many stakeholders may not be sufficiently knowledgeable to 
understand and interpret the CSR report and/or the CSR assurance report. 
The importance of ensuring that the CSR assurance engagement scope addresses all material CSR-
related issues and of disclosing the assurance engagement scope, are confirmed by both the 
reporting company survey respondents and the assurors interviewed.  
6.9 Independence  
6.9.1 CSR assurance report content analysis 
Unlike previous studies which found that many CSR assurance reports did not disclose the assuror’s 
independence (Al-Hamadeen, 2007; Deegan et al., 2006), apart from one assuror in the study that 
specifically acknowledged that it was not independent, all the remaining assurors (including internal 
audit) disclosed their independence.  In this regard, Maplecroft, one of the assurors of Gold Fields, 
referred to its report as a “second party: assurance on reporting”.  Clarifying its lack of 
independence, Maplecroft disclosed that it was not an independent party due to its close 
involvement with the reporting company by stating that “employees to collect, analyse and review 
information and data” (Gold Fields 2012 Integrated Annual Review, p. 157–158).  This lack of 
independence is ameliorated by Gold Fields also including a more conventional third party 
assurance report by KPMG.  The “first party assurance” in the Gold Fields annual report refers to 
the internal audit statement, but does not mention any CSR-related issues (p. 159–163).  Apart 
from Gold Fields, no other reporting company provided similar ‘multi-level’ assurance.  
As described in section  6.7, most assurors disclose their independence in the report title.  A few 
isolated auditor assurors (i.r.o. Sasol, Exxaro Resources and Pretoria Portland Cement) and 
specialist consultancies (i.r.o. SABMiller and Telkom) only disclosed their independence in the body 
of the report.  In addition to declaring their independence in the report title, assurors also provide 
additional information relating to their independence in their CSR assurance reports, as required by 
AA1000AS, even when AA1000AS was not specifically referenced in the assurance report.  The 
importance of disclosing some level of independence appears to be a widespread South African 
practice, compared to the Al-Hamadeen (2007) observation where only 56% of assurors disclosed 
their independence.   
All auditor assurors provided a generic statement confirming their compliance with the IFAC code 
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of ethics, by implication including the independence requirement.  Consultant assurors (IRAS in 
particular) tend to contextualise their independence more comprehensively by emphasising the 
reporting company’s responsibility to prepare the CSR report and explaining why their 
independence was not compromised.  While auditor assurors tend to rely on their accepted 
professional status, non-auditor assurors appear to believe that they should explain how they are 
independent and to specifically justify why their independence enhances the credibility of their 
assurance reports.   
Assuror comments provided in CSR assurance reports pertaining to independence primarily related 
to their professional independence and confirmed the absence of conflicts of interest during the 
assurance engagement.  Examples of comments provided include: 
• “We are not responsible for preparing any part of the report and have not undertaken any 
commissions for that would conflict with our independence”. 
• “We remain an independent assuror over the content and processes pertaining to this 
report”. 
• “We have not compromised our ability to afford independent third party assurance over this 
year’s report”. 
• “We have not provided any form of advisory services, and have not been responsible for the 
preparation of any part of this report”. 
• “Our responsibility is to independently express a conclusion”. 
• “An independent assurance report from an appropriately qualified organisation”. 
These above extracts from CSR assurance reports relating to assuror declarations of independence 
clearly illustrate the perception by all assurors that assurance report credibility is enhanced when 
they confirm their independence.  These extracts confirm the perception that assurors enhance 
their independence and objectivity when they disclose that they do not provide other related 
services. 
6.9.2 Assuror interviews  
An assuror interviewee attributed the decrease in the proportion of CSR assurance engagements 
provided by the Big 4 audit firms to their focusing “on other things.  One thing that they have 
probably identified is that assurance does not generate the type of money that advisory does.  So 
you can get more sort of ongoing revenue on advisory services than you can get from assurance”.  
Despite supporting the need for CSR assurors to remain independent and objective, it was 
suggested that some assurors were “guilty of providing both advisory and assurance services”.  
This presented a conflict since it may intuitively be argued that “you can’t check your own work”.  
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Therefore, to maintain independence and objectivity, the assuror suggested that after completing 
three assurance cycles, or a maximum of five years, assurors should ideally walk away from 
assurance engagements for about two years.  The principle of assuror rotation remains a 
contentious issue, since the typical business model deployed merely recovers the costs for the first 
couple of years, with the profits only accruing thereafter. 
6.9.3 Analysis and integration of results 
As argued in section  3.2.5.3, an assuror helps to reinforce stakeholder trust about the veracity of 
disclosed CSR-related information by rendering an independent and objective opinion on the 
reliability of the disclosed information (Al-Hamadeen, 2007; Chandler & Edwards, 1996; Deegan et 
al., 2006; Maury, 2000; Percy, 1997; Wiertz, 2009).  Questionable assuror independence therefore 
severely undermines the credibility of the assurance provided, and the extent to which stakeholders 
may rely on the underlying disclosures.  AA1000AS requires assurors to decline any assurance 
engagement where their relationship with the company or its stakeholders may compromise the 
production of an independent and impartial assurance report (AccountAbility, 2008a).  Similarly, 
section 210 of the SAICA Code of Professional Conduct requires auditor assurors to maintain their 
independence during assurance engagements (SAICA, 2013).  All assurance providers, irrespective 
of assuror type, should therefore publicly disclose their independence and objectivity in their CSR 
assurance reports. 
The content analysis of CSR assurance reports findings confirm the importance of assurors 
disclosing their independence in their CSR assurance reports.  This finding was similarly confirmed 
by the assurors interviewed.  
6.10 Report addressee  
As described in section  3.2.3, the parties to whom the assurance report is addressed should include 
both the intended and unintended audiences of the assurance report (Ackers, 2009; Wiertz, 2009).  
Section 49(b) of ISAE 3000 specifically requires the assurance report to identify the party or parties 
to whom the report is directed, which should include ‘all possible users’.  Similarly, AA1000AS 
requires the assurance report to clearly identify the intended assurance report users 
(AccountAbility, 2008a).  Since the primary audiences for CSR assurance reports include a variety 
of both internal and external stakeholders (O’Dwyer et al., 2011), CSR assurance reports should be 
addressed to all users that could reasonably be expected.   
While the content analysis revealed that two of the specialist CSR assurors did not identify the 
party/parties to whom their report was addressed, the remaining specialist CSR assurors and the 
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certification body addressed their assurance reports jointly to both the board and stakeholders.  All 
auditor assurors (including internal audit) however, addressed their assurance reports to their 
principals, being the board, directors, members, shareholders and even the company itself.  It is 
argued that the reason that auditor assurors confine their CSR assurance report users to their 
principals and deliberately exclude broader stakeholders from placing any reliance thereon, may be 
attributed to the risk of potential assuror liability combined with the general conservatism of the 
audit profession.   
6.11 Limitations of the assurance provider’s liability 
6.11.1 CSR assurance report content analysis 
Aligned to the parties to whom the CSR assurance report is addressed, as indicated in section  6.10, 
auditor assurors usually include a statement indemnifying themselves from any liability that may 
arise from any ‘non-intended users’ placing reliance on the assured CSR report.  Examples of terms 
used by auditor assurors to limit their liability to non-intended users include:  
• “We do not accept or assume liability to any party other than the company, for our work, for 
this report, or for the conclusions we have reached”. 
• “To the fullest extent permitted by law, we do not accept or assume responsibility to anyone 
other than the (company)”. 
• “We do not accept or assume responsibility to anyone other than the directors of the 
company and the company for our work, or this report, save where terms are expressly 
agreed and with our prior consent in writing”. 
• “We disclaim any assumption of responsibility for any reliance on this report, or the 
sustainability report to which it relates, to any person other than the directors or 
management, for any purpose other than for which it was prepared”. 
While several auditor assurors specifically denounce any liability towards non-intended users, this 
practice is inconsistent.  For example, independent assurance reports issued by the same audit firm 
and even signed by the same audit partner (at PwC) do not always contain a similar exclusionary 
paragraph.  By comparison, non-auditor assurors did not exclude any party from placing any 
reliance on their CSR assurance reports.   
6.11.2 Assuror interviews  
Assuror participants confirmed the practice of auditor assurors limiting their liability to their 
principals in their CSR assurance reports (as described in section  6.11).  While auditor assurors 
ascribe this practice to their mandatory compliance with ISAE 3000 (which prescribes what should 
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be included in their CSR assurance reports), there is no evidence that this practice is covered by 
ISAE 3000.  Another reason advanced by auditor assurors for including this exclusionary paragraph 
is that since the assuror was engaged by their principals, it is accordingly obliged to report to them 
(Al-Hamadeen, 2007; Eccles, 2010).  This assertion is confirmed by paragraph 10 of ISAE 3000 
which requires the assurance practitioner to agree on the assurance engagement terms with the 
reporting company.  Auditor assurors also argue that the contents of the CSR assurance report 
cannot be appreciated without contextualising the terms of the engagement.  They assert that this 
matter is addressed by providing management with a separate report containing the detailed 
assurance observations and recommending improvements to supplement the CSR assurance 
report.  Outside stakeholders do not have access to the management reports and they cannot 
therefore contextualise the findings, nor place reliance on partial information.  This practice is 
illustrated by the comments such as the following: 
• “Management have engaged us to do a piece of work”.   
• “We are presenting our results to management.  Because, remember – management doesn’t 
only see our assurance opinion, they see our management report as well”. 
• “The assurance opinion is only one part of the work that we do.  I don’t think that we can be 
held responsible to outsiders who were not involved in the engagement”.   
• “The value that external stakeholders can get from the assurance report is confirmation that 
the company’s CSR information has been looked at by persons external to the organisation.  
But I think if people do something beyond that, they can’t hold us liable for it”. 
Auditor assurors justified this practice by arguing that if they reach the wrong opinions then their 
firms will be exposed, for example by getting the carbon footprint wrong.  Since assurors were 
engaged by the reporting company, they asserted that their liability was limited to the company, 
explaining the reason that their reports were addressed to their engagement principals (as 
described in section  6.10). 
Denouncing the practice of limiting liability to external stakeholders, the non-auditor participant 
argued that the objective of CSR reporting was to disclose the impact of corporate operations on 
society and the environment.  It is therefore necessary for independent CSR assurance to provide 
broader stakeholders with confidence about the veracity of the underlying company CSR 
disclosures, by reflecting an independent and objective opinion.  The unacceptability of the current 
auditor assuror practice of limiting any liability to broader stakeholders was illustrated by the 
following comment: “For goodness sake, why bother.  If you can’t place reliance on the assurance 
statement, why are you giving it?  It’s a waste of time.” 
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6.11.3 Analysis and integration of results 
While qualitative non-financial data may be subject to more inherent limitations than quantitative 
financial data, it is suggested that the work undertaken and the evidence gathered by the assuror, 
are simply to support the opinion(s) reached in the assurance report, resulting in them only 
reporting for that purpose.  It would therefore appear that the processes of audit firms are typically 
designed to limit the liability resulting from unreliable CSR assurance reports (as described in 
section  6.11).   
Audit professionals and the professional audit bodies consulted informally63 suggest that this 
practice may be attributed to the undefined external boundaries of CSR-related issues and the 
potential impact of litigation on the global audit firms, and the Big 4 audit firms in particular.  By 
comparison, the boundaries of AFS auditing are more controllable by being confined to transactions 
directly initiated by the reporting company and accordingly, primarily verifiable by evidence 
available within the company and/or from the parties with which it interacts directly.  Therefore, 
failing to limit their liability to internal stakeholders who appreciate the intricacies of the assurance 
engagement and the implications of the engagement constraints may expose the assuror to the 
risk of legal action by ‘unintended stakeholders’, who may also rely on the underlying CSR 
disclosures.  This risk is compounded when the stakeholders do not have access to the 
supplementary information contained in the assuror’s reports to management.  
A review of the IFAE and of ISAE 3000 in particular, does not appear to justify the practice 
whereby auditor assurors disclaim responsibility to any parties other that the principals of the 
company, who may rely on the CSR report or on the assurance opinion provided.  This 
unacceptable practice is therefore confined to auditor assurors and not to any other CSR assurance 
providers.  Irrespective of whether this practice may be justifiable, this observation confirms 
Al-Hamadeen’s (2007) assertion that the assurance engagement risk may expose the assuror to 
potential liability. 
It is submitted that the practice of auditor assurors intentionally renouncing any responsibility to 
external stakeholders and deliberately restricting the intended users of their assurance reports to 
their principals, together with the practice of limiting their liability, fundamentally defeats the 
purpose of independent assurance, which should be to provide CSR report users with confidence 
that the underlying CSR disclosures may be relied upon.   
                                           
63 During the study period, the researcher held meetings with the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants 
(SAICA), the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW), the Institute of Chartered Accountants of 
Scotland (ICAS) and the Institute of Singapore Chartered Accountants (ISCA). 
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6.12 Standards, guidelines and frameworks 
6.12.1 CSR assurance report content analysis 
As reflected in Table 6.4 and Figure 6.19, this study found that although two assurance reports 
(4%) did not indicate the assurance standard used for 2011/2 (one in each of 2010/1 and 2007/8), 
AA1000AS and ISAE 3000 were the two primary CSR assurance standards referenced by assurors 
across the study period.  Where Gold Fields provided multi-level assurance on its CSR disclosures, 
only Maplecroft indicated an assurance standard, while KPMG remained silent.  In 2011/2, apart 
from KPMG, which did not refer to an assurance standard in its assurance report to Gold Fields, all 
the remaining auditor assurors referenced ISAE 3000, with EY referencing both ISAE 3000 and 
AA1000AS in its CSR assurance report to British American Tobacco.   
By comparison, except for ERM, which referenced ISAE 3000 as well as ISO 14064-3:2006 and 
ISO 19011 in its assurance report for Mondi, the remaining specialist CSR assurors all referenced 
AA1000AS, with CA Governance also referencing ISO 14064-3.  The internal audit activity did not 
reference any standard.  Apart from EY (i.r.o. British American Tobacco only), auditor assurors did 
not reference AA1000AS in their assurance reports, although several specifically referred to 
AA1000APS (as described in section  2.7.7.4) and its principles of inclusivity, materiality and 
responsiveness.   
As expected, the CSR assurance reports of Standard Bank, ABSA, Nedbank, Arcelor Mittal and 
Liberty Holdings (all assured by Big 4 audit firms that are obliged to comply with the IFAE) were 
assured according to ISAE 3000 and not AA1000AS (as described in section  3.2.6), although they 
referenced the AA1000APS principles (as described in section  2.7.7.4).  Depending on the nature 
and scope of the assurance engagement, assurors also referred to the following (reporting) 
frameworks and guidelines in their CSR assurance reports (as described in section  2.7.6): GRI G3, 
AA1000APS, King III, JSE SRI, GHG, BEE and UNGC.  In several, but not all instances, CSR assurors 
indicated that this information provided the criteria against which the assurance engagement was 
undertaken.  Even though the GRI is a reporting framework and not an assurance standard, it does 
provide reporting companies with the guidelines necessary to implement CSR assurance and allows 
compliant companies to add a ‘+’ (plus) to their self-declared GRI status.   
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Table 6.4 – Assurance standards referenced in CSR assurance reports 
Assurance standard 2007/8 2010/1 2011/2 
ISAE 3000 13 30 32 
AA1000AS 3 9 13 
AA1000AS & ISAE 3000 1 1 1 
AA1000AS & ISO 14064-3:2006 - - 1 
AA1000AS, ISO 14064-3:2006 & ISO 19011 - 1 1 
Not stated 1 1 2 
Total 18 42 50 
 
Figure 6.19 – Assurance standards referenced in CSR assurance reports 
In summary, as depicted in Table 6.4 and Figure 6.19, in 2011/2, 66% of assurors referenced 
ISAE 3000 (2010/1 – 74% and 2007/8 – 78%) and 32% referenced AA1000AS (2010/1 – 26% and 
2007/8 – 22%).  Therefore, whereas 90% of the CSR assurance reports in this study only 
referenced one standard, two (4%) referenced two standards and one (2%) referenced three 
standards (as depicted in Table 6.4 and by Figure 6.19).  By comparison, CorporateRegister (2008: 
12–13) found that 31% of assurance reports for 2007/8 of the combined ‘top 90’ companies (by 
market capitalisation) in the UK, the USA, Germany, Australia and Japan referenced AA1000AS, 
37% referenced ISAE 3000 and 44% referred to the GRI guidelines.  Similarly, the Manetti and 
Becatti (2009) study of 34 selected CSR assurance reports across Europe, North America, South 
America, Australia and Asia found that 41% of assurance reports referenced ISAE 3000, 12% 
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referenced AA1000AS, 26% referencing both ISAE 3000 and AA1000AS, with 21% referring to 
other criteria.   
The greater South African reference to ISAE 3000 is aligned to the finding that auditor assurors 
were the primary providers of independent CSR assurance.  Al-Hamadeen (2007) however, 
observed that the primary standard used in CSR assurance reports was AA1000AS, which is aligned 
to his observation that consultants and not the audit profession were the primary providers of 
independent CSR assurance in the UK.  CorporateRegister (2008) however, assert that this lack of 
standardisation may result in assurors ‘cherry-picking’ by complying with certain principles from 
one approach and with other principles from another, without being fully compliant with either, but 
referencing both. 
Since the GRI is not an assurance standard, this study only considered the GRI to the extent that it 
provides a guideline for reporting companies.  It has therefore not been specifically quantified in 
this study. 
6.12.2 Reporting company survey 
As summarised in Figure 6.15 responses to a question to establish the most important reasons for 
selecting a CSR assurance provider revealed that the assurance standard(s) referenced by the 
assuror was an important factor.  This is confirmed by Figure 6.18 in section  6.6, which confirms 
that the assurance standard (framework) utilised was an important component of a CSR assurance 
report. 
6.12.3 Assuror interviews  
Confirming the content analysis observations in section  6.12, participants confirmed that the two 
primary standards used for CSR assurance were ISAE 3000 and AA1000AS (Ackers, 2009; 
Al-Hamadeen, 2007; CorporateRegister, 2008; Manetti & Becatti, 2009).  Auditor assurors preferred 
using ISAE 3000, whereas non-auditor assurors preferred AA1000AS.  
The contentious debate about CSR assurance standards is illustrated by an auditor assuror arguing 
that ISAE 3000 was a more appropriate standard for CSR assurance.  Suggesting that it was 
inappropriate for smaller niche CSR assurors to perform CSR assurance engagements only using 
AA1000AS, the participant commented that “if they are serious about numbers and risk, and 
making decisions, they would take ISAE 3000 plus maybe AA1000AS”.  Confirming that assurors 
should respond to the requirements of their principals, the auditor assuror participant indicated that 
when requested by their clients, they provided assurance based on both AA1000AS and ISAE 3000.  
The use of multiple assurance standards is however infrequent, and not widely used by either 
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auditor assurors or non-auditor assurors.  An auditor assuror however, commented that the “quite 
hefty annual fee for using AA1000AS, was not necessarily offset by the associated benefits”.   
Another participant argued that AA1000AS was an inappropriate assurance standard from an 
investor perspective by stating that: “I’m not sure that people understand what an AA1000AS 
opinion means.  The investment community are used to financial reporting being assured according 
to the recognised auditing standards.”  This finding is aligned to the practice of auditor assurors 
addressing their CSR assurance reports to their principals, representing the company’s interests 
and not its non-investor stakeholders, and the perceived rigour of assurance provided by auditor 
assurors.   
The ambiguity of CSR-related assurance standards and the obligation for auditor assurors to 
comply with ISAE 3000 is illustrated in the following comment from a Big 4 auditor assuror: “What 
interests me is the number of opinions that are coming out from non-Big 4 companies that 
conclude in the same way in which we do.”  “We are doing limited assurance and we are bound in 
our conclusion to say based on the work performed, nothing has come to our attention to indicate 
whatever.”  These comments suggest that while auditor assurors were obliged to comply with 
ISAE 3000, other non-auditor assurors were coming to the same conclusions, but without adhering 
to the provisions of ISAE 3000. 
A non-auditor participant cynically suggested that negatively-framed CSR assurance reports issued 
by auditor assurors adhering to ISAE 3000 and stating that “nothing has come to our attention that 
information contained in this report is not correct”, actually indicate that the assurors did not know 
what they were looking for.  Put more strongly, the participant emphatically argued that this 
negatively oriented assurance opinion “is not actually a finding.  That’s a ‘cover your arse’ 
statement”.  The participant suggested that this negatively oriented assurance opinion indicated 
that in order “to provide that statement you can take a lawn chair and you can park in front of the 
company for two weeks.  And if nobody comes to you and tells you that there is something wrong 
with the information going into the report, then nothing has come to your attention.  They don’t 
give you the information.  So you don’t look at the right data”.  
Despite the apparent divergence and ambiguity of CSR reporting and accordingly CSR assurance 
practices, its evolving nature is reflected by the comment that “I think we are going to see 
standards emerging to deal with integrated reporting.  I don’t think sustainability assurance will 
survive in its current form.  Obviously certain firms will fight that.  But, I think that we need to 
devise standards that will withstand similar scrutiny of financial auditing.”  The participant argued 
that properly applied, ISAE 3000 would be adequate for the market to use, but suggested that 
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more detailed standards would emerge over the next two years (i.e. by 2014).64 
As described in sections  2.7.7.3 and  3.2.6.4, even though the GRI guidelines do not constitute an 
assurance standard, they are the most widely used framework for reporting CSR performance.  
Suggesting that different assurance standards should be applied in particular contexts, a participant 
commented that “Comparability is pertinent when you are looking at the three primary types of 
assurance.  There’s the AA1000AS which is looking at the stakeholder stuff and is basically the 
entire report.  Then there is the GRI that looks at comparability for which you can use ISAE 3000.  
And then finally, there is the integrated report that is looking at materiality, the driver for the new 
ISAE 3000.”  Confirming the emerging integrated reporting trend (as described in section  2.7.7.6), 
it was suggested that meaningful assurance should more effectively consider integrated reporting, 
instead of merely focusing on the CSR disclosures.  Since the IR<FW> does not presently require 
assurance, correct application of the combined assurance model may address this concern.  It will 
however, require skilful coordination of the different assurance components provided by the 
various assurance providers.  
Participants confirmed that a new assurance standard was being collaboratively developed by the 
professional standards bodies to address some of the deficiencies in the standards presently in use.  
At the same time, the global audit profession was currently considering revising ISAE 3000.65  It 
was proposed that in order to improve the usefulness of CSR assurance reports, the new CSR 
assurance standard must include the principles of inclusivity, materiality and responsiveness.66  It 
should also be opened up for use by non-auditor assurors.  Whether the intended collaboration will 
produce the desired result remains questionable, primarily due to matters relating to who will 
control the proposed standards body.  It is suggested that the impact of recent corporate reporting 
developments, particularly those relating to integrated reporting, may render this proposed 
standard obsolete.  Alternatively, the proposed new standard could be adapted to account for 
integrated reporting. 
The reasons advanced by auditor assurors for primarily using ISAE 3000 in their CSR assurance 
engagements was that it was developed specifically for the audit profession and that its application 
was mandatory (as described in section  6.12).  By contrast, AA1000AS was primarily used by non-
auditor assurors since they were not members of the global audit profession, implying that 
                                           
64 Despite being issued in December 2013, the IR<FW> (as described in section  2.7.7.6) does not address assurance.  
The revised ISAE 3000 however, acknowledges that integrated reporting includes both historical and future-oriented 
financial and non-financial information.     
65 While the revised ISAE 3000 was subsequently released in December 2013, its provisions have not been considered in 
detail since it is only due for implementation after 15 December 2015.  
66 While ISAE 3000 includes a significant revision in respect of materiality, the principles of inclusivity and responsiveness 
have still not been addressed.   
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ISAE 3000 was not applicable to them.  To substantiate the appropriateness of their assurance 
approach, non-auditor assurors therefore reference AA1000AS.   
6.12.4 Analysis and integration of results 
As described in section  3.2.6, providing information about the standards used on the CSR 
assurance engagement improves report comparability and enhances user understanding about the 
nature and extent of the assurance provided (Al-Hamadeen, 2007).  The inconsistent application of 
standards and frameworks, exacerbated by the tendency for auditor and non-auditor assurors to 
use different assurance standards (Ackers, 2009; Al-Hamadeen, 2007; CorporateRegister, 2008; 
Manetti & Becatti, 2009), impair the ability of users to meaningfully interpret, analyse and compare 
CSR assurance reports and the underlying CSR disclosures.   
The study observes that the primary CSR assurors (i.e. auditor assurors) use ISAE 3000, a generic 
non-financial assurance standard, not specifically designed for CSR assurance engagements 
(Ackers, 2009; Al-Hamadeen, 2007: 27; Manetti & Becatti, 2009).  Since ISAE 3000 is a generic 
and not a CSR assurance standard, it does not adequately provide stakeholders with meaningful 
assurance about the reliability of company CSR disclosures (as described in section  3.2.6.3) 
(Ackers, 2009; FEE, 2006; Manetti & Becatti, 2009).  While it may be argued that IFAC should 
develop a specific CSR assurance standard for auditor assurors, instead, it is proposed that the 
various CSR assurance providers should collaborate to develop a comprehensive CSR assurance 
standard that could be consistently applied by all types of CSR assurors around the world.  This 
new standard should reduce stakeholder confusion about CSR and CSR assurance reports by 
introducing a consistency mechanism that could improve user understanding and facilitate report 
comparability.       
These observations are aligned to the survey responses in the second phase indicating that the 
assurance standard(s) referenced were an important factor that their respective companies 
considered when selecting a CSR assurance provider (as reflected in Figure 6.15).  Similarly, 
Figure 6.18 confirms the importance of the assurance standard referenced as an important CSR 
assurance report component.   
The growth of CSR assurance by non-auditor assurors is reflected in the increased referencing of 
AA1000AS from 22% in 2007/8 and 26% in 2010/1, to 32% in 2011/2.  During the same period, 
ISAE 3000 has gradually declined from 78% in 2007/8 and 74% in 2010/1, to 66% in 2011/2. 
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6.13 CSR assurance levels  
6.13.1 CSR assurance report content analysis 
The study found that all auditor assurors, as well as the specialist CSR assuror that referenced 
ISAE 3000 and the internal audit activity, provided negatively-framed limited assurance conclusions 
(n = 35).  Ten of these assurance reports by auditor assurors and the assurance report by the 
specialist CSR assuror that referenced ISAE 3000 provided reasonable assurance on some 
dimensions of the CSR report, and limited assurance on others.   
The specialist assuror that referenced AA1000AS and ISO 14064-3 provided reasonable assurance 
on GHG emissions.  But instead of applying either high or moderate levels of assurance on the 
complete assurance engagement, introduced a nine-level assurance scale that exceeded the type 2 
assurance requirements of AA1000AS, ranging from ‘none’ (being 0 – 4% sure) to ‘extremely high’ 
(being more than 90% sure).  To assist report users understand the nature of the assurance 
provided, the assuror included a detailed explanation of the assurance scale together with the 
assurance report.  Although the certification body did not reference any assurance standard, it did 
provide positively-framed reasonable assurance.  One specialist CSR assuror (Maplecroft i.r.o. Gold 
Fields) did not indicate the level of assurance provided.  Despite being an auditor assuror, KPMG, 
the co-assuror of Gold Fields, provided reasonable assurance, although the assurance standard 
used was not disclosed.   
ERM (i.r.o. Sasol) provided high levels of assurance on some aspects of the CSR report and 
moderate levels on others.  Assurance reports by the remaining non-auditor assurors that applied 
AA1000AS, all provided moderate levels of assurance (n = 11) for a combination of type 1 and type 
2 engagements.  These findings are aligned to the observations that auditor assurors were more 
likely to use ISAE 3000, whereas non-auditor assurors tended to use AA1000AS (Ackers, 2009; 
CorporateRegister, 2008; Manetti & Becatti, 2009; Marx & Van Dyk, 2011). 
6.13.2 Reporting company survey 
As indicated in Figure 6.15 in section  6.4.2, the majority of survey respondents identified the level 
of assurance provided as an important factor when selecting an assurance provider.  This 
observation suggests that assurors providing higher levels of assurance on reasonable assurance 
engagements were more likely to be appointed to undertake CSR assurance engagements than 
assurors providing limited assurance. 
  
Page 247 of 338 
 
6.13.3 Analysis and integration of results 
Despite the wording used in CSR assurance reports, the quality and extent of assurance provided 
may not necessarily depend on whether reasonable or limited assurance levels were provided.  
Instead, it may relate directly to the reporting company’s reason for providing CSR assurance, the 
scope of the CSR assurance engagement, or the rigour of the assurance process.   
As described in sections  3.2.5.4 and  3.2.6, the ability of users to compare CSR assurance reports is 
complicated by the assurance levels provided by the two primary CSR assurance standards (i.e. 
AA1000AS and ISAE 3000).  These assurance levels mean different things and relate to different 
aspects of the assurance engagement.  While AA1000AS requires the assurance provider to 
indicate the level of assurance provided (i.e. type 1 and/or type 2), these assurors usually provide 
reasonable assurance opinions.  By contrast, ISAE 3000 (SAICA, 2012) compels auditor assurors to 
provide for two types of assurance engagement, namely, ‘reasonable’ and ‘limited’ (Wiertz, 2009).  
In a reasonable assurance engagement the assurance conclusion is expressed in a ‘positive form’, 
whereas a ‘negative form’ assurance conclusion is expressed in a limited assurance engagement.   
The evidence suggests that reasonable levels of assurance are perceived as being stronger than 
limited levels, as implied by the survey finding that the level of assurance provided was an 
important factor when selecting a CSR assuror.  Nevertheless, it is submitted that most reporting 
companies still tend to use auditor assurors that usually provide negatively-framed limited 
assurance opinions since they do not fully appreciate the difference between the two levels.  
Moreover, stakeholders may also believe that assurance provided by auditor assurors is more 
rigorous than assurance provided by non-auditor assurors (as described in section  6.4.3).  As 
indicated in sections  3.2.3.6 and  3.3, the assurance methodologies of the audit profession have 
been developed over centuries and have been entrenched by legislation. 
While it may be argued that CSR assurance should provide stakeholders with a mechanism to 
improve their confidence about the extent to which CSR disclosures may be relied upon, it is 
posited that this can only be effectively achieved through the development and adoption of a 
universal CSR assurance standard that can effectively and consistently regulate CSR assurance 
engagements by all CSR assurors.  This proposed standard that should apply to all CSR assurors 
(Deegan et al., 2006) could reduce stakeholder confusion and improve comparability, as argued by 
O’Dwyer et al. (2011).  This may facilitate the ability of assurance providers to improve the quality 
and coverage of their respective assurance reports and ensure that all material CSR-related issues 
are consistently disclosed and verified.   
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6.14 Assuror competencies 
6.14.1 CSR assurance report content analysis 
This study found that 37 (74%) CSR assurors disclosed the competencies or expertise of their 
organisations and/or of their assurance team in their CSR assurance reports, with the remaining 13 
(26%) assurors not providing similar disclosures.  However, where assurors disclosed their 
competencies, these were often generically referred to in terms of the ‘available competencies’ of 
their institutions.  While non-auditor assurors generically indicated the expertise of their assurance 
practitioners, the internal audit activity and the mid-tier auditor assurors did not refer to their 
competencies to conduct the assurance engagement.  Although the Big 4 auditor assurors usually 
disclosed their competencies, this practice was inconsistent.  Examples of specific references by 
assurors relating to their respective competencies disclosed in the 2011/2 CSR assurance reports 
include the following:  
• Big 4 auditor assurors inconsistently disclosed their competencies in some CSR assurance 
reports but not in others.  While some Big 4 auditor assurors generically referred to their 
compliance with the IFAC Code of Ethics, which inter alia includes the requirement for 
‘professional competencies’, others also disclosed the depth of their competency resource 
pool.  More specifically, several Big 4 auditor assurors illustrated their capacity to provide CSR 
assurance by disclosing that their “work was carried out by a multidisciplinary team of health, 
safety, social, environmental, governance, economic and assurance specialists with extensive 
experience in sustainability reporting”.  Since the IFAC Sustainability Framework does not 
require this disclosure (IFAC, 2011), it is asserted that these Big 4 auditor assurors have 
collaborated to produce similarly worded statements.  Since auditor assurors deliberately 
confine the intended users of their CSR assurance reports to their principals, it may be 
presumed that these intended users are aware of the competencies of the assurors whom 
they have engaged to conduct the CSR assurance engagement.   
• Corporate Citizenship (i.r.o. SABMiller) disclosed its institutional capacity by stating that 
“Corporate Citizenship is a leading assuror of corporate responsibility reports”.  The expertise 
of its assurance practitioners is reflected in a separate section titled “Methodological notes”, 
wherein the assuror reported that the assurance team had “a variety of professional and 
technical competencies and experience”, and referred readers to the assuror’s website for 
further information.  
• Bureau Veritas (i.r.o. Capital Shopping Centres) disclosed its institutional capacity by 
indicating that “Bureau Veritas is an independent professional services company that 
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specialises in quality, environmental, health, safety and social accountability with over 180 
years history in providing independent assurance services”.  The competencies of its 
assurance team and their suitability to conduct the assurance engagement is confirmed by 
the statement that its “assurance team has extensive experience in conducting assurance 
over environmental, social, ethical and health and safety information, systems and processes 
in accordance with best practice”.  
• CA-Governance (i.r.o. Telkom) disclosed its institutional capacity by stating that 
“CA-Governance is a specialist firm in the field of corporate governance, with a focus on the 
provision of independent assurance to stakeholders”.  It described the competencies of its 
assurance team by revealing that “the firm provides teams of assurance experts from a pool 
of persons with individual experience levels ranging from 22 to 33 years”.  In addition, it 
confirmed its competence by disclosing that it applied an ‘advocate model’, in terms of which 
“only highly experienced members serve on the assurance team”. 
• ERM (i.r.o. Sasol and Northam Platinum, but not for Mondi) reflected on its institutional 
capacity by stating that “ERM is an independent global provider of environmental, social and 
corporate responsibility consulting and assurance services”.  The competence of its CSR 
assurance team is generically referred to as a “multidisciplinary team of sustainability and 
assurance practitioners with experience”. 
• PwC (i.r.o. Anglo American) disclosed its institutional capacity by emphasising that its 
assurance report was issued by “an appropriately qualified organisation in connection with 
the selected subject matter”, but without referring to the specific competencies of the 
members of the assurance team assigned to the engagement.         
6.14.2 Reporting company survey 
Figure 6.15 in section  6.4.2 reveals that a majority of survey respondents agreed that the ability of 
the assuror to access to the necessary competencies was an important factor considered when 
appointing a CSR assurance provider.  Similarly, the fact that the assuror specialises in CSR was 
also considered important. 
6.14.3 Assuror interviews  
To establish the necessary attributes and competencies for CSR assurance providers, participant 
assurors were probed about their skills and expertise (AccountAbility, 2008a; Al-Hamadeen, 2007; 
GRI, 2013b; Huggins et al., 2011; Moroney et al., 2012; Perego & Kolk, 2012).  CSR assuror 
responses confirmed the evolutionary, developmental and multidisciplinary nature of CSR 
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assurance that requires the adoption of an appropriately rigorous assurance methodology in order 
to be effective, as illustrated by the following participant comments:   
“When we first started providing CSR assurance 13 years ago, we checked every single thing 
without any focus on risk.  Only once we started interacting with people from an assurance 
background, we quickly recognised the rigour and structure of the methodology utilised by 
the audit profession.  For example, by asking questions like: what is the system, what are 
the risks, and what controls do you have in place.  As our assurance practice has grown and 
matured, our methodology was subsequently formalised to incorporate global considerations 
and methodologies. Our revised approach now uses a team consisting of a combination of 
mostly scientists and technical experts, with some not even having any accounting or 
assurance backgrounds.  Sometimes we have six people on site and it’s not about keeping 
bodies busy, but rather to ensure that the assurance team has the correct mix of technical 
skills for a particular engagement.  The fact is that we have subject matter specialists 
particular to certain sectors, whether it is in mining, or banking, or pharmaceuticals.  We put 
the right people on the right job.  We started combining our teams and saying that for any 
assurance engagements we would make certain that we have relevant subject matter 
specialists on it”. 
The content analysis reveals that the CSR assurance reports issued by audit firms are usually 
signed by registered auditors, and not necessarily by the persons responsible for the assurance 
engagement.  It is posited that this practice is due to the inherent conservatism of the audit 
profession and their interpretation of the IFAE, resulting in the technical CSR assurance team 
looking at all the details, with the chartered accountant (CA) partner merely signing the assurance 
report as evidence of approval at the end of the engagement.  Moreover, an assuror participant 
asserted that some auditor assurors do not add value to CSR assurance engagements because 
“they keep sending junior accounting clerks without any industry or technical experience to provide 
assurance on something they know nothing about”.  To address these deficiencies, it is proposed 
that a succession plan should be developed that ensures that the assurance team includes a 
registered auditor with extensive sustainability experience.  
Reflecting its relatively small size, but leveraging on the primary practitioner’s reputation and 
emphasising the certification and registration of its primary member as a CSR assurance 
practitioner, IRAS usually included the following statement in its CSR assurance reports “the 
assurance team comprised primarily of Michael H. Rea, our Lead Certified Sustainability Assurance 
Practitioner (CSAP), with 13 years’ experience in environmental and social performance 
measurement, including sustainability reporting and assurance”.  In this regard, it should be noted 
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that the CSAP qualification was developed by AccountAbility and the International Register of 
Certificated Auditors (IRCA) in 2007.  CSAP is the first internationally recognised professional 
qualification in sustainability assurance, aimed at improving stakeholder confidence about the CSR 
assurance practitioner’s expertise and suitability to conduct the assurance engagement.67 
6.14.4 Analysis and integration of results 
Stakeholder confidence about the reliability of CSR reports can be improved by using appropriately 
qualified and credible assurors, using suitable assurance methodologies to verify the information 
contained in the CSR report against adequate supporting documentation (Al-Hamadeen, 2007; 
Moroney et al., 2012).  CSR assurors therefore reflect their professionalism and suitability to 
undertake assurance engagements by disclosing their expertise relating to the dimensions covered 
by the assurance engagement (AccountAbility, 2008a).  Assurors accordingly increase user 
confidence in CSR reporting when they disclose their competencies in a publicly issued CSR 
assurance report (AccountAbility, 2008a; Al-Hamadeen, 2007).  Conversely, CSR assurance reports 
are weakened when CSR assurors do not disclose their competencies, impairing the ability of users 
to rely on the underlying CSR disclosures (Al-Hamadeen, 2007). 
Both AA1000AS and ISAE 3000 require assurors to only accept assurance engagements for which 
they have the necessary technical knowledge and skills.  CSR assurors however, usually only 
ambiguously disclose their generic competencies.  While this may appear to simply reflect the 
assurors’ compliance with the competency requirements of both ISAE 3000 and AA1000AS (as 
described in section  3.2.5), it does not provide stakeholders with any reassurance about whether 
the assurance provider and/or the particular assurance practitioner(s) is (are) suitably qualified, 
experienced and skilled to conduct a meaningful CSR assurance engagement.   
Despite the important need for assurors to possess the requisite competencies, the content 
analysis observations suggests that reporting companies and auditor assurors presume that CSR 
report users perceive auditor assurors and particularly, the Big 4 audit firms, as having the required 
competencies and credibility to undertake CSR assurance engagements and enhance the credibility 
of their CSR disclosures (Perego, 2009).  They may therefore not see any need to specify, identify 
and confirm these competencies.  This may be ascribed to the audit profession’s strong reputation 
and brand, and its entrenched position within the global business environment.  By comparison, 
despite some specialist CSR assurors being perceived as CSR assurance ‘experts’, the relative 
anonymity of their organisational brands may explain why non-auditor assurors tend to describe 
                                           
67 Accessed online on 4 May 2013 at http://www.accountability.org/standards/qualifications/index.html.  
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their organisational and practitioner competencies and expertise more comprehensively than 
auditor assurors.   
Given the multidisciplinary and often technical nature of CSR activities and what may be covered in 
a typical CSR assurance engagement, there is a risk that the presumed knowledge and skills 
necessary for specific engagements may not actually exist.  The detailed declaration by IRAS about 
the qualifications and expertise of its lead assurance practitioner provides pertinent information 
that IRAS has the necessary competencies to undertake the assurance engagement.  This should 
reassure stakeholders that the CSR assurance report and the underlying CSR disclosures may be 
relied on.  At the same time, since no other CSR assurors provides this level of disclosure, this 
practice may simply be a component of the IRAS marketing strategy to differentiate itself and 
establish its legitimacy as a competent independent CSR assurance provider.  This may be 
especially necessary when considering the intensity of competition amongst well-established 
organisations.   
Even though assuror participants confirmed that assuror competencies were important to 
undertake effective CSR assurance engagements, the content analysis revealed that not all CSR 
assurors disclosed the competencies or expertise of their organisations, or of their respective 
assurance practitioners in their CSR assurance reports.  Apart from the small specialist CSR assuror, 
which comprehensively disclosed the competencies and expertise of its lead assuror, other assurors 
usually generically disclosed their competencies by referring to the ‘available competencies’ at their 
respective institutions.   
While SAICA (2010) requires auditor assurors to maintain professional knowledge and skill at the 
appropriate level to undertake the assurance engagement, it is proposed that this competency 
requirement should apply equally to non-auditor assurors (Huggins et al., 2011; Perego & Kolk, 
2012).  Moreover, all CSR assurance providers should be required to provide additional information 
about their specific competencies as they relate to their suitability to undertake particular CSR 
assurance engagements.  Aligned to the recommendation that a uniform CSR assurance standard 
should be introduced to improve the consistency of the assurance provided (as described in 
section  6.12.4), it is suggested that a global oversight body should be established to deal with CSR 
assurance.  All CSR assurance providers should be encouraged to register as members of this 
proposed oversight body.   
Assuming the development and implementation of a universally applicable CSR assurance standard, 
it is proposed that a qualification similar to the CSAP (referred to on page 251), should become a 
mandatory qualification for CSR assurance practitioners.  While this may improve stakeholder 
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perceptions of whether specific CSR assurors and/or their individual assurance practitioners have 
the necessary professional competencies to generically provide CSR assurance, it does not address 
the technical skills that may be required for complex CSR assurance engagements.  Although 
unsupported by empirical evidence, it is suggested that some of the smaller CSR assurance 
providers may lack access to the technical CSR-related skills required to undertake certain CSR 
assurance engagements, despite being skilled in the use of assurance methodologies.    
6.15 Recommendations for improvement 
6.15.1 CSR assurance report content analysis 
AA1000AS specifically requires the assuror to provide recommendations for improvement in a 
publicly issued assurance report.  By contrast, ISAE 3000 does not mention recommendations at 
all.  Nevertheless, using both AA1000AS and ISAE 3000, one Big 4 audit firm, EY (i.r.o. British 
American Tobacco), included a section titled “observations and areas for improvement” in its CSR 
assurance reports.  Attempting to add value to their clients and reduce the perception that auditing 
was a ‘grudge purchase’, the current practice in statutory financial statement audits is that the 
auditor issues a ‘report to management’.  This management report incorporates the detailed 
findings of the audit engagement and provides recommendations for improvement.  This 
management report is however, not widely distributed and is usually only intended for internal 
company stakeholder use.  It may therefore be reasonably assumed that auditor assurors have 
adopted a similar practice for their CSR assurance engagements as well.   
Despite being a specialist CSR assuror and not an auditor assuror, ERM confirmed this assumption 
by disclosing in their CSR assurance report for Sasol that it had issued a detailed report to 
management, listing its observations and recommendations for improvement.  ERM however, 
emphasise that its assurance conclusions have not been compromised by this practice.  In addition 
to providing a summary of the key recommendations made in the CSR assurance report, Bureau 
Veritas (i.r.o. Capital Shopping Centres) confirmed that it provided management with detailed 
recommendations for improvement.  CorporateRegister (2008) confirms the practice of auditor 
assurors providing internal and not external company stakeholders with additional information.   
Whereas Manetti and Becatti (2009) found that 59% of assurors provided recommendations for 
improvements to consolidate the CSR management processes, programmes and systems, only 36% 
(n = 18) of CSR assurance reports in this study included recommendations for improvements in 
their 2011/2CSR assurance reports.  Apart from EY i.r.o. British American Tobacco, all CSR 
assurance reports issued by auditor assurors did not disclose recommendations for improvement.  
By comparison, the assurance reports issued by non-auditor assurors (n = 17), either included or 
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disclosed that they had provided recommendations for improvements.   
Manetti and Becatti (2009) however, argue that assurance services should be confined to 
expressing a professional opinion on the reliability of the information contained in the CSR report, 
and not to providing recommendations.  Since IRAS uses AA1000AS in its assurance engagements, 
the recommendations for improvement included in its CSR assurance reports are appropriately 
aligned to the AA1000APS principles of inclusivity, materiality and responsiveness.  While several 
recommendations for improvement provided by CSR assurors relate to information about their 
specific engagement clients, examples of some of the generic areas highlighted for improvement in 
the CSR assurance report, include: 
• “A strategic review of CSR reporting, including the political risk-management dimension and 
updated risk-opportunity analysis, should be periodically undertaken to ensure its continued 
relevance and that the needs of significant stakeholders are being met”.   
• “Policies, procedures, reporting standards and measurement criteria should be improved to 
provide stakeholders with comparable data that stimulates improvements in performance”. 
• “More specific data on CSR performance targets should be provided.  For example, what is 
measured, whether it can be measured, how often is it measured, who benefits, how is value 
shared, etc.?”  
• “Having achieved several quick-wins, methods of sustaining current positive performance 
should be developed and implemented”. 
• “On-going stakeholder engagement is required to ensure that significant stakeholder interests 
are considered, with enhanced stakeholder feedback/explanation of the manner in which CSR 
information is measured and reported”.  
• “The linkages between the actions of management and performance outcomes should be 
enhanced”. 
• “People issues should be reported in appropriate depth”. 
• “As a result of known incomplete reporting, the importance of ensuring complete and 
accurate reporting must continue to be emphasised.  This would include the continued 
training of persons responsible for collating CSR data”.   
• “Management review controls should be improved to timeously identify reporting errors”. 
• “The formal documentation of assumptions, calculations and the audit trail should be 
improved”. 
• “Reporting standards/frameworks should be more consistently applied”. 
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• “Assurance processes should be expanded to include site visits where data is tested”. 
While the areas for improvement recommended by CSR assurors reflected above illustrate the 
emerging nature of CSR reporting practices and the need to improve CSR data collection and 
reporting practices, these recommendations are usually too generic and ambiguous to provide 
report users with any meaningful insights into the weaknesses requiring remedial action.  Assurors 
confirmed the principle that CSR practices should be aligned to the reasonable expectations of 
legitimate stakeholders, and should be continually adapted to changing external environmental 
factors.  Recommendations contained in CSR assurance reports suggest that CSR reporting 
practices will be enhanced through the continued improvement of CSR policies, procedures and 
reporting practices. 
As described in sections  3.2.5.3 and  6.8, assuror independence and objectivity are considered 
critical elements of a CSR assurance engagement.  Providing recommendations for improvement 
may however, constitute a ‘consulting engagement’, which should be distinctly separate from an 
assurance engagement.  It may therefore be argued that by providing detailed recommendations 
for improvement, assurors could compromise their independence and objectivity and undermine 
the credibility of their assurance reports.  It is suggested that this dilemma may be resolved by 
accepting that while assurors should identify weaknesses in CSR processes and reporting, they 
should refrain from giving advice during an assurance engagement in order to preserve their 
independence and objectivity. 
6.15.2 Reporting company survey 
The majority of survey respondents agreed that the assuror’s ability to assist the company to 
develop its own CSR reporting capacity by providing them with recommendations for improvement 
was an important factor when selecting a CSR assurance provider (as reflected in Figure 6.15).  
This also confirms the finding that one of the reasons that some reporting companies do not yet 
provide independent CSR assurance is that they were still busy building their capacity to do so in 
the future (as reflected in Figure 6.11).  
6.15.3 Assuror interviews  
Auditor assurors interviewed confirmed that they issued management with reports containing 
recommendations for improvement in order to assist them to improve their CSR governance 
processes and controls.  By contrast, arguing that AA1000AS was a more appropriate and 
comprehensive standard for CSR assurance, specifically requiring the disclosure of “findings, 
conclusions and recommendations”, the specialist CSR assuror argued that the recommendations 
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provided for improvement were one of the most important parts of the CSR assurance report.  
Illustrating how recommendations could add value to reporting companies, the assuror cited the 
following example: “That number is wrong and this is the right one.  This is how I got to it, which 
is how you ought to get to it.  That’s where the value comes.  You can’t just end with that number.  
It is wrong.  And unfortunately, because of the increased competitiveness in this space, what the 
companies are doing is depleting the value from the management report”. 
6.15.4 Analysis and integration of results 
The observations in the three empirical phases relating to the provision of, and need for 
recommendations for improvement, confirm the developmental nature of CSR reporting and 
assurance in South African companies.  This is confirmed by the finding that only 26% of JSE-listed 
companies complied with the de facto requirement to provide independent assurance on their CSR 
disclosures at the time of the study (as described in sections  2.7.7.2,  3.3.3.2,  6.2.2 and  6.2.4).  
This observation is aligned to the maturity phase of CSR practices within South African reporting 
companies, and highlights the need to improve CSR practices (as confirmed by the description on 
capacity development relating to Figure 6.11). 
In addition, as indicated by CSR assurors in section  6.11.2, without having access to the detailed 
management report containing the recommendations for improvement that auditor assurors 
provide to their engagement principals, other CSR assurance report users will not have the 
necessary context to fully appreciate the nature and scope of the assurance engagement, existing 
weaknesses, or understand the CSR challenges that the reporting company should still overcome.  
It is accordingly argued that the recommendations for improvement provide stakeholders 
examining CSR and CSR assurance reports with important insights into a reporting company’s 
systems, processes and the quality of CSR reporting.       
6.16 Assurance opinions 
6.16.1 CSR assurance report content analysis 
CSR assurance provides stakeholders with confidence that the underlying CSR disclosures may be 
relied upon.  It usually refers to a process that follows professional assurance standards, and leads 
to the production of an assurance report to accompany the CSR report (IFAC, 2011).  The opinion 
or conclusion expressed in the assurance report is arguably the most important component of an 
assurance engagement (Al-Hamadeen, 2007).  The expression of the assurance opinion is 
therefore the fundamental objective of the entire assurance engagement, which should not be 
materially different from what is suggested by the evidence.  As described in section  3.2.5.5, CSR 
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assurance opinions may be influenced by several factors including the assurance level pursued; the 
assurance engagement objective; and any limitations on the assurance engagement 
(AccountAbility, 2008a; O’Dwyer et al., 2004).  Where warranted by the evidence, assurance 
opinions may provide additional information and/or include disclaimers or qualified opinions.  
Examples of assuror statements published in CSR assurance reports providing adverse opinions 
include “the following could have been covered in more depth”, or “we are not able to obtain 
sufficient appropriate evidence to draw a conclusion on the accuracy, completeness and validity.  
Accordingly, we do not express an opinion ...”  
As described in section  3.2.6.3, ISAE 3000 requires the assurance level to be disclosed in the 
wording of the assurance opinion.  Unlike ISAE 3000, AA1000AS does not differentiate between 
either positively or negatively-framed opinions.  Table 6.5 and Figure 6.20, reveal that 25 (50%) of 
the CSR assurance reports for 2011/2 provided negatively-framed limited assurance opinions 
(2010/1: 24 – 57% and 2007/8: 8 – 44%); 12 (24%) provided positively-framed reasonable 
assurance opinions (2010/1: 10 – 24% and 2007/9: 7 – 24%); while 13 (26%) provided a 
combination of limited assurance on some aspects of the CSR report and reasonable assurance on 
others (2010/1: 8 – 19% and 2007/8: 3 – 17%).   
Table 6.5 – Assurance opinions provided in CSR assurance reports 
Assurance standard 2007/8 2010/1 2011/2 
Negatively-framed limited assurance  8 24 25 
Positively-framed reasonable assurance  7   10 12 
Combination of positive and negative assurance 3 8 13 
Total 18 42 50 
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Figure 6.20 – Distribution of assurance opinions provided in CSR assurance reports 
The study established that CSR assurance reports issued by auditor assurors (66% of all CSR 
assurance reports) all provided negatively-framed assurance opinions, including a few (n = 11, i.e. 
representing 22%) that provided negatively-framed limited assurance opinions on some dimensions 
and reasonable assurance opinions on others.  In addition, Corporate Citizenship (i.r.o. SABMiller), 
ERM (i.r.o. Mondi) and the internal audit activity (i.r.o. FirstRand, which did not specify an 
assurance standard) also provided negatively-framed limited assurance opinions.  The certification 
body provided reasonable assurance, and apart from Corporate Citizenship, the assurance reports 
of the remaining non-auditor assurors (26%) referencing AA1000AS, all provided positively-framed 
reasonable type 1 and/or type 2 assurance according to moderate (usually) or high assurance 
levels.  In total, therefore, 38 assurance reports (76%) provided negatively-framed limited CSR 
assurance opinions.   
By comparison, the CorporateRegister (2008) analysis of CSR assurance reports for the five 
countries depicted in Figure 6.2 established that 50% of assurance reports had positively-framed 
assurance opinions, 42% had negatively-framed opinions, and 8% did not express any opinion.  
CorporateRegister (2008) found that certification bodies and specialist consultants usually framed 
their opinions positively in their assurance reports (i.e. 92% and 73% respectively).  By 
comparison, it found that 83% of assurance reports from the Big 4 auditor assurors tended to 
provide negatively-framed assurance opinions, and accordingly a limited level of assurance, thus 
confirming the trend observed in this study. 
Negatively-framed limited CSR assurance opinions are usually worded as “nothing has come to our 
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attention causing us to believe that the ... is not fairly stated in all material respects” or “we are not 
aware of …“.  By comparison, positively-framed CSR assurance reports (i.r.o. reasonable, high and 
moderate assurance opinions) are usually worded as “in our opinion ... is prepared in all material 
respects, in accordance with ...” or “are fairly stated in all material respects”.   
A deeper scrutiny of the wording used in assurance opinions appears to indicate that auditor 
assurors tend to confine their reporting to the disclosed information.  This disclosure may, for 
example, be limited in terms of the engagement scope and worded as “the selected sustainability 
information” or as “presented in the report”.   By comparison, the opinions provided by non-auditor 
assurors tend to refer more comprehensively to the broader CSR performance and/or reporting 
frameworks.  The IRAS assurance opinions, for example, tend to conclude more comprehensively 
by stating that the “report provides a comprehensive and balanced account of (the company’s) 
environmental, safety and social performance for the period under review”.  When examining the 
nature of the opinion provided, while some reports acknowledged isolated errors, or identified 
areas requiring improvement, no assurance opinions were withheld (i.e. disclaimers of opinion) or 
were qualified (i.e. reporting major contraventions and/or significant reporting errors). 
The prominent CSR assurance role currently played by auditor assurors and the fact that they tend 
to adopt ISAE 3000 reflects the clear preference for providing negatively-framed limited assurance 
engagements, and accordingly, assurance opinions.  Nevertheless, while the provision of limited 
assurance opinions may appear to have remained relatively constant, the combination of the 
provision of both positive and negative assurance has grown.  Multiple assurance opinions within a 
single CSR assurance report are expected to continue growing as the assurance processes and 
methodologies of (primarily) auditor assurors mature and adapt to accommodate the needs of their 
engagement principals, which may in turn be responding to stakeholder requirements.   
6.16.2 Reporting company survey 
As illustrated in Figure 6.18 in section  6.6, the majority of survey respondents confirmed that the 
audit opinion provided was one of the most important components of a CSR assurance report. 
6.16.3 Assuror interviews  
Aligned to the ultimate objective of independent CSR assurance being to confirm the veracity of 
CSR disclosures, some assuror participants asserted that the assurance opinion was the most 
important aspect of an independent CSR assurance report.  The assurance opinion should therefore 
indicate whether the underlying CSR disclosures could be relied upon for decision-making.  This is 
implied by the comment that: “More recently our engagement is really going high up in the 
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organisation.  It is going to the CEO.  It is going to the CFO.  It is going to the audit committee.”  
At the same time, the comment’s focus on internal stakeholders appears to confirm instrumental 
shareholder assertions described in sections  2.4.2 and  2.4.7. 
6.16.4 Analysis and integration of results 
The assurance opinion provided reflects the assuror’s view as expressed in the assurance report 
about the veracity of the underlying CSR disclosures, as measured against appropriate 
predetermined criteria and standards (AccountAbility, 2008a).  The assurance opinion is therefore a 
key component of the CSR assurance engagement (Al-Hamadeen, 2007).  Paragraph 49(j) of 
ISAE 3000 allows assurors to provide separate opinions when the assurance engagement covers 
several aspects of a CSR report. 
While reasonable and limited assurance opinions may refer to fundamentally different assurance 
levels, the actual wording used is usually so discreet that an uninformed person may not notice the 
difference.  At first reading there appears to be little difference between negatively-framed and 
positively-framed assurance opinions expressed in CSR assurance reports.  When delving deeper, it 
becomes clear that by expressing a positively-framed assurance opinion, the assurance provider 
confirms that the evidence suggests that the disclosed information is reliable.  By contrast, in 
negatively-framed assurance opinions the assuror indicates that it cannot see any reason why the 
results should not be as expected.  Since auditor assurors are the primary collective providers of 
independent CSR assurance reports, it may be argued that the implied limitations of their 
negatively-framed limited assurance opinions impair the underlying objective of independent CSR 
assurance.  This is exacerbated by the tendency for auditor assurors to limit their liability to their 
engagement principals (as described in section  6.11).  Conversely, CSR assurance opinions 
provided by non-auditor assurors tend to provide higher assurance levels (Owen & O’Dwyer, 2004).  
This nuanced differentiation however, creates user confusion that undermines the purpose of 
independent assurance. 
The empirical results suggest that by providing positively-framed reasonable assurance opinions, 
non-auditor assurors tend to provide higher levels of assurance (Ackers, 2009; Manetti & Becatti, 
2009; Marx & Van Dyk, 2011; Wiertz, 2009).  By comparison, auditor assurors tend to provide 
negatively-framed limited assurance opinions.  Moreover, specialist CSR assurors typically consist of 
CSR experts who can add value to both the reporting company and its stakeholders through 
enhanced commentary (Owen & O’Dwyer, 2004).  Despite auditor assurors tending to provide 
lower levels of assurance, it may paradoxically be argued that CSR assurance provided by auditor 
assurors continue to be perceived by stakeholders as being more credible than assurance provided 
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by non-auditor assurors. 
6.17 Adequacy of existing CSR reporting and assurance frameworks and standards 
6.17.1 Background  
Unlike the standardised format and layout of AFS audit reports with which all auditors must comply 
(Al-Hamadeen, 2007; Maury, 2000), this study identified significant variation in the layout and 
structure of CSR assurance reports.  This variation is particularly evident amongst the different CSR 
assurance providers, even reflecting differences in the CSR assurance reports issued by the same 
CSR assuror.  Not only did the structure of the various CSR assurance reports differ, but the 
nuanced wording used in CSR reports also tends to result in different interpretations of the same 
phenomena.  This assertion may be illustrated by the description on limited and reasonable 
assurance levels and opinions reflected in sections  6.13 and  6.16.  A further example relates to the 
nature and extent of work performed during the assurance engagement.  Whereas some assurance 
engagements may involve verifying CSR-related disclosures, others may only consist of interviews 
or perfunctory reviews of processes and/or documentation (Ackers, 2009; CorporateRegister, 2008; 
Manetti & Becatti, 2009).   
This study reveals that existing CSR assurance practices, and accordingly, CSR assurance reports 
do not provide stakeholders, who are arguably the intended audience for CSR reporting (Aras & 
Crowther, 2008; Eccles, 2010; Gouws & Cronjé, 2008; Morimoto et al., 2005) with confidence that 
the underlying CSR disclosures can be relied upon, or are comparable.  This is exacerbated by the 
wide range of terminologies used to describe CSR-related issues (Aras & Crowther, 2008; Kirdahy, 
2007b; Votaw, 1972).  These terms, possibly meaning different things to different people, are often 
used interchangeably.  The absence of a standardised framework for reporting CSR performance 
results in different issues being reported, impairing the ability to ensure that all material CSR-
related issues are consistently disclosed (Aras & Crowther, 2008; Jenkins, 2001; Manetti & Becatti, 
2009; Morimoto et al., 2005). 
The lack of clarity in CSR assurance reports is highlighted when reviewing the engagement scope, 
the assurance work undertaken and the disclosed assurance engagement limitations.  Moreover, 
the nature of the company’s operations and/or the industry sector implies that different CSR-
related issues may be material to the various reporting companies.  The complex scope of CSR-
related issues directly influences the nature and scope of the CSR assurance engagement, which 
not only impairs user comprehension about the aspects of CSR performance that have been 
assured, but more importantly, by omission, the areas that have not.  Report users may therefore 
require in-depth knowledge about the company and/or industry in order to properly comprehend 
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the impact of CSR reporting and assurance. 
Despite still being in the early developmental stages, both the demand for, and the provision of 
CSR reporting and assurance are expected to continue growing, even if only to comply with the 
King III and JSE listing requirements in South Africa.  It is predicted that existing CSR reporting 
and assurance practices will harmonised over time.  By comparison, despite having already been a 
mandatory requirement for several centuries, financial accounting and assurance practices still 
continue evolving. 
6.17.2 Mandatory and voluntary CSR reporting and assurance  
The lack of a mandatory CSR assurance standard that is universally applicable to all CSR assurors 
undermines the ability of CSR report and CSR assurance report users to compare CSR performance 
and does not provide adequate confidence that the underlying disclosures may be relied upon 
(Manetti & Toccafondi, 2012).  Despite this study asserting that companies disclose their CSR 
performance to comply with the King III principles, and King III advocating voluntarism, the 
majority of survey respondents and assurors interviewed supported the imposition of government 
regulation and legislation for CSR reporting and assurance, as asserted by Ho and Wong (2001).   
The risk however, exists that companies will support perfunctory and relatively weak codes of 
governance instead, adopting a ‘tick-box’ approach by only complying with the minimum 
requirements (Wells, 2007; Jenkins, 2001).  Therefore, despite the arguments in favour of 
voluntarism (Ackers, 2009; Esser, 2008; Marx & Van Dyk, 2011; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Owen, et al., 
2000; Rea, 2011; Wines, 2008), in order to improve CSR governance, it is submitted that 
government should legislate, regulate and stringently enforce CSR compliance (Spencer [sa]; van 
Gass, 2008), notwithstanding Becht et al.’s (2005) contention that regulators may be ill-equipped.   
While it may be argued that mandatory legislation would facilitate the standardisation of CSR 
reporting and assurance practices, enhancing report usability and comparability, it is nevertheless 
acknowledged that mandatory requirements may also result in ‘tick-box’ compliance and even a 
desire to ‘beat the system’.  Moreover, it is suggested that company management’s aversion to 
government regulation and intervention (as described in section  2.7.5) makes it is unlikely that 
companies would lobby for government intervention.  Nevertheless, despite the existing impasse 
between mandatory and voluntary CSR reporting and assurance, this study examines what is 
ostensibly a de facto mandatory requirement for CSR reporting and assurance.   
Within a CSR context, the inappropriateness of voluntarism, is confirmed by both reporting 
company survey respondents and assurors interviewed (as described on page 175), both 
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supporting the imposition of regulatory mandatory CSR reporting and assurance.  Indicating that 
CSR reporting and assurance was already mandatory in certain countries, assurors suggested that 
it would become mandatory in South Africa as well.   
6.17.3 Standardisation of CSR reporting and assurance  
Transparency and accountability are the fundamental principles underlying CSR reporting 
(CorporateRegister, 2008; Okoye, 2009), aimed at providing stakeholders with pertinent and usable 
information (Archel et al., 2008; Gouws & Cronjé, 2008; Morimoto et al., 2005).  Unlike externally 
oriented financial reporting, which is mandatory for all companies and usually covered by IFRS, 
CSR reporting guidelines are voluntarily adopted and not prescriptive (Ackers, 2009; Marx & van 
Dyk, 2011; Rea, 2011), with their application being subject to interpretation by the reporting 
company (Archel et al., 2008).   
The disparate assurance practices utilised by the various assurance providers and the lack of 
universally accepted frameworks for CSR reporting and assurance, result in CSR assurance 
practices that do not adequately provide stakeholders with confidence that the underlying CSR 
disclosures are complete and may be relied upon (Morimoto et al., 2005).  It is accordingly argued 
that unless CSR reporting practices are standardised, it will not be possible to provide stakeholders 
with confidence that the assurance reports confirm that the underlying CSR disclosures are either 
reliable or comparable.  These proposed CSR reporting standards should be specified in sufficient 
detail, similar to that IFRS, in order to avoid their inconsistent interpretation and application.   
Despite the existence of several frameworks for CSR reporting, the GRI provides the most widely 
used and may serve as a proxy for a CSR reporting framework (as described in section  2.7.7.3) 
(Black & Quach, 2009; KPMG, 2011).  Since the application of the GRI is voluntary, its 
implementation remains subject to interpretation, resulting in extensive variation and impairing 
comparability.  Moreover, since the GRI is a reporting and not an accounting standard, it does not 
provide sufficient detail to clarify ambiguity or to overcome its inconsistent application (as 
described in section  2.4.7).  Given its widespread acceptance, it is nevertheless proposed that the 
GRI dimensions should inform the CSR components that companies must report on.  Unlike the GRI 
however, to avoid selective reporting, companies should not have flexibility to decide on the 
indicators that they wish to report on.  The GRI G4 version of the standard incorporates the 
principles for defining report content (including materiality, stakeholder inclusiveness, sustainability 
context and completeness); and the principles for ensuring report quality (namely balance, 
comparability, accuracy, timeliness, clarity and reliability) (GRI, 2013a).  As described in 
section  2.7.8, the GRI identifies the dimensions of CSR reporting and classifies it according to its 
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economic, environmental and social impacts (GRI, 2013a).  The economic dimension includes 
economic performance, market presence, indirect economic impacts and procurement practices.  
The environmental dimension covers aspects of materials, energy, water, biodiversity, emissions, 
effluents and waste, products and services, compliance, transport, overall, supplier environmental 
assessment and environmental grievance mechanisms.  The social dimension is broadly categorised 
into the sub-categories of labour practices and decent work; human rights; society; and product 
responsibility.  
Until existing anomalies in CSR reporting are addressed, the development of a conceptual CSR 
assurance framework that can be consistently applied around the world, by different types of 
assurance providers, and that will provide stakeholders with confidence that the underlying CSR 
disclosures may be relied upon and are comparable, will remain an elusive goal.  To overcome this 
deficiency, it is proposed that CSR reporting and assurance should be regulated.  This should 
stimulate the development of frameworks/standards for CSR reporting and assurance that may be 
consistently applied by all CSR assurance providers.   
This thesis proposes that a mandatory regulatory mechanism should be developed and 
implemented, which should prescribe a clearly defined CSR reporting standard to avoid selective 
disclosure.  While this proposed reporting standard should be based on the GRI G4 and consistently 
applied, reporting companies should not have the discretion to ‘cherry pick’ and selectively disclose 
their CSR reporting dimensions.  This proposed reporting standard should form the basis for 
developing a CSR assurance standard with which all assurance providers, irrespective of type, must 
comply.  Given the global diversity of CSR assurance providers, as introduced on page 252, it is 
posited that a representative body of all assurance providers should collaborate to develop this 
proposed new assurance standard.  All CSR assurors should be required to register with the 
proposed oversight body.  Moreover, accepting that the various parties currently providing 
independent CSR assurance will continue doing so, the proposed assurance standard should 
prescribe the minimum qualifications and experience that CSR assurance providers should possess.   
To ensure that CSR reporting and assurance provides stakeholders with confidence that the 
respective reports produced by the various reporting companies and assurance providers refer to 
the same issues and are comparable, a conceptual framework for CSR assurance engagements, 
based on the proposed CSR reporting standard must be developed.  This proposed framework, 
which should be consistently applied by all CSR assurors, irrespective of assuror type, will improve 
the comparability of CSR assurance reports and reduce stakeholder confusion.  Moreover, since 
reporting company CSR disclosures should reflect the manner in which companies account to their 
broader stakeholders for their non-financial performance, as envisaged by AA1000SES (as 
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described on page 73), assurors must engage with representative stakeholder bodies and address 
their CSR assurance reports to the stakeholders and not only to the company (as is currently the 
practice by auditor assurors).  Despite the anomalies in CSR assurance practices identified in this 
thesis, one of the most contentious issues that must be overcome in order to improve consistency 
is the scope of the various assurance engagements.  It is however, argued that defining the scope 
of CSR activities covered in an assurance engagement can only be standardised once appropriate 
CSR reporting frameworks have been developed and standardised. 
6.17.4 CSR assurance framework 
To ensure that CSR assurance provides stakeholders with confidence about the usefulness and 
veracity of company CSR disclosures, before a conceptual framework for CSR assurance can be 
developed, a suitable CSR accounting and reporting standard must first be developed, implemented 
and consistently applied.  This CSR accounting and reporting standard should not only address the 
scope of activities that should be covered, but also prescribe the manner in which the various 
dimensions should be accounted for and disclosed.  The CSR assurance framework should 
therefore ensure that the CSR assurance engagement considers all the CSR-related issues material 
to the reporting company, in order to provide stakeholders with confidence that the underlying CSR 
disclosures are complete, valid, accurate, reliable, relevant, comparable, and presented in a usable 
format. 
6.17.5 Regulation  
As implied by both reporting company respondents (as reflected in Figure 5.6) and assuror 
participants (as described on page 175), and contrary to the King III principle of voluntarism (as 
described in section  2.7.5.3), this thesis argues that regulations and legislation should be 
promulgated to prescribe mandatory and detailed CSR accounting, reporting and assurance 
standards to introduce an element of consistency, and enhance comparability.  This should reduce 
the impact of anomalies such as the type of assurance provider, the assurance standard, the 
assurance engagement scope, the assurance provider’s qualifications and expertise, and the 
assurance procedures used. 
Despite proposing the imposition of mandatory frameworks, these should remain sufficiently 
flexible to accommodate individual company heterogeneity based on regional differences, CSR 
reporting experience, the size and scale of company operations, and stakeholder expectations 
(CorporateRegister, 2008; De Beelde & Tuybens, 2013).  In order to ensure consistency and 
comparability, a typical independent CSR assurance report should therefore refer concisely and 
unambiguously to the (AccountAbility, 2008a; Al-Hamadeen, 2007; ICAEW, 2004): 
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• assurance engagement objectives and scope 
• the respective responsibilities of management and the assuror 
• the assurance methodology deployed 
• the stakeholder engagement process 
• the systems, processes and underlying data 
• the engagement limitations 
• the engagement results 
• the assurance opinion(s) relating to the veracity of the underlying CSR disclosures 
6.18 Suitability of the SAICA-endorsed curriculum to prepare CSR auditor assurors  
Since the audit profession is a significant provider of CSR assurance (as illustrated by Figure 6.13) 
(Ackers, 2009; CorporateRegister, 2008; Manetti & Becatti, 2009; Marx & van Dyk, 2011; O’Dwyer 
et al., 2011; Perego & Kolk, 2012; Wiertz; 2009), auditor assuror interview participants were 
probed to establish whether the existing curricula for aspirant auditing practitioners at South 
African tertiary academic institutions adequately address and develop the competencies needed to 
provide CSR assurance.  In this regard, Gouws and Cronjé (2008) acknowledge that the existing 
education, training and development regimen for auditing candidates, prescribed by SAICA, 
inadequately address CSR reporting and assurance.  It is therefore appropriate to briefly consider 
the auditing profession’s ability to capitalise on this emerging opportunity to expand their range of 
assurance services (as reflected in the research objectives in section  4.2.3).  Arguing that it was 
more important for tertiary education institutions to continue developing conventional auditing 
skills, one participant suggested that qualified auditors could easily be trained to provide CSR 
assurance, as indicated by the following statement: 
“It is better to take a trained auditor and help him understand how to calculate a carbon 
footprint, than to take an engineer and turn him into an auditor.  The most important thing 
for me is the discipline in documentation and a sceptical mind-set and those are things that I 
think people learn through universities and their (auditing) training contracts and that is not 
something you can instil in somebody who is five to six years into their careers in a different 
discipline.  I think the curriculum of trainees is already quite full.  For that reason I don’t 
think all our trainees should be experts in GRI or AA or anything like that.  I do believe they 
need to understand the concept of integrated reporting well.  And I think that they need to 
know that there are frameworks and that the indicators are defined.”   
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By contrast, predicting that the auditing curriculum will continue to evolve over time to include 
elementary CSR-related issues, a participant provided the analogy that: “many years ago, data 
processing was a very important subject in the curriculum, because it was a completely new thing 
and everybody had to know what it was about.  But you know that it was an awareness course but 
nothing else.  So you became aware, but you were not an expert at that point in time.”   
Suggesting that the lack of involvement by tertiary institutions in the development of CSR 
competencies could be overcome by using appropriately skilled multidisciplinary teams, another 
assuror participant argued that the apparent lack of skills was a ‘non-issue’ since “we call in 
specialists when we do an IT audit, or when we do an insurance company we call in an actuary”.  
Similarly, to compensate for a lack of the technical CSR skills that may be required to address 
particular aspects of an assurance engagement, auditor assurors may rely on the expertise of 
specialists to assist in their CSR assurance engagements when required, as envisaged by ISA 620.  
An assuror confirmed the depth of its extended multidisciplinary skills resource pool by commenting 
that: “I presently have two engineers who do the technical work and my auditors do the 
documentation.  They are the brains that walk through the client and check for this and check for 
that.  The actual auditing and documenting and the expressing of the opinion, I can see being 
done by the auditors”. 
6.19 Conclusion 
The assuror interviews revealed that CSR assurance was not a new phenomenon with most CSR 
assurors already been involved in CSR reporting, consulting and assurance services for some time 
(usually longer than the reporting companies studied).  Moreover, the depth of knowledge and 
experience of assurors involved the provision of CSR reporting and assurance services, enhanced 
by insights from continuous interaction with various reporting companies, improve the ability of 
assurors to understand the contextual nature of the emerging characteristics of CSR reporting and 
assurance (albeit skewed in favour of their own organisations). 
As illustrated in Figure 5.2 a broad range of stakeholders rely on the CSR disclosures provided by 
reporting companies.  Despite acknowledging the relative importance of all stakeholders, interview 
participants confirmed the prevalence of instrumental shareholder primacy by identifying the 
primary users of both CSR reports and CSR assurance reports as being management and the 
reporting company’s shareholders.  Auditor assurors interviewed accordingly confirmed that they 
addressed their CSR assurance reports to their principals at the reporting company.  Furthermore, 
auditor assurors justified their practice of limiting their liability to their assurance engagement 
principals by arguing that since they were engaged by the company, they had a concomitant duty 
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to report to them.  Moreover, these auditor assuror participants asserted that the CSR assurance 
report findings could only be fully understood and interpreted by parties who were in possession of 
the detailed management report.  By contrast, the non-auditor assuror emphasised the importance 
of engaging stakeholders in order to identify and include the parties that were likely to rely on the 
reporting company’s CSR disclosures.  Assurors should therefore address their CSR assurance 
reports to the broader stakeholders that rely on the underlying CSR disclosures, and not only to 
company shareholders and management.  
The study revealed a growing trend for the larger top 200 JSE-listed companies to provide 
independent CSR assurance, as asserted by slack resource theory described in section  2.4.6 
(Cacioppe et al., 2008; Eccles et al., 2008; Jenkins, 2001; Maignan et al., 1999; Orlitzky et al., 
2003; Saleh, 2009; Waddock & Graves, 1997).  Despite the CSR assurance rate only representing 
26% of reporting companies studied in 2011/2, this represented 70% of the total JSE market 
capitalisation in April 2012.  This disproportionate growth in the provision of CSR assurance 
confirms the assertion that larger companies were more likely to provide independent CSR 
assurance.  The study also revealed a greater propensity for companies in the heavily regulated 
resources, financial services and telecommunications industries to provide independent assurance 
on their CSR disclosures.  Despite the relatively slow uptake, the data in the study reveal that the 
provision of independent CSR assurance has grown steadily, increasing significantly following the 
implementation of King III.  It is accordingly predicted that this upward trend will continue 
accelerating (Davis, 2005; Salgado, 2008) as the CSR practices of reporting companies mature and 
as they develop their capacity to comply more fully with the King III principles.   
Reasons advanced by survey respondents for providing independent CSR assurance included that it 
was a King III requirement; it demonstrated improved transparency, responsibility, accountability 
and good corporate citizenship; and it improved the extent of reliance that stakeholders could place 
on the underlying company CSR disclosures.  Conversely, the primary reasons advanced for not 
providing CSR assurance were that it provided minimal value to stakeholders; stakeholders trusted 
their company CSR disclosures; stakeholders did not use the disclosed CSR information for 
decision-making; it was too expensive and too time consuming; it was sufficient that their CSR 
disclosures were reviewed by internal audit; or because it was not a legal requirement.   
Despite the assertion that independent CSR assurance illustrates the company’s commitment to 
broader stakeholder accountability, reasons provided by survey respondents for not doing so, 
appear to support the contention that some companies will only provide independent CSR 
assurance if it was a legal requirement.  It also confirms that certain aspects of CSR were already 
mandatory, for example BBBEE.  In this regard, as described in section  2.7.7.2, it is argued that 
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independent CSR assurance provision was already a mandatory requirement in terms of the JSE 
regulations, albeit on a ‘apply or explain’ basis.  Even though several companies did not provide 
independent CSR assurance at the time of the survey, they were developing their capacity to do so 
in the future.  Assurors interviewed suggested that some reporting companies do not provide CSR 
assurance due to deficiencies in the systems recording and monitoring their CSR performance; 
inappropriate evaluation criteria; it being considered to be an unnecessary expense that does not 
add value; or because reporting companies know that their CSR data were unreliable and would 
not withstand rigorous assurance scrutiny. 
Similarly, assurors interviewed suggested that reporting companies provide independent assurance 
on their CSR disclosures in order to adhere to the King III requirements; to enhance the company’s 
own confidence in the information provided; to reduce the information asymmetry arising from the 
agency problem; to legitimise the company and its operations; and/or to respond to peer/industry 
pressure.  The decision for reporting companies to select a particular CSR assurance provider was 
accordingly not based on any single factor, but on a combination of the expertise, track record, 
global reach and reputation of the CSR assuror, with the engagement cost also playing an 
important role.  To ensure that the assurance engagement was undertaken by a competent 
assurance team, some assurors interviewed suggested that the diverse nature of the activities 
covered in specific CSR assurance engagements often require the use of multidisciplinary assurance 
teams.  While this may suggest a strong preference for large established assurors, this deficiency 
may be overcome when smaller assurors contract in specialist skills when appropriate.  Aligned to 
the decision to select a CSR assuror, the various assuror participants identified different aspects of 
the CSR assurance report as being the most important.  These included the engagement scope, the 
information relevance, the materiality of the disclosures, the assuror’s credibility and brand, the 
assurance opinion provided and the recommendations for improvement. 
Despite the observation that 59% of survey respondents revealed that their respective companies 
provided independent assurance on their CSR disclosures, with several already having being doing 
so since before the advent of King III, this was not corroborated by the content analysis, which 
found that only 26% of the companies studied published their independent CSR assurance reports.  
The majority of respondents at companies that did not provide independent CSR assurance 
indicated that they planned doing so by 2015.  Since the sample for both the content analysis and 
the survey dealt with exactly the same research population, it is proposed that this divergence may 
be attributed to the purposive selection of respondents combined with possible respondent bias.  
Nevertheless, despite this possible respondent bias, the survey observations illustrate a growing 
awareness amongst respondents at reporting companies for CSR reporting and assurance.   
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The content analysis observation that auditor assurors were the most common CSR assurance 
providers was confirmed by survey respondents.  These findings confirm the observations of other 
researchers (Ackers, 2009; CorporateRegister, 2008; Manetti & Becatti, 2009; Marx & Van Dyk, 
2011) that auditor assurors (and the Big 4 in particular) collectively continue to provide the 
majority of CSR assurance reports.  While internal auditors were perceived as the second most 
common CSR assuror, this was not validated by the content analysis of published independent CSR 
assurance reports, which only identified a single instance of reporting companies publishing a CSR 
assurance report issued by an internal audit activity in each of the periods covered by this study.  It 
is suggested that this discrepancy may be attributed to CSR assurance provided to internal 
company stakeholders, by the internal audit activity using a risk-based audit approach as part of 
combined assurance described in section  2.7.7.2 (Coetzee & Lubbe, 2011; IoD, 2009b; PwC, 2009; 
Sarens et al., 2012), and is therefore not intended for external stakeholder consumption.  As 
described on page 220, in several instances, this internal audit involvement was disclosed in the 
body of the annual report and not in a CSR assurance report. 
Although the content analysis observed that collectively, auditor assurors were the primary 
providers of independent CSR assurance, survey respondents actually indicated that specialist CSR 
assurors were the most suitable providers of independent CSR assurance, followed by internal 
auditors and the Big 4 audit firms.  This paradox may be attributed to the observation that apart 
from Michael Rea at IRAS (whose practice grew significantly during the five year period covered by 
the content analysis study), other specialist CSR assurors did not yet develop their capacity to 
meaningfully penetrate the South African independent CSR assurance market, which has 
historically been dominated by the Big 4 auditor assurors.  Moreover, the global scale of operations 
of the Big 4 audit firms imply that they may have access to deep pools of specialist resources and 
skills, albeit contracted in.  Respondents perceived non-Big 4 audit firms as being the least 
appropriate organisations for providing independent CSR assurance, probably due to their 
respective firm brands not being as recognisable as the Big 4 audit firms, as well as the perception 
that external auditors were not necessarily experts in all types of assurance.  This may be as a 
result of the perception that the relative size of smaller audit firms may mean that they did not 
have the requisite skills to meaningfully undertake a CSR assurance engagement.   
As CSR reporting and assurance become embedded in South African company practice, and as 
more independent CSR assurors start providing CSR assurance, this Big 4 audit firm dominance is 
expected to diminish over time.  Although participation by specialist CSR assurors is expected to 
grow due to their specialisation in CSR-related matters and the provision of ‘value-added’ advice as 
described in section  6.4.2 and highlighted by Figure 6.15, the audit profession is expected to 
remain the collective primary provider of independent CSR assurance, primarily due to their 
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entrenched reputation in the South African commercial environment.  Despite potentially 
compromising their independence and objectivity, the need for assurors to provide value-added 
advice also highlights the reporting company’s need for assistance to improve the consistently 
quality of its CSR practices and disclosures, confirming that CSR reporting and assurance practices 
are still in a developmental stage.   
The content analysis observations suggest that non-auditor assurors provide greater levels of 
assurance, greater value-added by producing recommendations for improvement and are 
accordingly identified as being the preferred providers of independent CSR assurance by reporting 
company survey respondents.  Nevertheless, assurance provided by auditor assurors may still be 
perceived as being better than assurance provided by non-auditor assurors (Owen & O’Dwyer, 
2004; Wiertz, 2009), as illustrated by the content analysis finding that collectively, auditor assurors 
were the primary providers of independent CSR assurance.   
The content analysis reveals that the most comprehensive and unambiguous CSR assurance 
reports appear to be those issued by specialist CSR assurors, especially CA-Governance and to a 
lesser extent IRAS.  By contrast, the CSR assurance reports issued by auditor assurors tend to be 
more ambiguous and generic, without providing the necessary detailed information relating to each 
specific engagement that stakeholders may require for decision-making.  In this regard, both the 
structure and format of CSR assurance reports issued by auditor assurors appear similar to those 
provided by the auditors of conventional AFS audits (refer to Table 7.1), which largely reflect 
compliant or non-compliant performance within predetermined parameters, but without providing 
the underlying detail necessary to meaningfully interpret and understand the nature and scope of 
the CSR assurance engagement and accordingly the CSR assurance report.  Even though non-
auditor assurors appear to disclose more relevant information relating to their CSR assurance 
practices than auditor assurors, it is asserted that these disclosures still do not consistently 
adequately cover all the material issues that the users of CSR reporting and assurance may 
consider important.  Moreover, the inconsistent application and the technical nature of the CSR 
assurance engagement practices further undermine the extent of reliance that stakeholders may 
place on the CSR assurance report and the underlying CSR disclosures.   
The data considered in the content analysis phase of the thesis were confined to information that 
was publicly available.  Therefore, while this thesis acknowledges the established practice that CSR 
assurors usually provide a separate management report reflecting the detailed results of the 
assurance engagement as well as recommendations for improvement, this report is usually 
produced confidentially and is not publicly available.  
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While the content analysis found that AA1000AS and ISAE 3000 were the primary standards used 
on CSR assurance engagements, these standards mean different things (AccountAbility, 2008a).  
While the assurance standard most suitable for providing meaningful CSR assurance remains a 
contentious issue for assurance providers, the decision about which standard(s) to use is primarily 
driven by the type of CSR assurance provider.  The lack of a universally accepted CSR assurance 
standard that consistently applies to all providers of independent CSR assurance increases 
stakeholder confusion, and undermines their ability to understand the nature, scope and results of 
the CSR assurance engagement.  This particularly applies when trying to establish exactly which 
aspects of the CSR report were assured, which aspects were excluded and even the extent to 
which CSR assurance was provided.  This ambiguity is further complicated by the emerging nature 
of the CSR assurance phenomenon and the CSR maturity of the reporting company, which may 
result in certain reporting companies changing their CSR assurors as they attempt to understand 
which assuror provides greater value, or even which assuror will give them the confirmation that 
they seek.  Moreover, this impact is further exacerbated by the considerable variation in the poorly 
defined assurance engagement scope by the diverse assurance providers in their various CSR 
assurance reports.  Collectively, these factors cloud perceptions about the confidence that the 
broader corporate stakeholders can gain from the independent CSR assurance provided, and 
accordingly, the veracity of the underlying CSR disclosures.  The development of a new CSR 
assurance standard applicable to all assurors should address some of the identified shortcomings 
and reduce the confusion caused by the various assurors using different assurance standards that 
may suit their organisations, but do not adequately respond to the needs of reporting companies. 
The observation that the majority of CSR assurance reports were addressed to ‘internal company 
users’, confirms the contention of auditor assurors interviewed that the intended beneficiaries of 
their CSR assurance were their engagement principals.  Moreover, this assertion is confirmed by 
the practice of auditor assurors deliberately confining their assurance reports to their principals and 
excluding any ‘non-intended users’ from relying on their CSR assurance reports and, accordingly, 
the underlying CSR disclosures.  Despite the objective of CSR reporting and assurance being to 
transparently account to the broader company stakeholders for the impact of corporate operations, 
this implies that CSR assurance reports are produced for the benefit of the company’s shareholders 
and not for their stakeholders, effectively undermining the fundamental objective of CSR reporting 
and assurance.  Instrumental shareholder primacy is further confirmed by the preferred use of 
auditor assurors by reporting companies, despite a declared preference for specialist CSR assurors.  
The increase in the demand for CSR assurance together with the expectation that it will continue 
growing, provide opportunities for new CSR assurance providers to begin providing independent 
assurance on company CSR disclosures, as well as for existing assurors to increase their 
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penetration of the CSR assurance market.  Leveraging on the positive association with the South 
African audit profession, the anticipated increased demand for independent CSR assurance 
presents an opportunity for auditor assurors to expand their range of professional services.  At the 
same time, CSR assurance addresses the audit expectation gap (as described in section  3.3.3.5).  
While it may be argued that the Big 4 audit firms have already entrenched their collective CSR 
assurance dominance, in order to capitalise on this emerging opportunity emerging CSR assurors 
need to develop their capacity and ensure that they have access to the necessary competencies 
(either in-house or in-sourced) to provide this service at an appropriate standard.  Moreover, the 
current intransigence of the broader audit profession in CSR-related issues creates an opportunity 
for professional bodies (such as SAICA), tertiary education institutions and independent training 
providers to design and provide training and development programmes aimed at developing the 
competencies necessary to undertake CSR assurance engagements.  On the other hand, failing to 
capitalise on the opportunities emerging from the anticipated increased demand for independent 
CSR assurance will result in non-auditor assurors increasingly assuming this role at the expense of 
the audit profession (as predicted in section  6.4).   
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7.1 Introduction 
This concluding chapter provides a brief synopsis of this thesis, highlighting significant conclusions 
representing its academic contribution.  Chapters 2 and 3 provide the theoretical framework by 
introducing and describing the academic discourse relating to CSR reporting and CSR assurance 
respectively.  Within the context of this theoretical framework, Chapter 4 identifies the research 
objectives and describes the methodological orientation of this study.  Chapters 5 and 6 describe 
the collective results of the three empirical research phases in terms of the CSR reporting and CSR 
assurance theoretical frameworks.  This final chapter concludes the thesis by reflecting on the 
extent to which the research problem and objectives have been addressed, and establishes the 
basis upon for defending the thesis statement advanced for this research.   
The content analysis of CSR reports and CSR assurance reports provided the initial source of 
empirical data used in this study, while the survey responses assisted to understand the emerging 
characteristics of CSR assurance from a reporting company perspective.  The survey observations 
identified additional characteristics that were not detected in the content analysis phase, while also 
validating the observations of the other research phases.  The survey established that despite its 
recent topicality, independent CSR assurance provision was not a new phenomenon.  Several 
reporting companies had already been having their CSR disclosures independently assured, before 
it was required by King III and JSE.  Others only started doing so after the King III and JSE 
requirement, while the remaining non-compliant companies confirming that they planned doing so 
in the future.  Similarly, most assurors interviewed revealed that they had already been providing 
CSR assurance services to their clients for some time. 
The study identifies a variety of assurance providers that currently provide independent assurance 
on the CSR disclosures of reporting companies, usually covering a different assurance engagement 
scope and deploying various CSR assurance practices.  These diverse CSR assurance practices 
undermine the true objective of independent assurance on CSR disclosures, and do not adequately 
provide stakeholders with sufficient confidence that the underlying CSR disclosures may be relied 
upon. 
7.2 Comparison between CSR assurance and AFS audit engagements  
Since the audit profession remains the primary provider of independent CSR assurance, and given 
the similarities between auditing and assurance, it is appropriate to briefly consider CSR assurance 
engagement practices and characteristics against the established and standardised practices 
relating to AFS audit engagements.  Table 7.1 provides a synopsis of pertinent observations 
extracted from the content analysis in the first phase; the interviews in the third phase; and the 
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assurance frameworks used.  In this regard, auditor assurors used ISA 700 for AFS audit 
engagements and ISAE 3000 for CSR assurance engagements.  By contrast, non-auditor assurors 
primarily used AA1000AS.  Unlike the highly regulated and mandatory AFS audits, and despite the 
implications of the King III principles and the JSE regulations, CSR assurance remains largely 
unregulated.   
The lack of an enforceable regulatory CSR assurance regime has impaired the development of 
standardised CSR assurance practices.  This has resulted in the inconsistent application of different 
CSR assurance practices by various CSR assurance providers.  The information contained in 
Table 7.1 contextually differentiates between the practices of auditors involved in AFS audit 
engagements and the CSR assurance engagement practices of both auditor assurors and non-
auditor assurors.  Table 7.1 therefore differentiates between the primary characteristics of CSR 
assurance provided by each type of CSR assurance provider, juxtaposed against the characteristics 
of AFS audits.   
Therefore, where appropriate, the table only provides an overview of the most common 
characteristics.  However, unlike the CSR assurance characteristics that were empirically 
established in this study, the characteristics of AFS audits were determined from the auditing 
standards (ISAs)n, or are anecdotal and based on experience. 
Table 7.1 – Synopsis of research results 
 AFS auditors CSR auditor assurors CSR non-auditor 
assurors 
Regulatory 
framework 
Mandatory: 
• Companies Act 
• Public Audit Act  
Ostensibly voluntary: 
• King III 
• JSE regulations 
Ostensibly voluntary: 
• King III 
• JSE regulations 
Engagement scope  All transactions 
influencing the 
company’s annual 
financial statements  
Determined by the 
reporting company 
Determined by the 
reporting company 
Assurance 
providers  
Only IRBA auditors 
registered in terms of 
above legislation  
Not specified: 
- audit firms (primarily the 
Big 4) 
- internal audit 
Not specified: 
- certification bodies; 
- specialist CSR assurors 
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 AFS auditors CSR auditor assurors CSR non-auditor 
assurors 
Report titles “Independent Auditor’s 
Report”   
Primarily “Independent 
assurance report”, but 
application thereof was 
inconsistent 
Various titles, with common 
titles including 
“Independent assurance 
report”, “Independent 
assurance report on 
selected sustainability 
information”, “Assurance 
report”, “Independent third 
party assurance reports” or 
“Statement of assurance” 
Independence  The audit report title 
must disclose the 
independence of the 
auditor 
The assurance report title 
must disclose the 
independence of the 
assuror 
AA1000AS requires 
assurors not to accept 
engagements where their 
independence would be 
compromised 
Report addressee According to the terms 
of the engagement  
The party or parties to 
whom the report is 
directed, which should 
include all possible users   
AA1000AS requires the 
assurance report to clearly 
identify the intended users 
of the assurance report  
 
Assuror’s liability 
Not stated but implicitly 
confined to the 
members, as indicated 
in the report addressee 
Limited to their 
engagement principals 
No restriction 
Standards Comprehensive auditing 
standards (ISAs) 
relating to various 
aspects of the audit 
engagement   
Primarily ISAE 3000, 
although AA1000AS is used 
when requested by 
reporting company 
Primarily AA1000AS, with 
the occasional use of 
ISAE 3000, ISO19011 and 
ISO14064-3:2006  
Competencies Not stated since auditors 
have to be registered 
with the IRBA which has 
specific competency 
requirements  
ISAE 3000 requires auditor 
assurors to only accept 
engagements for which 
they have the necessary 
competencies   
AA1000AS requires 
assurors to only accept 
engagements for which 
they have the necessary 
competencies   
Recommendations  Not required, although 
the established practice 
is to provide a separate 
management report   
Not required, although 
established practice is to 
provide a separate 
management report   
AA1000AS requires 
assurors to include 
recommendations for 
improvement in a published 
assurance report 
Assurance levels 
and opinion 
Usually reasonable, with 
opinions being qualified, 
qualified or disclaimed 
Either reasonable and/or 
limited, but usually 
provided in a negative form 
limited opinion that may be 
qualified, qualified or 
disclaimed 
Either moderate and/or 
high, but usually a 
reasonable opinion 
expressed in a positive 
form   
Despite isolated exceptions, such as Enron, WorldCom etc., Table 7.1 appears to suggest that the 
highly regulated AFS auditing environment has produced robust, consistent and comparable 
auditing practices relating to AFS audit engagements.  By comparison, the various CSR assurance 
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approaches deployed by the different CSR assurors in this study do not appear to be as robust, or 
have been inconsistently applied, impairing comparability.  It is also acknowledged that CSR 
assurance’s voluntary nature does not prevent any party (even one without any demonstrable 
competencies) from providing independent CSR assurance, further impairing the ability to adopt a 
consistent CSR assurance approach that utilises a standardised assurance framework and conforms 
to specific assurance standards and practices.  By comparison, AFS-related audit regulations and 
frameworks prescribe the parties that may provide independent AFS audits and the competencies 
that the auditor must possess; define the scope of the AFS audit engagement, and determine the 
wording used in AFS audit reports.   
7.3 Alignment of study objectives and empirical results 
Collectively, the diversity of CSR assurance practices by various assurance providers undermine the 
confidence of stakeholders about the extent of confidence that should be placed on reported CSR 
performance, particularly in terms of what was disclosed, what was omitted and which dimensions 
were assured.  This lack of confidence is exacerbated by inconsistencies in the nature and extent of 
assurance provided and/or the assurance procedures applied.  For ease of comparison, the study 
findings described in chapters 5 and 6 are briefly summarised below and aligned to the research 
objectives identified in section  4.2.3.  
• CSR assurance characteristics 
Although components that should be included in a CSR assurance framework have been 
identified, the study does not attempt to provide a definitive framework for CSR reporting and 
assurance.  Instead, it proposes that the identified inconsistencies in CSR reporting and 
assurance practices can only be effectively addressed through legislation and regulation, 
which will provide a CSR reporting and assurance framework that could be consistently 
applied by all assurance providers.   
- CSR assuror competencies  
The assuror’s skills and competencies were confirmed as one of the most important 
reasons for choosing a CSR assuror.   
- CSR assuror independence 
The importance of independence was confirmed by all assurors disclosing their 
independence. 
- CSR assurance providers   
The providers of independent assurance were identified as being auditor assurors 
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(primarily the Big 4), internal auditors, specialist CSR assurors and certification bodies. 
- Intended audience for CSR assurance reports  
Whereas non-auditor assuror practices confirm that their efforts are directed at broader 
company stakeholders, auditor assuror practices suggest that their intended beneficiaries 
were shareholders. 
- CSR assurance report titles  
Despite the use of a range of titles, “Independent assurance report on selected 
sustainability information” provides users with a more comprehensive overview of both 
the CSR assurance engagement objective and the report content. 
- CSR assurance engagement scope  
The CSR assurance engagement scope is one of the most important components of the 
CSR assurance report, and reflects the extent to which stakeholders should rely on the 
CSR assurance report and the underlying CSR disclosures.   
- CSR assurance levels and opinions 
The different assurance levels and opinions provided represent some of the most 
contentious aspects of assurance that contribute to undermining stakeholder confidence.   
- Recommendations for improvement 
The ability of assurors to assist companies to build their CSR reporting capacity by 
providing value-added advice during a CSR assurance engagement is an important factor 
that reporting companies take into account when selecting a CSR assurance provider.   
• Extent to which JSE-listed companies provide independent CSR assurance   
Despite the mandatory requirement for JSE-listed companies to have their CSR disclosures 
independently assured, only about a quarter of companies complied.  These companies tend 
to be larger and operating in environmentally sensitive industries.  
• Reporting CSR performance 
Pertinent aspects relating to the reporting of company CSR performance, upon which the CSR 
assurance engagement is based, include: 
- Stakeholders relying on CSR reports 
The variety of stakeholders interested in company CSR reports confirm the premise that 
companies have a responsibility that extends beyond shareholders. 
- Reasons reporting companies disclose their CSR performance 
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Companies report their CSR performance to stakeholders for both stakeholder and 
instrumental reasons. 
- Titles of CSR reports 
CSR report title variation undermines stakeholder confidence relating to company CSR 
performance. 
- CSR accountability 
The role of the board and audit committee in improving corporate governance was 
confirmed by CSR disclosures being approved by audit committees or another relevant 
company structure.   
• Reasons reporting companies provide independent CSR assurance 
Some companies provided independent CSR assurance because it was a King III requirement, 
while others did not do so because it was not a mandatory requirement; confirming the 
prevalence of instrumentalism, and not necessarily responsible corporate citizenship.   
• Reasons for selecting particular CSR assurance providers 
While a combination of factors are used to select a CSR assuror, the relative importance of 
each factor varies according to the reporting company’s specific circumstances, and what it 
expects to achieve.   
• Internal audit’s CSR assurance role 
Despite active involvement by internal audit in CSR assurance, this is not usually directly 
intended for external stakeholders, but rather to complement and not substitute externally 
provided CSR assurance.   
• Comparison of CSR assurance practices of auditor and non-auditor assurors 
The tendency of specialist CSR assurors providing more informative positively framed 
reasonable assurance opinions, provides stakeholders with greater value, particularly when 
considered together with recommendations for improvement that reveal deficiencies requiring 
attention.  Moreover, the practice of auditor assurors deliberately excluding ‘non intended’ 
users from relying on their reports contributes to undermining the purpose of CSR assurance.        
• Implications of existing CSR assurance practices 
The largely unregulated and voluntary nature of CSR reporting and assurance, have resulted 
in the emergence of diverse assurance practices by a variety of assurance providers. 
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• Primary standards and/or frameworks used in CSR assurance engagements 
AA1000AS and ISAE 3000 are the primary standards used on CSR assurance engagements.   
7.4 Thesis propositions 
The empirical study results confirm the following propositions advanced for this thesis:   
• Stakeholders require companies to disclose their impacts on the economy, environment and 
society.  While assurors supported shareholder primacy and instrumentalism, reporting 
company survey respondents identified a diverse range of stakeholders that rely on a 
company’s CSR disclosures (as described in section  5.2), confirmed by the reasons provided 
for companies disclosing their CSR performance (as described in section  5.3). 
• CSR disclosures should be independently assured to provide users with confidence about the 
veracity of the underlying company CSR disclosures.  Both reporting company survey 
respondents and assurors interviewed confirmed that CSR assurance provides verified CSR 
disclosures (as described in section  6.3).  The importance of the assuror’s independence was 
identified in all three empirical phases described in section  6.9. 
• The provision of independent CSR assurance will increase following the promulgation of the 
JSE regulations requiring JSE-listed companies to apply the King III provisions.  While the 
increase in the provision of independent CSR assurance may represent company responses to 
increased stakeholder demands for greater company accountability and transparency, the 
spike in 2010/1 is attributed to companies implementing the King III principles (as illustrated 
in Figure 6.2).  Moreover, survey respondents confirmed that one of the reasons their 
respective companies provide independent CSR assurance was in order to comply with 
King III (as illustrated in Figure 6.10).  This assertion is further supported by respondents 
confirming that companies that did not provide independent CSR assurance at the time of the 
study, intended doing so in future (as illustrated in Figure 6.9). 
• New entrants will begin providing independent CSR assurance to meet the increased demand.  
Table 6.4 reveals that whereas only eight assurors provided CSR assurance in 2007/8, by 
2011/2 there were fifteen independent CSR assurors.  
• Despite these new entrants, the audit profession will continue to be the primary collective 
providers of independent CSR assurance.  The collective dominance of auditor assurors is 
illustrated in Table 6.2.  The prediction that this trend will continue is substantiated by the 
descriptions in sections  6.4 and  6.19. 
• Despite tending to provide lower levels of CSR assurance, the audit profession will continue 
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to be perceived as providing more credible assurance than non-auditor assurors.  While this 
assertion is supported by several researchers, this was not supported by the empirical 
evidence.  The practice of reporting companies to use auditor assurors for their CSR 
assurance engagements, rather than specialist CSR assurors despite being the confirmed as 
the preferred providers, confirms this assertion.  It may therefore be concluded that 
ultimately, ‘actions speak loader than words’. 
• Although auditor assurors are expected to remain the primary providers of independent CSR 
assurance, the extent of this dominance will diminish over time.  This is illustrated by the 
growth of CSR assurance by IRAS from only one in 2007/8 to nine in 2011/2, to share the 
position as the most prolific CSR assuror with PwC (as illustrated in Table 6.3).  Similarly, 
Figure 6.13 reveals that the proportion of independent CSR assurance by specialist CSR 
assurors has grown from 17% in 2007/8 to 30% by 2011/2.   
7.5 Suitability of existing CSR assurance frameworks  
Despite several companies reporting their CSR performance and having it independently assured, 
the study found that the principle of voluntarism, as advocated by King III, impaired the 
standardisation of CSR reporting and assurance practices, thereby improving reporting consistency, 
usability and comparability.  It is accordingly proposed that these inconsistencies can only be 
overcome through the promulgation of CSR reporting and assurance regulations and legislation. 
7.6 Research implications 
Following the implementation of King III on 1 March 2010, this thesis represents one of the first 
studies to comprehensively examine emerging independent CSR assurance practices within a 
de facto mandatory environment.  Within this context, the study established the characteristics of 
the CSR assurance and identified the following CSR-related implications affecting reporting 
companies, industry associations, CSR assurance providers, standards bodies and government.   
• The study confirms that the provision of independent CSR assurance is increasing, and 
predicts that this growth trend will continue as JSE-listed companies develop their 
competencies to more comprehensively apply the King III principles. 
• On the assumption that independent CSR assurance should provide stakeholders with 
confidence about the completeness, relevance, validity, accuracy and reliability of company 
CSR disclosures, this thesis asserts that existing CSR assurance practices do not presently 
provide stakeholders with the necessary levels of confidence about the veracity of company 
CSR reports.   
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• This thesis accordingly asserts that these inconsistencies can be overcome through the 
imposition of mandatory that CSR reporting and assurance regulations and legislation. 
• Given the diversity of CSR assurance providers utilising different CSR assurance practices, it is 
submitted that the current impasse can only be resolved through the establishment of a 
representative oversight body, to which all types of CSR assurance providers should 
contribute and subscribe.     
• This oversight body should prescribe the competencies that CSR assurance practitioners 
should possess, and coordinate the development of appropriate frameworks that prescribe 
standardised CSR reporting and assurance practices, that applies to all types of assurance 
providers.  In addition, this oversight body should monitor and enforce the consistent 
application of the proposed competency requirement and the proposed CSR reporting and 
assurance standards. 
• Acknowledging deficiencies in existing assurance practices, the study concludes by identifying 
the obstacles that must first be overcome, proposing certain practices that should be applied 
and suggesting important characteristics that should be incorporated into a conceptual 
framework for the independent assurance of CSR reports. 
• To reduce inconsistencies, the various professional bodies representing the interests of the 
diverse assurance providers should collaborate to develop a comprehensive and dedicated 
CSR assurance standard that may be used by all CSR assurors, irrespective of type.  The 
proposed CSR assurance standard(s) should be presented in an easily understandable, 
unambiguous and comparable manner to facilitate its consistent application by the diverse 
assurors.  It should address the shortcomings of the existing standards, possibly by 
combining elements of both AA1000AS and ISAE 3000, as well as through the introduction of 
additional elements to counter the respective weaknesses of each.  
• Moreover, acknowledging the asymmetrical distribution of information caused by the agency 
problem, under certain circumstances the members of the board of directors may be held 
personally liable for breaches of their fiduciary duties.  These may include being held 
accountable for their perceived governance responsibilities (including those relating to CSR).  
It is accordingly suggested that the imposition of mandatory CSR reporting and assurance 
could protect the board from potential liability claims resulting from the adverse 
consequences of the operations of their respective companies. 
• Responding to the changes brought about by the Companies Act, 2008, and the anticipated 
reduced demand for auditing company AFS, it is suggested that independent CSR assurance 
presents an opportunity for the audit profession to expand its range of services. 
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• Moreover, as organisations recognise that independent CSR assurance represents an 
underexploited, but lucrative opportunity that may be capitalised upon, several new CSR 
assurance providers are expected to start providing independent CSR assurance.  It is 
however, predicted that the reasons attributed to the audit profession presently being the 
primary providers of independent CSR assurance will persist, resulting in its collective 
dominance continuing. 
• The predicted increased demand for independent CSR assurance implies an increased 
demand by all assurance providers for effective CSR reporting and assurance training and 
development. 
• Within the context of the prediction that the audit profession will remain the primary 
providers of independent CSR assurance, it is recommended that professional bodies such as 
SAICA, assisted by tertiary education institutions, should incorporate aspects of CSR reporting 
and assurance into the training curriculum for auditors.  The objective of this training and 
education programme should however, not necessarily be to develop competent CSR 
assurance practitioners, but rather to expose them to material non-financial issues that could 
severely affect their client companies.  Moreover, this proposed training and development 
should therefore only be the first rung on the ladder to becoming a competent CSR assurance 
practitioner.  This proposal may be compared to the introduction of information systems 
auditing into the auditing curriculum towards the end of the 20th century, without eliminating 
the need for specialist computer auditors. 
• Recognising the questionable ability (or willingness) of companies to comprehensively 
disclose their material non-financial impacts and to safeguard against the risk of green-wash, 
institutional investors only tend to factor non-financial company information into their 
valuation models, when it has been independently assured.  Since companies perceived as 
being ‘responsible corporate citizens’ find it easier to raise capital on the financial markets, 
they may therefore only disclose their CSR performance and/or provide independent 
assurance thereon, not because it is the ‘right thing to do’, but rather for instrumental 
reasons. 
7.7 Research limitations 
Despite recognising that CSR reporting and assurance practices should illustrate the company’s 
commitment to responsible corporate citizenship, this study did not empirically examine the 
perspectives of stakeholders, who should be the intended beneficiaries of these CSR practices.  
Instead, prior literature was used to confirm the need for CSR reporting and assurance.  Similarly, 
the extent to which stakeholders meaningfully consider the information contained in the CSR 
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assurance report has not been explored.    
Despite this thesis advancing the instrumentalist position for CSR reporting and assurance, it did 
not attempt to establish any correlation between CSR assurance and share value.  Similarly, 
although the research identified the extent to which reporting companies provided independent 
CSR assurance, no attempt was made to establish the extent to which companies complied, or to 
quantify the number of companies that did not explain why they did not.   
The research population was identified as being JSE-listed companies, with the purposively selected 
study sample being confined to the 200 largest JSE-listed companies.  The study results and the 
inferences and conclusions drawn therefore only apply to the companies studied and cannot 
therefore be generalised to other companies.   
While the content analysis observations in the first empirical phase were sourced from publicly 
available information, the study acknowledges that certain CSR-related documents and reports are 
confidentially distributed to company management and the board.  Therefore, any information that 
was not publicly available has accordingly been excluded.    
Even though the GRI G4 has been used as a proxy for CSR reporting, it has not been examined in 
detail.  The components of the GRI reporting framework have accordingly not been empirically 
tested and have been excluded from the scope of this thesis.   
Despite the study referring to integrated reporting and combined assurance, it was only included 
for contextual purposes.  It has therefore not been empirically tested.   
7.8 Areas for future research 
To address the research limitations described above, it is suggested that a detailed content analysis 
should be undertaken on the scope of CSR assurance engagements in order to establish exactly 
which aspects of CSR-related performance have been included and excluded.  Such a study will 
establish the extent to which CSR assurance practices address all the issues that are material to 
both the reporting company and its stakeholders, while also determining whether CSR assurance 
practices adequately address stakeholder concerns and ameliorate the effects of green-wash. 
Where companies did not have their CSR disclosures independently assured, research should be 
undertaken to establish the adequacy of the reasons provided.  Where reasons were provided, 
research should be undertaken to investigate the validity thereof. 
Since integrated reporting which involves both financial and non-financial company disclosures, has 
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only been contextually introduced, it is proposed that a study into the independent assurance of 
integrated reports be done.  Similarly, a study should be undertaken to establish the extent to 
which combined assurance has been implemented to address all the material risks facing the 
company, and to ensure that no significant assurance gaps and exist. 
Research should be undertaken in order to develop a CSR reporting standard that overcomes the 
deficiencies identified in this thesis.  This should inform further research aimed at developing a 
standardised CSR assurance framework. 
Finally, while this thesis acknowledges a need for independent assurance of company CSR 
disclosures, this was based on assertions by other researchers and complemented by the primarily 
qualitative research techniques deployed in the mixed methods approach adopted for this research.  
Appropriate quantitative research should therefore be undertaken to establish a correlation 
between independent assurance provided on CSR disclosures and the expectations of stakeholders.  
Similarly, any correlation between share price and CSR assurance should be investigated. 
7.9 Conclusion 
The study confirmed steady growth in the frequency with which reporting companies have their 
CSR disclosures independently assured.  While it is clear that King III and the JSE regulations have 
contributed to this growth in South Africa, at the same time this growth may also be attributed to a 
company desire to provide stakeholders with verified CSR disclosures that demonstrate their 
commitment to transparency and responsible corporate citizenship, and the manner in which they 
discharge their responsibility and accountability to stakeholders.   
It is however, recognised that this may not necessarily reflect responsible corporate citizenship, but 
merely because of instrumental reasons.  Irrespective of whether companies disclose their CSR 
performance and provide independent assurance thereon because of instrumental shareholder 
primacy, stakeholder theory or legitimacy theory, companies that fail to meaningfully account for 
their non-financial impacts may impair longer-term shareholder value.  The study objective was to 
understand the impact of present CSR assurance practices on the extent of confidence that 
stakeholders may have about the underlying CSR disclosures, by examining emerging CSR 
assurance practices.  Within the context of the primary objectives identified for this thesis the 
following pertinent observations warrant highlighting. 
The frequency with which the companies studied provided independent assurance on their CSR 
disclosures has steadily increased from 9% in 2007/8, to 26% by 2011/2.  Despite this CSR 
assurance growth, the rate at which CSR assurance is being provided remains low, especially since 
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all the JSE-listed companies studied, were required to have their CSR disclosures independently 
assured.  In this regard, CSR assurance should not only be about complying with some regulatory 
or corporate governance control mechanism, but should ultimately be about providing all users of 
non-financial company reporting with some degree of confidence that the underlying CSR 
disclosures may be relied upon.  Aligned to slack resource theory, the study found that larger 
companies appear to have a greater propensity to provide independent CSR assurance, with 
companies operating in highly regulated industries and with a greater impact on the social and 
environmental dimensions being more likely to do so.  This thesis however, predicts that as 
companies develop their capacity to report their CSR performance, the provision of CSR assurance 
will continue to grow, in order to comply with the King III and JSE requirements, as confirmed by 
several non-compliant companies that indicated their intention to do so in future. 
Despite their proportion of independent CSR assurance reducing over the study period, the results 
confirm that the audit profession (primarily represented by the Big 4 audit firms) collectively 
remained the dominant providers of independent CSR assurance.  The factors that contribute to 
companies selecting Big 4 auditor assurors as the primary providers of CSR assurance also provide 
opportunities for smaller auditor assurors to expand their range of professional services, which may 
in turn continue to entrench the audit profession’s collective dominance as the primary provider of 
independent CSR assurance in South Africa.   
Despite the audit profession’s collective dominance, the extent of independent CSR assurance 
provided by specialist CSR assurors is steadily increasing, reflecting particular growth in 2011/2.  As 
new non-auditor assurors enter the lucrative CSR assurance market, this growth trend is expected 
to continue.  Although the audit profession are expected to collectively remain the primary provider 
of independent assurance on in South African CSR disclosures, their present intransigence will 
result in the extent of this dominance continuing to be eroded by non-auditor assurors.   
Despite ostensibly providing CSR report users with assurance that the underlying disclosures may 
be relied upon, the extent of confidence provided by independent CSR assurance is determined by 
the type of assurance provider, the assurance standard(s) used, the competencies of the assurance 
provider, the scope of the assurance engagement and the nature of the assurance opinion 
provided.  Moreover, the characteristics of CSR assurance by specialist CSR assurors provide 
stakeholders with more comprehensive and pertinent information about the extent to which the 
underlying CSR disclosures have been verified and may be relied upon.  The CSR assurance 
practices of auditor assurors aims to provide assurance to shareholders, which is contrary to the 
objective of independent CSR assurance, which should reassure all legitimate stakeholders about 
the veracity of the underlying CSR disclosures.  Despite this assertion, stakeholders are 
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nevertheless expected to continue perceiving CSR assurance provided by auditor assurors as being 
more credible than assurance provided by non-auditors.     
This study proposes that the existing deficiencies and inconsistencies in independent CSR 
assurance practices may be overcome through the mandatory imposition of appropriate legislation 
and regulations, which should facilitate the development of an appropriate mandatory CSR 
reporting and assurance standard applicable to all CSR assurance providers.  Such regulation will 
improve the ability of stakeholders to understand the nature of CSR reporting and assurance, by 
ensuring that the proposed CSR reporting and assurance standards/frameworks are consistently 
applied by all reporting companies and CSR assurors. 
Stakeholder theory posits that companies should disclose their CSR performance and have it 
independently assured, for the benefit of their broader stakeholders.  However, the empirical 
evidence emerging from this study suggests that these practices are primarily driven by 
instrumental reasons, and not because it may be the ‘right thing to do’ as responsible corporate 
citizens.   
Irrespective of the underlying theoretical base, it is proposed that a conceptual framework should 
be developed to standardise the disparate CSR assurance practices, and to provide for the 
monitoring of CSR assurance providers and CSR assurance practices by a representative oversight 
body.  While it is argued that such a framework will improve the consistency and comparability of 
CSR assurance reports and the underlying CSR disclosures, enhancing stakeholder confidence, this 
thesis does not attempt to develop a definitive conceptual framework.  Drawing on the empirical 
observations, it does however, attempt to identify the primary components that should be included 
therein, as well as the obstacles that should be overcome before existing CSR reporting and CSR 
assurance anomalies can be addressed and resolved. 
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Annexure 1: Top 200 JSE-listed Companies (by Market Capitalisation) @ 30 April 2012 
 
Ranking  Company 
Code 
Market 
Capitalisation  
Market 
% Year ended 
      R millions 
 
  
1 British American Tobacco plc BTI  R     805 816  11.70% 31 December 2012 
2 SABMiller plc SAB  R     540 984  7.85% 31 March 2012 
3 BHP Billiton Plc BIL  R     529 774  7.69% 30 June 2012 
4 Anglo American plc AGL  R     402 881  5.85% 31 December 2011 
5 MTN Group Ltd MTN  R     256 127  3.72% 31 December 2012 
6 Compagnie Financière Richemont SA CFR  R     251 082  3.64% 31 March 2012 
7 Sasol Ltd  SOL  R     237 928  3.45% 30 June 2012 
8 Naspers Ltd  NPN  R     192 866  2.80% 31 March 2012 
9 Standard Bank Group Ltd  SBK  R     188 061  2.73% 31 December 2011 
10 Kumba Iron Ore Ltd  KIO  R     176 971  2.57% 31 December 2012 
11 Vodacom Group Ltd  VOD  R     160 848  2.33% 31 March 2012 
12 FirstRand Ltd  FSR  R     147 032  2.13% 30 June 2012 
13 Anglo American Platinum Ltd  AMS  R     135 920  1.97% 31 December 2011 
14 Absa Group Ltd  ASA  R     114 914  1.67% 31 December 2012 
15 Old Mutual plc OML  R     103 993  1.51% 31 December 2012 
16 AngloGold Ashanti Ltd  ANG  R     101 176  1.47% 31 December 2012 
17 Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd IMP  R       95 578  1.39% 30 June 2012 
18 Nedbank Group Ltd  NED  R       85 999  1.25% 31 December 2012 
19 Shoprite Holdings Ltd  SHP  R       76 687  1.11% 30 June 2012 
20 Exxaro Resources Ltd  EXX  R       73 361  1.06% 31 December 2011 
21 Gold Fields Ltd  GFI  R       71 658  1.04% 31 December 2012 
22 Sanlam Ltd  SLM  R       70 224  1.02% 31 December 2012 
23 Remgro Ltd  REM  R       63 342  0.92% 30 June 2012 
24 The Bidvest Group Ltd  BVT  R       60 254  0.87% 30 June 2012 
25 Aspen Pharmacare Holdings Ltd  APN  R       54 923  0.80% 30 June 2012 
26 Tiger Brands Ltd  TBS  R       54 337  0.79% 30 September 2012 
27 Steinhoff International Holdings Ltd  SHF  R       51 539  0.75% 30 June 2012 
28 RMB Holdings Ltd  RMH  R       47 433  0.69% 30 June 2012 
29 Woolworths Holdings Ltd  WHL  R       40 608  0.59% 24 June 2012 
30 African Rainbow Minerals Ltd  ARI  R       38 792  0.56% 30 June 2012 
31 Truworths International Ltd  TRU  R       38 252  0.56% 01 July 2012 
32 Assore Ltd  ASR  R       36 996  0.54% 30 June 2012 
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33 Growthpoint Properties Ltd  GRT  R       36 605  0.53% 30 June 2012 
34 Massmart Holdings Ltd  MSM  R       36 095  0.52% 24 June 2012 
35 Imperial Holdings Ltd  IPL  R       35 857  0.52% 30 June 2012 
36 Capital Shopping Centres Group PLC CSO  R       34 894  0.51% 31 December 2012 
37 Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd  HAR  R       32 637  0.47% 30 June 2012 
38 African Bank Investments Ltd  ABL  R       32 351  0.47% 30 September 2012 
39 Discovery Holdings Ltd  DSY  R       31 345  0.46% 30 June 2012 
40 The Foschini Group Ltd  TFG  R       30 972  0.45% 31 March 2012 
41 Life Healthcare Group Holdings Ltd  LHC  R       28 015  0.41% 30 September 2012 
42 Reinet Investments SCA REI  R       27 726  0.40% 31 March 2012 
43 Investec plc INP  R       27 532  0.40% 31 March 2012 
44 Lonmin plc LON  R       26 710  0.39% 30 September 2012 
45 Mondi plc MNP  R       26 401  0.38% 31 December 2012 
46 MMI Holdings Ltd  MMI  R       26 335  0.38% 30 June 2012 
47 ArcelorMittal South Africa Ltd ACL  R       26 299  0.38% 31 December 2012 
48 Mr Price Group Ltd  MPC  R       26 274  0.38% 31 March 2012 
49 Rand Merchant Insurance Holdings Ltd  RMI  R       25 851  0.38% 30 June 2012 
50 Mediclinic International Ltd  MDC  R       25 629  0.37% 31 March 2012 
51 Liberty Holdings Ltd  LBH  R       25 260  0.37% 31 December 2012 
52 Barloworld Ltd  BAW  R       22 632  0.33% 30 September 2012 
53 Capitec Bank Holdings Ltd  CPI  R       22 302  0.32% 28 February 2012 
54 Redefine Properties Ltd  RDF  R       22 194  0.32% 31 August 2012 
55 Pick n Pay Stores Ltd  PIK  R       21 632  0.31% 28 February 2012 
56 Uranium One Inc  UUU  R       21 327  0.31% 31 December 2011 
57 The SPAR Group Ltd  SPP  R       20 950  0.30% 30 September 2012 
58 Netcare Ltd  NTC  R       20 948  0.30% 30 September 2012 
59 Santam Ltd  SNT  R       20 551  0.30% 31 December 2012 
60 Tsogo Sun Holdings Ltd  TSH  R       20 494  0.30% 31 March 2012 
61 Pretoria Portland Cement Company Ltd  PPC  R       18 160  0.26% 30 September 2012 
62 Distell Group Ltd  DST  R       17 241  0.25% 30 June 2012 
63 Capital & Counties Properties PLC CCO  R       17 098  0.25% 31 December 2012 
64 AVI Ltd AVI  R       16 491  0.24% 30 June 2012 
65 Aveng Ltd  AEG  R       15 967  0.23% 30 June 2012 
66 Nampak Ltd  NPK  R       15 632  0.23% 30 September 2012 
67 Investec Ltd  INL  R       14 947  0.22% 31 March 2012 
68 Capital Property Fund Ltd  CPL  R       14 897  0.22% 31 December 2011 
69 Sappi Ltd  SAP  R       14 673  0.21% 30 September 2012 
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70 Reunert Ltd  RLO  R       14 375  0.21% 30 September 2012 
71 Hyprop Investments Ltd  HYP  R       13 979  0.20% 31 December 2011 
72 PSG Group Ltd  PSG  R       13 195  0.19% 28 February 2012 
73 Pioneer Food Group Ltd  PFG  R       13 157  0.19% 30 September 2012 
74 Clicks Group Ltd  CLS  R       12 917  0.19% 31 August 2012 
75 Northam Platinum Ltd  NHM  R       12 759  0.19% 30 June 2012 
76 Telkom SA Ltd  TKG  R       12 384  0.18% 31 March 2012 
77 Brait SE BAT  R       12 326  0.18% 31 March 2012 
78 Illovo Sugar Ltd  ILV  R       11 569  0.17% 31 March 2012 
79 AECI Ltd AFE  R       11 426  0.17% 31 December 2012 
80 Tongaat Hulett Ltd  TON  R       11 040  0.16% 31 March 2012 
81 Resilient Property Income Fund Ltd  RES  R       11 025  0.16% 31 December 2012 
82 Hosken Consolidated Investments Ltd  HCI  R       11 004  0.16% 31 March 2012 
83 JD Group Ltd  JDG  R       10 684  0.16% 31 August 2012 
84 Adcock Ingram Holdings Ltd  AIP  R       10 649  0.15% 30 September 2012 
85 Pick n Pay Holdings Ltd  PWK  R       10 308  0.15% 28 February 2012 
86 Grindrod Ltd  GND  R       10 019  0.15% 31 December 2012 
87 Royal Bafokeng Platinum Ltd  RBP  R         9 990  0.15% 31 December 2012 
88 Optimum Coal Holdings Ltd  OPT  R         9 568  0.14% Delisted 
89 Murray & Roberts Holdings Ltd  MUR  R         9 489  0.14% 30 June 2012 
90 Coronation Fund Managers Ltd  CML  R         9 193  0.13% 30 September 2012 
91 Sun International Ltd  SUI  R         9 132  0.13% 30 June 2012 
92 Wilson Bayly Holmes - Ovcon Ltd  WBO  R         8 973  0.13% 30 June 2012 
93 Fountainhead Property Trust FPT  R         8 662  0.13% 30 September 2012 
94 Allied Electronics Company Ltd  ATN  R         8 655  0.13% 28 February 2012 
95 Datatec Ltd  DTC  R         8 511  0.12% 28 February 2012 
96 Mondi Ltd MND  R         8 483  0.12% 31 December 2012 
97 KAP International Holdings Ltd KAP  R         8 414  0.12% 30 June 2012 
98 Trencor Ltd  TRE  R         7 968  0.12% 31 December 2011 
99 Aquarius Platinum Ltd  AQP  R         7 612  0.11% 30 June 2012 
100 Palabora Mining Company Ltd  PAM  R         7 492  0.11% 31 December 2012 
101 Lewis Group Ltd  LEW  R         7 404  0.11% 31 March 2012 
102 Acucap Properties Ltd  ACP  R         7 152  0.10% 31 March 2012 
103 JSE Ltd JSE  R         7 141  0.10% 31 December 2011 
104 SA Corporate Real Estate Fund SAC  R         6 953  0.10% 31 December 2012 
105 Caxton and CTP Publishers and Printers Ltd. CAT  R         6 840  0.10% 30 June 2012 
106 Omnia Holdings Ltd  OMN  R         6 590  0.10% 31 March 2012 
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107 African Oxygen Ltd  AFX  R         6 548  0.10% 31 December 2012 
108 Emira Property Fund EMI  R         6 329  0.09% 30 June 2012 
109 Sycom Property Fund SYC  R         6 116  0.09% 31 March 2012 
110 Gold One International Ltd  GDO  R         5 803  0.08% 31 December 2012 
111 Allied Technologies Ltd  ALT  R         5 803  0.08% 28 February 2012 
112 Italtile Ltd ITE  R         5 735  0.08% 30 June 2012 
113 Fortress Income Fund Ltd  FFA  R         5 539  0.08% 30 June 2012 
114 Vukile Property Fund Ltd  VKE  R         5 458  0.08% 31 March 2012 
115 Oceana Group Ltd  OCE  R         5 370  0.08% 30 September 2011 
116 Astral Foods Ltd  ARL  R         5 184  0.08% 30 September 2012 
117 Famous Brands Ltd  FBR  R         5 146  0.07% 28 February 2012 
118 Rainbow Chicken Ltd  RBW  R         5 139  0.07% 30 June 2012 
119 Invicta Holdings Ltd  IVT  R         4 985  0.07% 31 March 2012 
120 Super Group Ltd  SPG  R         4 648  0.07% 30 June 2012 
121 Blue Label Telecoms Ltd  BLU  R         4 587  0.07% 31 May 2012 
122 Coal of Africa Ltd  CZA  R         4 565  0.07% 30 June 2012 
123 Absa Bank Ltd  ABSP  R         4 500  0.07% 31 December 2012 
124 Capevin Investments Ltd  CVI  R         4 274  0.06% 30 June 2011 
125 Net 1 UEPS Technologies Inc  NT1  R         4 146  0.06% 30 June 2012 
126 Metair Investments Ltd  MTA  R         4 117  0.06% 31 December 2012 
127 Nedbank Ltd  NBKP  R         4 014  0.06% 31 December 2012 
128 New Europe Property Investments plc NEP  R         3 883  0.06% 31 December 2012 
129 Hudaco Industries Ltd  HDC  R         3 668  0.05% 30 November 2012 
130 City Lodge Hotels Ltd  CLH  R         3 651  0.05% 30 June 2012 
131 Clientèle Ltd  CLI  R         3 622  0.05% 30 June 2012 
132 Group Five Ltd  GRF  R         3 605  0.05% 30 June 2012 
133 Cashbuild Ltd. CSB  R         3 299  0.05% 30 June 2012 
134 Cipla Medpro South Africa Ltd CMP  R         3 268  0.05% 31 December 2011 
135 EOH Holdings Ltd  EOH  R         3 166  0.05% 31 July 2011 
136 Evraz Highveld Steel and Vanadium Ltd  EHS  R         3 097  0.04% 31 December 2012 
137 Eqstra Holdings Ltd  EQS  R         3 082  0.04% 30 June 2012 
138 Clover Industries Ltd  CLR  R         2 978  0.04% 30 June 2012 
139 Eastern Platinum Ltd  EPS  R         2 924  0.04% 31 December 2012 
140 Pan African Resources PLC PAN  R         2 854  0.04% 30 September 2012 
141 Mpact Ltd  MPT  R         2 792  0.04% 31 December 2012 
142 Brimstone Investment Company Ltd  BRT  R         2 752  0.04% 31 December 2012 
143 Zeder Investments Ltd  ZED  R         2 729  0.04% 28 February 2012 
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144 Pinnacle Technology Holdings Ltd  PNC  R         2 701  0.04% 30 June 2012 
145 ADvTECH Ltd  ADH  R         2 652  0.04% 31 December 2011 
146 Raubex Group Ltd  RBX  R         2 650  0.04% 28 February 2012 
147 Oando Plc OAO  R         2 615  0.04% 31 December 2011 
148 Blue Financial Services Ltd  BFS  R         2 606  0.04% 28 February 2012 
149 Kagiso Media Ltd  KGM  R         2 596  0.04% 30 June 2012 
150 Zurich Insurance Company S.A. Ltd  ZSA  R         2 594  0.04% 31 December 2011 
151 Hulamin Ltd HLM  R         2 587  0.04% 31 December 2012 
152 Peregrine Holdings Ltd  PGR  R         2 532  0.04% 31 March 2012 
153 Avusa Ltd  AVU  R         2 525  0.04% 31 March 2012 
154 Great Basin Gold Ltd  GBG  R         2 521  0.04% 31 December 2011 
155 Rebosis Property Fund Ltd  REB  R         2 373  0.03% 31 August 2011 
156 Premium Properties Ltd  PMM  R         2 352  0.03% 28 February 2012 
157 AFGRI Ltd  AFR  R         2 253  0.03% 30 June 2012 
158 Alexander Forbes Pref. Share Inv. Ltd  AFP  R         2 237  0.03% 31 March 2012 
159 Redefine Properties International Ltd  RIN  R         2 210  0.03% 31 August 2012 
160 Merafe Resources Ltd  MRF  R         2 194  0.03% 31 December 2012 
161 Ceramic Industries Ltd  CRM  R         2 173  0.03% 31 July 2012 
162 Bell Equipment Ltd  BEL  R         2 160  0.03% 31 December 2012 
163 Adcorp Holdings Ltd  ADR  R         2 089  0.03% 28 February 2012 
164 Stefanutti Stocks Holdings Ltd SSK  R         2 059  0.03% 28 February 2012 
165 Mercantile Bank Holdings Ltd  MTL  R         2 048  0.03% 31 December 2012 
166 DRDGOLD Ltd  DRD  R         2 043  0.03% 30 June 2012 
167 Investec Property Fund Ltd  IPF  R         1 989  0.03%  31 March 2012 
168 Business Connexion Group Ltd  BCX  R         1 968  0.03% 31 August 2011 
169 Mvelaphanda Group Ltd  MVG  R         1 951  0.03% 30 June 2012 
170 Holdsport Ltd  HSP  R         1 912  0.03%  29 February 2012 
171 Basil Read Holdings Ltd BSR  R         1 882  0.03% 31 December 2011 
172 Curro Holdings Ltd  COH  R         1 838  0.03%  31 December 2012 
173 Petmin Ltd  PET  R         1 811  0.03% 30 June 2012 
174 Wesizwe Platinum Ltd  WEZ  R         1 774  0.03% 31 December 2012 
175 Lonrho Plc LAF  R         1 712  0.02% 31 December 2012 
176 Mvelaserve Ltd. MVS  R         1 628  0.02% 30 June 2012 
177 Spur Company Ltd  SUR  R         1 611  0.02% 30 June 2012 
178 Dipula Income Fund Ltd  DIA  R         1 526  0.02% 31 August 2012 
179 Village Main Reef Ltd  VIL  R         1 524  0.02% 30 June 2012 
180 Investec Bank Ltd  INLP  R         1 514  0.02% 31 March 2012 
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181 Consolidated Infrastructure Group Ltd  CIL  R         1 509  0.02% 31 August 2012 
182 Hospitality Property Fund Ltd  HPA  R         1 500  0.02% 30 June 2012 
183 Distribution and Warehousing Network Ltd  DAW  R         1 475  0.02% 30 June 2012 
184 Octodec Investments Ltd  OCT  R         1 464  0.02% 31 August 2011 
185 Pallinghurst Resources Ltd  PGL  R         1 451  0.02% 31 December 2012 
186 Witwatersrand Consolidated Gold Resources  WGR  R         1 380  0.02% 31 December 2011 
187 York Timber Holdings Ltd  YRK  R         1 375  0.02% 30 June 2012 
188 Metrofile Holdings Ltd  MFL  R         1 365  0.02% 30 June 2012 
189 Sentula Mining Ltd  SNU  R         1 331  0.02% 31 March 2012 
190 Howden Africa Holdings Ltd  HWN  R         1 315  0.02% 31 December 2012 
191 Litha Healthcare Group Ltd  LHG  R         1 289  0.02% 31 December 2011 
192 MiX Telematics Ltd  MIX  R         1 209  0.02% 31 March 2012 
193 Combined Motor Holdings Ltd  CMH  R         1 206  0.02% 28 February 2012 
194 Grand Parade Investments Ltd  GPL  R         1 200  0.02% 30 June 2012 
195 Ellies Holdings Ltd  ELI  R         1 199  0.02% 30 April 2012 
196 Sasfin Holdings Ltd  SFN  R         1 197  0.02% 30 June 2012 
197 Value Group Ltd  VLE  R         1 043  0.02% 28 February 2012 
198 BK One Ltd  BK1P  R         1 015  0.01%  29 February 2012 
199 Datacentrix Holdings Ltd  DCT  R         1 010  0.01% 29 February 2012 
200 Astrapak Ltd  APK  R         1 010  0.01% 29 February 2012 
200 Top 200 Companies    R 6 838 647  99.27% 
   Total Market Capitalisation    R 6 888 834  100% 
 
 
Total population 200 
   
 
less – incurporated into holding company/group 7 
   
 
less – delisted  1 
   
 
Net population 192 
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Annexure 2: Covering letter to potential survey respondents at reporting companies 
Dear Sir/Madam 
As you may appreciate, the subject of corporate social responsibility is receiving high levels of 
interest by corporations around the world.  South Africa is no exception; in fact in certain respects 
South Africa is in the forefront of developments in this area, especially with the release of the King 
Code of Governance for South Africa in 2009 (King III).  In terms of principle 9.3 of King III, 
sustainability reporting and disclosures should be independently assured and section 8.63 (a) of the 
JSE listing requirements requires listed companies to disclose the extent of their compliance with 
King III and the reasons for non-compliance with any of the principles.  
Given the recent strong focus on “responsible corporate citizenship” and the desire by most 
organisations to comply with the King III principles, I see the results of this thesis project adding 
significantly to our understanding of how companies can improve their stakeholder accountability 
and of the role of the audit profession. 
In order to complete this important research, I have prepared an electronic research questionnaire, 
which is available on the following link 
http://surveys.mynetresearch.com/Survey.aspx?view=ViewUserPage&ID=273.  If at all possible, I 
would accordingly appreciate you forwarding this email (with the link to the survey) to the 
following officials within, or associated with your organisation. 
o The Company Secretary 
o Chairperson of the Board of Directors  
o All independent non-executive directors 
o Chairperson of the Audit Committee 
o All independent Audit Committee Members 
o All Members of the CSR/Sustainability Committee 
o Chief Executive Officer 
o Chief Financial Officer 
o Chief Risk Officer 
o Executive Manager responsible for CSR/Sustainability 
o Chief Audit Executive/Internal Audit Manager 
o External Audit Manager/Partner 
o Managing partner/member/manager of external CSR assurance provider 
Thanking you for your cooperation and kind assistance in distributing this survey on my behalf, the 
results of which will provide meaningful insights into this important area. 
Kind regards 
Barry Ackers 
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Research Survey on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Assurance within South African 
companies publicly listed on the JSE 
PURPOSE 
This thesis is being conducted by Barry Ackers, a Senior Lecturer, in the Department of Auditing, School of 
Accounting Sciences, at the University of South Africa, as part of his fulfilling the requirements of a Doctor of 
Commerce in Auditing.  As you may appreciate, the corporate accountability landscape is evolving at an 
unprecedented pace.  The principles incorporated within King III, goes beyond requiring all organisations to 
embrace the principal stakeholders in respect of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).  The purpose of this 
particular research project is to determine the need for CSR assurance and to assess Audit Profession’s 
involvement therein.   
INTRODUCTION 
There is increasing evidence that society is demanding that organisations should be sensitive to the 
environmental and social impact of their operations.  No longer is the business of business, simply about 
short term profit maximisation, but increasingly there are calls around what value it adds, (or destroys), in 
respect of its interaction with the environment; and society as a whole. 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
The research should assist in determining which organisational levels are responsible and accordingly 
accountable, for breaches of the principles of non-financial governance.  The primary objective of this thesis 
is to determine whether CSR assurance is desirable.  Where CSR assurance is considered to be desirable, to 
ascertain how this assurance is obtained and for which stakeholder group it is provided. 
GENERAL   
As you may appreciate, the auditing horizon has been evolving over the past 4 500 years and will continue to 
evolve in response to meeting stakeholder requirements.  Your invaluable input will therefore assist in 
defining the role of the Audit Profession in respect of evaluating, monitoring and reporting on accountability 
for corporate social responsibility into the future. 
I would appreciate you taking around 15 minutes of your precious time, to complete the online survey 
(available at http://surveys.mynetresearch.com/Survey.aspx?view=ViewUserPage&ID=273.  You are 
naturally more than welcome to provide additional information on a separate page.  Moreover, should you 
believe that there are other parties within (or associated with) your organisation, which could provide 
meaningful input into this important research, I would appreciate you forwarding this email to them as well. 
Could you please complete the online survey by 30th September 2011?  Please note that your responses 
will be regarded as being confidential and that the names of your organisations and of the 
respondents will not be disclosed.  The data analysis methodology will not in any way reflect the 
organisation or industry that you represent. 
While I would truly appreciate your invaluable input, participation is entirely voluntary with your disclosures 
being regarded as being confidential.  Appropriate precautions have accordingly been taken to safeguard 
your privacy and to protect anonymity.  There are no questions in this survey that are of a sensitive or 
personal nature. 
Should you have any questions, or require additional information, please do not hesitate to contact me 
directly. 
Once again I appreciate your time for participating in this important research project, and urge you to please 
answer all the questions completely and honestly.  
Finally, should you require a copy of the finalised Research Report, please contact me directly.  Once 
completed, a copy of the research report will accordingly be forwarded to you. 
Yours faithfully 
Barry Ackers    
Department of Auditing 
School of Accounting Sciences 
University of South Africa (UNISA) 
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Annexure 3: Copy of Survey on Corporate Social Responsibility Assurance 
Please TICK (√) the applicable block(s) 
 
A. DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
 
1 Which of the following do you represent?   
Please tick one block only.   
1.1 Certification body (optional – please specify which below)  
1.2 External audit firm (optional – please specify which below)  
1.3 Independent CSR assurance provider (optional – please specify which below)  
1.4 JSE-listed public company (optional – please specify which below)  
1.5 Other (please specify below)  
 
 
2 What best describes your position within the company?   
Please tick one block only.   
2.1 Chairperson of the Audit Committee  
2.2 Chairperson of the Board of Directors  
2.3 Chief Executive Officer/Managing Director  
2.4 Executive Manager responsible for CSR/Sustainability  
2.5 External Audit Manager/Partner  
2.6 Independent Board Member/Director  
2.7 Independent Audit Committee Member  
2.8 Internal Audit Manager/Chief Audit Executive  
2.9 Managing partner/member/manager of external CSR assurance provider  
2.10 Member of the CSR/Sustainability Committee   
2.11 Other (Please specify below)  
 
 
B. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY (CSR) 
 
3 Has your company developed and implemented a programme that considers its social, environmental 
and economic impacts?   
Please tick one block only.   
3.1 NOT APPLICABLE  
3.2 Yes  
3.3 No  
3.4 Other (please specify below)  
 
4 If yes (to 3 above), what is it called?   
Please tick one block only.  
4.1 NOT APPLICABLE  
4.2 Corporate Social Investment (CSI)  
4.3 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)  
4.4 Sustainable Development  
4.5 Corporate Citizenship  
4.6 Other (Please specify below)  
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5 In your opinion, which stakeholders place reliance on the information contained in your CSR 
disclosures?   
You may tick more than one block.    
 
6 Does your company disclose its impact on the economy, society and the environment?   
Please tick one block only. 
6.1 NOT APPLICABLE  
6.2 Yes  
6.3 No  
6.4 Uncertain  
 
7 If yes (to 6 above), where is this information available?   
You may tick more than one block.   
 
8 If yes (to 6 above), what is the report (section) called?   
Please tick one block only. 
8.1 NOT APPLICABLE  
8.2 Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Report  
8.3 Sustainability Report   
8.4 Corporate Social Investment (CSI) Report   
8.5 Other (please specify below)  
 
 
  
5.1 NOT APPLICABLE  
5.2 Activists   
5.3 Employees  
5.4 Existing customers   
5.5 Government  
5.6 Institutional investors  
5.7 Media   
5.8 NGOs  
5.9 Potential (new) customers  
5.10 Rating agencies  
5.11 Trade unions  
5.12 Shareholders   
5.13 Suppliers   
5.14 Other (please specify below)  
 
7.1 NOT APPLICABLE  
7.2 Annual Report  
7.3 Corporate website  
7.4 CSR/Sustainability Report (stand-alone)  
7.5 Other (please specify below)  
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9 Consider the following statement and provide your opinion thereon (not necessarily from your 
company’s perspective).   
 
The reasons that companies disclose their CSR-related initiatives are because...   
There are no right or wrong answers.  Please indicate your response to each dimension, by ticking the 
appropriate boxes below. 
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9.1 it is required by King III         
9.2 it demonstrates the company’s 
commitment to being a “good corporate 
citizen”  
       
9.3 it demonstrates improved transparency         
9.4 it demonstrates improved stakeholder 
responsibility  
       
9.5 it demonstrates improved stakeholder 
accountability 
       
9.6 it assists the company to project a positive 
corporate image (reputation 
management) 
       
9.7 it provides information on how the 
company is mitigating its CSR-related 
risks 
       
9.8 investors want to know the company’s 
CSR track record and risks 
       
9.8 customers want to know the company’s 
CSR track record 
       
9.9 suppliers want to know the company’s 
CSR track record 
       
9.10 it is a useful marketing and public 
relations tool 
       
9.11 it positions the company favourably to 
compete in global markets 
       
9.12 Other (please specify)        
 
 
C. GOVERNANCE AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
 
10 Does your Audit Committee approve your company’s CSR disclosures prior to publication?   
Please tick one block only. 
10.1 NOT APPLICABLE  
10.2 Yes  
10.3 No  
10.4 Uncertain  
10.5 Other (please specify below)  
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11 What is your opinion of the following statement? 
“Government should enact legislation (or amend the Companies Act) to require all 
companies to provide CSR disclosures.” 
 There are no right or wrong answers. 
11.1 Very strongly agree  
11.2 Strongly agree  
11.3 Agree  
11.4 Neither agree nor disagree  
11.5 Disagree  
11.6 Strongly disagree  
11.7 Very strongly disagree  
 
12 Which organisations currently provide assurance or inspection services at of your company?   
You may tick more than one block. 
12.1 NOT APPLICABLE  
12.2 Auditor General  
12.3 Certification Bodies (please specify which e.g. SABS, SGS, Dekra, TÜV, LRQA, 
UL, etc.) 
 
12.4 Environmental Inspectors  
12.5 External Auditors (please specify which below)  
12.6 Internal Audit  
12.7 Labour Inspectors  
12.8 Occupational Health & Safety Inspectors  
12.9 Specialist CSR Assuror (please specify which, e.g. Trialogue, Corporate 
Citizenship, Sustainability, etc.) 
 
12.10 Other (please specify below)  
 
 
13 In your opinion, is there a duplication (or overlap) of the audit or assurance roles referred to in 12 
above?   
Please tick one block only. 
13.1 NOT APPLICABLE  
13.2 Yes  
13.3 No  
13.4 Other (please specify)  
 
D. CSR ASSURANCE  
 
14 Are your company’s CSR disclosures externally assured?   
Please tick one block only. 
14.1 Yes  
14.2 No  
14.3 NOT APPLICABLE  
14.4 Other (please specify)  
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15 If you answered yes to question 14 above, since when has external CSR assurance been provided?   
Please tick one block only. 
15.1 NOT APPLICABLE  
15.2 Since 2010  
15.3 Since 2009   
15.4 Since 2008   
15.5 Since 2007   
15.6 Since 2006  
15.7 Since before 2006 (please state in which year CSR assurance was first provided 
below) 
 
 
 
16 If you answered yes to question 14 above, which organisation(s) provides assurance on the CSR 
disclosures?   
You may tick more than one block. 
16.1 NOT APPLICABLE  
16.2 Internal Audit  
16.3 External Audit (please specify which firm in the space provided below)  
16.4 Certification Bodies (please specify which firm in the space provided below)   
16.5 Specialist Sustainability Assuror (please specify which firm in the space provided 
below) 
 
16.6 Other (please specify by whom in the space provided below)  
 
 
17 If you answered yes to question 14 above, is your CSR assurance report published?   
Please tick one block only. 
17.1 NOT APPLICABLE  
17.2 Yes  
17.3 No  
 
18 If your company does not presently provide CSR assurance (refer question 14 above), what are the 
main reasons for not doing so?   
You may tick more than one block. 
18.1 NOT APPLICABLE  
18.2 Building capacity to do so in future  
18.3 CSR assurance is a passing “FAD”  
18.4 CSR disclosures are provided for information purposes only  
18.5 Internal audit reviews CSR   
18.6 Little value will be added    
18.7 No legal/regulatory requirement to do so   
18.8 Not considered important at this stage  
18.9 Stakeholders do not place reliance on CSR disclosures when making decisions   
18.10 Stakeholders trust our disclosures   
18.11 Too expensive  
18.12 Too time consuming  
18.13 Other (please specify below)  
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19 If your company does not provide CSR assurance at present, but intends doing so in the future (refer 
question 14 above), by when will this be done?   
Please tick one block only. 
19.1 2010 year end  
19.2 2011 year end  
19.3 2012 year end  
19.4 2013 year end  
19.5  2014 year end  
19.6 2015 year end  
19.7 After 2015  
 
20 Assuming that external assurance of CSR disclosures is important, what is your opinion on the 
following statement?   
The primary reasons that companies provide assurance on its CSR disclosures are as 
reflected below.   
There are no right or wrong answers.  Please indicate your response to each dimension, by ticking the 
appropriate boxes below. 
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20.1 King III requires it        
20.2 Demonstrates the company’s 
commitment to being a “good 
corporate citizen”  
       
20.3 Demonstrates improved transparency         
20.4 Demonstrates improved stakeholder 
responsibility  
       
20.5 Demonstrates improved stakeholder 
accountability 
       
20.6 Provides verified CSR disclosures 
which may be relied upon by 
stakeholders 
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21 What is your opinion on the following statement?   
There are no right or wrong answers.  Please indicate by ticking one box below. 
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21.1 Assurance on CSR disclosures 
adds little value to stakeholders.   
       
21.2 CSR assurance is too expensive to 
provide stakeholders with any 
meaningful benefit.   
       
21.3 CSR assurance is too expensive to 
provide a meaningful benefit to 
the company.   
       
21.4 CSR assurance reports provide 
stakeholders with confidence that 
the company’s CSR disclosures 
are complete, accurate, reliable 
and valid (in other words, 
provides a fair reflection of the 
CSR “state of affairs” within the 
company).   
       
21.5 CSR assurance reports are 
unnecessary, since our company 
has an impeccable reputation as 
a responsible corporate citizen. 
       
 
22 What is your opinion on the following statement?   
The most suitable organisation(s) to provide CSR assurance is (are) … 
There are no right or wrong answers.  Please indicate by ticking one box below. 
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22.1 Big 4 audit firms (i.e. KPMG, Ernst & 
Young, Deloitte and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers) 
       
22.2 Other audit firms (not listed above)        
22.3 Specialist assurance consultancies        
22.4 Certification bodies (e.g. SABS, SGS, 
UL, TÜV, Dekra, etc.) 
       
22.5 Internal audit        
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23 What is your opinion on the following statement?   
The most important reason(s) for selecting an assuror to provide CSR assurance is (are)... 
There are no right or wrong answers.  Please indicate by ticking the appropriate boxes below. 
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23.1 Ability of the assuror to complete the 
engagement within the required 
timeframe  
       
23.2 Aligned to the provision of certification 
services 
       
23.3 Can provide the necessary capacity 
building within our company 
       
23.4 Cost of the assurance engagement         
23.5 Provides value added CSR-related advice 
during the assurance engagement  
       
23.6 The assurance standard referenced by 
the assuror 
       
23.7 The assuror has access to the necessary 
skills 
       
23.8 The assuror specialises in CSR        
23.9 The external audit profession are experts 
at all types of audits 
       
23.10 The global reach of the assuror        
23.11 The reputation of the assuror        
23.12 We prefer to use the same auditors as for 
our annual financial statements 
       
23.13 Whether the assuror provides a "limited" 
or "reasonable" level of assurance 
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24 What is your opinion on the following statement?   
The most important elements of CSR assurance reports include... 
There are no right or wrong answers.  Please indicate by ticking the appropriate boxes below. 
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24.1 Depth of work undertaken        
24.2 Limitations on scope of assurance 
engagement 
       
24.3 Transparency of activities undertaken        
24.4 Clarity of the assurance report        
24.5 Reliability (reputation) of the assurance 
provider 
       
24.6 Assurance standard (framework) utilised        
24.7 Audit opinion provided (i.e. qualified, 
unqualified or disclaimer) 
       
 
D. INTERNAL AUDIT (this section is intended to be answered by the Chief Audit 
Executive/Head of Internal Audit and does not need to be answered by any other 
respondent) 
 
25 Does the Internal Audit Activity play a role within the CSR governance structure of your company? 
25.1 Yes  
25.2 No  
 
If yes to 25 above, please describe the internal audit role? 
 ___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
26 Has internal audit recently completed an audit on CSR within your company? 
27.1 Yes  
27.2 No  
27.3 NOT APPLICABLE  
27.4 Other (please specify)  
 
 
If yes to 26 above, when was this done and what was the primary audit objective? 
 ___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
27 Has internal audit provided consulting services in respect of CSR governance within your company? 
29.1 Yes  
29.2 No  
 
If yes to 27 above, when was this provided and to what extent? 
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 ___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
28 If your company conforms to a certification standard (e.g. ISO 9000, ISO 18000, OHSAS 18000, etc.), 
does your Internal Audit Activity assist in the attestation thereof? 
31.1 Yes (please provide details of which certification standards below)  
31.2 No  
 
 
29 If your company provides external assurance on its CSR disclosures, does your Internal Audit Activity 
assist in the attestation thereof? 
32.1 Yes   
32.2 No  
 
30 Does your Internal Audit Activity comply with the IIA Standard 2130 on Governance? 
33.1 Yes  
33.2 No  
 
31 Do you believe that Internal Audit could play a more active role in CSR and Governance within your 
company? 
34.1 Yes  
34.2 Uncertain  
34.3 No  
 
If yes to 31 above, how could Internal Audit be more actively involved in CSR and Governance? 
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
32 Do you believe that Internal Audit has the existing capacity to play a more active role in CSR 
Governance within your company? 
36.1 Yes  
36.2 No  
36.3 Uncertain  
 
Any other comments on other issues not adequately covered in the preceding questionnaire that you 
would like to make? 
 ___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________
___________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Name of Organisation (OPTIONAL) 
 
_________________________________________________________ 
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Annexure 4: Summary of Survey Responses 
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Annexure 5: CSR assurance analysis of top 200 JSE-listed Companies @ 30 April 2012 
Company 
Market 
Capitalisation 
R millions 2012 2011 
 
 
2008 
 
1. British American Tobacco plc  R     805 816  EY EY EY  
2. SABMiller plc  R     540 984  
Corporate 
Citizenship 
Corporate 
Citizenship 
Corporate 
Citizenship 
 
3. BHP Billiton Plc  R     529 774  KPMG KPMG EY  
4. Anglo American plc  R     402 881  PwC PwC PwC  
5. MTN Group Ltd.  R     256 127  PwC No No  
6. Sasol Ltd.  R     237 928  ERM PwC KPMG  
7. Standard Bank Group Ltd.  R     188 061  KPMG KPMG EY  
8. Kumba Iron Ore Ltd.  R     176 971  PwC PwC PwC  
9. Vodacom Group Ltd.  R     160 848  EY No N/A  
10. FirstRand Ltd.  R     147 032  
Internal 
Audit 
Internal 
Audit 
 
No 
 
11. Anglo American Platinum Ltd.  R     135 920  PwC PwC PwC  
12. Absa Group Ltd.  R     114 914  PwC & EY PwC & EY No  
13. AngloGold Ashanti Ltd.  R     101 176  EY EY PwC  
14. Impala Platinum Holdings Ltd.  R       95 578  KPMG KPMG Trialogue  
15. Nedbank Group Ltd.  R       85 999  
KPMG & 
Deloitte 
KPMG & 
Deloitte 
 
EY 
 
16. Exxaro Resources Ltd.  R       73 361  PwC PwC KPMG  
17. Gold Fields Ltd.  R       71 658  
Maplecroft 
& KPMG 
Maplecroft & 
KPMG 
 
No 
 
18. Sanlam Ltd.  R       70 224  EY EY No  
19. The Bidvest Group Ltd.  R       60 254  Deloitte No Deloitte  
20. Woolworths Holdings Ltd.  R       40 608  EY EY No  
21. African Rainbow Minerals Ltd.  R       38 792  IRAS 
Sustainability 
services 
 
No 
 
22. Massmart Holdings Ltd.  R       36 095  No No 
Internal 
Audit 
 
23. Capital Shopping Centres Group PLC  R       34 894  
Bureau 
Veritas No 
 
No 
 
24. Harmony Gold Mining Company Ltd.  R       32 637  PwC PwC PwC  
25. African Bank Investments Ltd.  R       32 351  IRAS 
Sustainability 
services 
 
No 
 
26. Discovery Holdings Ltd.  R       31 345  Indyebo No No  
27. Lonmin plc  R       26 710  KPMG KPMG KPMG  
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28. Mondi plc  R       26 401  ERM ERM N/A  
29. ArcelorMittal South Africa Ltd.  R       26 299  Deloitte 
Bureau 
Veritas 
 
No 
 
30. Liberty Holdings Ltd.  R       25 260  PwC No EY  
31. Barloworld Ltd.  R       22 632  Deloitte Deloitte Deloitte  
32. Pretoria Portland Cement Company Ltd.  R       18 160  Deloitte Deloitte No  
33. Aveng Ltd.  R       15 967  EY EY No  
34. Northam Platinum Ltd.  R       12 759  ERM ERM No  
35. Telkom SA Ltd.  R       12 384  
CA 
Governance No 
 
No 
 
36. Illovo Sugar Ltd.  R       11 569  IRAS No No  
37. AECI Ltd.  R       11 426  KPMG KPMG No  
38. Tongaat Hulett Ltd.  R       11 040  IRAS 
Sustainability 
services 
 
No 
 
39. Grindrod Ltd.  R       10 019  Deloitte Deloitte No  
40. Royal Bafokeng Platinum Ltd.  R         9 990  IRAS PwC N/A  
41. Optimum Coal Holdings Ltd.  R         9 568  Delisted KPMG N/A  
42. Murray & Roberts Holdings Ltd.  R         9 489  Deloitte Deloitte No  
43. Sun International Ltd.  R         9 132  IRAS 
Sustainability 
services 
 
No 
 
44. Allied Electronics Company Ltd.  R         8 655  IRAS 
Sustainability 
services 
 
No 
 
45. Allied Technologies Ltd.  R         5 803  PKF PKF No  
46. Blue Label Telecoms Ltd.  R         4 587  PwC PwC N/A  
47. Met air Investments Ltd.  R         4 117  IRAS 
Sustainability 
services 
 
No 
 
48. Group Five Ltd.  R         3 605  PwC PwC No  
49. Hulamin Ltd.  R         2 587  KPMG KPMG N/A  
50. Merafe Resources Ltd.  R         2 194  KPMG 
Sustainability 
services 
Sustainability 
services 
 
51. Wesizwe Platinum Ltd.  R         1 774  KPMG No N/A  
52. Consolidated Infrastructure Group Ltd.  R         1 509  IRAS  PKF N/A  
Top 200 Companies  R 6 838 647  99.27% 
 
  
Total Market Capitalisation  R 6 888 834  100% 
 
  
CSR as % of market capitalisation 69.2% 61.5% 42.6% 
CSR as % of top 200 69.7% 61.9% 42.9% 
 
